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Fourth Article. Whether To Create Is Proper To The Whole Trinity.
44. Doctrina Ecclesiæ, quoad præsentem quæstionem , declarata est in Conc. CPtano. V. c. 1., ubi dicitur : "Unus Pater, ex quo omnia, et unus Dominus Deus, per quem omnia, et unus Spiritus Sanctus, in
4 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 43 quo omnia. " Et in Conc. Later. IV. (n. 27.), ubi dicitur : "Simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus .. unum universorum principium : creator omnium, etc."
4 Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 43 quo omnia. " Et in Conc. Later. IV. (n. 27.), ubi dicitur : "Simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus .. unum universorum principium : creator omnium, etc."
44. The doctrine of the Church, with respect to the present question, was declared in the Fifth Council of Constantinople, chapter 1, where it is said: "One Father, from whom are all things, and one Lord God, through whom are all things, and one Holy Spirit, in whom are all things." And in the Fourth Lateran Council (n. 27), where it is said: "We simply confess that one alone is the true God, Father and Son and Holy Spirit ... one principle of all things: creator of all, etc."
45. Ad cujus doctrinæ intelligentiam, sciendum est neminem, ut videtur, unquam negavisse simpliciter creationem pertinere ad Deum, non solum ut est natura unus, sed etiam ut est Personis trinus. Sed 1. sectatores Raimundi Lulli, docentis mysterium Sanctissimæ Trinitatis posse per naturalem rationem certo et evidenter demonstrari, ut errorem sui magistri defenderent, commenti sunt in creaturis aliquid inveniri productum a solo Patre , aliquid a solo Filio, aliquid a solo Spiritu Sancto.- 2. Henricus Gandavensis asseruit creationem tribuendam quidem esse tribus Personis divinis ; at non per aliquid omnibus commune, puta per potentiam, et per essentialem notitiam et amorem, sed solum per Verbum et amorem productum.-3. Minus recte etiam locuti esse videntur Mastrofini (de Trin. 1. VI. c. 7. ) et Staudenmaier (tom. II.) contendentes Personas divinas creare pro ratione characteris personalis.
45. For the understanding of this doctrine, it must be known that no one, as it seems, ever simply denied that creation belongs to God, not only as he is one in nature, but also as he is three in Persons. But 1. the followers of Raymond Lull, who taught that the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity could be certainly and evidently demonstrated by natural reason, in order to defend the error of their master, invented that in creatures something is found produced by the Father alone, something by the Son alone, and something by the Holy Spirit alone. 2. Henry of Ghent asserted that creation is indeed to be attributed to the three divine Persons, but not through something common to all, namely through power, and through essential knowledge and love, but only through the Word and produced love. 3. Mastrofini (On the Trinity, book VI, chapter 7) and Staudenmaier (vol. II) also seem to have spoken less correctly, contending that the divine Persons create according to the character of the personal property.
46. Quare doctrina vera est 1. creationem ita pertinere ad tres Personas divinas, ut nulla sit creatura , et nihil sit in ulla creatura, quod non sit simul productum ab omnibus.-- 2 . Creationem tribuendam esse tribus Personis divinis per aliquid, quod est omnibus commune, ac propterea secundum eamdem causalitatem.-3. Quod consequens est, creationem pertinere ad tres Personas divinas, tamquam ad unum principium ut expresse dicitur in cit. c. Conc. Lat. Qua in re notandum est principium quod crea
44 De Deo Creatore. tionis esse tres Personas divinas ; principium quo esse voluntatem et intellectum cum potentia, si hæc ab intellectu et voluntate distinguatur. Unde absolute debet dici Personas divinas esse unum principium creationis, seu unum Creatorem. Concreta enim substantiva cum includant suppositum et formam, non multiplicantur nisi utroque multiplicato ; sed Creator est concretum substantivum, quod dicit tres Personas, sed unam formam, seu unum principium quo ; ergo. Vid. D. Th. 1. p. q . 39. a. 3 .; et q. 36. a. 4.
44 De Deo Creatore. tionis esse tres Personas divinas ; principium quo esse voluntatem et intellectum cum potentia, si hæc ab intellectu et voluntate distinguatur. Unde absolute debet dici Personas divinas esse unum principium creationis, seu unum Creatorem. Concreta enim substantiva cum includant suppositum et formam, non multiplicantur nisi utroque multiplicato ; sed Creator est concretum substantivum, quod dicit tres Personas, sed unam formam, seu unum principium quo ; ergo. Vid. D. Th. 1. p. q . 39. a. 3 .; et q. 36. a. 4.
46. Therefore the true doctrine is: 1. creation so belongs to the three divine Persons that there is no creature, and nothing in any creature, which has not been produced simultaneously by all. 2. Creation is to be attributed to the three divine Persons through something which is common to all, and therefore according to the same causality. 3. What follows from this is that creation belongs to the three divine Persons as to one principle, as is expressly said in the cited chapter of the Lateran Council. In this matter it must be noted that the principle which of creation is the three divine Persons; the principle by which is the will and intellect together with power, if this is distinguished from intellect and will. Hence it must be said absolutely that the divine Persons are one principle of creation, or one Creator. For concrete substantives, since they include the supposit and the form, are not multiplied unless both are multiplied; but Creator is a concrete substantive which denotes three Persons, but one form, or one principle by which; therefore. See St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, a. 3; and q. 36, a. 4.
47. Unum quæri hic potest : utrum dato quod tres divinæ Personæ creant per aliquid ipsis commune (quod nemo, ut vidimus, negare potest), creant etiam per aliquid ipsis proprium. Cui quæstioni occasionem dat D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a. 6. dicens : "Sed tamen divinæ Personæ secundum rationem suæ processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. " Et de Valentia tom. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 3. ait : "etiam fatendum est a Personis quoque secundum proprietates personales, creaturas procedere. " Eadem quæstio ab aliis sic proponitur : utrum ad causalitatem creationis requirantur processiones personales ; seu utrum Personæ Verbi et Spiritus Sancti postulentur ut Pater creet. Responderi breviter potest Personas procedentes necessarias esse ut Deus possit creare, quatenus necesse est ut sit Deus, cujus creare est proprium : Deus autem, ut fide constat, non est sine Trinitate Personarum. Pariter cum Deus creet per intellectum dirigentem, et voluntatem imperantem ; necesse est ut intellectus et voluntas sint quales debent esse in Deo, cujus est creare : intellectus autem et
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 45 voluntas, ut fides docet, habent in Deo essentialiter terminum immanentem. Vid. etiam Sylv. in cit. 1. D. Th. At vero non videntur Personæ procedentes postulari ut Deus creare possit, quatenus Personæ divinæ creent per aliquid proprium : Sic enim non viderentur amplius esse unum principium, unus Creator. Unde D. Th. eodem 1. ait : " processiones Personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, in quantum includunt essentialia attributa, quæ sunt scientia et voluntas. " Asserenti ergo Personas divinas creare etiam per aliquid proprium, facile possent opponi fere omnes rationes, quibus ipse de Valentia 1. c. Henrici Gandavensis sententiam, quam dicit non esse tolerabilem, impugnat.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 45 voluntas, ut fides docet, habent in Deo essentialiter terminum immanentem. Vid. etiam Sylv. in cit. 1. D. Th. At vero non videntur Personæ procedentes postulari ut Deus creare possit, quatenus Personæ divinæ creent per aliquid proprium : Sic enim non viderentur amplius esse unum principium, unus Creator. Unde D. Th. eodem 1. ait : " processiones Personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, in quantum includunt essentialia attributa, quæ sunt scientia et voluntas. " Asserenti ergo Personas divinas creare etiam per aliquid proprium, facile possent opponi fere omnes rationes, quibus ipse de Valentia 1. c. Henrici Gandavensis sententiam, quam dicit non esse tolerabilem, impugnat.
47. One thing can be asked here: whether, granted that the three divine Persons create through something common to themselves (which, as we have seen, no one can deny), they also create through something proper to themselves. St. Thomas gives occasion for this question, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 6, saying: "But nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the notion of their procession, have causality with respect to the creation of things." And de Valentia, vol. 1, disp. 3, q. 2, p. 3, says: "it must also be confessed that creatures proceed from the Persons also according to the personal properties." The same question is proposed by others thus: whether personal processions are required for the causality of creation; or whether the Persons of the Word and of the Holy Spirit are demanded in order that the Father may create.
It can be answered briefly that the proceeding Persons are necessary in order that God may be able to create, insofar as it is necessary that he be God, whose proper act it is to create; but God, as is established by faith, is not without the Trinity of Persons. Likewise, since God creates through the intellect directing and the will commanding, it is necessary that the intellect and will be such as they must be in God, whose act it is to create; but intellect and will, as faith teaches, have in God an essentially immanent terminus. See also Sylvius on the cited place of St. Thomas. But in truth the proceeding Persons do not seem to be demanded so that God may be able to create insofar as the divine Persons create through something proper; for in this way they would no longer seem to be one principle, one Creator. Hence St. Thomas says in the same place: "the processions of the Persons are the reasons of the production of creatures, insofar as they include the essential attributes, which are knowledge and will." Therefore, to one asserting that the divine Persons create also through something proper, nearly all the arguments could easily be opposed by which de Valentia himself, in the cited place, attacks the opinion of Henry of Ghent, which he says is not tolerable.
It can be answered briefly that the proceeding Persons are necessary in order that God may be able to create, insofar as it is necessary that he be God, whose proper act it is to create; but God, as is established by faith, is not without the Trinity of Persons. Likewise, since God creates through the intellect directing and the will commanding, it is necessary that the intellect and will be such as they must be in God, whose act it is to create; but intellect and will, as faith teaches, have in God an essentially immanent terminus. See also Sylvius on the cited place of St. Thomas. But in truth the proceeding Persons do not seem to be demanded so that God may be able to create insofar as the divine Persons create through something proper; for in this way they would no longer seem to be one principle, one Creator. Hence St. Thomas says in the same place: "the processions of the Persons are the reasons of the production of creatures, insofar as they include the essential attributes, which are knowledge and will." Therefore, to one asserting that the divine Persons create also through something proper, nearly all the arguments could easily be opposed by which de Valentia himself, in the cited place, attacks the opinion of Henry of Ghent, which he says is not tolerable.
48. Quamvis autem hæc certa sint, ad pleniorem tamen doctrinæ catholicæ intelligentiam et ad præcavendas difficultates, animadvertamus oportet opus creationis per appropriationem diverso modo tribui Personis divinis .
48. Although these things are certain, nevertheless for a fuller understanding of Catholic doctrine and for warding off difficulties, we must observe that the work of creation is attributed in diverse ways to the divine Persons through appropriation.
49. Norunt omnes in divinis valde differre propria unius Personæ ab appropriatis. Propria dicuntur ea, quæ ita competunt uni Personæ, ut non possint alteri competere. Sic ex. gr. Paternitas, intellectus notionalis Patris generans Verbum, ita competunt Personæ Patris ut non possint tribui neque Filio, neque Spiritui Sancto. Appropriata vero sunt ea, quæ etsi sint communia toti Trinitati, nec proinde magis conveniant uni Personæ, quam alteri (hoc enim æqualitati Personarum repugnat), ratione tamen majoris manifestationis attribuuntur uni certæ Personæ. Fundamentum appropriationis est, ut docet D. Th. de ver. q. 7. art. 3., major similitudo ad id, quod est
46 De Deo Creatore proprium unius Personæ, quam ad id, quod est proprium alterius. Sic ex. gr. sapientia est quidem communis tribus Personis, sed per appropriationem attribuitur Filio, ad cujus propria, ut mox explicabitur, habet majorem similitudinem.
46 De Deo Creatore proprium unius Personæ, quam ad id, quod est proprium alterius. Sic ex. gr. sapientia est quidem communis tribus Personis, sed per appropriationem attribuitur Filio, ad cujus propria, ut mox explicabitur, habet majorem similitudinem.
49. Everyone knows that in divine things the proper things of one Person differ greatly from the appropriated things. Those things are called proper which so belong to one Person that they cannot belong to another. Thus, for example, Paternity, and the notional intellect of the Father generating the Word, so belong to the Person of the Father that they cannot be attributed either to the Son or to the Holy Spirit. But appropriated things are those which, although they are common to the whole Trinity, and consequently do not belong more to one Person than to another (for this is repugnant to the equality of the Persons), nevertheless by reason of greater manifestation are attributed to a certain Person. The foundation of appropriation is, as St. Thomas teaches, De veritate, q. 7, a. 3, a greater likeness to that which is proper to one Person than to that which is proper to another. Thus, for example, wisdom is indeed common to the three Persons, but by appropriation it is attributed to the Son, to whose proper things, as will soon be explained, it has a greater likeness.
50. Unde, ad rem nostram, sequitur a) posse attributa communia toti Trinitati appropriari uni certæ Personæ. Si consideremus ex. gr. virtutem Dei operativam ad extra, habemus omnipotentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem, quæ certe pertinent ad tres Personas divinas. Attamen potentia per appropriationem tribuitur Patri ; potentia enim, in quantum hujusmodi, est quoddam principium, ideoque majorem habet similitudinem cum Patre cœlesti, qui est principium non tantum creaturarum, sed et aliarum Personarum divinarum. Sapientia per appropriationem tribuitur Filio: quia, cum pertineat ad intellectum, majorem habet similitudinem cum propriis Filii, qui procedit per intellectum, et est Verbum. Bonitas per appropriationem tribuitur Spiritui Sancto ; bonitas enim est objectum amoris, et Spiritus Sanctus per voluntatem est Amor. Sequitur b) quod si consideremus diversa opera Dei ad extra, prout ipsa habent majorem similitudinem cum propriis unius Personæ, per appropriationem ei tribuuntur. Sic ex. gr. si in uno opere magis reluceat omnipotentia, in alio sapientia, in alio bonitas ; primum tribuitur Patri, alterum Filio, tertium Spiritui Sancto. "Licet," inquit D. Th. 1. c. ad 3., quilibet effectus Dei procedat ex quolibet attributorum, tamen reducitur unusquisque effectus ad illud attributum cum quo habet convenientiam secundum
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 47 propriam rationem ; sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam ; et justificatio impii, ad misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio vero, quæ est productio ipsius substantiæ rei, reducitur ad potentiam. " Sequitur c) quod idem opus Dei ad extra, quamvis pertineat ad totam Trinitatem operantem per aliquid commune causalitate unica, possit tamen per appropriationem diverso modo tribui unicuique Personæ. Quare D. Th. 1. c. ad 2. ait : "Sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, in quantum Filius accipit naturam divinam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque ; ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit. Nam Filius habet eam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque. Unde Creatorem esse attribuitur Patri ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De Filio autem dicitur Joan. 1. 3 : Per quem omnia facta sunt, in quantum habet eamdem virtutem , sed ab alio ; nam hæc præpositio, per, solet denotare causam mediam, sive principium de principio. Sed Spiritui Sancto, qui habet eamdem virtutem ab utroque , attribuitur quod dominando gubernet et vivificet quæ sunt creata a Patre per Filium . Potest enim hujus attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, qu. 39, art. 8, ad 3 , Patri attribuitur et appropriatur potentia, quæ maxime manifestatur in creatione ; et ideo attribuitur Patri Creatorem esse, Filio autem appropriatur sapientia ; per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur :
48 De Deo Creatore. de Filio : per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui Sancto autem appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in debitos fines, et vivificatio ; nam vita in interiori quodam motu consistit ; primum autem movens est finis et bonitas ."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 47 propriam rationem ; sicut ordinatio rerum ad sapientiam ; et justificatio impii, ad misericordiam et bonitatem se superabundanter diffundentem. Creatio vero, quæ est productio ipsius substantiæ rei, reducitur ad potentiam. " Sequitur c) quod idem opus Dei ad extra, quamvis pertineat ad totam Trinitatem operantem per aliquid commune causalitate unica, possit tamen per appropriationem diverso modo tribui unicuique Personæ. Quare D. Th. 1. c. ad 2. ait : "Sicut natura divina, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit, in quantum Filius accipit naturam divinam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque ; ita etiam et virtus creandi, licet sit communis tribus Personis, ordine tamen quodam eis convenit. Nam Filius habet eam a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque. Unde Creatorem esse attribuitur Patri ut ei qui non habet virtutem creandi ab alio. De Filio autem dicitur Joan. 1. 3 : Per quem omnia facta sunt, in quantum habet eamdem virtutem , sed ab alio ; nam hæc præpositio, per, solet denotare causam mediam, sive principium de principio. Sed Spiritui Sancto, qui habet eamdem virtutem ab utroque , attribuitur quod dominando gubernet et vivificet quæ sunt creata a Patre per Filium . Potest enim hujus attributionis communis ratio accipi ex appropriatione essentialium attributorum. Nam, sicut supra dictum est, qu. 39, art. 8, ad 3 , Patri attribuitur et appropriatur potentia, quæ maxime manifestatur in creatione ; et ideo attribuitur Patri Creatorem esse, Filio autem appropriatur sapientia ; per quam agens per intellectum operatur, et ideo dicitur :
48 De Deo Creatore. de Filio : per quem omnia facta sunt. Spiritui Sancto autem appropriatur bonitas, ad quam pertinet gubernatio deducens res in debitos fines, et vivificatio ; nam vita in interiori quodam motu consistit ; primum autem movens est finis et bonitas ."
50. Hence, for our matter, it follows: a) that attributes common to the whole Trinity can be appropriated to one certain Person. If, for example, we consider God's operative virtue outside himself, we have omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness, which certainly belong to the three divine Persons. Yet power is attributed by appropriation to the Father; for power, insofar as it is such, is a certain principle, and therefore has a greater likeness to the heavenly Father, who is the principle not only of creatures, but also of the other divine Persons. Wisdom is attributed by appropriation to the Son, because, since it belongs to the intellect, it has a greater likeness to the proper things of the Son, who proceeds through intellect and is the Word. Goodness is attributed by appropriation to the Holy Spirit; for goodness is the object of love, and the Holy Spirit through the will is Love.
It follows: b) that if we consider the diverse works of God outside himself, according as they have a greater likeness to the proper things of one Person, they are attributed to that Person by appropriation. Thus, for example, if in one work omnipotence shines forth more, in another wisdom, in another goodness, the first is attributed to the Father, the second to the Son, the third to the Holy Spirit. "Although," says St. Thomas in the cited place, reply to objection 3, "every effect of God proceeds from each of the attributes, nevertheless each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it has fittingness according to its proper notion; as the ordering of things is reduced to wisdom, and the justification of the impious to mercy and to goodness superabundantly diffusing itself. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to power."
It follows: c) that the same work of God outside himself, although it belongs to the whole Trinity operating through something common by a single causality, can nevertheless by appropriation be attributed in a diverse way to each Person. Wherefore St. Thomas says in the cited place, reply to objection 2: "Just as the divine nature, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless belongs to them in a certain order, insofar as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, so also the virtue of creating, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless belongs to them in a certain order. For the Son has it from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. Hence to be Creator is attributed to the Father, as to him who does not have the virtue of creating from another. But of the Son it is said, John 1:3: Through whom all things were made, insofar as he has the same virtue, but from another; for this preposition, through, is accustomed to denote a middle cause, or a principle from a principle. But to the Holy Spirit, who has the same virtue from both, it is attributed that by ruling he governs and vivifies the things which have been created by the Father through the Son. For the common reason of this attribution can be taken from the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as was said above, q. 39, a. 8, reply to objection 3, power is attributed and appropriated to the Father, which is especially manifested in creation; and therefore to be Creator is attributed to the Father. Wisdom is appropriated to the Son, through which one acting through intellect operates, and therefore it is said of the Son: through whom all things were made. But goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, to which belongs governance leading things to their due ends, and vivification; for life consists in a certain interior motion, and the first mover is end and goodness."
It follows: b) that if we consider the diverse works of God outside himself, according as they have a greater likeness to the proper things of one Person, they are attributed to that Person by appropriation. Thus, for example, if in one work omnipotence shines forth more, in another wisdom, in another goodness, the first is attributed to the Father, the second to the Son, the third to the Holy Spirit. "Although," says St. Thomas in the cited place, reply to objection 3, "every effect of God proceeds from each of the attributes, nevertheless each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it has fittingness according to its proper notion; as the ordering of things is reduced to wisdom, and the justification of the impious to mercy and to goodness superabundantly diffusing itself. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to power."
It follows: c) that the same work of God outside himself, although it belongs to the whole Trinity operating through something common by a single causality, can nevertheless by appropriation be attributed in a diverse way to each Person. Wherefore St. Thomas says in the cited place, reply to objection 2: "Just as the divine nature, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless belongs to them in a certain order, insofar as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, so also the virtue of creating, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless belongs to them in a certain order. For the Son has it from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. Hence to be Creator is attributed to the Father, as to him who does not have the virtue of creating from another. But of the Son it is said, John 1:3: Through whom all things were made, insofar as he has the same virtue, but from another; for this preposition, through, is accustomed to denote a middle cause, or a principle from a principle. But to the Holy Spirit, who has the same virtue from both, it is attributed that by ruling he governs and vivifies the things which have been created by the Father through the Son. For the common reason of this attribution can be taken from the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as was said above, q. 39, a. 8, reply to objection 3, power is attributed and appropriated to the Father, which is especially manifested in creation; and therefore to be Creator is attributed to the Father. Wisdom is appropriated to the Son, through which one acting through intellect operates, and therefore it is said of the Son: through whom all things were made. But goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, to which belongs governance leading things to their due ends, and vivification; for life consists in a certain interior motion, and the first mover is end and goodness."
51. His bene constitutis, dicimus : PROP. V. Causa mundi efficiens sunt tres divinæ Personæ, quæ singulari communique actione omnia, quæcumque sunt, ex nihilo produxere. Prob . I. ex Scriptura. Etenim in Scripturis creatio tribuitur Patri, Filio, et Spiritui Sancto ; atqui ita tribuitur, ut eis competat per singularem communemque efficientiam. Ergo . Prob. maj . Creatio in Scripturis a) tribuitur Patri : sic Luc. 10. 21. legitur : "Confiteor tibi Pater Domine cæli et terræ ;" et Act. 4. 24. seq. " Domine tu es, qui fecisti cælum et terram, mare et omnia quæ in eis sunt : qui Spiritu Sancto per os patris nostri David pueri tui dixisti ... convenerunt enim vere adversum sanctum puerum tuum Jesum." -b) tribuitur Filio : sic Jo. 1.1-3. “In principio erat Verbum ... omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est."-Colos. 1. 15. seq. "Qui est imago Dei invisibilis primogenitus omnis creaturæ ; quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa in cœlis et in terra .. omnia per ipsum ... et in ipso creata sunt, et ipse est ante omnes, et omnia in ipso constant. "-c) tribuitur Spiritui Sancto : sic Ps. 32. 6. "Verbo Domini cæli firmati sunt, et. Spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum. " Ps. 103. 30. "Emittes Spiritum tuum et creabuntur : et renovabis faciem terræ. "-De tribus Personis simul potest intel-
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 49 ligi illud ad Rom. 11. 36. “ Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in sæcula." Prob. min. Causalitas respectu Patris communiter exprimitur per particulam ex, respectu Filii per particulam per, respectu Spiritus Sancti per particulam in. Jamvero hæ diversæ particulæ vel exprimunt eamdem causalitatem respectu trium Personarum, quatenus omnes creant per aliquid ipsis commune, quod potest diverso modo unicuique tribui solum per appropriationem ; vel exprimunt veluti diversam causalitatem, quatenus unaquæque creat per aliquid proprium. Atqui hoc ultimum dici nequit. Ergo. Prob. hæc min. Quod est proprium unius Personæ nequit de aliis prædicari ; ergo si illæ diversæ particulæ aliquid proprium exprimerent, quæ pro una Persona adhibetur, non posset adhiberi pro altera : si ex. gr. particula ex adhiberetur pro Patre, non posset adhiberi pro aliis Personis ; et ita de cæteris. Atqui particulæ illæ promiscue adhibentur pro omnibus Personis. Ergo. Prob. hæc ult. min. Particula per adhibetur etiam pro Patre : sic 1. Cor. 1. 9. "Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii ejus Jesu Christi. " Particula in adhibetur etiam pro Filio, uti patet ex testimonio Colos. 1. 15. seq. superius recitato ; et item particula ex, uti Eph . 4. 15. "Crescamus in illo per omnia qui est caput Christus , ex quo totum corpus compactum et connexum, etc."-De Spiritu Sancto usurpatur particula per 1. Cor. 12. 8. "alii quidem per Spiritum datur sermo sapientiæ"; atque particula ex Jo. 3. 6. "Quod natum est ex Spiritu spiritus est." Vid. S. Bas. de Spir. San. c. 5.
50 De Deo Creatore. Prob . II . Ex Patribus. S. Dionysius, de divinis nominibus cap. 2. dixit : "Communia totius Trinitatis esse omnia creabilia."-S. Athanasius serm. 3 . n. 5. " Pater per Filium in Spiritu Sancto creat omnia. " S. Basilius de Sp. San. c. 16. "In rerum creatione cogita Patrem ut primam creaturarum causam, Filium ut causam creantem, Spiritum Sanctum ut causam omnia perficientem . "-Similia habent S. Greg. Naz . Or. 38. n. 9.-S. Ambrosius Hexæm. 1 . 2. c. 5. n. 18.-S. Augustinus 1. 11. de Civ. Dei c. 32 . Quare omnia testimonia ex dictis de appropriatione, et de argumento ex Scripturis facile intelliguntur. Prob . III . Est Theologicum axioma testimoniis etiam Patrum confirmatum (Vid. Valentia tom. 1. disp. 2. q. 10. p. 2.) "In divinis omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio." Atqui in creatione, quæ est opus Dei ad extra, nulla, uti patet, obviat relationis oppositio. Ergo .
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 49 ligi illud ad Rom. 11. 36. “ Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in sæcula." Prob. min. Causalitas respectu Patris communiter exprimitur per particulam ex, respectu Filii per particulam per, respectu Spiritus Sancti per particulam in. Jamvero hæ diversæ particulæ vel exprimunt eamdem causalitatem respectu trium Personarum, quatenus omnes creant per aliquid ipsis commune, quod potest diverso modo unicuique tribui solum per appropriationem ; vel exprimunt veluti diversam causalitatem, quatenus unaquæque creat per aliquid proprium. Atqui hoc ultimum dici nequit. Ergo. Prob. hæc min. Quod est proprium unius Personæ nequit de aliis prædicari ; ergo si illæ diversæ particulæ aliquid proprium exprimerent, quæ pro una Persona adhibetur, non posset adhiberi pro altera : si ex. gr. particula ex adhiberetur pro Patre, non posset adhiberi pro aliis Personis ; et ita de cæteris. Atqui particulæ illæ promiscue adhibentur pro omnibus Personis. Ergo. Prob. hæc ult. min. Particula per adhibetur etiam pro Patre : sic 1. Cor. 1. 9. "Fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii ejus Jesu Christi. " Particula in adhibetur etiam pro Filio, uti patet ex testimonio Colos. 1. 15. seq. superius recitato ; et item particula ex, uti Eph . 4. 15. "Crescamus in illo per omnia qui est caput Christus , ex quo totum corpus compactum et connexum, etc."-De Spiritu Sancto usurpatur particula per 1. Cor. 12. 8. "alii quidem per Spiritum datur sermo sapientiæ"; atque particula ex Jo. 3. 6. "Quod natum est ex Spiritu spiritus est." Vid. S. Bas. de Spir. San. c. 5.
50 De Deo Creatore. Prob . II . Ex Patribus. S. Dionysius, de divinis nominibus cap. 2. dixit : "Communia totius Trinitatis esse omnia creabilia."-S. Athanasius serm. 3 . n. 5. " Pater per Filium in Spiritu Sancto creat omnia. " S. Basilius de Sp. San. c. 16. "In rerum creatione cogita Patrem ut primam creaturarum causam, Filium ut causam creantem, Spiritum Sanctum ut causam omnia perficientem . "-Similia habent S. Greg. Naz . Or. 38. n. 9.-S. Ambrosius Hexæm. 1 . 2. c. 5. n. 18.-S. Augustinus 1. 11. de Civ. Dei c. 32 . Quare omnia testimonia ex dictis de appropriatione, et de argumento ex Scripturis facile intelliguntur. Prob . III . Est Theologicum axioma testimoniis etiam Patrum confirmatum (Vid. Valentia tom. 1. disp. 2. q. 10. p. 2.) "In divinis omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio." Atqui in creatione, quæ est opus Dei ad extra, nulla, uti patet, obviat relationis oppositio. Ergo .
51. These things having been well established, we say:
Proposition V. The efficient cause of the world is the three divine Persons, who by a singular and common action produced out of nothing all things whatsoever are.
First proof, from Scripture. For in the Scriptures creation is attributed to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit; but it is attributed in such a way that it belongs to them through a singular and common efficiency. Therefore.
The major is proved. Creation in the Scriptures a) is attributed to the Father: thus Luke 10:21 reads: "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth"; and Acts 4:24 ff.: "Lord, you are he who made heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are in them: who by the Holy Spirit, through the mouth of our father David your servant, said ... for they have truly assembled against your holy servant Jesus." b) It is attributed to the Son: thus John 1:1-3: "In the beginning was the Word ... all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that was made." Colossians 1:15 ff.: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature; for in him all things were created in heaven and on earth ... all things were created through him and in him, and he is before all, and all things consist in him." c) It is attributed to the Holy Spirit: thus Psalm 32:6: "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power." Psalm 103:30: "You will send forth your Spirit and they will be created, and you will renew the face of the earth." Of the three Persons together can be understood that text of Romans 11:36: "From him, and through him, and in him are all things: to him be glory forever."
The minor is proved. Causality with respect to the Father is commonly expressed by the particle from, with respect to the Son by the particle through, and with respect to the Holy Spirit by the particle in. Now these diverse particles either express the same causality with respect to the three Persons, insofar as all create through something common to themselves, which can be attributed in a diverse way to each one only by appropriation; or they express, as it were, a diverse causality, insofar as each one creates through something proper. But this last cannot be said. Therefore.
This minor is proved. What is proper to one Person cannot be predicated of the others; therefore if those diverse particles expressed something proper, the particle which is applied for one Person could not be applied for another: if, for example, the particle from were applied for the Father, it could not be applied for the other Persons; and so concerning the rest. But those particles are applied promiscuously for all the Persons. Therefore.
This last minor is proved. The particle through is also applied for the Father: thus 1 Corinthians 1:9: "God is faithful, through whom you have been called into the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ." The particle in is also applied for the Son, as is clear from the testimony of Colossians 1:15 ff. recited above; and likewise the particle from, as in Ephesians 4:15: "Let us grow in him through all things, who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body, compacted and connected, etc." Concerning the Holy Spirit the particle through is used in 1 Corinthians 12:8: "to one indeed through the Spirit is given the word of wisdom"; and the particle from in John 3:6: "That which is born from the Spirit is spirit." See St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapter 5.
Second proof, from the Fathers. St. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 2, said: "All creatable things are common to the whole Trinity." St. Athanasius, sermon 3, n. 5: "The Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit creates all things." St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16: "In the creation of things, think of the Father as the first cause of creatures, the Son as the creating cause, the Holy Spirit as the cause perfecting all things." Similar things are found in St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, n. 9; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 2, chapter 5, n. 18; St. Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, chapter 32. Therefore all the testimonies are easily understood from what has been said concerning appropriation, and concerning the argument from the Scriptures.
Third proof. It is a theological axiom confirmed also by testimonies of the Fathers (see Valentia, vol. 1, disp. 2, q. 10, p. 2): "In divine things all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way." But in creation, which is a work of God outside himself, no opposition of relation, as is clear, stands in the way. Therefore.
Proposition V. The efficient cause of the world is the three divine Persons, who by a singular and common action produced out of nothing all things whatsoever are.
First proof, from Scripture. For in the Scriptures creation is attributed to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit; but it is attributed in such a way that it belongs to them through a singular and common efficiency. Therefore.
The major is proved. Creation in the Scriptures a) is attributed to the Father: thus Luke 10:21 reads: "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth"; and Acts 4:24 ff.: "Lord, you are he who made heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are in them: who by the Holy Spirit, through the mouth of our father David your servant, said ... for they have truly assembled against your holy servant Jesus." b) It is attributed to the Son: thus John 1:1-3: "In the beginning was the Word ... all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that was made." Colossians 1:15 ff.: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature; for in him all things were created in heaven and on earth ... all things were created through him and in him, and he is before all, and all things consist in him." c) It is attributed to the Holy Spirit: thus Psalm 32:6: "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power." Psalm 103:30: "You will send forth your Spirit and they will be created, and you will renew the face of the earth." Of the three Persons together can be understood that text of Romans 11:36: "From him, and through him, and in him are all things: to him be glory forever."
The minor is proved. Causality with respect to the Father is commonly expressed by the particle from, with respect to the Son by the particle through, and with respect to the Holy Spirit by the particle in. Now these diverse particles either express the same causality with respect to the three Persons, insofar as all create through something common to themselves, which can be attributed in a diverse way to each one only by appropriation; or they express, as it were, a diverse causality, insofar as each one creates through something proper. But this last cannot be said. Therefore.
This minor is proved. What is proper to one Person cannot be predicated of the others; therefore if those diverse particles expressed something proper, the particle which is applied for one Person could not be applied for another: if, for example, the particle from were applied for the Father, it could not be applied for the other Persons; and so concerning the rest. But those particles are applied promiscuously for all the Persons. Therefore.
This last minor is proved. The particle through is also applied for the Father: thus 1 Corinthians 1:9: "God is faithful, through whom you have been called into the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ." The particle in is also applied for the Son, as is clear from the testimony of Colossians 1:15 ff. recited above; and likewise the particle from, as in Ephesians 4:15: "Let us grow in him through all things, who is the head, Christ, from whom the whole body, compacted and connected, etc." Concerning the Holy Spirit the particle through is used in 1 Corinthians 12:8: "to one indeed through the Spirit is given the word of wisdom"; and the particle from in John 3:6: "That which is born from the Spirit is spirit." See St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapter 5.
Second proof, from the Fathers. St. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 2, said: "All creatable things are common to the whole Trinity." St. Athanasius, sermon 3, n. 5: "The Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit creates all things." St. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, chapter 16: "In the creation of things, think of the Father as the first cause of creatures, the Son as the creating cause, the Holy Spirit as the cause perfecting all things." Similar things are found in St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, n. 9; St. Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 2, chapter 5, n. 18; St. Augustine, book 11 of The City of God, chapter 32. Therefore all the testimonies are easily understood from what has been said concerning appropriation, and concerning the argument from the Scriptures.
Third proof. It is a theological axiom confirmed also by testimonies of the Fathers (see Valentia, vol. 1, disp. 2, q. 10, p. 2): "In divine things all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way." But in creation, which is a work of God outside himself, no opposition of relation, as is clear, stands in the way. Therefore.