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Sixth Article. Whether God Is The Exemplar Cause Of The World.
69. Deus, uti patet ex superius disputatis, ita est causa mundi efficiens per creationem, ut non modo
68 De Deo Creatore. ipse omnia creaverit, sed nullum præter ipsum sit ens, cui virtus creandi competere possit. Agendum modo est de aliis causalitatis speciebus : cumque causalitas formalis et materialis Dei simplicitati et perfectioni repugnet, superest ut agamus de causalitate exemplari et finali. A prima incipimus. § I. Germana divinarum idearum notio.
68 De Deo Creatore. ipse omnia creaverit, sed nullum præter ipsum sit ens, cui virtus creandi competere possit. Agendum modo est de aliis causalitatis speciebus : cumque causalitas formalis et materialis Dei simplicitati et perfectioni repugnet, superest ut agamus de causalitate exemplari et finali. A prima incipimus. § I. Germana divinarum idearum notio.
69. God, as is clear from the things disputed above, is the efficient cause of the world through creation in such a way that not only did he himself create all things, but no being besides him exists to which the virtue of creating can belong. We must now treat the other species of causality; and since formal and material causality are repugnant to God's simplicity and perfection, it remains that we treat exemplar and final causality. We begin from the first.
Section I. The Genuine Notion Of The Divine Ideas.
70. Duo hic breviter exponenda suscipimus : 1 . quid sit idea generatim.-2. quid sit idea in Deo : ita quidem Dei causalitas exemplaris respectu mundi perspicua fiet.
70. We undertake here briefly to explain two things: 1. what an idea is generally; 2. what an idea is in God. Thus indeed God's exemplar causality with respect to the world will become clear.
71. Et quoad 1um, uti notavit D. Th. 1. p. q. 15. a. 1. , quod græce idea, latine dicitur forma. "Forma autem alicujus rei præter ipsam existens ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar ejus cujus dicitur forma, vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formæ cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente ."
71. And as to the first, as St. Thomas noted in Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 1, what in Greek is called idea is in Latin called form. "But the form of some thing existing apart from the thing itself can be for two things: either so that it is the exemplar of that of which it is called the form, or so that it is the principle of cognition of that thing, according as the forms of knowable things are said to be in the knower."
72. Quæ duplex ideæ acceptio facilius intelligetur, si animadvertamus discrimen inter scientiam speculativam et practicam ; ad utramque enim idea refertur. Discrimen illud ita exponitur a D. Th. 1. p. q. 14. a. 16.: "Scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter : primo , ex parte rerum scitarum, quæ non sunt operabiles a sciente , sicut est scientia hominis de rebus naturalibus, vel divinis ; secundo, quantum ad modum sciendi, ut puta, si ædificator consideret domum, definiendo et dividendo, et considerando
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 69 universalia prædicata ipsius ; hoc siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare , et non secundum quod operabilia sunt ; operabile enim est aliquid per applicationem formæ ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in principia universalia formalia ; tertio, quantum ad finem : nam intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo . sicut dicitur in 3 de Anima, text. 49. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem operationis ; finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio veritatis. Unde si quis ædificator consideret qualiter posset fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis , sed ad cognoscendum tantum, erit quantum ad finem speculativa consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quæ est speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitæ, est speculativa tantum. Quæ vero speculativa est, vel secundum modum, vel secundum finem, est secundum quid speculativa, et secundum quid practica. Cum vero ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 69 universalia prædicata ipsius ; hoc siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare , et non secundum quod operabilia sunt ; operabile enim est aliquid per applicationem formæ ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in principia universalia formalia ; tertio, quantum ad finem : nam intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo . sicut dicitur in 3 de Anima, text. 49. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem operationis ; finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio veritatis. Unde si quis ædificator consideret qualiter posset fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis , sed ad cognoscendum tantum, erit quantum ad finem speculativa consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quæ est speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitæ, est speculativa tantum. Quæ vero speculativa est, vel secundum modum, vel secundum finem, est secundum quid speculativa, et secundum quid practica. Cum vero ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica."
72. This twofold acceptation of idea will be more easily understood if we observe the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge; for idea is referred to each. This distinction is explained thus by St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 16: "Knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower, as is man's knowledge of natural or divine things; second, as to the mode of knowing, as, for example, if a builder considers a house by defining and dividing and considering its universal predicates. For this is to consider operable things in a speculative mode, and not according as they are operable; for something is operable by application of form to matter, not by resolution of the composite into universal formal principles. Third, as to the end; for the practical intellect differs in end from the speculative, as is said in book 3 of On the Soul, text 49. For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of operation; but the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence, if some builder considers how some house could be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to knowing, the consideration will be speculative as to the end, though concerning an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing known itself is speculative simply. But knowledge which is speculative either according to mode or according to end is speculative in a certain respect and practical in a certain respect. But when it is ordered to the end of operation, it is practical simply."
73. Quamvis idea ad scientiam tum speculativam tum practicam referatur, non tamen ad utramque refertur eadem proprietate, eodemque sensu. Etenim, ut docet idem S. Doctor Qq. de Ideis, 3. "Forma semper notat habitudinem causæ . Est enim forma quodammodo causa ejus, quod secundum ipsam formatur : sive formatio fiat per modum inhærentiæ , sicut in formis intrinsecis, sive per modum imitationis, ut in formis exemplaribus ... Si ergo loquamur de idea secundum propriam nominis rationem, sic non extendit se nisi ad illam scientiam, secundum quam aliquid formari potest : et hæc est cognitio actu practica vel virtute tantum Sed tamen si ideam com- ...
70 De Deo Creatore muniter appellemus similitudinem vel rationem, sic idea etiam ad speculativam cognitionem pure pertinere potest. Vel magis proprie dicamus quod idea respicit cognitionem practicam actu vel virtute, similitudo autem et ratio tam speculativam quam practicam."
70 De Deo Creatore muniter appellemus similitudinem vel rationem, sic idea etiam ad speculativam cognitionem pure pertinere potest. Vel magis proprie dicamus quod idea respicit cognitionem practicam actu vel virtute, similitudo autem et ratio tam speculativam quam practicam."
73. Although idea is referred both to speculative and to practical knowledge, nevertheless it is not referred to each with the same property and in the same sense. For, as the same holy Doctor teaches in the Questions on Ideas, 3: "Form always marks a relation of cause. For form is in a certain way the cause of that which is formed according to it: whether formation occurs by way of inherence, as in intrinsic forms, or by way of imitation, as in exemplar forms ... Therefore if we speak of idea according to the proper notion of the name, then it extends only to that knowledge according to which something can be formed; and this is knowledge actually practical, or only virtually practical. But nevertheless, if we commonly call a likeness or notion an idea, then idea can also pertain to purely speculative cognition. Or let us say more properly that idea regards cognition practical actually or virtually, but likeness and notion regard both speculative and practical cognition."
74. In præsenti quæstione consideramus ideam solum prout pertinet ad scientiam practicam, ac proinde possumus illam definire cum D. Th. 1. mox cit. a. 1. "Hæc videtur esse ratio ideæ, quod idea sit forma quam aliquid imitatur ex intentione agentis, qui determinat sibi finem."
74. In the present question we consider idea only insofar as it belongs to practical knowledge, and consequently we can define it with St. Thomas, in the place just cited, article 1: "This seems to be the notion of idea: that an idea is a form which something imitates from the intention of an agent who determines an end for himself."
75. Ex hac ideæ descriptione deducitur quatuor conditiones requiri ad ideam constituendam. Prima est ut sit forma existens extra rem, cujus est forma, et a qua necessario distinguitur. Etenim, uti observat D. Th. c. g. de Ideis a. 1. "Forma alicujus rei potest dici tripliciter. Uno modo a qua formatur res, sicut a forma agentis procedit effectus formatio . Sed quia non est de necessitate actionis ut effectus pertingant ad completam rationem formæ agentis , cum frequenter deficiant, maxime in causis æquivocis ; ideo forma a qua formatur aliquid, non dicitur esse idea vel forma. Alio modo dicitur forma alicujus secundum quam aliquid formatur ; sicut anima est forma hominis, et figura statuæ est forma cupri ; et quamvis forma, quæ est pars compositi, vere dicatur esse illius forma, non tamen consuevit dici ejus idea ; quia videtur hoc nomen idea significare formam separatam ab eo cujus est forma. Tertio modo dicitur forma alicujus illud ad quod aliquid formatur ; et hæc est forma exemplaris, ad cujus similitudinem aliquid
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 71 constituitur ; et in hac significatione consuetum est nomen ideæ accipi, ut idem sit idea quod forma quam aliquid imitatur. " Secunda est ut aliquid fiat ad similitudinem et imitationem ideæ ; hic enim est modus proprius causandi ideæ, quod sit regula, ad cujus imitationem fit effectus : unde non quævis forma extra rem existens dicitur idea aut exemplar. Tertia, ut quod fit ad similitudinem ideæ per se ita fiat. "Aliquid," inquit D. Th. 1. mox c. , "potest imitari formam aliquam dupliciter. Uno modo ex intentione agentis ; sicut pictura ad hoc fit a pictore ut imitetur aliquem cujus figura depingitur : aliquando autem est prædicta imitatio per accidens, præter intentionem, et a casu : sicut frequenter pictores faciunt imaginem alicujus, de quo non intendunt. Quod autem imitatur aliquam formam a casu, non dicitur ad illam formari, quia ly ad videtur importare ordinem ad finem ; unde, cum forma exemplaris, vel idea, sit ad quam formatur aliquid ; oportet quod formam exemplarem vel ideam aliquid imitetur per se , non per accidens." Quarta, ut agens tale sit per intellectum, ac proinde determinet sibi finem. "Si ergo," prosequitur idem S. Doctor, "aliquid fiat ad imitationem alterius per agens quod non determinat sibi finem, non ex hoc forma imitata habebit rationem exemplaris vel ideæ ; non enim dicimus quod forma hominis generantis sit idea vel exemplar hominis generati ; sed solum hoc dicimus quando agens propter finem determinat sibi finem ; sive illa forma sit in agente, sive extra agentem ; dicimus enim formam artis in
72 De Deo Creatore. artifice esse exemplar artificiati ; et simpliciter etiam formam quæ est extra artificem, ad cujus imitationem artifex aliquid facit."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 71 constituitur ; et in hac significatione consuetum est nomen ideæ accipi, ut idem sit idea quod forma quam aliquid imitatur. " Secunda est ut aliquid fiat ad similitudinem et imitationem ideæ ; hic enim est modus proprius causandi ideæ, quod sit regula, ad cujus imitationem fit effectus : unde non quævis forma extra rem existens dicitur idea aut exemplar. Tertia, ut quod fit ad similitudinem ideæ per se ita fiat. "Aliquid," inquit D. Th. 1. mox c. , "potest imitari formam aliquam dupliciter. Uno modo ex intentione agentis ; sicut pictura ad hoc fit a pictore ut imitetur aliquem cujus figura depingitur : aliquando autem est prædicta imitatio per accidens, præter intentionem, et a casu : sicut frequenter pictores faciunt imaginem alicujus, de quo non intendunt. Quod autem imitatur aliquam formam a casu, non dicitur ad illam formari, quia ly ad videtur importare ordinem ad finem ; unde, cum forma exemplaris, vel idea, sit ad quam formatur aliquid ; oportet quod formam exemplarem vel ideam aliquid imitetur per se , non per accidens." Quarta, ut agens tale sit per intellectum, ac proinde determinet sibi finem. "Si ergo," prosequitur idem S. Doctor, "aliquid fiat ad imitationem alterius per agens quod non determinat sibi finem, non ex hoc forma imitata habebit rationem exemplaris vel ideæ ; non enim dicimus quod forma hominis generantis sit idea vel exemplar hominis generati ; sed solum hoc dicimus quando agens propter finem determinat sibi finem ; sive illa forma sit in agente, sive extra agentem ; dicimus enim formam artis in
72 De Deo Creatore. artifice esse exemplar artificiati ; et simpliciter etiam formam quæ est extra artificem, ad cujus imitationem artifex aliquid facit."
75. From this description of idea four conditions are deduced as required for constituting an idea.
The first is that it be a form existing outside the thing of which it is the form, and from which it is necessarily distinguished. For, as St. Thomas observes in Contra Gentiles, On Ideas, article 1: "The form of some thing can be said in three ways. In one way, that from which the thing is formed, as from the form of the agent the formation of the effect proceeds. But because it is not of the necessity of action that effects attain to the complete notion of the form of the agent, since they often fall short, especially in equivocal causes, therefore the form from which something is formed is not said to be an idea or form. In another way, the form of something is said to be that according to which something is formed; as the soul is the form of man, and the figure of the statue is the form of bronze. And although the form which is part of the composite is truly said to be its form, nevertheless it is not customarily called its idea; because this name idea seems to signify a form separated from that of which it is the form. In a third way, the form of something is said to be that to which something is formed; and this is the exemplar form, to whose likeness something is constituted; and in this signification the name idea is customarily taken, so that idea is the same as the form which something imitates."
The second is that something be made according to the likeness and imitation of the idea; for this is the proper mode of causing of an idea, that it be the rule to whose imitation the effect is made. Hence not any form whatever existing outside the thing is called an idea or exemplar.
The third is that what is made according to the likeness of the idea be made according to it per se. "Something," says St. Thomas in the place just cited, "can imitate some form in two ways. In one way, from the intention of the agent; as a painting is made by a painter for this, that it imitate someone whose figure is depicted. But sometimes the aforesaid imitation is per accidens, beyond intention, and by chance; as painters frequently make an image of someone whom they do not intend. But what imitates some form by chance is not said to be formed to that form, because the expression to seems to import an order to an end. Hence, since an exemplar form, or idea, is that to which something is formed, it is necessary that something imitate an exemplar form or idea per se, not per accidens."
The fourth is that such an agent act through intellect, and consequently determine an end for himself. "Therefore," the same holy Doctor continues, "if something is made in imitation of another through an agent which does not determine an end for itself, the imitated form will not from this have the notion of exemplar or idea. For we do not say that the form of the man generating is the idea or exemplar of the man generated; but we say this only when the agent, for the sake of an end, determines an end for itself, whether that form is in the agent or outside the agent. For we say that the form of art in the artisan is the exemplar of the thing made by art; and simply also the form which is outside the artisan, to whose imitation the artisan makes something."
The first is that it be a form existing outside the thing of which it is the form, and from which it is necessarily distinguished. For, as St. Thomas observes in Contra Gentiles, On Ideas, article 1: "The form of some thing can be said in three ways. In one way, that from which the thing is formed, as from the form of the agent the formation of the effect proceeds. But because it is not of the necessity of action that effects attain to the complete notion of the form of the agent, since they often fall short, especially in equivocal causes, therefore the form from which something is formed is not said to be an idea or form. In another way, the form of something is said to be that according to which something is formed; as the soul is the form of man, and the figure of the statue is the form of bronze. And although the form which is part of the composite is truly said to be its form, nevertheless it is not customarily called its idea; because this name idea seems to signify a form separated from that of which it is the form. In a third way, the form of something is said to be that to which something is formed; and this is the exemplar form, to whose likeness something is constituted; and in this signification the name idea is customarily taken, so that idea is the same as the form which something imitates."
The second is that something be made according to the likeness and imitation of the idea; for this is the proper mode of causing of an idea, that it be the rule to whose imitation the effect is made. Hence not any form whatever existing outside the thing is called an idea or exemplar.
The third is that what is made according to the likeness of the idea be made according to it per se. "Something," says St. Thomas in the place just cited, "can imitate some form in two ways. In one way, from the intention of the agent; as a painting is made by a painter for this, that it imitate someone whose figure is depicted. But sometimes the aforesaid imitation is per accidens, beyond intention, and by chance; as painters frequently make an image of someone whom they do not intend. But what imitates some form by chance is not said to be formed to that form, because the expression to seems to import an order to an end. Hence, since an exemplar form, or idea, is that to which something is formed, it is necessary that something imitate an exemplar form or idea per se, not per accidens."
The fourth is that such an agent act through intellect, and consequently determine an end for himself. "Therefore," the same holy Doctor continues, "if something is made in imitation of another through an agent which does not determine an end for itself, the imitated form will not from this have the notion of exemplar or idea. For we do not say that the form of the man generating is the idea or exemplar of the man generated; but we say this only when the agent, for the sake of an end, determines an end for itself, whether that form is in the agent or outside the agent. For we say that the form of art in the artisan is the exemplar of the thing made by art; and simply also the form which is outside the artisan, to whose imitation the artisan makes something."
Section I Continued. What An Idea Is In God.
76. Quoad 2um vero, si ex generali theoria de ideis deveniamus ad investigandum quid sit in concreto idea in Deo, dicendum videtur quod divina essentia, ut cognita ab intellectu divino communicabilis extra se, habet rationem ideæ. " Quod, " inquit D. Th. 1. p. 15. a. 2. c., "hoc modo potest videri : ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit ; unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquæque autem creatura habet propriam speciem secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinæ essentiæ similitudinem. Sic igitur in quantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam hujus creaturæ ; et similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum , quæ sunt plures ideæ . "
76. As to the second, however, if from the general theory of ideas we come to investigating what an idea is concretely in God, it seems that it must be said that the divine essence, as known by the divine intellect as communicable outside itself, has the notion of an idea. "This," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 15, a. 2, corpus, "can be seen in this way: for he perfectly knows his own essence; hence he knows it according to every mode in which it is knowable. But it can be known not only according as it is in itself, but according as it is participable according to some mode of likeness by creatures. Now each creature has its proper species according as in some way it participates in the likeness of the divine essence. Thus, therefore, insofar as God knows his own essence as thus imitable by such a creature, he knows it as the proper notion and idea of this creature; and similarly concerning others. And thus it is clear that God understands several proper notions of several things, which are several ideas."
77. Ut magis determinemus ideas divinas in concreto, possumus tria distinguere. 1. ipsam divinam essentiam, quæ est realiter una, sed virtualiter multiplex, quatenus cum sit ipsa essendi plenitudo continet in se quemcumque essendi gradum.-2. Essentiam divinam prout actu cognoscitur a divino intellectu, ut imitabilis ad extra : seu varios gradus essendi, secundum quos divina essentia est imitabilis, actu terminantes cognitionem divinam.-3 . Cognitionem quamdam reflexam (nostro concipiendi modo), qua
Disp. I.-De Mundi Origine. 73 Deus cognoscit cognitionem habitam imitabilitatis suæ essentiæ. Jamvero ipsa essentia divina in se considerata antecedenter ad actum intellectus, quo illam contemplatur ut imitabilem, potest dici fundamentaliter idea sed non formaliter ; nondum enim dicit relationem ad id, cujus est exemplar, nec ad intellectum seu ad agens intellectuale, quod per ideam operatur : quæ tamen necessaria sunt, ut vidimus, ad rationem ideæ constituendam.-Varii gradus essendi, secundum quos essentia divina est imitabilis, prout actu terminant cognitionem divinam, formaliter constituunt ideas divinas ; ut enim patet, in iis verificantur omnia, quæ requiri diximus ad rationem ideæ.-Cognitio autem illa reflexa non dicitur constituere formaliter ideas divinas, siquidem illas supponit. Unde scite animadvertit Toledo in h. 1.: "Aliud est ideam fieri, aliud cognosci in se. Fit idea, quum essentia in ordine ad aliud intelligitur : cognoscitur autem, quum actu reflexo essentia habens ordinem cognoscitur. Ista distinguimus secundum nostrum modum intelligendi ; in Deo autem non est multitudo actuum, sed unus , qui ipsemet est."
Disp. I.-De Mundi Origine. 73 Deus cognoscit cognitionem habitam imitabilitatis suæ essentiæ. Jamvero ipsa essentia divina in se considerata antecedenter ad actum intellectus, quo illam contemplatur ut imitabilem, potest dici fundamentaliter idea sed non formaliter ; nondum enim dicit relationem ad id, cujus est exemplar, nec ad intellectum seu ad agens intellectuale, quod per ideam operatur : quæ tamen necessaria sunt, ut vidimus, ad rationem ideæ constituendam.-Varii gradus essendi, secundum quos essentia divina est imitabilis, prout actu terminant cognitionem divinam, formaliter constituunt ideas divinas ; ut enim patet, in iis verificantur omnia, quæ requiri diximus ad rationem ideæ.-Cognitio autem illa reflexa non dicitur constituere formaliter ideas divinas, siquidem illas supponit. Unde scite animadvertit Toledo in h. 1.: "Aliud est ideam fieri, aliud cognosci in se. Fit idea, quum essentia in ordine ad aliud intelligitur : cognoscitur autem, quum actu reflexo essentia habens ordinem cognoscitur. Ista distinguimus secundum nostrum modum intelligendi ; in Deo autem non est multitudo actuum, sed unus , qui ipsemet est."
77. In order that we may determine the divine ideas more concretely, we can distinguish three things. 1. The divine essence itself, which is really one, but virtually multiple, insofar as, since it is the very fullness of being, it contains in itself every grade of being. 2. The divine essence as actually known by the divine intellect as imitable outside itself; or the various grades of being, according to which the divine essence is imitable, actually terminating divine cognition. 3. A certain reflex cognition (according to our mode of conceiving), by which God knows the cognition he has of the imitability of his essence.
Now the divine essence itself, considered in itself antecedently to the act of intellect by which he contemplates it as imitable, can be called fundamentally an idea, but not formally; for it does not yet express a relation to that of which it is the exemplar, nor to the intellect or to the intellectual agent which operates through an idea. Yet these things, as we have seen, are necessary for constituting the notion of idea. The various grades of being according to which the divine essence is imitable, as they actually terminate divine cognition, formally constitute the divine ideas; for, as is clear, in them are verified all the things which we said are required for the notion of idea. But that reflex cognition is not said formally to constitute the divine ideas, since it supposes them. Hence Toledo acutely observes in this place: "It is one thing for an idea to be made, another for it to be known in itself. An idea is made when the essence is understood in order to another; but it is known when, by a reflex act, the essence having an order is known. We distinguish these things according to our mode of understanding; but in God there is not a multitude of acts, but one act, which is himself."
Now the divine essence itself, considered in itself antecedently to the act of intellect by which he contemplates it as imitable, can be called fundamentally an idea, but not formally; for it does not yet express a relation to that of which it is the exemplar, nor to the intellect or to the intellectual agent which operates through an idea. Yet these things, as we have seen, are necessary for constituting the notion of idea. The various grades of being according to which the divine essence is imitable, as they actually terminate divine cognition, formally constitute the divine ideas; for, as is clear, in them are verified all the things which we said are required for the notion of idea. But that reflex cognition is not said formally to constitute the divine ideas, since it supposes them. Hence Toledo acutely observes in this place: "It is one thing for an idea to be made, another for it to be known in itself. An idea is made when the essence is understood in order to another; but it is known when, by a reflex act, the essence having an order is known. We distinguish these things according to our mode of understanding; but in God there is not a multitude of acts, but one act, which is himself."
78. Ex dictis sequitur a) quod verissime S. Aug. (apud D. Th. q. 15. a. 2.) ideas divinas ita definierit : " Ideæ sunt principales quædam formæ, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsæ formatæ non sunt ; ac per hoc æternæ, ac semper eodem modo se habentes , quæ divina intelligentia continentur. Sed cum ipsæ neque oriantur, neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit."
74 De Deo Creatore. Sequitur b) quod idea in Deo potest dici una et multiplex. Una, quatenus una est divina essentia, et una realiter est divina cognitio ; multiplex vero, quatenus "idea," ut inquit D. Th. q. 15, a. 2. ad 1. , "non nominat divinam essentiam, in quantum est essentia, sed in quantum est similitudo, vel ratio hujus vel illius -rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectæ ex una essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideæ." Sequitur c) quod hæc multiplicitas idearum nullo modo repugnat infinitæ Dei simplicitati. Etenim si ideæ considerentur in suo veluti fundamento, sunt ipsa divina essentia, quæ est realiter una, et solum virtualiter multiplex : virtualis autem distinctio non facit compositionem. Si ideæ formaliter considerentur, sunt termini divini intellectus contemplantis divinam essentiam uti imitabilem ad extra : intellectus autem unico actu attingens multiplex objectum non obstat simplicitati. Si denique ideæ considerentur uti principium cognitionis ; certe in Deo non sunt tamquam principium subjectivum, quo Deus intelligit ; Deus enim non indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, sed ipsa sua essentia determinatur ad cognoscendum : quidquid cognoscibile est. Sunt ergo ad summum principium objectivum in quo Deus cognoscit omnia possibilia, quemadmodum in sigillo possumus nos cognoscere varias impressiones quæ ex eo in aliqua materia fieri possunt. Sequitur d) quod omnes naturæ quatenus sunt termini imitantes divinam essentiam, respondentes ideis divinis, in quibus et cognoscuntur ; participant aliquo pacto de vita Dei, "Quidquid est in Deo," ait D. Th.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 75 1. p. q. 19. a. 4., "ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita ejus. Unde cum omnia, quæ facta sunt a Deo, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina." Quod pulcherrime expressit S. Augustinus (in Jo. tract. 1. n. 17. ) dicens : "Faber facit arcam. Primo in arte habet arcam ; si enim in arte arcam non haberet, unde illam fabricando proferret ? Sed arca sic est in arte, ut non ipsa arca sit quæ videtur oculis. In arte invisibiliter est, in opere visibiliter erit. Ecce facta est in opere : numquid destitit esse in arte ? Et illa in opere facta est, et illa manet quæ in arte est : nam potest illa arca putrescere, et iterum ex illa quæ in arte est, alia fabricari. Attendite ergo arcam in arte, et arcam in opere. Arca in opere non est vita, arca in arte vita est, quia vivit anima artificis, ubi sunt ista omnia antequam proferantur. Si ergo, fratres carissimi, quia sapientia Dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, secundum artem continet omnia, antequam fabricet omnia ; hinc quæ fiunt per ipsam artem, non continuo vita sunt, sed quidquid factum est, vita in illo est. Terram vides, est in arte terra ; cælum vides, est in arte cœlum; solem et lunam vides, sunt et ista in arte ; sed foris corpora sunt, in arte vita sunt." (Vid. præter D. Th. et Toledo in ll. cc. , Liberatore, Della Conoscenza intellettuale, parte seconda, cap. 1. a. 1., et cap. 8. a. 2.).
74 De Deo Creatore. Sequitur b) quod idea in Deo potest dici una et multiplex. Una, quatenus una est divina essentia, et una realiter est divina cognitio ; multiplex vero, quatenus "idea," ut inquit D. Th. q. 15, a. 2. ad 1. , "non nominat divinam essentiam, in quantum est essentia, sed in quantum est similitudo, vel ratio hujus vel illius -rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectæ ex una essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideæ." Sequitur c) quod hæc multiplicitas idearum nullo modo repugnat infinitæ Dei simplicitati. Etenim si ideæ considerentur in suo veluti fundamento, sunt ipsa divina essentia, quæ est realiter una, et solum virtualiter multiplex : virtualis autem distinctio non facit compositionem. Si ideæ formaliter considerentur, sunt termini divini intellectus contemplantis divinam essentiam uti imitabilem ad extra : intellectus autem unico actu attingens multiplex objectum non obstat simplicitati. Si denique ideæ considerentur uti principium cognitionis ; certe in Deo non sunt tamquam principium subjectivum, quo Deus intelligit ; Deus enim non indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, sed ipsa sua essentia determinatur ad cognoscendum : quidquid cognoscibile est. Sunt ergo ad summum principium objectivum in quo Deus cognoscit omnia possibilia, quemadmodum in sigillo possumus nos cognoscere varias impressiones quæ ex eo in aliqua materia fieri possunt. Sequitur d) quod omnes naturæ quatenus sunt termini imitantes divinam essentiam, respondentes ideis divinis, in quibus et cognoscuntur ; participant aliquo pacto de vita Dei, "Quidquid est in Deo," ait D. Th.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 75 1. p. q. 19. a. 4., "ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita ejus. Unde cum omnia, quæ facta sunt a Deo, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa vita divina." Quod pulcherrime expressit S. Augustinus (in Jo. tract. 1. n. 17. ) dicens : "Faber facit arcam. Primo in arte habet arcam ; si enim in arte arcam non haberet, unde illam fabricando proferret ? Sed arca sic est in arte, ut non ipsa arca sit quæ videtur oculis. In arte invisibiliter est, in opere visibiliter erit. Ecce facta est in opere : numquid destitit esse in arte ? Et illa in opere facta est, et illa manet quæ in arte est : nam potest illa arca putrescere, et iterum ex illa quæ in arte est, alia fabricari. Attendite ergo arcam in arte, et arcam in opere. Arca in opere non est vita, arca in arte vita est, quia vivit anima artificis, ubi sunt ista omnia antequam proferantur. Si ergo, fratres carissimi, quia sapientia Dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, secundum artem continet omnia, antequam fabricet omnia ; hinc quæ fiunt per ipsam artem, non continuo vita sunt, sed quidquid factum est, vita in illo est. Terram vides, est in arte terra ; cælum vides, est in arte cœlum; solem et lunam vides, sunt et ista in arte ; sed foris corpora sunt, in arte vita sunt." (Vid. præter D. Th. et Toledo in ll. cc. , Liberatore, Della Conoscenza intellettuale, parte seconda, cap. 1. a. 1., et cap. 8. a. 2.).
78. From what has been said it follows: a) that St. Augustine very truly defined the divine ideas thus (as cited by St. Thomas, q. 15, a. 2): "Ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and incommutable notions of things, because they themselves have not been formed; and through this they are eternal, and always having themselves in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence. But although they themselves neither arise nor perish, nevertheless according to them everything is said to be formed which can arise and perish, and everything which arises and perishes."
It follows: b) that idea in God can be called one and multiple. One, insofar as the divine essence is one, and divine cognition is really one; but multiple, insofar as "idea," as St. Thomas says, q. 15, a. 2, reply to objection 1, "does not name the divine essence insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is the likeness or notion of this or that thing. Hence according as there are several notions understood from one essence, according to this they are called several ideas."
It follows: c) that this multiplicity of ideas in no way conflicts with the infinite simplicity of God. For if the ideas are considered in their, as it were, foundation, they are the divine essence itself, which is really one and only virtually multiple; but a virtual distinction does not make composition. If the ideas are considered formally, they are the termini of the divine intellect contemplating the divine essence as imitable outside itself; but an intellect reaching a multiple object by one act does not stand in the way of simplicity. Finally, if the ideas are considered as a principle of cognition, certainly in God they are not as a subjective principle by which God understands; for God does not need intelligible species, but is determined by his own essence itself to knowing whatever is knowable. Therefore they are at most an objective principle in which God knows all possible things, just as in a seal we can know the various impressions which can be made from it in some matter.
It follows: d) that all natures, insofar as they are termini imitating the divine essence and corresponding to the divine ideas in which they are also known, participate in some manner in the life of God. "Whatever is in God," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 4, "as understood, is his very living or life. Hence, since all things which have been made by God are in him as understood, it follows that all things in him are the divine life itself." St. Augustine expressed this most beautifully (On John, tractate 1, n. 17), saying: "A craftsman makes a chest. First he has the chest in his art; for if he did not have the chest in his art, from where would he bring it forth by making it? But the chest is in the art in such a way that it is not the chest itself which is seen by the eyes. It is invisibly in the art; it will be visibly in the work. Behold, it has been made in the work: did it cease to be in the art? Both the one was made in the work, and the one which is in the art remains; for that chest can rot, and again another can be made from that which is in the art. Therefore attend to the chest in the art and the chest in the work. The chest in the work is not life; the chest in the art is life, because the soul of the artisan lives, where all those things are before they are brought forth. Therefore, most beloved brothers, because the wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, contains all things according to art before it makes all things, hence the things which are made through that art are not immediately life, but whatever has been made is life in him. You see the earth; earth is in the art. You see the heaven; heaven is in the art. You see the sun and moon; these too are in the art. But outwardly they are bodies; in the art they are life." See, besides St. Thomas and Toledo in the cited places, Liberatore, Della Conoscenza intellettuale, part 2, chapter 1, article 1, and chapter 8, article 2.
It follows: b) that idea in God can be called one and multiple. One, insofar as the divine essence is one, and divine cognition is really one; but multiple, insofar as "idea," as St. Thomas says, q. 15, a. 2, reply to objection 1, "does not name the divine essence insofar as it is essence, but insofar as it is the likeness or notion of this or that thing. Hence according as there are several notions understood from one essence, according to this they are called several ideas."
It follows: c) that this multiplicity of ideas in no way conflicts with the infinite simplicity of God. For if the ideas are considered in their, as it were, foundation, they are the divine essence itself, which is really one and only virtually multiple; but a virtual distinction does not make composition. If the ideas are considered formally, they are the termini of the divine intellect contemplating the divine essence as imitable outside itself; but an intellect reaching a multiple object by one act does not stand in the way of simplicity. Finally, if the ideas are considered as a principle of cognition, certainly in God they are not as a subjective principle by which God understands; for God does not need intelligible species, but is determined by his own essence itself to knowing whatever is knowable. Therefore they are at most an objective principle in which God knows all possible things, just as in a seal we can know the various impressions which can be made from it in some matter.
It follows: d) that all natures, insofar as they are termini imitating the divine essence and corresponding to the divine ideas in which they are also known, participate in some manner in the life of God. "Whatever is in God," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 4, "as understood, is his very living or life. Hence, since all things which have been made by God are in him as understood, it follows that all things in him are the divine life itself." St. Augustine expressed this most beautifully (On John, tractate 1, n. 17), saying: "A craftsman makes a chest. First he has the chest in his art; for if he did not have the chest in his art, from where would he bring it forth by making it? But the chest is in the art in such a way that it is not the chest itself which is seen by the eyes. It is invisibly in the art; it will be visibly in the work. Behold, it has been made in the work: did it cease to be in the art? Both the one was made in the work, and the one which is in the art remains; for that chest can rot, and again another can be made from that which is in the art. Therefore attend to the chest in the art and the chest in the work. The chest in the work is not life; the chest in the art is life, because the soul of the artisan lives, where all those things are before they are brought forth. Therefore, most beloved brothers, because the wisdom of God, through whom all things were made, contains all things according to art before it makes all things, hence the things which are made through that art are not immediately life, but whatever has been made is life in him. You see the earth; earth is in the art. You see the heaven; heaven is in the art. You see the sun and moon; these too are in the art. But outwardly they are bodies; in the art they are life." See, besides St. Thomas and Toledo in the cited places, Liberatore, Della Conoscenza intellettuale, part 2, chapter 1, article 1, and chapter 8, article 2.
Section II. The Proposed Question Is Solved.
79. His rite intellectis
76 De Deo Creatore. § II. Solvitur proposita quæstio. PROP. VIII. Deus est prima causa exemplaris mundi. Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Legitur Ps. 135. 5. "Qui facit cælos in intellectu. "-Jer. 1. 12. " Qui facit terram in fortitudine sua, præparat in sapientia sua, et potentia sua extendit cœlos.".-Prov. 3. 19. “Dominus sapientia fundavit terram, stabilivit cœlos prudentia. "-Sap. 9. 21. "Omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia. "-Prov. 8, 22-30. inducitur sapientia sic loquens : "Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum , antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Ab æterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram : necdum fontes aquarum eruperant : necdum montes gravi mole constiterant : ante colles ego parturiebar : adhuc terram non fecerat, et flumina, et cardines orbis terræ . Quando præparabat cælos, aderam : quando certa lege, et gyro vallabat abyssos : quando æthera firmabat sursum, et librabat fontes aquarum : quando circumdabat mari terminum suum, et legem ponebat aquis, ne transirent fines suos : quando appendebat fundamenta terræ. Cum eo eram cuncta componens : et delectabar per singulos dies, ludens coram eo omni tempore." Unde : ex datis testimoniis Deus mundum, seu res omnes extra ipsum existentes, condidit juxta ideas præconceptas-quas non ab aliquo objecto extra se
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 77 posito accepit. Ergo Deus est prima causa exemplaris mundi. Prob. antec. quoad 1am partem. Dicitur Deus omnia creasse in intellectu : intellectus autem non aliter concurrit ad opus externum, quam exhibendo formam rei faciendæ-Dicitur Deus omnia fecisse in sapientia ; in sapientia autem non potest aliquid moliri qui non habet ideam finis eorumque quæ ad finem ordinantur. "Si ordo universi," inquit D. Th. sæpe cit. q. 15. a. 2., "est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso , necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicujus totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriæ rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur ; sicut ædificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cujuslibet partium ejus. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriæ rationes omnium rerum." -Sapientia divina, per quam mundus conditus est, dicitur omnium artifex : artifex autem operatur juxta præconceptam ideam. Prob. antec. quoad 2am partem. Dicitur Deus cælos et terram , omnia, seu universitatem creaturarum in sapientia fecisse ; ergo non potuit ab aliquo objecto extra se posito ideas accipere ; secus enim non fecisset illud Deus in Sapientia.-Dicitur sapientia divina existere ab æterno , præexistere omnibus creaturis, præparasse seu direxisse omnia opera Dei ad extra ; ergo non potuit Deus ab aliquo objecto extra se posito rerum creandarum ideas accipere. Prob. II. ex Patribus. Origenes (in Jo. ad ea verba "In principio erat Verbum.") : "Opinor, sicut domus et navis fabricatur, vel ædificatur juxta figuras
78 De Deo Creatore. et formas mentibus eorum, qui structuræ præsident, conceptas, domo navique principium sumentibus ab his figuris et rationibus, quæ sunt in artifice ; sic universa facta fuisse juxta rerum futurarum rationes jam antea a Deo manifestatas in sapientia : omnia enim in sapientia fecit."--S. Augustinus (lib. 83. qq. q. 46. ) : " Quis audeat dicere, Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse ? quod si recte dici et credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo , qua equus ; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus . Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris ? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuetur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat ; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quod si hæ rerum creandarum, creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi æternum atque incommutabile potest esse, non solum sunt ideæ, sed ipsæ veræ sunt, quia æternæ sunt, et ejusmodi, atque incommutabiles manent, quarum participatione fit, ut sit, quidquid est, quoquo modo est. "-S. Maximus (apud Euthymium P. 1. Panop. Tit. 3.) : "Rationes omnium in Deo fixæ sunt, secundum quas ex non exstantibus illa produxit, ac secundum rationes easdem cognoscit omnia antequam fiant. Has porro rationes Areopagita Dionysius prædestinationes vocat, divinasque voluntates."-S. Anselmus (mon. c. 9.) : "Priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summæ naturæ, quid aut quale aut quomodo futura essent. Quare cum ea, quæ facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc quia non erant
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 79 quod nunc sunt, neque erat ex quo fierent : non tamen nihil erant, quantum ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent. "-Ideas Platonicas extra Deum existentes impugnant S. Justinus Martyr (Cohort. ad Gentes) Tertullianus (de anima)-Nazianzenus (orat. 33.), etc., etc.-Quæ omnia testimonia tam aperta sunt, ut nulla expositione indigeant. Prob. III. argumento D. Th. 1. p. q. 44 a. 3. , quod sic proponi potest : qui habet omnium rerum exemplaria quæ non sunt aliud a sua essentia, est prima causa exemplaris omnium ; atqui Deus habet rerum omnium exemplaria, seu ideas, quæ "non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout ejus similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode ;" ergo . Prob. min. quoad 1am partem, nempe Deus habet rerum omnium ideas. Deus enim creando mundum non ex necessitate sed ex libera sua voluntate egit, ut inferius probabitur ; qui autem ita agit, agit intellectu dirigente ; ergo Deus , qui certe sapientissime operatus est, prout ejus natura exigit, debuit creationis finem præstituere, singulas creaturas ad finem ordinare, eas cognoscere etc. Sed hoc importat Deum habuisse ideas rerum omnium, quæ factæ sunt ; ergo. Confirmatur hoc a posteriori, siquidem constat esse ordinem in mundo, eumque in divinam sapientiam tamquam in primum principium reduci : "ordo autem in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere, quod in divina sapientia sint rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. " "In omnibus" enim inquit idem S. Doctor q. 15. a. 1., quæ non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse
६० De Deo Creatore. finem generationis cujuscumque. Agens autem non agit propter formam, nisi in quantum similitudo formæ est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter : in quibusdam enim agentibus præexistit forma rei faciendæ secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quæ agunt per naturam ; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quæ agunt per intellectum ; sicut similitudo domus præexistit in mente ædificatoris ; et hæc potest dici idea domus, quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formæ quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit q. 46. a. 6, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma ad similitudinem cujus mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideæ." Prob. min. quoad 2am partem, nempe ideas divinas non esse aliud re a divina essentia. Nam Deus est causa omnino independens : sed talis non esset, si non a seipso, seu a sua essentia, sed ab aliquo alio exemplari a se distincto debuisset illas accipere ; ergo. Præterea cum nihil sit extra Deum, quod ab eo factum non sit ; nihil est extra Deum, a quo possit Deus rerum faciendarum ideas accipere. NOTA. Nonnulli recentiores timent ne ex statuta doctrina de ideis divinis, Pantheismus inducatur. Etenim , aiunt, juxta expositam doctrinam, ideæ divinæ realiter non distinguuntur a Deo, et Deus dici debet prototypus mundi ; jamvero cum artifex aliquid exterius molitur, manifestat suam ideam ; mundus ergo non esset nisi exterior Dei manifestatio. Unde, addunt, dicendum potius est quod in Deo est idea
4 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 81 mundi, sed non quod Deus est idea mundi : quam formam loquendi et plurium Theologorum exempla confirmant (Staudenmayr apud Knoll, par. 2. c. 1 . a. 1.) At vero si tradita doctrina de ideis divinis bene intelligatur, evidens est nullum esse pantheismi periculum. Creaturæ enim, sive in statu existentiæ, sive in statu possibilitatis spectentur, non sunt ipsæ ideæ Dei ; sed eæ sunt quæ ideas Dei imitantur, seu quæ ad idearum divinarum similitudinem fiunt aut fieri possunt. Quare Deus creando manifestat quidem suas ideas, seu manifestat seipsum , sed non ponendo extra se suas ipsas ideas, sed earumdem terminos imitativos : ita ut ex creaturis possimus ideas divinas cognoscere , non quatenus has in se ipsis intuemur, sed quatenus ex earum similitudine in creaturis manifestata ad idearum notitiam assurgimus.- Non est autem recedendum ab illo modo loquendi "Deus est idea mundi ; " tum quia, ut vidimus, est communis apud Patres et D. Th.; tum quia, ex dictis est veritati conformis. Cæterum fere nullum est discrimen inter hæc duo "Deus est idea mundi ;" et "in Deo sunt ideæ mundi :" quidquid enim in Deo est, Deus est. Unde iidem Theologi ab adversariis citati, qui utuntur altera formula "in Deo sunt ideæ mundi" promiscue adhibent etiam primam, quod et videre est apud D. Thomam. Piget dicere præfatum Theologum vere erroneo fundamento niti, et discrimen esse non in modo loquendi, sed in doctrina. Nam distinguit in Deo duplex, ut ait, Logon : Increatum, quod est Verbum, Filius Dei ; et creatum, quod, juxta ipsum, est cogi
82 De Deo Creatore. tatio de mundo, quam habet Pater : hoc alterum vero ponit in Deo ut realiter distinctum ab intellectu et essentia divina. Sed hic talis est error, ut vix refutatione indigeat. Etenim præterquam quod sic tribueretur creatio solum Patri ; aliquid reale poneretur in Deo a Deo ipso realiter distinctum. Quod si dicitur infinitum, habemus duo infinita, vel quartam Personam in Deo ; si finitum, actum est de divina simplicitate, etc. Hæc attigisse sufficiat de re sat evidenti.
76 De Deo Creatore. § II. Solvitur proposita quæstio. PROP. VIII. Deus est prima causa exemplaris mundi. Prob. I. ex Scriptura. Legitur Ps. 135. 5. "Qui facit cælos in intellectu. "-Jer. 1. 12. " Qui facit terram in fortitudine sua, præparat in sapientia sua, et potentia sua extendit cœlos.".-Prov. 3. 19. “Dominus sapientia fundavit terram, stabilivit cœlos prudentia. "-Sap. 9. 21. "Omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia. "-Prov. 8, 22-30. inducitur sapientia sic loquens : "Dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum , antequam quidquam faceret a principio. Ab æterno ordinata sum, et ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram : necdum fontes aquarum eruperant : necdum montes gravi mole constiterant : ante colles ego parturiebar : adhuc terram non fecerat, et flumina, et cardines orbis terræ . Quando præparabat cælos, aderam : quando certa lege, et gyro vallabat abyssos : quando æthera firmabat sursum, et librabat fontes aquarum : quando circumdabat mari terminum suum, et legem ponebat aquis, ne transirent fines suos : quando appendebat fundamenta terræ. Cum eo eram cuncta componens : et delectabar per singulos dies, ludens coram eo omni tempore." Unde : ex datis testimoniis Deus mundum, seu res omnes extra ipsum existentes, condidit juxta ideas præconceptas-quas non ab aliquo objecto extra se
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 77 posito accepit. Ergo Deus est prima causa exemplaris mundi. Prob. antec. quoad 1am partem. Dicitur Deus omnia creasse in intellectu : intellectus autem non aliter concurrit ad opus externum, quam exhibendo formam rei faciendæ-Dicitur Deus omnia fecisse in sapientia ; in sapientia autem non potest aliquid moliri qui non habet ideam finis eorumque quæ ad finem ordinantur. "Si ordo universi," inquit D. Th. sæpe cit. q. 15. a. 2., "est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso , necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicujus totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriæ rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur ; sicut ædificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cujuslibet partium ejus. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriæ rationes omnium rerum." -Sapientia divina, per quam mundus conditus est, dicitur omnium artifex : artifex autem operatur juxta præconceptam ideam. Prob. antec. quoad 2am partem. Dicitur Deus cælos et terram , omnia, seu universitatem creaturarum in sapientia fecisse ; ergo non potuit ab aliquo objecto extra se posito ideas accipere ; secus enim non fecisset illud Deus in Sapientia.-Dicitur sapientia divina existere ab æterno , præexistere omnibus creaturis, præparasse seu direxisse omnia opera Dei ad extra ; ergo non potuit Deus ab aliquo objecto extra se posito rerum creandarum ideas accipere. Prob. II. ex Patribus. Origenes (in Jo. ad ea verba "In principio erat Verbum.") : "Opinor, sicut domus et navis fabricatur, vel ædificatur juxta figuras
78 De Deo Creatore. et formas mentibus eorum, qui structuræ præsident, conceptas, domo navique principium sumentibus ab his figuris et rationibus, quæ sunt in artifice ; sic universa facta fuisse juxta rerum futurarum rationes jam antea a Deo manifestatas in sapientia : omnia enim in sapientia fecit."--S. Augustinus (lib. 83. qq. q. 46. ) : " Quis audeat dicere, Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse ? quod si recte dici et credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo , qua equus ; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus . Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris ? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuetur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat ; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quod si hæ rerum creandarum, creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi æternum atque incommutabile potest esse, non solum sunt ideæ, sed ipsæ veræ sunt, quia æternæ sunt, et ejusmodi, atque incommutabiles manent, quarum participatione fit, ut sit, quidquid est, quoquo modo est. "-S. Maximus (apud Euthymium P. 1. Panop. Tit. 3.) : "Rationes omnium in Deo fixæ sunt, secundum quas ex non exstantibus illa produxit, ac secundum rationes easdem cognoscit omnia antequam fiant. Has porro rationes Areopagita Dionysius prædestinationes vocat, divinasque voluntates."-S. Anselmus (mon. c. 9.) : "Priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summæ naturæ, quid aut quale aut quomodo futura essent. Quare cum ea, quæ facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc quia non erant
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 79 quod nunc sunt, neque erat ex quo fierent : non tamen nihil erant, quantum ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent. "-Ideas Platonicas extra Deum existentes impugnant S. Justinus Martyr (Cohort. ad Gentes) Tertullianus (de anima)-Nazianzenus (orat. 33.), etc., etc.-Quæ omnia testimonia tam aperta sunt, ut nulla expositione indigeant. Prob. III. argumento D. Th. 1. p. q. 44 a. 3. , quod sic proponi potest : qui habet omnium rerum exemplaria quæ non sunt aliud a sua essentia, est prima causa exemplaris omnium ; atqui Deus habet rerum omnium exemplaria, seu ideas, quæ "non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout ejus similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode ;" ergo . Prob. min. quoad 1am partem, nempe Deus habet rerum omnium ideas. Deus enim creando mundum non ex necessitate sed ex libera sua voluntate egit, ut inferius probabitur ; qui autem ita agit, agit intellectu dirigente ; ergo Deus , qui certe sapientissime operatus est, prout ejus natura exigit, debuit creationis finem præstituere, singulas creaturas ad finem ordinare, eas cognoscere etc. Sed hoc importat Deum habuisse ideas rerum omnium, quæ factæ sunt ; ergo. Confirmatur hoc a posteriori, siquidem constat esse ordinem in mundo, eumque in divinam sapientiam tamquam in primum principium reduci : "ordo autem in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere, quod in divina sapientia sint rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. " "In omnibus" enim inquit idem S. Doctor q. 15. a. 1., quæ non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse
६० De Deo Creatore. finem generationis cujuscumque. Agens autem non agit propter formam, nisi in quantum similitudo formæ est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter : in quibusdam enim agentibus præexistit forma rei faciendæ secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quæ agunt per naturam ; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quæ agunt per intellectum ; sicut similitudo domus præexistit in mente ædificatoris ; et hæc potest dici idea domus, quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formæ quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit q. 46. a. 6, necesse est quod in mente divina sit forma ad similitudinem cujus mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideæ." Prob. min. quoad 2am partem, nempe ideas divinas non esse aliud re a divina essentia. Nam Deus est causa omnino independens : sed talis non esset, si non a seipso, seu a sua essentia, sed ab aliquo alio exemplari a se distincto debuisset illas accipere ; ergo. Præterea cum nihil sit extra Deum, quod ab eo factum non sit ; nihil est extra Deum, a quo possit Deus rerum faciendarum ideas accipere. NOTA. Nonnulli recentiores timent ne ex statuta doctrina de ideis divinis, Pantheismus inducatur. Etenim , aiunt, juxta expositam doctrinam, ideæ divinæ realiter non distinguuntur a Deo, et Deus dici debet prototypus mundi ; jamvero cum artifex aliquid exterius molitur, manifestat suam ideam ; mundus ergo non esset nisi exterior Dei manifestatio. Unde, addunt, dicendum potius est quod in Deo est idea
4 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 81 mundi, sed non quod Deus est idea mundi : quam formam loquendi et plurium Theologorum exempla confirmant (Staudenmayr apud Knoll, par. 2. c. 1 . a. 1.) At vero si tradita doctrina de ideis divinis bene intelligatur, evidens est nullum esse pantheismi periculum. Creaturæ enim, sive in statu existentiæ, sive in statu possibilitatis spectentur, non sunt ipsæ ideæ Dei ; sed eæ sunt quæ ideas Dei imitantur, seu quæ ad idearum divinarum similitudinem fiunt aut fieri possunt. Quare Deus creando manifestat quidem suas ideas, seu manifestat seipsum , sed non ponendo extra se suas ipsas ideas, sed earumdem terminos imitativos : ita ut ex creaturis possimus ideas divinas cognoscere , non quatenus has in se ipsis intuemur, sed quatenus ex earum similitudine in creaturis manifestata ad idearum notitiam assurgimus.- Non est autem recedendum ab illo modo loquendi "Deus est idea mundi ; " tum quia, ut vidimus, est communis apud Patres et D. Th.; tum quia, ex dictis est veritati conformis. Cæterum fere nullum est discrimen inter hæc duo "Deus est idea mundi ;" et "in Deo sunt ideæ mundi :" quidquid enim in Deo est, Deus est. Unde iidem Theologi ab adversariis citati, qui utuntur altera formula "in Deo sunt ideæ mundi" promiscue adhibent etiam primam, quod et videre est apud D. Thomam. Piget dicere præfatum Theologum vere erroneo fundamento niti, et discrimen esse non in modo loquendi, sed in doctrina. Nam distinguit in Deo duplex, ut ait, Logon : Increatum, quod est Verbum, Filius Dei ; et creatum, quod, juxta ipsum, est cogi
82 De Deo Creatore. tatio de mundo, quam habet Pater : hoc alterum vero ponit in Deo ut realiter distinctum ab intellectu et essentia divina. Sed hic talis est error, ut vix refutatione indigeat. Etenim præterquam quod sic tribueretur creatio solum Patri ; aliquid reale poneretur in Deo a Deo ipso realiter distinctum. Quod si dicitur infinitum, habemus duo infinita, vel quartam Personam in Deo ; si finitum, actum est de divina simplicitate, etc. Hæc attigisse sufficiat de re sat evidenti.
79. With these things rightly understood:
Proposition VIII. God is the first exemplar cause of the world.
First proof, from Scripture. Psalm 135:5 reads: "Who makes the heavens in understanding." Jeremiah 1:12: "Who makes the earth in his strength, prepares it in his wisdom, and stretches out the heavens by his power." Proverbs 3:19: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth, established the heavens by prudence." Wisdom 9:21: "For wisdom, the artisan of all things, taught me." In Proverbs 8:22-30 wisdom is introduced speaking thus: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, and from ancient times before the earth was made. The abysses were not yet, and I was already conceived; the fountains of waters had not yet burst forth; the mountains had not yet stood with heavy mass; before the hills I was brought forth; he had not yet made the earth and the rivers and the hinges of the world of the earth. When he prepared the heavens, I was present; when by a fixed law and circle he enclosed the abysses; when he established the ether above and balanced the fountains of waters; when he set its boundary around the sea, and placed a law for the waters, lest they pass beyond their limits; when he suspended the foundations of the earth. I was with him composing all things; and I was delighted through each day, playing before him at all times."
Hence: from the given testimonies, God founded the world, or all things existing outside himself, according to preconceived ideas, which he did not receive from any object posited outside himself. Therefore God is the first exemplar cause of the world.
The antecedent is proved as to the first part. God is said to have created all things in understanding; but the intellect does not concur otherwise toward an external work than by exhibiting the form of the thing to be made. God is said to have made all things in wisdom; but one who does not have an idea of the end and of the things ordered to the end cannot attempt something in wisdom. "If the order of the universe," says St. Thomas in the often-cited q. 15, a. 2, "is created by him per se, and intended by him, it is necessary that he have an idea of the order of the universe. But the notion of some whole cannot be had unless the proper notions are had of the things from which the whole is constituted; just as a builder could not conceive the species of a house unless there were with him the proper notion of each of its parts. Thus, therefore, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be the proper notions of all things." Divine wisdom, through which the world was founded, is called the artisan of all things; but an artisan operates according to a preconceived idea.
The antecedent is proved as to the second part. God is said to have made heaven and earth, all things, or the universality of creatures, in wisdom; therefore he could not have received the ideas from any object posited outside himself; for otherwise God would not have made that in Wisdom. Divine wisdom is said to exist from eternity, to preexist all creatures, and to have prepared or directed all the works of God outside himself; therefore God could not have received the ideas of things to be created from any object posited outside himself.
Second proof, from the Fathers. Origen (on John, at the words "In the beginning was the Word"): "I think that, just as a house and ship are fashioned or built according to the figures and forms conceived in the minds of those who preside over the construction, with the house and ship taking their principle from those figures and notions which are in the artisan, so all things were made according to the notions of future things already manifested beforehand by God in wisdom; for he made all things in wisdom." St. Augustine (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46): "Who would dare to say that God founded all things irrationally? But if this cannot rightly be said and believed, it remains that all things were founded according to reason, and not man according to the same reason as horse; for to think this is absurd. Therefore individual things were created according to their proper reasons. But where should those reasons be thought to be, except in the very mind of the Creator? For he does not look at anything posited outside himself, so that according to it he would constitute what he was constituting; for to think this is sacrilegious. But if these reasons of things to be created or already created are contained in the divine mind, and nothing can be in the divine mind except what is eternal and incommutable, not only are they ideas, but they are themselves true, because they are eternal and of this sort, and remain incommutable; by participation in them it comes about that whatever is, in whatever way it is, is." St. Maximus (as cited by Euthymius, Panoplia, part 1, title 3): "The reasons of all things are fixed in God, according to which he produced those things out of non-existing things, and according to the same reasons he knows all things before they come to be. Moreover Dionysius the Areopagite calls these reasons predestinations and divine wills." St. Anselm (Monologion, chapter 9): "Before all things came to be, there was in the reason of the supreme nature what or what sort or in what way they were going to be. Wherefore, since it is clear that the things which have been made were nothing before they came to be, as to this, that they were not what they now are, nor was there anything from which they might be made, nevertheless they were not nothing as to the reason of the maker, through which and according to which they were to be made." St. Justin Martyr (Exhortation to the Greeks), Tertullian (On the Soul), Nazianzen (Oration 33), etc., attack Platonic ideas existing outside God. All these testimonies are so open that they need no exposition.
Third proof, from the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 3, which can be proposed thus: he who has the exemplars of all things, which are not other than his essence, is the first exemplar cause of all things; but God has the exemplars of all things, or ideas, which "are not really other than the divine essence, according as its likeness can be participated in diverse ways by diverse things"; therefore.
The minor is proved as to the first part, namely that God has the ideas of all things. For in creating the world God acted not from necessity but from his free will, as will be proved below; but he who acts in this way acts with intellect directing. Therefore God, who certainly operated most wisely, as his nature requires, had to pre-establish the end of creation, order the individual creatures to the end, know them, etc. But this imports that God had the ideas of all the things which were made; therefore. This is confirmed a posteriori, since it is established that there is order in the world, and that it is reduced to divine wisdom as to its first principle: "but order consists in the distinction of things. And therefore it is necessary to say that in divine wisdom there are the notions of all things, which above we called ideas, that is, exemplar forms existing in the divine mind." For "in all things," says the same holy Doctor, q. 15, a. 1, "which are not generated by chance, it is necessary that form be the end of any generation whatever. But an agent does not act for the sake of a form except insofar as the likeness of the form is in it. This indeed happens in two ways: for in some agents the form of the thing to be made preexists according to natural being, as in those which act through nature, as man generates man and fire generates fire. But in some it preexists according to intelligible being, as in those things which act through intellect, as the likeness of a house preexists in the mind of the builder; and this can be called the idea of the house, because the artisan intends to assimilate the house to the form which he conceived in his mind. Therefore, because the world was not made by chance, but was made by God acting through intellect, as will be clear below, q. 46, a. 6, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be the form to whose likeness the world was made. And in this consists the notion of idea."
The minor is proved as to the second part, namely that the divine ideas are not something really other than the divine essence. For God is an altogether independent cause; but he would not be such if he had to receive those ideas not from himself, or from his essence, but from some other exemplar distinct from himself; therefore. Moreover, since there is nothing outside God which has not been made by him, there is nothing outside God from which God could receive the ideas of things to be made.
Note. Some more recent authors fear lest pantheism be introduced from the established doctrine concerning the divine ideas. For, they say, according to the doctrine set forth, the divine ideas are not really distinguished from God, and God must be called the prototype of the world. Now when an artisan fashions something external, he manifests his idea; therefore the world would be nothing but an exterior manifestation of God. Hence, they add, it should rather be said that in God there is the idea of the world, but not that God is the idea of the world; and examples from several theologians confirm this form of speaking (Staudenmayr, as cited by Knoll, part 2, chapter 1, article 1).
But in truth, if the handed-down doctrine concerning the divine ideas is well understood, it is evident that there is no danger of pantheism. For creatures, whether they are considered in the state of existence or in the state of possibility, are not themselves the ideas of God; but they are those things which imitate the ideas of God, or which are made or can be made according to the likeness of the divine ideas. Therefore God in creating indeed manifests his ideas, or manifests himself, but not by positing outside himself his very ideas, but their imitative termini; so that from creatures we can know the divine ideas, not insofar as we intuit these in themselves, but insofar as from their likeness manifested in creatures we rise to knowledge of the ideas.
Nor should there be any departure from that mode of speaking, "God is the idea of the world"; both because, as we have seen, it is common among the Fathers and St. Thomas, and because, from what has been said, it is conformable to truth. Besides, there is almost no difference between these two: "God is the idea of the world" and "in God are the ideas of the world"; for whatever is in God, God is. Hence the same theologians cited by the adversaries, who use the other formula, "in God are the ideas of the world," also promiscuously employ the first, as can also be seen in St. Thomas.
It is irksome to say that the aforementioned theologian rests on a truly erroneous foundation, and that the difference is not in the mode of speaking, but in the doctrine. For he distinguishes in God a twofold Logos, as he says: an uncreated Logos, which is the Word, the Son of God; and a created Logos, which, according to him, is the thought concerning the world which the Father has. He places this latter in God as really distinct from the divine intellect and essence. But this is such an error that it scarcely needs refutation. For besides the fact that in this way creation would be attributed to the Father alone, something real would be posited in God really distinct from God himself. If this is said to be infinite, we have two infinites, or a fourth Person in God; if finite, it is over with divine simplicity, etc. It is enough to have touched upon these things concerning a matter sufficiently evident.
Proposition VIII. God is the first exemplar cause of the world.
First proof, from Scripture. Psalm 135:5 reads: "Who makes the heavens in understanding." Jeremiah 1:12: "Who makes the earth in his strength, prepares it in his wisdom, and stretches out the heavens by his power." Proverbs 3:19: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth, established the heavens by prudence." Wisdom 9:21: "For wisdom, the artisan of all things, taught me." In Proverbs 8:22-30 wisdom is introduced speaking thus: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, and from ancient times before the earth was made. The abysses were not yet, and I was already conceived; the fountains of waters had not yet burst forth; the mountains had not yet stood with heavy mass; before the hills I was brought forth; he had not yet made the earth and the rivers and the hinges of the world of the earth. When he prepared the heavens, I was present; when by a fixed law and circle he enclosed the abysses; when he established the ether above and balanced the fountains of waters; when he set its boundary around the sea, and placed a law for the waters, lest they pass beyond their limits; when he suspended the foundations of the earth. I was with him composing all things; and I was delighted through each day, playing before him at all times."
Hence: from the given testimonies, God founded the world, or all things existing outside himself, according to preconceived ideas, which he did not receive from any object posited outside himself. Therefore God is the first exemplar cause of the world.
The antecedent is proved as to the first part. God is said to have created all things in understanding; but the intellect does not concur otherwise toward an external work than by exhibiting the form of the thing to be made. God is said to have made all things in wisdom; but one who does not have an idea of the end and of the things ordered to the end cannot attempt something in wisdom. "If the order of the universe," says St. Thomas in the often-cited q. 15, a. 2, "is created by him per se, and intended by him, it is necessary that he have an idea of the order of the universe. But the notion of some whole cannot be had unless the proper notions are had of the things from which the whole is constituted; just as a builder could not conceive the species of a house unless there were with him the proper notion of each of its parts. Thus, therefore, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be the proper notions of all things." Divine wisdom, through which the world was founded, is called the artisan of all things; but an artisan operates according to a preconceived idea.
The antecedent is proved as to the second part. God is said to have made heaven and earth, all things, or the universality of creatures, in wisdom; therefore he could not have received the ideas from any object posited outside himself; for otherwise God would not have made that in Wisdom. Divine wisdom is said to exist from eternity, to preexist all creatures, and to have prepared or directed all the works of God outside himself; therefore God could not have received the ideas of things to be created from any object posited outside himself.
Second proof, from the Fathers. Origen (on John, at the words "In the beginning was the Word"): "I think that, just as a house and ship are fashioned or built according to the figures and forms conceived in the minds of those who preside over the construction, with the house and ship taking their principle from those figures and notions which are in the artisan, so all things were made according to the notions of future things already manifested beforehand by God in wisdom; for he made all things in wisdom." St. Augustine (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46): "Who would dare to say that God founded all things irrationally? But if this cannot rightly be said and believed, it remains that all things were founded according to reason, and not man according to the same reason as horse; for to think this is absurd. Therefore individual things were created according to their proper reasons. But where should those reasons be thought to be, except in the very mind of the Creator? For he does not look at anything posited outside himself, so that according to it he would constitute what he was constituting; for to think this is sacrilegious. But if these reasons of things to be created or already created are contained in the divine mind, and nothing can be in the divine mind except what is eternal and incommutable, not only are they ideas, but they are themselves true, because they are eternal and of this sort, and remain incommutable; by participation in them it comes about that whatever is, in whatever way it is, is." St. Maximus (as cited by Euthymius, Panoplia, part 1, title 3): "The reasons of all things are fixed in God, according to which he produced those things out of non-existing things, and according to the same reasons he knows all things before they come to be. Moreover Dionysius the Areopagite calls these reasons predestinations and divine wills." St. Anselm (Monologion, chapter 9): "Before all things came to be, there was in the reason of the supreme nature what or what sort or in what way they were going to be. Wherefore, since it is clear that the things which have been made were nothing before they came to be, as to this, that they were not what they now are, nor was there anything from which they might be made, nevertheless they were not nothing as to the reason of the maker, through which and according to which they were to be made." St. Justin Martyr (Exhortation to the Greeks), Tertullian (On the Soul), Nazianzen (Oration 33), etc., attack Platonic ideas existing outside God. All these testimonies are so open that they need no exposition.
Third proof, from the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 3, which can be proposed thus: he who has the exemplars of all things, which are not other than his essence, is the first exemplar cause of all things; but God has the exemplars of all things, or ideas, which "are not really other than the divine essence, according as its likeness can be participated in diverse ways by diverse things"; therefore.
The minor is proved as to the first part, namely that God has the ideas of all things. For in creating the world God acted not from necessity but from his free will, as will be proved below; but he who acts in this way acts with intellect directing. Therefore God, who certainly operated most wisely, as his nature requires, had to pre-establish the end of creation, order the individual creatures to the end, know them, etc. But this imports that God had the ideas of all the things which were made; therefore. This is confirmed a posteriori, since it is established that there is order in the world, and that it is reduced to divine wisdom as to its first principle: "but order consists in the distinction of things. And therefore it is necessary to say that in divine wisdom there are the notions of all things, which above we called ideas, that is, exemplar forms existing in the divine mind." For "in all things," says the same holy Doctor, q. 15, a. 1, "which are not generated by chance, it is necessary that form be the end of any generation whatever. But an agent does not act for the sake of a form except insofar as the likeness of the form is in it. This indeed happens in two ways: for in some agents the form of the thing to be made preexists according to natural being, as in those which act through nature, as man generates man and fire generates fire. But in some it preexists according to intelligible being, as in those things which act through intellect, as the likeness of a house preexists in the mind of the builder; and this can be called the idea of the house, because the artisan intends to assimilate the house to the form which he conceived in his mind. Therefore, because the world was not made by chance, but was made by God acting through intellect, as will be clear below, q. 46, a. 6, it is necessary that in the divine mind there be the form to whose likeness the world was made. And in this consists the notion of idea."
The minor is proved as to the second part, namely that the divine ideas are not something really other than the divine essence. For God is an altogether independent cause; but he would not be such if he had to receive those ideas not from himself, or from his essence, but from some other exemplar distinct from himself; therefore. Moreover, since there is nothing outside God which has not been made by him, there is nothing outside God from which God could receive the ideas of things to be made.
Note. Some more recent authors fear lest pantheism be introduced from the established doctrine concerning the divine ideas. For, they say, according to the doctrine set forth, the divine ideas are not really distinguished from God, and God must be called the prototype of the world. Now when an artisan fashions something external, he manifests his idea; therefore the world would be nothing but an exterior manifestation of God. Hence, they add, it should rather be said that in God there is the idea of the world, but not that God is the idea of the world; and examples from several theologians confirm this form of speaking (Staudenmayr, as cited by Knoll, part 2, chapter 1, article 1).
But in truth, if the handed-down doctrine concerning the divine ideas is well understood, it is evident that there is no danger of pantheism. For creatures, whether they are considered in the state of existence or in the state of possibility, are not themselves the ideas of God; but they are those things which imitate the ideas of God, or which are made or can be made according to the likeness of the divine ideas. Therefore God in creating indeed manifests his ideas, or manifests himself, but not by positing outside himself his very ideas, but their imitative termini; so that from creatures we can know the divine ideas, not insofar as we intuit these in themselves, but insofar as from their likeness manifested in creatures we rise to knowledge of the ideas.
Nor should there be any departure from that mode of speaking, "God is the idea of the world"; both because, as we have seen, it is common among the Fathers and St. Thomas, and because, from what has been said, it is conformable to truth. Besides, there is almost no difference between these two: "God is the idea of the world" and "in God are the ideas of the world"; for whatever is in God, God is. Hence the same theologians cited by the adversaries, who use the other formula, "in God are the ideas of the world," also promiscuously employ the first, as can also be seen in St. Thomas.
It is irksome to say that the aforementioned theologian rests on a truly erroneous foundation, and that the difference is not in the mode of speaking, but in the doctrine. For he distinguishes in God a twofold Logos, as he says: an uncreated Logos, which is the Word, the Son of God; and a created Logos, which, according to him, is the thought concerning the world which the Father has. He places this latter in God as really distinct from the divine intellect and essence. But this is such an error that it scarcely needs refutation. For besides the fact that in this way creation would be attributed to the Father alone, something real would be posited in God really distinct from God himself. If this is said to be infinite, we have two infinites, or a fourth Person in God; if finite, it is over with divine simplicity, etc. It is enough to have touched upon these things concerning a matter sufficiently evident.