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Fifth Article. Whether The Virtue Of Creating Is Communicable To Any Creature.
52. Ex iis, quæ disputavimus, satis superque constat Deum unum et Trinum per unam efficientiam esse causam mundi effectricem. Quod nunc quærimus est, utrum creare ita sit proprium Dei, ut nulli creaturæ possit competere. Hæc quæstio non levis momenti est, præsertim quoad doctrinam de miraculis, ubi statuitur aliqua esse miracula, quæ neque quoad veritatem operis possunt ab ulla creatura patrari : claritatis gratia distinctis paragraphis illam pertractabimus .
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 51 § I. Status quæstionis.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 51 § I. Status quæstionis.
52. From the things which we have discussed, it is sufficiently and more than sufficiently established that God, one and triune, through one efficiency, is the efficient cause of the world. What we now ask is whether to create is so proper to God that it cannot belong to any creature. This question is of no slight importance, especially with respect to the doctrine concerning miracles, where it is established that there are some miracles which, even with respect to the reality of the work, cannot be performed by any creature. For the sake of clarity we shall treat this question in distinct paragraphs.
Section I. State Of The Question.
53. Non agitur hic de facto : Deus enim solus, ut demonstravimus (n. 26. seqq.) est rerum omnium Creator, ac proinde nulla creatura aliquid unquam creavit. Ex hoc autem facile deducitur nullam creaturam habere potestatem creandi de lege ordinaria, seu ut nunc res sunt a Deo constitutæ. Quod enim de facto numquam est, de potentia ordinaria non potest esse ; sed nulla unquam creatura aliquid creavit ; ergo . Maj . patet ; siquidem ad Dei providentiam spectat, ut sinat creaturas proprias actiones operari , ne frustra sit ulla potentia in agentibus naturalibus.
53. The question here is not about the fact. For God alone, as we have demonstrated (n. 26 ff.), is the Creator of all things, and consequently no creature has ever created anything. From this it is easily deduced that no creature has the power of creating according to the ordinary law, or as things are now constituted by God. For what never exists in fact cannot exist by ordinary power; but no creature has ever created anything; therefore. The major is clear, since it belongs to God's providence that he permit creatures to perform their own proper actions, lest any potency in natural agents be in vain.
54. Agitur ergo de possibilitate et de Dei potentia absoluta ; et quæritur utrum ita creaturæ repugnet potestas creandi, ut Deus, nec agendo præter ordinem jam constitutum, possit vel ulli creaturæ existenti, vel alii creaturæ creabili illam communicare. Hæc autem quæstio agitari potest de creatura ut causa principali, et ut causa instrumentali.
54. Therefore the question concerns possibility and the absolute power of God; and it is asked whether the power of creating is so repugnant to a creature that God, even by acting beyond the order already constituted, cannot communicate it either to any existing creature or to some other creatable creature. This question, however, can be treated concerning a creature as a principal cause and as an instrumental cause.
55. Si consideretur creatura ut causa creans principalis , duo iterum certa sunt. Primo, virtus creandi secundum omnimodam independentiam, qua est in Deo, non est communicabilis creaturæ ; hæc enim quemadmodum essentialiter dependet a Deo in essendo ita et in operando-secundo, virtus creandi adæquata objecto creabili, seu quæ se porrigit ad omnia creabilia, neque potest ulli creaturæ communicari. Nam a) "talis potentia," inquit Suarez Met. disp. 20.
52 De Deo Creatore. sec. 2. n. 4. "habet objectum infinite perfectum syncategorematice : nam in illa latitudine objecti, nullum potest assignari tantæ perfectionis, quin aliud majoris perfectionis creari possit, et ita in infinitum : ergo in potentia, quæ sua virtute continet totum illud objectum requireretur virtus, et perfectio simpliciter infinita : quia neque actu finita sufficere potest , alias posset æquari et superari ab aliqua parte objecti sui, neque potest virtus illa esse infinita syncategorematice, quia simul et actu habet existentem totam suam virtutem et perfectionem. "-2. "Secunda ratio, " ait idem auctor l. c., "adhiberi potest, quia impossibile est potentiam aliquam productivam se ipsam claudere sub objecto suo adæquato : quia impossibile est aliquid posse creare se ipsum : sed omnis creatura continetur sub ente creabili, ut per se notum est : ergo non potest habere pro objecto adæquato suæ potentiæ ens creabile ut sic : alias se ipsam clauderet sub objecto suo ."- Omnis creatura est finita, ac proinde potest alia dari ea perfectior ; ergo si illa haberet vim creandi adæquatam objecto creabili, posset ut causa principalis producere aliam creaturam se præstantiorem ; atqui hoc repugnat, siquidem non datur effectus major sua causa. Ergo .
52 De Deo Creatore. sec. 2. n. 4. "habet objectum infinite perfectum syncategorematice : nam in illa latitudine objecti, nullum potest assignari tantæ perfectionis, quin aliud majoris perfectionis creari possit, et ita in infinitum : ergo in potentia, quæ sua virtute continet totum illud objectum requireretur virtus, et perfectio simpliciter infinita : quia neque actu finita sufficere potest , alias posset æquari et superari ab aliqua parte objecti sui, neque potest virtus illa esse infinita syncategorematice, quia simul et actu habet existentem totam suam virtutem et perfectionem. "-2. "Secunda ratio, " ait idem auctor l. c., "adhiberi potest, quia impossibile est potentiam aliquam productivam se ipsam claudere sub objecto suo adæquato : quia impossibile est aliquid posse creare se ipsum : sed omnis creatura continetur sub ente creabili, ut per se notum est : ergo non potest habere pro objecto adæquato suæ potentiæ ens creabile ut sic : alias se ipsam clauderet sub objecto suo ."- Omnis creatura est finita, ac proinde potest alia dari ea perfectior ; ergo si illa haberet vim creandi adæquatam objecto creabili, posset ut causa principalis producere aliam creaturam se præstantiorem ; atqui hoc repugnat, siquidem non datur effectus major sua causa. Ergo .
55. If the creature is considered as a principal creating cause, two things again are certain. First, the virtue of creating according to the independence in every respect by which it exists in God is not communicable to a creature; for just as a creature depends essentially on God in being, so also in operating. Second, the virtue of creating adequate to the creatable object, or which extends itself to all creatable things, also cannot be communicated to any creature. For a) "such a potency," says Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 4, "has an object infinitely perfect syncategorematically; for in that breadth of object, nothing of such perfection can be assigned that another of greater perfection cannot be created, and so on to infinity. Therefore in a potency which by its own virtue contains that whole object, virtue and perfection simply infinite would be required; because neither can one actually finite suffice, otherwise it could be equaled and surpassed by some part of its own object; nor can that virtue be infinite syncategorematically, because it has its whole virtue and perfection existing simultaneously and actually." 2. "A second reason," says the same author in the cited place, "can be applied, because it is impossible for any productive potency to enclose itself under its own adequate object; because it is impossible for something to be able to create itself. But every creature is contained under creatable being, as is self-evident. Therefore it cannot have creatable being as such for the adequate object of its potency; otherwise it would enclose itself under its own object." Every creature is finite, and consequently another more perfect than it can be given; therefore, if that creature had a force of creating adequate to the creatable object, it could, as a principal cause, produce another creature more excellent than itself. But this is repugnant, since an effect is not given greater than its cause. Therefore.
56. Quæstio ergo potest solum procedere de virtute creandi in creatura, per modum causæ secundæ principalis dependentis in agendo a prima causa, et limitatæ ad certum ordinem vel speciem rerum creabilium. En, quomodo totam rem explicat de Valentia (tom. 1. disp. 3. q. 2. p. 4) : "Sciendum est , principalem causam eam dici quæ secundum virtutem, in ipsa existentem, potest effectum attingere, sive
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 53 illa virtus in illa existens sit supra naturam, sive præter naturam ejus, sive naturalis et naturæ ejus proportionata. Nam et contingit esse quasdam causas principales secundas per virtutem supernaturalem . Ut cum homo per habitus supernaturales producit actus supernaturales in intellectu et voluntate. Itaque quæstio est, utrum per potentiam Dei absolutam queat aliqua creatura quidpiam creare per virtutem suam ad id sufficientem : sive ea virtus ei, supra vel præter naturam ipsius, a Deo communicetur, sive sit ei naturalis : ut si Deus præter creaturas omnes , quæ jam sunt, conderet aliquam creaturam præstantissimam quæ esset tali virtute naturaliter prædita."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 53 illa virtus in illa existens sit supra naturam, sive præter naturam ejus, sive naturalis et naturæ ejus proportionata. Nam et contingit esse quasdam causas principales secundas per virtutem supernaturalem . Ut cum homo per habitus supernaturales producit actus supernaturales in intellectu et voluntate. Itaque quæstio est, utrum per potentiam Dei absolutam queat aliqua creatura quidpiam creare per virtutem suam ad id sufficientem : sive ea virtus ei, supra vel præter naturam ipsius, a Deo communicetur, sive sit ei naturalis : ut si Deus præter creaturas omnes , quæ jam sunt, conderet aliquam creaturam præstantissimam quæ esset tali virtute naturaliter prædita."
56. Therefore the question can proceed only concerning the virtue of creating in a creature by way of a secondary principal cause dependent in acting on the first cause, and limited to a certain order or species of creatable things. Behold how de Valentia explains the whole matter (vol. 1, disp. 3, q. 2, p. 4): "It must be known that a principal cause is called that which according to a virtue existing in it can reach the effect, whether that virtue existing in it is above its nature, or beyond its nature, or natural and proportioned to its nature. For it also happens that there are certain secondary principal causes through supernatural virtue. As when man through supernatural habits produces supernatural acts in the intellect and will. And so the question is whether, by the absolute power of God, some creature can create anything through its own virtue sufficient for this: whether that virtue is communicated to it by God above or beyond its own nature, or whether it is natural to it; as if God, besides all the creatures which now exist, were to found some most excellent creature which would be naturally endowed with such a virtue."
57. His positis, expenditur imprimis quæstio § II. Utrum virtus creandi communicabilis sit creaturæ ut causæ principali. PROP. VI. Virtus creativa, etiam dependens a causa prima et ad certum creaturarum ordinem limitata , non est ulli creaturæ, nec de potentia Dei absoluta, communicabilis. Prob. I. ex Patribus. S. Athanasius (serm. 3. con. Arianos), inquit : "Administrare creaturarum et servorum est. Condere autem et creare solius Dei ejusque Verbi et Sapientiæ. "- S. Basilius (con. Eunom. 1. 4. c. 3.), ait : "Si Filius creatura Dei est, omnis autem creatura est Creatoris serva ; Angelus Dei servus est non Filius . Potestas eadem non communis .. est facturæ cum factore ; nihil ergo commune Patri
54 De Deo Creatore. cum Filio, ne creatio quidem, etc. " Idem asserit Cyrillus Alex. (de Trinitate Dial. 6.), et (con . Jul. 1. 2.) inquit : "Repugnat maxime divinæ gloriæ putare quod aliis insint facultates procreandi, et in lucem edendi quæ non erant. Neque enim fas est dicere quæ singularia et propria sunt divinæ et ineffabilis naturæ (scribit contra Platonem dicentem res inferiores et sublunares creari per deos inferiores) ea posse naturaliter quibusdam inesse rebus a se conditis, etc." -Damascenus (1. 2. c. 3.) " Quicumque dicunt Angelos conditores esse qualiscumque substantiæ, ipsi os diaboli sunt, qui est eorum pater. Creaturæ enim cum sint, non sunt conditores. "-S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. c. 9. n. 15.) "Angeli nullam omnino possunt creare creaturam, solus enim unus cujuslibet naturæ seu minimæ Creator est Deus ... Creare naturam tam nullus Angelus potest, quam nec seipsum. Voluntas vero Angelica obedienter Deo subjecta ... de rebus subjectis tamquam materiam ministrare ... ut aliquid in tempore creetur, more agricolandi vel medendi potest." Eadem habet (de Civ. Dei 1. 12. c. 24.)-Theodoretus (hæret. fabul. 1. 5. c. 5.) "Est autem hoc quoque humanarum actionum imbecillitatis argumentum : quoniam enim ars omnis apud homines subjecta materia indiget existimarunt stolidi • Deum quoque sine materia creare non posse ; nec intellexerunt quantum Dei et hominum sit discrimen, et quod fieri non possit ut omnia habeat imago quæ archetypus habet, et quod homo quidem velut imago ex iis quæ extant fabricatur , Deus autem ex iis quæ non sunt." Similia habent S. Irenæus (1. 2 . c. 2. n. 5.) ; S. Ambrosius (Hex. 1. 3. с. 7.).
1 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 55 Unde : agunt Patres de virtute creativa 1. dependente a causa prima-2. limitata ad certum creaturarum ordinem ; et hanc negant esse creaturæ communicabilem-3 . etiam de potentia Dei absoluta. Ergo. Prob. antec. quoad 1. Dum PP. negant posse creaturas creare, simul dicunt posse alia facere, uti administrare materiam, etc.; sed hæc possunt facere uti causæ secundæ a prima dependentes. Ergo. Prob. quoad 2. Negant PP. posse creaturam aliquid vel minimum creare asserunt nihil posse creare -impugnant eos qui docebant Angelos vel deos minores posse res solum sublunares creare-opponunt potentiam creatam potentiæ divinæ non in eo quod illa possit aliqua creare, hæc omnia ; sed in eo quod illa exigat subjectum ut aliquid faciat, hæc possit sine subjecto agere. Ergo . Prob . quoad 3. Negant PP. virtutem creandi in creatura, quia est creatura, quia est imago non archetypus, quia non potest creatura creare seipsam : hæ vero rationes attingunt quamcumque creaturam possibilem, et potentiam Dei etiam absolutam. Negant iterum PP. eamdem virtutem Angelis, quos sæpe exhibent uti supremum genus creaturarum etiam creabilium : iidem vero negant non quia optime perspectum habebant gradum perfectionis supremi inter Angelos, sed quia, utut perfecti, Angeli sunt creaturæ. -Agentes contra Arianos, PP. dicunt : Filius Dei creavit cum Patre, ergo est Deus. Ariani autem concedebant Verbum esse nobilissimam omnium creaturarum etiam possibilium. Ergo . Prob . II. Ex communi Doctorum sensu. Etenim si Gabrielem et Durandum excipias, cæteri omnes do-
56 De Deo Creatore cuerunt impossibilitatem virtutis creandi in creatura. Vid Suarez et Valentia ll. cc. Prob . III. Argumento D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 5., quod sic ex Suaresio exponi potest : illius tantum potest esse actio et potentia, cujus potest esse effectus ; atqui effectus actionis et potentiæ creativæ potest esse solius Dei. Ergo. Prob . min. Effectus universalissimus non potest nisi causæ universalissimæ, quæ est solus Deus, convenire ; sicut enim universaliores effectus ad universaliores causas revocantur, ita universalissimus ad universalissimam. Atqui effectus creationis est universalissimus : nam per creationem non ita proprie producitur aliquid in quantum est hoc vel tale esse, sed in quantum est absolute ens ; ens autem secundum absolutam suam rationem est universalissimus effectus. Ergo . Decl. Tota vis hujus argumenti nititur eo principio "producere esse absolute, non in quantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis." Hoc autem potest triplicem sensum habere. Primus est quod solus Deus potest efficere ipsum esse in qualibet creatura, quasi causæ secundæ nullo modo concurrere possint active ad efficiendum esse existentiæ : hic sensus est falsus, et non est intentus a D. Th.- Secundus est quod solus Deus facere potest esse ex omnino non esse, seu facere in qualibet re omnia, quæ ad illius esse requiruntur : hic sensus est verus, non tamen eum intendit D. Th. in præfato argumento ; secus enim, uti patet, incideret in petitionem principii. Tertius est quod solus Deus respicit totum esse factibile, seu sola divina potentia adæquat totum
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 57 esse creabile: hic est verus sensus, quem intendit D. Th. At vero hoc posito, contra datum argumentum Dices : si ens dicitur effectus universalissimus , ac proinde solius Dei proprius, solum quatenus comprehendit totum creabile ; ex hoc sequitur quidem non posse communicari creaturæ virtutem creandi adæquatam objecto creabili, sed non sequitur non posse eidem communicari virtutem creandi limitatam ad certum ordinem creabilium : atqui nostra propositio negat in creatura possibilitatem virtutis creativæ ad certum creabilium ordinem limitatæ ; ergo hoc argumentum non probat thesim nostram.- Revera etsi ens absolute sumptum sit proprius effectus potentiæ creativæ ut sic, seu quæ se extendit ad omnia creabilia ; effectus tamen virtutis creativæ ad certum creabilium ordinem limitatæ videtur esse ens hoc vel tale, nempe esse creaturæ quæ continetur in eo ordine . Ergo. Resp. Si daretur in creatura virtus creandi ad certum ordinem creaturarum limitata, deberet in ea posse etiam dari virtus creandi adæquata toti latitudini entis participabilis ; ergo si illa virtus limitata admitteretur in creatura, deberet posse in ea admitti etiam potentia creandi habens pro objecto ens absolute ut ens. Aliis verbis, qui potest unum creare, potest omnia. Prob. antec. a) Omnis potentia complectitur omnia, quæ sub suo formali et adæquato objecto comprehenduntur : intellectus, ex. gr., cujus formale objectum est verum, complectitur omnia quæ participant rationem veritatis ; voluntas, cujus formale objectum est bonum, complectitur omnia, in quibus invenitur ratio bonitatis. Atqui objectum formale et
58 De Deo Creatore. adæquatum virtutis creativæ, quæcumque ea sit, est ens absolute ut ens (objectum virtutis creandi adæquatæ toti entis participabilis latitudini). Ergo si virtus creativa etiam limitata ad certum ordinem creabilium admitteretur in creatura , deberet in ea admitti etiam virtus creativa adæquata toti latitudini entis participabilis. Prob . hæc min. Certum est quod prima ratio, secundum quam virtus creativa, etiam limitata, attingit suum effectum est ratio entis. "Nam, " inquit Suarez, 1. c. n. 28., " effectus dicitur fieri per se primo secundum eam rationem quæ non præcessit ex parte effectus: nam si præcessit, jam non per se, sed per accidens fieri dicetur, nam cum ignis generatur ex aere, non fit per se corpus, neque elementum, fit autem per se ignis. Sic igitur in omni creatione fit per se ens seu esse, non solum ut tale, sed simpliciter ut esse : quia nulla ratio entis aut esse supponitur ad creationem, cum fit ex nihilo." -Certum est quod id quod distinguit creationem ab omni alia productionis specie, est quod res fiat ex nihilo, seu ex non ente ; ac proinde id quod per creationem primo fit est ipsum esse. (Vid. n . 8.) . Unde : id quod primo attingit aliqua potentia , et ratione cujus attingit quodcumque aliud, et quod eam distinguit a quacumque alia potentia, est ejus formale objectum ; atqui quod primo attingit potentia creativa, etiam limitata ad certum ordinem, et ratione cujus attingit quemcumque effectum, et quod eam distinguit a quacumque alia potentia productiva , est ens ut ens . Ergo . Prob. idem antec. b) Si ex una parte supponatur in creatura potentia creativa, et ex alia dicatur limitata ad certum ordinem creabilium ; hæc limitatio vel
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 59 peteretur ex ipsa potentia, vel ex ejus objecto, vel ex modo illud attingendi. Atqui non potest peti ex ipso objecto ; quia in objecto nihil aliud requiritur, nisi possibilitas, et hæc invenitur in omnibus creabilibus : non ex parte modi attingendi illud ; quia modus est producere ex nihilo, et hæc difficultas jam superata est ab eo, qui supponitur posse vel unum creare : non ex ipsa potentia ; quia cum creatio nullum præsupponat subjectum, potentia creandi in creatura videtur esse ipsa ejus voluntas, cui communicata esset efficacia divina "dixit, et facta sunt ; mandavit, et creata sunt ; " voluntas autem potest velle sicut unum, ita omnia creabilia. Ergo.-Dices : limitatio illa peteretur ex ipso subjecto, in quo esset potentia creandi; creatura enim est finita.-Resp . Sed si aliqua potentia inspecta in se ipsa, in suo objecto, in modo illud attingendi, nullam patitur limitationem ; nequit dici quod limitetur a subjecto limitato, in quo est ; sed potius quod cum sit infinita, nequit in limitato subjecto reperiri. Prob . IV. Argumento, quod indicat D. Th. 1. c. a 5. ad 2. Ita exponitur a Suaresio 1. c. nn. 36.38. "Potentia creandi esse debet necessario infinita : ergo non potest esse creata : et eodem modo inferri potest necessario extendi ad omne creabile, nam potentia simpliciter infinita, est etiam universalissima et objectum ejus esse debet infinitum quantum esse potest in ratione objecti factibilis . Antecedens probatur a D. Thoma, quia virtus potentiæ non tantum attenditur ex re facta, sed etiam ex modo ; sed modus producendi ex nihilo indicat infinitam vim in agendo ; nam ad producendum aliquid ex potentia
60 De Deo. Creatore. remota , requiritur magna virtus, et ex remotiori major : ergo ad producendum ex nulla potentia, seu ex nihilo requiritur infinita virtus. "- "Communiter fundant illam consecutionem in maxima improportione, quæ est inter ens et nihil. Nam ad agendum ex potentia magis elongata ab actu, requiritur major virtus : ergo qua proportione effectus fiet ex remotiore potentia, eadem requiretur major virtus : ergo ubi elongatio actus a potentia est sine ulla proportione ibi major sine ulla proportione virtus requiretur, hæc autem non est nisi infinita : nam omnis virtus finita servat aliquam proportionem ad alteram finitam. Qui argumentandi modus frequens est apud Aristotelem ut constat ex 4. et 8. Phys . Ex quo simili proportione argumentatur Cajetanus , nam si ad producendum aliquid ex nihilo sufficeret virtus finita, sequeretur, æqualem virtutem requiri ad producendum aliquid ex aliqua materia, et ex nihilo : sit enim virtus creatrix finita ut quatuor : virtus autem producens ex materia remota sit ut duo : ergo virtus necessaria ad producendum ex materia duplo remotiori, erit saltem ut tria : ergo ad producendum ex ulteriori materia duplo etiam remotiori , erit necessaria virtus ut quatuor : ergo tanta virtus requiretur ad producendum aliquid ex aliqua materia, quanta ad creandum. "
54 De Deo Creatore. cum Filio, ne creatio quidem, etc. " Idem asserit Cyrillus Alex. (de Trinitate Dial. 6.), et (con . Jul. 1. 2.) inquit : "Repugnat maxime divinæ gloriæ putare quod aliis insint facultates procreandi, et in lucem edendi quæ non erant. Neque enim fas est dicere quæ singularia et propria sunt divinæ et ineffabilis naturæ (scribit contra Platonem dicentem res inferiores et sublunares creari per deos inferiores) ea posse naturaliter quibusdam inesse rebus a se conditis, etc." -Damascenus (1. 2. c. 3.) " Quicumque dicunt Angelos conditores esse qualiscumque substantiæ, ipsi os diaboli sunt, qui est eorum pater. Creaturæ enim cum sint, non sunt conditores. "-S. Aug. (de Gen. ad litt. c. 9. n. 15.) "Angeli nullam omnino possunt creare creaturam, solus enim unus cujuslibet naturæ seu minimæ Creator est Deus ... Creare naturam tam nullus Angelus potest, quam nec seipsum. Voluntas vero Angelica obedienter Deo subjecta ... de rebus subjectis tamquam materiam ministrare ... ut aliquid in tempore creetur, more agricolandi vel medendi potest." Eadem habet (de Civ. Dei 1. 12. c. 24.)-Theodoretus (hæret. fabul. 1. 5. c. 5.) "Est autem hoc quoque humanarum actionum imbecillitatis argumentum : quoniam enim ars omnis apud homines subjecta materia indiget existimarunt stolidi • Deum quoque sine materia creare non posse ; nec intellexerunt quantum Dei et hominum sit discrimen, et quod fieri non possit ut omnia habeat imago quæ archetypus habet, et quod homo quidem velut imago ex iis quæ extant fabricatur , Deus autem ex iis quæ non sunt." Similia habent S. Irenæus (1. 2 . c. 2. n. 5.) ; S. Ambrosius (Hex. 1. 3. с. 7.).
1 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 55 Unde : agunt Patres de virtute creativa 1. dependente a causa prima-2. limitata ad certum creaturarum ordinem ; et hanc negant esse creaturæ communicabilem-3 . etiam de potentia Dei absoluta. Ergo. Prob. antec. quoad 1. Dum PP. negant posse creaturas creare, simul dicunt posse alia facere, uti administrare materiam, etc.; sed hæc possunt facere uti causæ secundæ a prima dependentes. Ergo. Prob. quoad 2. Negant PP. posse creaturam aliquid vel minimum creare asserunt nihil posse creare -impugnant eos qui docebant Angelos vel deos minores posse res solum sublunares creare-opponunt potentiam creatam potentiæ divinæ non in eo quod illa possit aliqua creare, hæc omnia ; sed in eo quod illa exigat subjectum ut aliquid faciat, hæc possit sine subjecto agere. Ergo . Prob . quoad 3. Negant PP. virtutem creandi in creatura, quia est creatura, quia est imago non archetypus, quia non potest creatura creare seipsam : hæ vero rationes attingunt quamcumque creaturam possibilem, et potentiam Dei etiam absolutam. Negant iterum PP. eamdem virtutem Angelis, quos sæpe exhibent uti supremum genus creaturarum etiam creabilium : iidem vero negant non quia optime perspectum habebant gradum perfectionis supremi inter Angelos, sed quia, utut perfecti, Angeli sunt creaturæ. -Agentes contra Arianos, PP. dicunt : Filius Dei creavit cum Patre, ergo est Deus. Ariani autem concedebant Verbum esse nobilissimam omnium creaturarum etiam possibilium. Ergo . Prob . II. Ex communi Doctorum sensu. Etenim si Gabrielem et Durandum excipias, cæteri omnes do-
56 De Deo Creatore cuerunt impossibilitatem virtutis creandi in creatura. Vid Suarez et Valentia ll. cc. Prob . III. Argumento D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 5., quod sic ex Suaresio exponi potest : illius tantum potest esse actio et potentia, cujus potest esse effectus ; atqui effectus actionis et potentiæ creativæ potest esse solius Dei. Ergo. Prob . min. Effectus universalissimus non potest nisi causæ universalissimæ, quæ est solus Deus, convenire ; sicut enim universaliores effectus ad universaliores causas revocantur, ita universalissimus ad universalissimam. Atqui effectus creationis est universalissimus : nam per creationem non ita proprie producitur aliquid in quantum est hoc vel tale esse, sed in quantum est absolute ens ; ens autem secundum absolutam suam rationem est universalissimus effectus. Ergo . Decl. Tota vis hujus argumenti nititur eo principio "producere esse absolute, non in quantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis." Hoc autem potest triplicem sensum habere. Primus est quod solus Deus potest efficere ipsum esse in qualibet creatura, quasi causæ secundæ nullo modo concurrere possint active ad efficiendum esse existentiæ : hic sensus est falsus, et non est intentus a D. Th.- Secundus est quod solus Deus facere potest esse ex omnino non esse, seu facere in qualibet re omnia, quæ ad illius esse requiruntur : hic sensus est verus, non tamen eum intendit D. Th. in præfato argumento ; secus enim, uti patet, incideret in petitionem principii. Tertius est quod solus Deus respicit totum esse factibile, seu sola divina potentia adæquat totum
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 57 esse creabile: hic est verus sensus, quem intendit D. Th. At vero hoc posito, contra datum argumentum Dices : si ens dicitur effectus universalissimus , ac proinde solius Dei proprius, solum quatenus comprehendit totum creabile ; ex hoc sequitur quidem non posse communicari creaturæ virtutem creandi adæquatam objecto creabili, sed non sequitur non posse eidem communicari virtutem creandi limitatam ad certum ordinem creabilium : atqui nostra propositio negat in creatura possibilitatem virtutis creativæ ad certum creabilium ordinem limitatæ ; ergo hoc argumentum non probat thesim nostram.- Revera etsi ens absolute sumptum sit proprius effectus potentiæ creativæ ut sic, seu quæ se extendit ad omnia creabilia ; effectus tamen virtutis creativæ ad certum creabilium ordinem limitatæ videtur esse ens hoc vel tale, nempe esse creaturæ quæ continetur in eo ordine . Ergo. Resp. Si daretur in creatura virtus creandi ad certum ordinem creaturarum limitata, deberet in ea posse etiam dari virtus creandi adæquata toti latitudini entis participabilis ; ergo si illa virtus limitata admitteretur in creatura, deberet posse in ea admitti etiam potentia creandi habens pro objecto ens absolute ut ens. Aliis verbis, qui potest unum creare, potest omnia. Prob. antec. a) Omnis potentia complectitur omnia, quæ sub suo formali et adæquato objecto comprehenduntur : intellectus, ex. gr., cujus formale objectum est verum, complectitur omnia quæ participant rationem veritatis ; voluntas, cujus formale objectum est bonum, complectitur omnia, in quibus invenitur ratio bonitatis. Atqui objectum formale et
58 De Deo Creatore. adæquatum virtutis creativæ, quæcumque ea sit, est ens absolute ut ens (objectum virtutis creandi adæquatæ toti entis participabilis latitudini). Ergo si virtus creativa etiam limitata ad certum ordinem creabilium admitteretur in creatura , deberet in ea admitti etiam virtus creativa adæquata toti latitudini entis participabilis. Prob . hæc min. Certum est quod prima ratio, secundum quam virtus creativa, etiam limitata, attingit suum effectum est ratio entis. "Nam, " inquit Suarez, 1. c. n. 28., " effectus dicitur fieri per se primo secundum eam rationem quæ non præcessit ex parte effectus: nam si præcessit, jam non per se, sed per accidens fieri dicetur, nam cum ignis generatur ex aere, non fit per se corpus, neque elementum, fit autem per se ignis. Sic igitur in omni creatione fit per se ens seu esse, non solum ut tale, sed simpliciter ut esse : quia nulla ratio entis aut esse supponitur ad creationem, cum fit ex nihilo." -Certum est quod id quod distinguit creationem ab omni alia productionis specie, est quod res fiat ex nihilo, seu ex non ente ; ac proinde id quod per creationem primo fit est ipsum esse. (Vid. n . 8.) . Unde : id quod primo attingit aliqua potentia , et ratione cujus attingit quodcumque aliud, et quod eam distinguit a quacumque alia potentia, est ejus formale objectum ; atqui quod primo attingit potentia creativa, etiam limitata ad certum ordinem, et ratione cujus attingit quemcumque effectum, et quod eam distinguit a quacumque alia potentia productiva , est ens ut ens . Ergo . Prob. idem antec. b) Si ex una parte supponatur in creatura potentia creativa, et ex alia dicatur limitata ad certum ordinem creabilium ; hæc limitatio vel
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 59 peteretur ex ipsa potentia, vel ex ejus objecto, vel ex modo illud attingendi. Atqui non potest peti ex ipso objecto ; quia in objecto nihil aliud requiritur, nisi possibilitas, et hæc invenitur in omnibus creabilibus : non ex parte modi attingendi illud ; quia modus est producere ex nihilo, et hæc difficultas jam superata est ab eo, qui supponitur posse vel unum creare : non ex ipsa potentia ; quia cum creatio nullum præsupponat subjectum, potentia creandi in creatura videtur esse ipsa ejus voluntas, cui communicata esset efficacia divina "dixit, et facta sunt ; mandavit, et creata sunt ; " voluntas autem potest velle sicut unum, ita omnia creabilia. Ergo.-Dices : limitatio illa peteretur ex ipso subjecto, in quo esset potentia creandi; creatura enim est finita.-Resp . Sed si aliqua potentia inspecta in se ipsa, in suo objecto, in modo illud attingendi, nullam patitur limitationem ; nequit dici quod limitetur a subjecto limitato, in quo est ; sed potius quod cum sit infinita, nequit in limitato subjecto reperiri. Prob . IV. Argumento, quod indicat D. Th. 1. c. a 5. ad 2. Ita exponitur a Suaresio 1. c. nn. 36.38. "Potentia creandi esse debet necessario infinita : ergo non potest esse creata : et eodem modo inferri potest necessario extendi ad omne creabile, nam potentia simpliciter infinita, est etiam universalissima et objectum ejus esse debet infinitum quantum esse potest in ratione objecti factibilis . Antecedens probatur a D. Thoma, quia virtus potentiæ non tantum attenditur ex re facta, sed etiam ex modo ; sed modus producendi ex nihilo indicat infinitam vim in agendo ; nam ad producendum aliquid ex potentia
60 De Deo. Creatore. remota , requiritur magna virtus, et ex remotiori major : ergo ad producendum ex nulla potentia, seu ex nihilo requiritur infinita virtus. "- "Communiter fundant illam consecutionem in maxima improportione, quæ est inter ens et nihil. Nam ad agendum ex potentia magis elongata ab actu, requiritur major virtus : ergo qua proportione effectus fiet ex remotiore potentia, eadem requiretur major virtus : ergo ubi elongatio actus a potentia est sine ulla proportione ibi major sine ulla proportione virtus requiretur, hæc autem non est nisi infinita : nam omnis virtus finita servat aliquam proportionem ad alteram finitam. Qui argumentandi modus frequens est apud Aristotelem ut constat ex 4. et 8. Phys . Ex quo simili proportione argumentatur Cajetanus , nam si ad producendum aliquid ex nihilo sufficeret virtus finita, sequeretur, æqualem virtutem requiri ad producendum aliquid ex aliqua materia, et ex nihilo : sit enim virtus creatrix finita ut quatuor : virtus autem producens ex materia remota sit ut duo : ergo virtus necessaria ad producendum ex materia duplo remotiori, erit saltem ut tria : ergo ad producendum ex ulteriori materia duplo etiam remotiori , erit necessaria virtus ut quatuor : ergo tanta virtus requiretur ad producendum aliquid ex aliqua materia, quanta ad creandum. "
57. These things having been posited, the question is first weighed:
Proposition VI. Creative virtue, even dependent on the first cause and limited to a certain order of creatures, is not communicable to any creature, not even by the absolute power of God.
First proof, from the Fathers. St. Athanasius (Sermon 3 Against the Arians) says: "To administer belongs to creatures and servants. But to found and create belongs to God alone and to his Word and Wisdom." St. Basil (Against Eunomius, book 4, chapter 3) says: "If the Son is a creature of God, and every creature is the servant of the Creator, an angel is the servant of God, not the Son. The same power is not common to the thing made and to the maker; therefore nothing is common to the Father with the Son, not even creation, etc." Cyril of Alexandria asserts the same (On the Trinity, Dialogue 6), and (Against Julian, book 2) says: "It is maximally repugnant to the divine glory to think that faculties of producing and bringing into light things which were not are present in others. For it is not right to say that the things which are singular and proper to the divine and ineffable nature (he writes against Plato, who says that inferior and sublunary things are created through inferior gods) can naturally be present in certain things founded by him, etc." Damascene (book 2, chapter 3): "Whoever say that angels are founders of any substance whatsoever are themselves the mouth of the devil, who is their father. For since they are creatures, they are not founders." St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, chapter 9, n. 15): "Angels can create no creature at all; for the one sole Creator of any nature whatever, even the least, is God ... No angel can create a nature any more than he can create himself. But the angelic will, obediently subject to God ... can minister from subject things as from matter ... so that something may be created in time, in the manner of farming or of healing." He has the same things in The City of God, book 12, chapter 24. Theodoret (Heretical Fables, book 5, chapter 5): "This also is an argument of the weakness of human actions: for since every art among men needs underlying matter, foolish men thought that God also could not create without matter; nor did they understand how great is the difference between God and men, and that it cannot happen that the image have all the things which the archetype has, and that man indeed, as an image, fashions from things which exist, but God from things which are not." Similar things are found in St. Irenaeus (book 2, chapter 2, n. 5) and St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, book 3, chapter 7).
Hence: the Fathers treat of creative virtue 1. dependent on the first cause; 2. limited to a certain order of creatures, and they deny that this is communicable to a creature; 3. even by the absolute power of God. Therefore.
The antecedent is proved as to 1. While the Fathers deny that creatures can create, they at the same time say that they can do other things, such as administer matter, etc.; but they can do these things as secondary causes dependent on the first. Therefore.
It is proved as to 2. The Fathers deny that a creature can create anything, even the least thing; they assert that it can create nothing; they attack those who taught that angels or lesser gods can create only sublunary things; they oppose created potency to divine potency, not in this respect, that the former can create some things while the latter can create all things, but in this, that the former requires a subject in order to make something, while the latter can act without a subject. Therefore.
It is proved as to 3. The Fathers deny the virtue of creating in a creature because it is a creature, because it is an image and not the archetype, because a creature cannot create itself; but these reasons touch any possible creature whatsoever, and even the absolute power of God. Again, the Fathers deny the same virtue to angels, whom they often present as the supreme genus of creatures, even of creatable creatures; and they deny this not because they had a perfectly surveyed knowledge of the grade of perfection of the highest among the angels, but because, however perfect, angels are creatures. Acting against the Arians, the Fathers say: the Son of God created with the Father; therefore he is God. But the Arians conceded that the Word is the noblest of all creatures, even possible creatures. Therefore.
Second proof. From the common judgment of the Doctors. For if you except Gabriel and Durandus, all the rest taught the impossibility of the virtue of creating in a creature. See Suarez and Valentia in the cited places.
Third proof. From the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5, which can be explained from Suarez in this way: action and potency can belong only to him to whom the effect can belong; but the effect of creative action and potency can belong to God alone. Therefore.
The minor is proved. The most universal effect cannot belong except to the most universal cause, which is God alone; for just as more universal effects are referred back to more universal causes, so the most universal effect is referred back to the most universal cause. But the effect of creation is the most universal; for through creation something is not so properly produced insofar as it is this or such a being, but insofar as it is absolutely being; and being according to its absolute notion is the most universal effect. Therefore.
Explanation. The whole force of this argument rests on the principle: "to produce being absolutely, not insofar as it is this or such a being, belongs to the notion of creation." But this can have a threefold sense. The first is that God alone can effect being itself in any creature, as though secondary causes could in no way actively concur in effecting the being of existence; this sense is false, and is not intended by St. Thomas. The second is that God alone can make being from altogether non-being, or make in any thing all the things which are required for its being; this sense is true, yet St. Thomas does not intend it in the aforesaid argument; otherwise, as is clear, he would fall into begging the principle. The third is that God alone regards the whole of makeable being, or that the divine power alone is adequate to the whole of creatable being; this is the true sense which St. Thomas intends.
But, this being posited, against the given argument you will say: if being is called the most universal effect, and consequently proper to God alone, only insofar as it comprehends the whole of the creatable, from this it indeed follows that the virtue of creating adequate to the creatable object cannot be communicated to a creature; but it does not follow that there cannot be communicated to the same creature a virtue of creating limited to a certain order of creatable things. But our proposition denies in a creature the possibility of creative virtue limited to a certain order of creatable things; therefore this argument does not prove our thesis. In reality, although being taken absolutely is the proper effect of creative potency as such, or as it extends itself to all creatable things, nevertheless the effect of creative virtue limited to a certain order of creatable things seems to be this or such a being, namely the being of the creature which is contained in that order. Therefore.
Response. If there were given in a creature a virtue of creating limited to a certain order of creatures, there ought also to be able to be given in it a virtue of creating adequate to the whole breadth of participable being; therefore, if that limited virtue were admitted in a creature, there ought also to be able to be admitted in it a potency of creating having being absolutely as being for its object. In other words, he who can create one thing can create all things.
The antecedent is proved: a) Every potency embraces all things which are comprehended under its formal and adequate object: the intellect, for example, whose formal object is the true, embraces all things which participate in the notion of truth; the will, whose formal object is the good, embraces all things in which the notion of goodness is found. But the formal and adequate object of creative virtue, whatever it may be, is being absolutely as being (the object of the virtue of creating adequate to the whole breadth of participable being). Therefore, if creative virtue, even limited to a certain order of creatable things, were admitted in a creature, there ought also to be admitted in it a creative virtue adequate to the whole breadth of participable being. This minor is proved. It is certain that the first notion according to which creative virtue, even limited creative virtue, reaches its effect is the notion of being. "For," says Suarez, in the cited place, n. 28, "an effect is said to be made per se first according to that notion which did not precede on the part of the effect; for if it did precede, it will now be said to be made not per se, but per accidens. For when fire is generated from air, body is not made per se, nor element, but fire is made per se. Thus, therefore, in every creation being or to-be is made per se, not only as such, but simply as to-be, because no notion of being or to-be is presupposed for creation, since it is made out of nothing." It is certain that what distinguishes creation from every other species of production is that a thing is made out of nothing, or out of non-being; and consequently what is first made through creation is being itself (see n. 8). Hence: that which some potency first reaches, and by reason of which it reaches anything else whatever, and which distinguishes it from any other potency, is its formal object; but what creative potency first reaches, even when limited to a certain order, and by reason of which it reaches any effect whatever, and which distinguishes it from any other productive potency, is being as being. Therefore.
The same antecedent is proved: b) If on the one hand creative potency is supposed in a creature, and on the other it is said to be limited to a certain order of creatable things, this limitation would be sought either from the potency itself, or from its object, or from the mode of reaching that object. But it cannot be sought from the object itself, because nothing else is required in the object except possibility, and this is found in all creatable things; not from the mode of reaching it, because the mode is to produce out of nothing, and this difficulty has already been overcome by him who is supposed to be able to create even one thing; not from the potency itself, because since creation presupposes no subject, the potency of creating in a creature seems to be its very will, to which the divine efficacy would have been communicated: "he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created"; but the will can will all creatable things just as it can will one. Therefore. You will say: that limitation would be sought from the subject itself in which the potency of creating would be, for the creature is finite. Response. But if some potency, considered in itself, in its object, and in the mode of reaching that object, suffers no limitation, it cannot be said that it is limited by the limited subject in which it is; but rather that, since it is infinite, it cannot be found in a limited subject.
Fourth proof. From the argument which St. Thomas indicates in the cited place, article 5, reply to objection 2. It is explained by Suarez in the cited place, nn. 36-38: "The potency of creating must necessarily be infinite; therefore it cannot be created. And in the same way it can be inferred that it necessarily extends to every creatable thing, for a potency simply infinite is also most universal, and its object must be infinite as much as it can be in the notion of a makeable object. The antecedent is proved by St. Thomas, because the virtue of a potency is considered not only from the thing made, but also from the mode; but the mode of producing out of nothing indicates an infinite force in acting. For to produce something from remote potency, great virtue is required, and from a more remote potency a greater one; therefore to produce from no potency, or out of nothing, infinite virtue is required." "They commonly found that consequence on the greatest disproportion which exists between being and nothing. For to act from a potency more distant from act, a greater virtue is required; therefore in the proportion in which the effect will be made from a more remote potency, in the same proportion a greater virtue will be required. Therefore where the distance of act from potency is without any proportion, there a greater virtue without any proportion will be required; but this is nothing other than infinite, for every finite virtue preserves some proportion to another finite virtue. This mode of arguing is frequent in Aristotle, as is clear from books 4 and 8 of the Physics. From this Cajetan argues by a similar proportion: for if finite virtue sufficed to produce something out of nothing, it would follow that equal virtue is required to produce something from some matter and out of nothing. For let the creative virtue be finite as four; but let the virtue producing a thing from remote matter be as two; therefore the virtue necessary for producing from matter twice as remote will be at least as three; therefore for producing from further matter, also twice as remote, virtue as four will be necessary; therefore as much virtue will be required to produce something from some matter as to create."
Proposition VI. Creative virtue, even dependent on the first cause and limited to a certain order of creatures, is not communicable to any creature, not even by the absolute power of God.
First proof, from the Fathers. St. Athanasius (Sermon 3 Against the Arians) says: "To administer belongs to creatures and servants. But to found and create belongs to God alone and to his Word and Wisdom." St. Basil (Against Eunomius, book 4, chapter 3) says: "If the Son is a creature of God, and every creature is the servant of the Creator, an angel is the servant of God, not the Son. The same power is not common to the thing made and to the maker; therefore nothing is common to the Father with the Son, not even creation, etc." Cyril of Alexandria asserts the same (On the Trinity, Dialogue 6), and (Against Julian, book 2) says: "It is maximally repugnant to the divine glory to think that faculties of producing and bringing into light things which were not are present in others. For it is not right to say that the things which are singular and proper to the divine and ineffable nature (he writes against Plato, who says that inferior and sublunary things are created through inferior gods) can naturally be present in certain things founded by him, etc." Damascene (book 2, chapter 3): "Whoever say that angels are founders of any substance whatsoever are themselves the mouth of the devil, who is their father. For since they are creatures, they are not founders." St. Augustine (On Genesis Literally, chapter 9, n. 15): "Angels can create no creature at all; for the one sole Creator of any nature whatever, even the least, is God ... No angel can create a nature any more than he can create himself. But the angelic will, obediently subject to God ... can minister from subject things as from matter ... so that something may be created in time, in the manner of farming or of healing." He has the same things in The City of God, book 12, chapter 24. Theodoret (Heretical Fables, book 5, chapter 5): "This also is an argument of the weakness of human actions: for since every art among men needs underlying matter, foolish men thought that God also could not create without matter; nor did they understand how great is the difference between God and men, and that it cannot happen that the image have all the things which the archetype has, and that man indeed, as an image, fashions from things which exist, but God from things which are not." Similar things are found in St. Irenaeus (book 2, chapter 2, n. 5) and St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron, book 3, chapter 7).
Hence: the Fathers treat of creative virtue 1. dependent on the first cause; 2. limited to a certain order of creatures, and they deny that this is communicable to a creature; 3. even by the absolute power of God. Therefore.
The antecedent is proved as to 1. While the Fathers deny that creatures can create, they at the same time say that they can do other things, such as administer matter, etc.; but they can do these things as secondary causes dependent on the first. Therefore.
It is proved as to 2. The Fathers deny that a creature can create anything, even the least thing; they assert that it can create nothing; they attack those who taught that angels or lesser gods can create only sublunary things; they oppose created potency to divine potency, not in this respect, that the former can create some things while the latter can create all things, but in this, that the former requires a subject in order to make something, while the latter can act without a subject. Therefore.
It is proved as to 3. The Fathers deny the virtue of creating in a creature because it is a creature, because it is an image and not the archetype, because a creature cannot create itself; but these reasons touch any possible creature whatsoever, and even the absolute power of God. Again, the Fathers deny the same virtue to angels, whom they often present as the supreme genus of creatures, even of creatable creatures; and they deny this not because they had a perfectly surveyed knowledge of the grade of perfection of the highest among the angels, but because, however perfect, angels are creatures. Acting against the Arians, the Fathers say: the Son of God created with the Father; therefore he is God. But the Arians conceded that the Word is the noblest of all creatures, even possible creatures. Therefore.
Second proof. From the common judgment of the Doctors. For if you except Gabriel and Durandus, all the rest taught the impossibility of the virtue of creating in a creature. See Suarez and Valentia in the cited places.
Third proof. From the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5, which can be explained from Suarez in this way: action and potency can belong only to him to whom the effect can belong; but the effect of creative action and potency can belong to God alone. Therefore.
The minor is proved. The most universal effect cannot belong except to the most universal cause, which is God alone; for just as more universal effects are referred back to more universal causes, so the most universal effect is referred back to the most universal cause. But the effect of creation is the most universal; for through creation something is not so properly produced insofar as it is this or such a being, but insofar as it is absolutely being; and being according to its absolute notion is the most universal effect. Therefore.
Explanation. The whole force of this argument rests on the principle: "to produce being absolutely, not insofar as it is this or such a being, belongs to the notion of creation." But this can have a threefold sense. The first is that God alone can effect being itself in any creature, as though secondary causes could in no way actively concur in effecting the being of existence; this sense is false, and is not intended by St. Thomas. The second is that God alone can make being from altogether non-being, or make in any thing all the things which are required for its being; this sense is true, yet St. Thomas does not intend it in the aforesaid argument; otherwise, as is clear, he would fall into begging the principle. The third is that God alone regards the whole of makeable being, or that the divine power alone is adequate to the whole of creatable being; this is the true sense which St. Thomas intends.
But, this being posited, against the given argument you will say: if being is called the most universal effect, and consequently proper to God alone, only insofar as it comprehends the whole of the creatable, from this it indeed follows that the virtue of creating adequate to the creatable object cannot be communicated to a creature; but it does not follow that there cannot be communicated to the same creature a virtue of creating limited to a certain order of creatable things. But our proposition denies in a creature the possibility of creative virtue limited to a certain order of creatable things; therefore this argument does not prove our thesis. In reality, although being taken absolutely is the proper effect of creative potency as such, or as it extends itself to all creatable things, nevertheless the effect of creative virtue limited to a certain order of creatable things seems to be this or such a being, namely the being of the creature which is contained in that order. Therefore.
Response. If there were given in a creature a virtue of creating limited to a certain order of creatures, there ought also to be able to be given in it a virtue of creating adequate to the whole breadth of participable being; therefore, if that limited virtue were admitted in a creature, there ought also to be able to be admitted in it a potency of creating having being absolutely as being for its object. In other words, he who can create one thing can create all things.
The antecedent is proved: a) Every potency embraces all things which are comprehended under its formal and adequate object: the intellect, for example, whose formal object is the true, embraces all things which participate in the notion of truth; the will, whose formal object is the good, embraces all things in which the notion of goodness is found. But the formal and adequate object of creative virtue, whatever it may be, is being absolutely as being (the object of the virtue of creating adequate to the whole breadth of participable being). Therefore, if creative virtue, even limited to a certain order of creatable things, were admitted in a creature, there ought also to be admitted in it a creative virtue adequate to the whole breadth of participable being. This minor is proved. It is certain that the first notion according to which creative virtue, even limited creative virtue, reaches its effect is the notion of being. "For," says Suarez, in the cited place, n. 28, "an effect is said to be made per se first according to that notion which did not precede on the part of the effect; for if it did precede, it will now be said to be made not per se, but per accidens. For when fire is generated from air, body is not made per se, nor element, but fire is made per se. Thus, therefore, in every creation being or to-be is made per se, not only as such, but simply as to-be, because no notion of being or to-be is presupposed for creation, since it is made out of nothing." It is certain that what distinguishes creation from every other species of production is that a thing is made out of nothing, or out of non-being; and consequently what is first made through creation is being itself (see n. 8). Hence: that which some potency first reaches, and by reason of which it reaches anything else whatever, and which distinguishes it from any other potency, is its formal object; but what creative potency first reaches, even when limited to a certain order, and by reason of which it reaches any effect whatever, and which distinguishes it from any other productive potency, is being as being. Therefore.
The same antecedent is proved: b) If on the one hand creative potency is supposed in a creature, and on the other it is said to be limited to a certain order of creatable things, this limitation would be sought either from the potency itself, or from its object, or from the mode of reaching that object. But it cannot be sought from the object itself, because nothing else is required in the object except possibility, and this is found in all creatable things; not from the mode of reaching it, because the mode is to produce out of nothing, and this difficulty has already been overcome by him who is supposed to be able to create even one thing; not from the potency itself, because since creation presupposes no subject, the potency of creating in a creature seems to be its very will, to which the divine efficacy would have been communicated: "he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created"; but the will can will all creatable things just as it can will one. Therefore. You will say: that limitation would be sought from the subject itself in which the potency of creating would be, for the creature is finite. Response. But if some potency, considered in itself, in its object, and in the mode of reaching that object, suffers no limitation, it cannot be said that it is limited by the limited subject in which it is; but rather that, since it is infinite, it cannot be found in a limited subject.
Fourth proof. From the argument which St. Thomas indicates in the cited place, article 5, reply to objection 2. It is explained by Suarez in the cited place, nn. 36-38: "The potency of creating must necessarily be infinite; therefore it cannot be created. And in the same way it can be inferred that it necessarily extends to every creatable thing, for a potency simply infinite is also most universal, and its object must be infinite as much as it can be in the notion of a makeable object. The antecedent is proved by St. Thomas, because the virtue of a potency is considered not only from the thing made, but also from the mode; but the mode of producing out of nothing indicates an infinite force in acting. For to produce something from remote potency, great virtue is required, and from a more remote potency a greater one; therefore to produce from no potency, or out of nothing, infinite virtue is required." "They commonly found that consequence on the greatest disproportion which exists between being and nothing. For to act from a potency more distant from act, a greater virtue is required; therefore in the proportion in which the effect will be made from a more remote potency, in the same proportion a greater virtue will be required. Therefore where the distance of act from potency is without any proportion, there a greater virtue without any proportion will be required; but this is nothing other than infinite, for every finite virtue preserves some proportion to another finite virtue. This mode of arguing is frequent in Aristotle, as is clear from books 4 and 8 of the Physics. From this Cajetan argues by a similar proportion: for if finite virtue sufficed to produce something out of nothing, it would follow that equal virtue is required to produce something from some matter and out of nothing. For let the creative virtue be finite as four; but let the virtue producing a thing from remote matter be as two; therefore the virtue necessary for producing from matter twice as remote will be at least as three; therefore for producing from further matter, also twice as remote, virtue as four will be necessary; therefore as much virtue will be required to produce something from some matter as to create."
Section III. Whether A Creature Can Be An Instrumental Cause Of Creation.
58. Ad quæstionis intelligentiam pauca prænotabimus de natura causæ instrumentalis. Dividitur hæc contra causam principalem ; ac plures habet acceptiones. Sic, ex. gr. , si nomine causæ principalis veniat ea, quæ a nulla pendet, et a qua pendent cæteræ ; quibus proinde veluti instrumentis utitur ; tunc omnes causæ secundæ dicuntur causæ instrumentales, et nonnisi causæ primæ nomen causæ principalis relinquitur. Quo sensu locutus est D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 7. , dicens : "Deus est causa omnis actionis, prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinæ virtutis operantis . " Sed hac aliisque minus propriis acceptionibus omissis, in præsenti quæstione sermo tantum est de causa instrumentali proprie dicta.
58. For understanding the question, we shall pre-note a few things concerning the nature of an instrumental cause. This is divided in contrast to a principal cause, and it has several acceptions. Thus, for example, if by the name principal cause there comes that which depends on none, and on which the rest depend, and which consequently uses them as instruments, then all secondary causes are called instrumental causes, and the name principal cause is left only to the first cause. In this sense St. Thomas spoke in De potentia, q. 3, a. 7, saying: "God is the cause of every action, insofar as every agent is an instrument of the divine virtue operating." But these and other less proper acceptions being omitted, in the present question the discussion is only about an instrumental cause properly so called.
59. De hac certum est 1. quod debeat virtute sua influere aliquo modo in productionem effectus ; et 2 . quod non possit sola sine juvamine causæ principalis totum effectum attingere.
59. Concerning this it is certain: 1. that by its own virtue it must in some way flow into the production of the effect; and 2. that by itself, without the aid of the principal cause, it cannot reach the whole effect.
60. Quoad 1um, debet imprimis aliquo modo concurrere ad productionem effectus ; nam causa instrumentalis est vera causa, quæ ad genus causæ efficientis reducitur ; debet ergo in ea reperiri quidquid causam efficientem constituit : hæc autem, ut omnes norunt, natura sua postulat ut actione sua influat in effectum.
60. As to the first, it must first in some way concur in the production of the effect; for an instrumental cause is a true cause, which is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. Therefore there must be found in it whatever constitutes an efficient cause; but this, as all know, by its nature requires that by its action it flow into the effect.
61. Debet insuper causa instrumentalis concurrere ad productionem effectus virtute sua propria.
62 De Deo Creatore. Quod expresse docet D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 21. , dicens : "Omne agens instrumentale exequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam actionem propriam et connaturalem sibi ; sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad perfectionem scamni secando." Revera si instrumentum aliquod nihil ex virtute sua ageret, esset solum medium veluti deferens virtutem principalis agentis ; quod autem solum defert virtutem alterius, et nihil ex virtute sua agit, habet quidem rationem medii, at non veræ causæ .
62 De Deo Creatore. Quod expresse docet D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 21. , dicens : "Omne agens instrumentale exequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam actionem propriam et connaturalem sibi ; sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad perfectionem scamni secando." Revera si instrumentum aliquod nihil ex virtute sua ageret, esset solum medium veluti deferens virtutem principalis agentis ; quod autem solum defert virtutem alterius, et nihil ex virtute sua agit, habet quidem rationem medii, at non veræ causæ .
61. Moreover, an instrumental cause must concur in the production of the effect by its own proper virtue. St. Thomas expressly teaches this in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 21, saying: "Every instrumental agent executes the action of the principal agent through some action proper and connatural to itself; as natural heat generates flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw operates toward the perfection of a bench by cutting." In reality, if some instrument acted nothing from its own virtue, it would be only a medium as it were carrying the virtue of the principal agent; but what only carries the virtue of another, and acts nothing from its own virtue, has indeed the notion of a medium, but not of a true cause.
62. Debet denique causa instrumentalis, concurrere ad productionem effectus, nempe effectus causæ principalis, cujus est instrumentum. Distinguit D. Th. 3. p. q. 62. a. 1. ad 2. duplicem actionem in instrumento "unam instrumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed virtute principalis agentis ; aliam autem habet actionem propriam, quæ competit sibi secundum propriam formam ; sicut securi competit scindere ratione suæ acuitatis, facere autem lectum, in quantum est instrumentum artis : non autem perficit instrumentalem actionem, nisi exercendo actionem propriam, scindendo enim facit lectum." At quamvis distinguantur hæ duæ actiones, et possint consequenter distingui duo termini , quorum unus sit proprius actionis causæ instrumentalis, alter causæ principalis ; certum est tamen quod debet instrumentum concurrere etiam ad productionem effectus causæ principalis : secus enim non posset dici hujus effectus vera causa in suo ordine. Unde idem S. Doctor, 3. p. q. 79. a. 2. ad 3., ait : "Nihil prohibet causam instrumentalem producere
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 63 potiorem effectum. " Et 1. p. q. 115. a. 1. ad 5. ait : " Corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formæ substantialis sicut ejus instrumentum ; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem, sicut et calor naturalis, in quantum est instrumentum animæ agit ad generationem carnis. " Recte tamen notat Sylvius quod licet actio propria instrumenti sit formaliter diversa ab actione propria principalis agentis ; non est tamen necessarium ut assignentur duæ actiones secundum rem differentes, quarum una sit solius instrumenti, et altera agentis principalis. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 23. a. 5. c. dicit, "non esse distinctum id, quod est ex causa secunda, et ex causa prima. "-Et q. 105. dicit nihil prohibere " quin una et eadem actio procedat a primo et secundo agente. "-Et c. g. 1. 2. c. 70. docet unum eumdemque effectum totum tribui instrumento, et totum agenti principali.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 63 potiorem effectum. " Et 1. p. q. 115. a. 1. ad 5. ait : " Corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formæ substantialis sicut ejus instrumentum ; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem, sicut et calor naturalis, in quantum est instrumentum animæ agit ad generationem carnis. " Recte tamen notat Sylvius quod licet actio propria instrumenti sit formaliter diversa ab actione propria principalis agentis ; non est tamen necessarium ut assignentur duæ actiones secundum rem differentes, quarum una sit solius instrumenti, et altera agentis principalis. Unde D. Th. 1. p. q. 23. a. 5. c. dicit, "non esse distinctum id, quod est ex causa secunda, et ex causa prima. "-Et q. 105. dicit nihil prohibere " quin una et eadem actio procedat a primo et secundo agente. "-Et c. g. 1. 2. c. 70. docet unum eumdemque effectum totum tribui instrumento, et totum agenti principali.
62. Finally, an instrumental cause must concur in the production of the effect, namely the effect of the principal cause of which it is the instrument. St. Thomas distinguishes a twofold action in an instrument, Summa Theologiae III, q. 62, a. 1, reply to objection 2: "one instrumental, according to which it operates not in its own virtue, but in the virtue of the principal agent; but it has another proper action, which belongs to it according to its own proper form; as it belongs to an axe to cut by reason of its sharpness, but to make a bed insofar as it is an instrument of art; nor does it perfect the instrumental action except by exercising the proper action, for by cutting it makes the bed." But although these two actions are distinguished, and consequently two termini can be distinguished, of which one is proper to the action of the instrumental cause, the other to the principal cause, nevertheless it is certain that the instrument must also concur in the production of the effect of the principal cause; otherwise it could not be called a true cause of this effect in its own order.
Hence the same holy Doctor says, Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 2, reply to objection 3: "Nothing prevents an instrumental cause from producing a more excellent effect." And in I, q. 115, a. 1, reply to objection 5, he says: "A body acts both toward an accidental form and toward a substantial form. For an active quality, such as heat, although it is an accident, nevertheless acts in the virtue of the substantial form as its instrument; and therefore it can act toward a substantial form, just as natural heat, insofar as it is an instrument of the soul, acts toward the generation of flesh."
Yet Sylvius rightly notes that although the proper action of the instrument is formally diverse from the proper action of the principal agent, nevertheless it is not necessary that two actions differing according to reality be assigned, one of which belongs to the instrument alone and the other to the principal agent. Hence St. Thomas says in I, q. 23, a. 5, corpus, that "what is from the second cause and from the first cause is not distinct." And in q. 105 he says that nothing prevents "one and the same action from proceeding from the first and second agent." And in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 70, he teaches that one and the same whole effect is attributed wholly to the instrument and wholly to the principal agent.
Hence the same holy Doctor says, Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 2, reply to objection 3: "Nothing prevents an instrumental cause from producing a more excellent effect." And in I, q. 115, a. 1, reply to objection 5, he says: "A body acts both toward an accidental form and toward a substantial form. For an active quality, such as heat, although it is an accident, nevertheless acts in the virtue of the substantial form as its instrument; and therefore it can act toward a substantial form, just as natural heat, insofar as it is an instrument of the soul, acts toward the generation of flesh."
Yet Sylvius rightly notes that although the proper action of the instrument is formally diverse from the proper action of the principal agent, nevertheless it is not necessary that two actions differing according to reality be assigned, one of which belongs to the instrument alone and the other to the principal agent. Hence St. Thomas says in I, q. 23, a. 5, corpus, that "what is from the second cause and from the first cause is not distinct." And in q. 105 he says that nothing prevents "one and the same action from proceeding from the first and second agent." And in Contra Gentiles II, chapter 70, he teaches that one and the same whole effect is attributed wholly to the instrument and wholly to the principal agent.
63. Tribus autem modis intelligi potest instrumentum concurrere ad effectum principalis agentis , scilicet vel tantum remote, attingendo scilicet aliquid prævium ; vel tantum proxime nempe attingendo formam intentam a principali agente ; vel simul utroque modo. "Serra," ex. gr. , inquit Suarez, "est instrumentum ad tale artificium, quod instrumentum proxime solum efficit incisionem, impellendo et loco movendo partes intermedias ; inde vero resultat forma artificialis, ad quam comparatur ut instrumentalis causa, quia illam non attingit immediate propria actione , sed solum resultat ex priori effectu. " Et e
64 De Deo Creatore contra sunt alia instrumenta quæ immediate attingunt ipsam formam intentam a principali agente : sicut, ex. gr. Sacramenta ad efficiendam gratiam , ipsam in se attingendo. Quare ratio instrumenti exigit ut uno ex tribus prædictis modis concurrat ad effectum principalis agentis ; sed non ita limitatur ad primum modum, nempe ad influxum remotum, ut non possit ullo in casu proximum influxum exercere .
64 De Deo Creatore contra sunt alia instrumenta quæ immediate attingunt ipsam formam intentam a principali agente : sicut, ex. gr. Sacramenta ad efficiendam gratiam , ipsam in se attingendo. Quare ratio instrumenti exigit ut uno ex tribus prædictis modis concurrat ad effectum principalis agentis ; sed non ita limitatur ad primum modum, nempe ad influxum remotum, ut non possit ullo in casu proximum influxum exercere .
63. Now an instrument can be understood to concur in the effect of the principal agent in three ways: namely, either only remotely, by reaching something prior; or only proximately, namely by reaching the form intended by the principal agent; or by both ways at once. "A saw," for example, says Suarez, "is an instrument for such an artifact, which instrument proximately effects only the incision, by driving and locally moving the intermediate parts; from this, however, the artificial form results, to which it is compared as an instrumental cause, because it does not immediately reach that form by its own proper action, but that form only results from the prior effect." And on the contrary there are other instruments which immediately reach the very form intended by the principal agent: as, for example, the Sacraments for effecting grace, by reaching grace itself in itself. Therefore the notion of instrument requires that it concur in the effect of the principal agent in one of the three aforesaid ways; but it is not so limited to the first way, namely to remote influx, that it cannot in any case exercise proximate influx.
64. Quoad 2um vero, evidens est quod causa instrumentalis non potest effectum causæ principalis sola totum attingere sine juvamine hujus causæ. Causa enim principalis, proprie loquendo, ea est, quæ per virtutem suam vel nobiliorem, vel saltem æque nobilem cum effectu, influit in actionem, per quam talis effectus producitur ; ergo si eadem esset virtus instrumenti, hoc non instrumentalis, sed principalis esset causa.
64. As to the second, however, it is evident that an instrumental cause cannot by itself reach the whole effect of the principal cause without the aid of that cause. For a principal cause, properly speaking, is that which by its virtue, either more noble than the effect or at least equally noble with it, flows into the action through which such an effect is produced. Therefore if the virtue of the instrument were the same, it would not be an instrumental cause, but a principal cause.
65. Ex his colligitur a) vera notio causæ instrumentalis : ea est, quæ producit effectum se nobiliorem, vel saltem ad quem activitas ejus proportionata non est. nisi a superiore agente moveatur speciali concursu. Dicimus speciali concursu, ut distinguatur a concursu illo generali causæ primæ, qui requiritur in omnibus causis secundis . In artificialibus, ex. gr., forma intenta ab artifice non attingitur ab instrumento, nisi quatenus ab arte dirigitur et movetur. Intelligitur b) quo sensu dicitur causa instrumentalis agere in virtute principalis agentis. " Dicitur," inquit Suarez, Met. disp. 17. sect. 2. n. 19 , " operari in virtute principalis agentis, non quia non indigeat aliqua virtute intrinseca, id est in ea existente, ad suam actionem instrumentalem , sive illa virtus sit
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 65 innata, sive superaddita rei, et sive sit permanens et durabilis cessante actione, sive sit fluens (ut aiunt) et in motu consistens : in variis enim instrumentis vario modo reperiri potest, aliqua tamen vis instrumentaria necessaria est, alias non posset a tali re ulla actio prodire . Dicuntur ergo hæc instrumenta operari in virtute principalis agentis, quia illa vis quæ in eis est, improportionata est et insufficiens, et solum habet vim operandi juxta mensuram virtutis et elevationis principalis agentis." Patet c) quid significet illud D. Thomæ " instrumentum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis." Sensus certe non est quodlibet instrumentum semper operari aliquem effectum sibi proprium, qui re antecedat effectum principalis agentis, sitque prævia dispositio ad illum. Diximus enim instrumentum effectum ultimo intentum aliquando immediate attingere ; quo in casu nihil ipsum facit, quod simul et totum non faciat principalis agens. Sed sensus est quod cum causa instrumentalis sit ea, qua veluti mediante, causa principalis attingit suum effectum cumque effectus proprius causæ principalis, qui ultimus est, non possit tribui soli causæ instrumentali, quæ tamen sua virtute aliquid vere agit ; hujus actio et effectus proprius saltem natura antecedit effectum causæ principalis , ac proinde dispositive se habet. Qui plura cupit de natura causæ instrumentalis, consulat Suarez 1. c.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 65 innata, sive superaddita rei, et sive sit permanens et durabilis cessante actione, sive sit fluens (ut aiunt) et in motu consistens : in variis enim instrumentis vario modo reperiri potest, aliqua tamen vis instrumentaria necessaria est, alias non posset a tali re ulla actio prodire . Dicuntur ergo hæc instrumenta operari in virtute principalis agentis, quia illa vis quæ in eis est, improportionata est et insufficiens, et solum habet vim operandi juxta mensuram virtutis et elevationis principalis agentis." Patet c) quid significet illud D. Thomæ " instrumentum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis." Sensus certe non est quodlibet instrumentum semper operari aliquem effectum sibi proprium, qui re antecedat effectum principalis agentis, sitque prævia dispositio ad illum. Diximus enim instrumentum effectum ultimo intentum aliquando immediate attingere ; quo in casu nihil ipsum facit, quod simul et totum non faciat principalis agens. Sed sensus est quod cum causa instrumentalis sit ea, qua veluti mediante, causa principalis attingit suum effectum cumque effectus proprius causæ principalis, qui ultimus est, non possit tribui soli causæ instrumentali, quæ tamen sua virtute aliquid vere agit ; hujus actio et effectus proprius saltem natura antecedit effectum causæ principalis , ac proinde dispositive se habet. Qui plura cupit de natura causæ instrumentalis, consulat Suarez 1. c.
65. From these things is gathered: a) the true notion of an instrumental cause. It is that which produces an effect more noble than itself, or at least an effect to which its activity is not proportioned, unless it is moved by a superior agent through a special concurrence. We say through a special concurrence, so that it may be distinguished from that general concurrence of the first cause which is required in all secondary causes. In artificial things, for example, the form intended by the craftsman is not reached by the instrument except insofar as it is directed and moved by the art.
b) It is understood in what sense an instrumental cause is said to act in the virtue of the principal agent. "It is said," says Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 17, sect. 2, n. 19, "to operate in the virtue of the principal agent, not because it does not need some intrinsic virtue, that is, one existing in it, for its instrumental action, whether that virtue is innate or superadded to the thing, and whether it is permanent and durable when the action ceases, or is flowing, as they say, and consists in motion. For in various instruments it can be found in various ways; nevertheless some instrumental force is necessary, otherwise no action could proceed from such a thing. Therefore these instruments are said to operate in the virtue of the principal agent because that force which is in them is disproportionate and insufficient, and only has the force of operating according to the measure of the virtue and elevation of the principal agent."
c) It is clear what that saying of St. Thomas signifies: "the instrument through something proper to itself operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent." The sense certainly is not that any instrument whatever always operates some effect proper to itself, which precedes in reality the effect of the principal agent and is a prior disposition to it. For we have said that the instrument sometimes immediately reaches the effect ultimately intended; in that case it does nothing which the principal agent does not simultaneously and wholly do. But the sense is that, since the instrumental cause is that by which, as though by a medium, the principal cause reaches its effect, and since the proper effect of the principal cause, which is ultimate, cannot be attributed to the instrumental cause alone, which nevertheless by its own virtue truly does something, the action and proper effect of the latter at least by nature precedes the effect of the principal cause, and consequently has itself dispositively. Whoever desires more concerning the nature of instrumental cause should consult Suarez in the cited place.
b) It is understood in what sense an instrumental cause is said to act in the virtue of the principal agent. "It is said," says Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 17, sect. 2, n. 19, "to operate in the virtue of the principal agent, not because it does not need some intrinsic virtue, that is, one existing in it, for its instrumental action, whether that virtue is innate or superadded to the thing, and whether it is permanent and durable when the action ceases, or is flowing, as they say, and consists in motion. For in various instruments it can be found in various ways; nevertheless some instrumental force is necessary, otherwise no action could proceed from such a thing. Therefore these instruments are said to operate in the virtue of the principal agent because that force which is in them is disproportionate and insufficient, and only has the force of operating according to the measure of the virtue and elevation of the principal agent."
c) It is clear what that saying of St. Thomas signifies: "the instrument through something proper to itself operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent." The sense certainly is not that any instrument whatever always operates some effect proper to itself, which precedes in reality the effect of the principal agent and is a prior disposition to it. For we have said that the instrument sometimes immediately reaches the effect ultimately intended; in that case it does nothing which the principal agent does not simultaneously and wholly do. But the sense is that, since the instrumental cause is that by which, as though by a medium, the principal cause reaches its effect, and since the proper effect of the principal cause, which is ultimate, cannot be attributed to the instrumental cause alone, which nevertheless by its own virtue truly does something, the action and proper effect of the latter at least by nature precedes the effect of the principal cause, and consequently has itself dispositively. Whoever desires more concerning the nature of instrumental cause should consult Suarez in the cited place.
66. Nunc, causa alia est physica, alia moralis : prima est quæ physice et realiter influit in effectum ; altera, quæ solum moraliter, ex. gr., consulendo, ro
66 De Deo Creatore. gando, imperando, etc. in effectum influit. Præsens quæstio procedit de causa instrumentali physica.
66 De Deo Creatore. gando, imperando, etc. in effectum influit. Præsens quæstio procedit de causa instrumentali physica.
66. Now, one cause is physical, another moral. The first is that which physically and really flows into the effect; the other is that which flows into the effect only morally, for example by advising, asking, commanding, etc. The present question proceeds concerning a physical instrumental cause.
67. Dividitur etiam causa instrumentalis in naturalem et supernaturalem ; illa est, quæ habet instrumentariam ad effectum potentiam naturæ suæ proportionatam et debitam ; secunda vero, cujus potentia est ex dono superaddito naturæ.
67. An instrumental cause is also divided into natural and supernatural. The former is that which has an instrumental potency toward the effect proportioned and due to its own nature; but the latter is that whose potency is from a gift superadded to nature.
68. Concedunt omnes nullam creaturam posse esse causam instrumentalem naturalem creationis : quæstio fit solum de supernaturali. Suarez Met. disp. 2a. sect . 4. affirmat : sententia tamen negans est D. Thomæ, eamque communem et verissimam vocat de Valentia 1. c. Dicimus itaque : PROP. VII. Non potest ulla creatura, nec de potentia Dei absoluta, esse causa instrumentalis physica creationis . Prob . Quod absolute repugnat nec de potentia Dei absoluta fieri potest ; atqui natura tum creationis tum causæ instrumentalis inspecta, absolute repugnat ut detur aliqua causa instrumentalis physica in creatione. Ergo. Prob . min. argumento maxima perspicuitate proposito a D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 21., quod est hujusmodi : " Omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam actionem propriam et connaturalem sibi ; sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad perfectionem scamni secando. Si igitur aliqua creatura sit quæ operetur ad creationem sicut instrumentum primi creantis, oportet quod hoc operetur per aliquam actionem debitam et propriam suæ naturæ. Effectus autem respondens actioni propriæ instru
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 67 menti, est prior in via generationis quam effectus respondens principali agenti ; ex quo provenit quod primo agenti finis ultimus respondet : prius enim est sectio ligni quam forma scamni, et digestio cibi quam generatio carnis. Oportebit igitur aliquid esse effectum per propriam operationem instrumentalis creantis , quod sit prius in via generationis, quam esse quod est effectus respondens actioni primi creantis. Hoc autem est impossibile ; nam quanto aliquid est communius, tanto est prius in via generationis , sicut prius est animal quam homo in generatione hominis, sicut Philosopus dicit (de Generatione Animalium) . Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua creatura creet sicut principale agens aut instrumentale." NOTA. Ad solutionem difficultatum, duo præ oculis habere sufficit .-1 . Ratio, propter quam repugnare dicitur causa instrumentalis in creatione est, quia nullus effectus potest concipi re aut natura prior effectu creationis. Cum autem hæc ratio non vigeat nisi in hac actione, nulla comparatione ducta ex quacumque alia productione, sive naturali sive supernaturali, infirmari potest thesis -2 Quæstio , ut diximus, est de causalitate physica : concedi autem potest Sacramenta habere causalitatem moralem. Vid. Sylv. in 1 . p. q. 45. a. 5.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 67 menti, est prior in via generationis quam effectus respondens principali agenti ; ex quo provenit quod primo agenti finis ultimus respondet : prius enim est sectio ligni quam forma scamni, et digestio cibi quam generatio carnis. Oportebit igitur aliquid esse effectum per propriam operationem instrumentalis creantis , quod sit prius in via generationis, quam esse quod est effectus respondens actioni primi creantis. Hoc autem est impossibile ; nam quanto aliquid est communius, tanto est prius in via generationis , sicut prius est animal quam homo in generatione hominis, sicut Philosopus dicit (de Generatione Animalium) . Impossibile est ergo quod aliqua creatura creet sicut principale agens aut instrumentale." NOTA. Ad solutionem difficultatum, duo præ oculis habere sufficit .-1 . Ratio, propter quam repugnare dicitur causa instrumentalis in creatione est, quia nullus effectus potest concipi re aut natura prior effectu creationis. Cum autem hæc ratio non vigeat nisi in hac actione, nulla comparatione ducta ex quacumque alia productione, sive naturali sive supernaturali, infirmari potest thesis -2 Quæstio , ut diximus, est de causalitate physica : concedi autem potest Sacramenta habere causalitatem moralem. Vid. Sylv. in 1 . p. q. 45. a. 5.
68. All concede that no creature can be a natural instrumental cause of creation; the question is only about a supernatural one. Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 20, sect. 4, affirms it; nevertheless the denying opinion is that of St. Thomas, and de Valentia calls it common and most true in the cited place. Therefore we say:
Proposition VII. No creature can, not even by the absolute power of God, be a physical instrumental cause of creation.
Proof. What is absolutely repugnant cannot be done even by the absolute power of God; but, once the nature both of creation and of instrumental cause has been inspected, it is absolutely repugnant that there be any physical instrumental cause in creation. Therefore.
The minor is proved by an argument proposed with the greatest clarity by St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, chapter 21, which is of this kind: "Every instrumental agent executes the action of the principal agent through some action proper and connatural to itself; as natural heat generates flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw operates toward the perfection of a bench by cutting. Therefore if there is some creature which operates toward creation as an instrument of the first creator, it must operate through some action due and proper to its own nature. But the effect corresponding to the proper action of the instrument is prior in the way of generation to the effect corresponding to the principal agent; from this it comes that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent. For the cutting of wood is prior to the form of the bench, and the digestion of food is prior to the generation of flesh. Therefore there will have to be some effect through the proper operation of the instrumental creator which is prior in the way of generation to being, which is the effect corresponding to the action of the first creator. But this is impossible; for the more common something is, the more prior it is in the way of generation, just as animal is prior to man in the generation of man, as the Philosopher says (On the Generation of Animals). Therefore it is impossible that any creature create either as a principal agent or as an instrumental agent."
Note. For the solution of difficulties, it is enough to keep two things before the eyes. 1. The reason on account of which an instrumental cause is said to be repugnant in creation is that no effect can be conceived, either in reality or by nature, prior to the effect of creation. But since this reason has force only in this action, the thesis cannot be weakened by any comparison drawn from any other production whatsoever, whether natural or supernatural. 2. The question, as we said, concerns physical causality; but it can be conceded that the Sacraments have moral causality. See Sylvius on Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5.
Proposition VII. No creature can, not even by the absolute power of God, be a physical instrumental cause of creation.
Proof. What is absolutely repugnant cannot be done even by the absolute power of God; but, once the nature both of creation and of instrumental cause has been inspected, it is absolutely repugnant that there be any physical instrumental cause in creation. Therefore.
The minor is proved by an argument proposed with the greatest clarity by St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, chapter 21, which is of this kind: "Every instrumental agent executes the action of the principal agent through some action proper and connatural to itself; as natural heat generates flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw operates toward the perfection of a bench by cutting. Therefore if there is some creature which operates toward creation as an instrument of the first creator, it must operate through some action due and proper to its own nature. But the effect corresponding to the proper action of the instrument is prior in the way of generation to the effect corresponding to the principal agent; from this it comes that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent. For the cutting of wood is prior to the form of the bench, and the digestion of food is prior to the generation of flesh. Therefore there will have to be some effect through the proper operation of the instrumental creator which is prior in the way of generation to being, which is the effect corresponding to the action of the first creator. But this is impossible; for the more common something is, the more prior it is in the way of generation, just as animal is prior to man in the generation of man, as the Philosopher says (On the Generation of Animals). Therefore it is impossible that any creature create either as a principal agent or as an instrumental agent."
Note. For the solution of difficulties, it is enough to keep two things before the eyes. 1. The reason on account of which an instrumental cause is said to be repugnant in creation is that no effect can be conceived, either in reality or by nature, prior to the effect of creation. But since this reason has force only in this action, the thesis cannot be weakened by any comparison drawn from any other production whatsoever, whether natural or supernatural. 2. The question, as we said, concerns physical causality; but it can be conceded that the Sacraments have moral causality. See Sylvius on Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5.