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Third Article. Whether God Is The Efficient Cause Of The World.
25. Exposita vera creationis natura ad factum investigandum progredimur, utrum Deus creando mundum condiderit. Cumque aliqui veritatem catholicam hac in re impugnaverint non modo ex principiis rationis, verum ex ipsis revelationis fontibus, asserentes ideam creationis a nobis exhibitam nec in Scripturis contineri, nec Patribus fuisse notam, operæ pretium erit singillatim expendere quid Scriptura-quid Patres- quid recta ratio doceat quoad dogma creationis. § I. Status quæstionis .
25. Having set forth the true nature of creation, we proceed to investigate the fact: whether God, by creating, founded the world. And since some have attacked Catholic truth in this matter not only from principles of reason, but even from the very sources of revelation, asserting that the idea of creation as presented by us is contained neither in the Scriptures nor was known to the Fathers, it will be worthwhile to weigh one by one what Scripture, what the Fathers, and what right reason teach concerning the dogma of creation.
§ I. State Of The Question.
26. Antiquos errores circa dogma de creatione mundi paucis complectitur D. Th. opusc. 5. de articulis Fidei et de Sacramentis Ecclesiæ : " Contra hunc articulum, primo quidem erravit Democritus et Epicurus, ponentes quod nec materia mundi, nec ipsa mundi compositio est a Deo, sed quod mundus est casu factus per concursum corporum indivisibilium, quæ rerum principia existimabant ; contra quos dicitur in Psal. 32. Verbo Domini cæli firmati sunt ; idest, secundum rationem æternam , non autem casu. Secundus est error Platonis et Anaxagore, qui posuerunt mundum factum a Deo, sed ex materia præjacente ; contra quos dicitur in Psal. 148. Mandavit et creata
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 21 sunt : idest, ex nihilo facta. Tertius est error Aristotelis, qui posuit mundum a Deo factum non esse, sed ab æterno fuisse ; contra quod dicitur Genes. 1 . In principio Deus creavit cœlum et terram. Quartus est error Manichæorum , qui posuerunt Deum factorem invisibilium, sed visibilia a diabolo facta ; contra quos dicitur Hebr. 11. Fide intelligimus aptata esse sæcula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Quintus est error Simonis Magi, et Menandri ejus discipuli , et multorum aliorum hæreticorum eos sequentium, qui creationem mundi non Deo, sed Angelis attribuunt ; contra quos dicit Paulus, Act. 17. Deus qui fecit mundum et omnia quæ in eo sunt. Sextus est error eorum qui posuerunt Deum per seipsum non gubernare mundum, sed per quasdam partes sibi subjectas ; contra quos dicitur Job. 34. Quem constituit alium super terram , aut quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est ? Et contra hos errores dicitur in symbolo : Factorem vel creatorem cæli et terræ, visibilium omnium et invisibilium." Opusc. V. De articulis Fidei et Sacramentis Ecclesiæ . Cf. Opusc. VI. Expositio super Symbolo Apostolorum , Cap. III. His addi possunt Sociniani et non pauci protestantes, qui contendunt doctrinam de mundi creatione ex nihilo non esse ita clare expressam in Scripturis, ut quisque teneatur illam credere-Philosophi sæculi XVIII . , Voltaire, Rousseau etc., qui etsi non semper sibimetipsis cohærentes , dogma tamen creationis non raro uti absurdum traduxere-Pantheistæ omnes denique, qui sub quacumque forma suum systema exponunt, idem dogma inficiati sunt.
22 De Deo Creatore.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 21 sunt : idest, ex nihilo facta. Tertius est error Aristotelis, qui posuit mundum a Deo factum non esse, sed ab æterno fuisse ; contra quod dicitur Genes. 1 . In principio Deus creavit cœlum et terram. Quartus est error Manichæorum , qui posuerunt Deum factorem invisibilium, sed visibilia a diabolo facta ; contra quos dicitur Hebr. 11. Fide intelligimus aptata esse sæcula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Quintus est error Simonis Magi, et Menandri ejus discipuli , et multorum aliorum hæreticorum eos sequentium, qui creationem mundi non Deo, sed Angelis attribuunt ; contra quos dicit Paulus, Act. 17. Deus qui fecit mundum et omnia quæ in eo sunt. Sextus est error eorum qui posuerunt Deum per seipsum non gubernare mundum, sed per quasdam partes sibi subjectas ; contra quos dicitur Job. 34. Quem constituit alium super terram , aut quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est ? Et contra hos errores dicitur in symbolo : Factorem vel creatorem cæli et terræ, visibilium omnium et invisibilium." Opusc. V. De articulis Fidei et Sacramentis Ecclesiæ . Cf. Opusc. VI. Expositio super Symbolo Apostolorum , Cap. III. His addi possunt Sociniani et non pauci protestantes, qui contendunt doctrinam de mundi creatione ex nihilo non esse ita clare expressam in Scripturis, ut quisque teneatur illam credere-Philosophi sæculi XVIII . , Voltaire, Rousseau etc., qui etsi non semper sibimetipsis cohærentes , dogma tamen creationis non raro uti absurdum traduxere-Pantheistæ omnes denique, qui sub quacumque forma suum systema exponunt, idem dogma inficiati sunt.
22 De Deo Creatore.
26. St. Thomas briefly gathers the ancient errors concerning the dogma of the creation of the world in Opuscule 5, On the Articles of Faith and the Sacraments of the Church: "Against this article, first indeed Democritus and Epicurus erred, holding that neither the matter of the world nor the very composition of the world is from God, but that the world was made by chance through a concourse of indivisible bodies, which they considered the principles of things. Against them it is said in Psalm 32: By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; that is, according to eternal reason, and not by chance. The second is the error of Plato and Anaxagoras, who held that the world was made by God, but from preexisting matter. Against them it is said in Psalm 148: He commanded and they were created; that is, made out of nothing. The third is the error of Aristotle, who held that the world was not made by God, but existed from eternity. Against this it is said in Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. The fourth is the error of the Manichaeans, who held God to be the maker of invisible things, but visible things to have been made by the devil. Against them it is said in Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that visible things might be made from invisible things. The fifth is the error of Simon Magus, and Menander his disciple, and of many other heretics following them, who attribute the creation of the world not to God but to angels. Against them Paul says in Acts 17: God who made the world and all things that are in it. The sixth is the error of those who held that God does not govern the world through himself, but through certain parts subject to himself. Against them it is said in Job 34: Whom has he appointed another over the earth, or whom has he placed over the world which he fashioned? And against these errors it is said in the Creed: Maker or creator of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible." Opuscule V, On the Articles of Faith and the Sacraments of the Church. Compare Opuscule VI, Exposition on the Apostles' Creed, chapter III.
To these can be added the Socinians and not a few Protestants, who contend that the doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing is not so clearly expressed in the Scriptures that everyone is bound to believe it; the philosophers of the eighteenth century, Voltaire, Rousseau, and others, who, although not always consistent with themselves, nevertheless not rarely presented the dogma of creation as absurd; and finally all pantheists, who, under whatever form they set forth their system, have denied the same dogma.
To these can be added the Socinians and not a few Protestants, who contend that the doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing is not so clearly expressed in the Scriptures that everyone is bound to believe it; the philosophers of the eighteenth century, Voltaire, Rousseau, and others, who, although not always consistent with themselves, nevertheless not rarely presented the dogma of creation as absurd; and finally all pantheists, who, under whatever form they set forth their system, have denied the same dogma.
27. Fides vero Ecclesiæ continetur in symbolo Apostolico, cujus primus articulus est : " Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem Creatorem cæli et terræ"- Symb . Nicaeno-Constpno, ubi dicitur : “ Credo in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem , factorem cœli et terræ, visibilium omnium et invisibilium"-Concil. Later. IV. cap. Firmiter, ubi legitur ; "Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus unum universorum principium : cre- ... ator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium : qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam spiritualem et corporalem : angelicam videlicet et mundanam : ac deinde humanam, quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. "-Conc. Vatic. Const. Dei Filius , cap. I. "Hic solus verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quæ creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consilio simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam , ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam." Et can. 1. "Si quis unum verum Deum, visibilium et invisibilium Creatorem et Dominum negavit ; anathema sit ;" et 5. "Si quis non confiteatur, mundum resque omnes, quæ in eo continentur, et spirituales et materiales, secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas ; anathema. sit."
27. But the faith of the Church is contained in the Apostles' Creed, whose first article is: "I believe in God the Father almighty, Creator of heaven and earth"; in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, where it is said: "I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible"; in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, where it is read: "We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one only true God, the one principle of all things: creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by his omnipotent power, at once from the beginning of time, established out of nothing each creature, spiritual and corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and then the human, constituted as it were common from spirit and body"; in the Vatican Council, Constitution Dei Filius, chapter I: "This one true God, by his goodness and almighty power, not for increasing his blessedness, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, at once from the beginning of time established out of nothing each creature, spiritual and corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and then the human, constituted as it were common from spirit and body." And canon 1: "If anyone has denied the one true God, Creator and Lord of visible and invisible things, let him be anathema"; and canon 5: "If anyone does not confess that the world and all things which are contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced by God out of nothing according to their whole substance, let him be anathema."
28. Quare catholicum dogma, quod ad præsentem quæstionem spectat, est Deum-et quidem solum
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 23 esse effectricem mundi causam per creationem. Ne tamen ambiguitati sit locus, tria animadvertimus.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 23 esse effectricem mundi causam per creationem. Ne tamen ambiguitati sit locus, tria animadvertimus.
28. Therefore the Catholic dogma which pertains to the present question is that God, and indeed God alone, is the efficient cause of the world through creation. But lest there be room for ambiguity, we make three observations.
29. Primo quidem nomen Mundi multiplicem habet acceptionem in Sacra Scriptura. Quandoque enim nomine mundi venit orbis terrarum, ut Marc. 16. 15. "Euntes in mundum universum prædicate Evangelium omni creaturæ."-Quandoque significatur totum genus hominum, ut Jo. 3. 16. "Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum Unigenitum daret. "- Quandoque intelliguntur homines perversi, ut Jo . 15. 18. “Si mundus vos odit, scitote, quia me priorem vobis odio habuit. "-Quandoque tandem, cæteris omissis , nomen mundi significat universitatem rerum contingentium, ut 2. Mach. 8. 18. " Potest (Deus) universum mundum uno nutu delere ; " et Jo . 1. 10. "mundus per ipsum factus est. " Hoc idem vero solet aliis vocibus designari, ut Gen. 1. per " cælum et terram" ; quibus adjungitur Gen. 2. 1. " omnis ornatus eorum ;" et Act. 4. 24. "mare, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt ;" ut etiam Col. 1. 16. per "visibilia, et invisibilia. " In præsenti quæstione su - mitur nomen mundi hoc ultimo sensu, ad significandum nempe complexum rerum omnium existentium extra Deum.
29. First, the name world has multiple acceptations in Sacred Scripture. Sometimes by the name world is meant the globe of the earth, as in Mark 16:15: "Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature." Sometimes the whole human race is signified, as in John 3:16: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." Sometimes wicked men are understood, as in John 15:18: "If the world hates you, know that it hated me before you." Finally, omitting the rest, the name world sometimes signifies the universe of contingent things, as in 2 Maccabees 8:18: "God can destroy the whole world by one nod"; and John 1:10: "the world was made through him." This same thing is also commonly designated by other expressions, as in Genesis 1 by "heaven and earth," to which is joined Genesis 2:1, "and all their adornment"; and Acts 4:24, "the sea, and all things that are in them"; and also Colossians 1:16 by "visible and invisible things." In the present question the name world is taken in this last sense, namely to signify the whole complex of all things existing outside God.
30. Secundo, optime animadvertit De Valentia T. 1. Disp. 3. q. 2. p. 2. "Res omnes produci a Deo per creationem, dupliciter intelligi potest. Uno modo ita ut nulla res sit quam secundum se totam Deus non creet. Altero modo ita, ut nulla res sit quam secundum se totam (ut res incorruptibiles) vel secundum aliquid sui, puta secundum materiam primam, Deus non producat ex nihilo . Priori modo non omnes
24 De Deo Creatore. res productæ sunt aut producuntur a Deo per creationem. Nam de ipso homine legimus Genes. 2. quod formavit Deus illum de limo terræ ; et quotidie una cum causis secundis producit res ex subjecto . Posteriori autem modo ex fide certum est, Deum omnia producere per creationem, videlicet aut secundum totum quod est in rebus (quomodo creavit Angelos, et creat animas rationales) aut secundum aliquid quod est rebus intimum, puta secundum materiam. Recte enim et orthodoxe D. Augustinus lib. I. de Genesi contra Manichæos, cap. 6. "Ideo," inquit, Deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi omnia formata de ista materia facta sunt, hæc ipsa tamen materia de omnino nihilo facta est. " Qua in re juverit etiam notare communem nunc loquendi modum. Distinguunt inter creationem primam et secundam . Primam vocant productionem ex nihilo materiæ informis seu indigestæ , ut Gen. 1.; secundam vero ejusdem expolitionem, seu formationem, ex ea, rerum corporearum quibus mundus adspectabilis constat, ut Sap. 11. 18. Alii tamen sub eodem nomine aliud intelligunt : dicunt enim creationem primam eam, qua substantiæ omnes cum suis viribus esse incipiunt ; secundam qua aliæ res producuntur per evolutionem harum virium juxta naturæ leges. Aliis denique creatio prima est illa, qua mundum ante multa annorum millia factum putant ; secunda, qua mundus fuit veluti restitutus.
24 De Deo Creatore. res productæ sunt aut producuntur a Deo per creationem. Nam de ipso homine legimus Genes. 2. quod formavit Deus illum de limo terræ ; et quotidie una cum causis secundis producit res ex subjecto . Posteriori autem modo ex fide certum est, Deum omnia producere per creationem, videlicet aut secundum totum quod est in rebus (quomodo creavit Angelos, et creat animas rationales) aut secundum aliquid quod est rebus intimum, puta secundum materiam. Recte enim et orthodoxe D. Augustinus lib. I. de Genesi contra Manichæos, cap. 6. "Ideo," inquit, Deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi omnia formata de ista materia facta sunt, hæc ipsa tamen materia de omnino nihilo facta est. " Qua in re juverit etiam notare communem nunc loquendi modum. Distinguunt inter creationem primam et secundam . Primam vocant productionem ex nihilo materiæ informis seu indigestæ , ut Gen. 1.; secundam vero ejusdem expolitionem, seu formationem, ex ea, rerum corporearum quibus mundus adspectabilis constat, ut Sap. 11. 18. Alii tamen sub eodem nomine aliud intelligunt : dicunt enim creationem primam eam, qua substantiæ omnes cum suis viribus esse incipiunt ; secundam qua aliæ res producuntur per evolutionem harum virium juxta naturæ leges. Aliis denique creatio prima est illa, qua mundum ante multa annorum millia factum putant ; secunda, qua mundus fuit veluti restitutus.
30. Second, De Valentia very well observes, tome 1, disputation 3, question 2, point 2: "That all things are produced by God through creation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that there is no thing which God does not create according to its whole self. In another way, so that there is no thing which God does not produce out of nothing either according to its whole self, as incorruptible things, or according to something of itself, namely according to prime matter. In the former way not all things have been or are produced by God through creation. For of man himself we read in Genesis 2 that God formed him from the slime of the earth; and daily, together with secondary causes, he produces things from a subject. But in the latter way it is certain from faith that God produces all things through creation, namely either according to the whole that is in things - in the way he created the angels and creates rational souls - or according to something that is innermost in things, namely according to matter. For rightly and orthodoxly St. Augustine says in book I of On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, chapter 6: 'Therefore God is most rightly believed to have made all things from nothing, because even if all things formed from that matter were made, nevertheless that matter itself was made from absolutely nothing.'"
In this matter it will also be useful to note the common manner of speaking now. They distinguish between first and second creation. They call the production out of nothing of unformed or unordered matter the first creation, as in Genesis 1; but the refinement or formation of the same matter, from it, into the corporeal things of which the visible world consists, the second, as in Wisdom 11:18. Others, however, understand something else under the same name: for they call the first creation that by which all substances begin to be with their powers; the second, that by which other things are produced through the evolution of these powers according to the laws of nature. Finally, for others the first creation is that by which they think the world was made many thousands of years ago; the second, that by which the world was, as it were, restored.
In this matter it will also be useful to note the common manner of speaking now. They distinguish between first and second creation. They call the production out of nothing of unformed or unordered matter the first creation, as in Genesis 1; but the refinement or formation of the same matter, from it, into the corporeal things of which the visible world consists, the second, as in Wisdom 11:18. Others, however, understand something else under the same name: for they call the first creation that by which all substances begin to be with their powers; the second, that by which other things are produced through the evolution of these powers according to the laws of nature. Finally, for others the first creation is that by which they think the world was made many thousands of years ago; the second, that by which the world was, as it were, restored.
31. Tertio, dicimus Deum solum esse causam mundi effectricem ad excludendum errorem tum Simonis Magi, Menandri, etc. qui contendebant mundum per Angelos tamquam per causam principalem crea
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 25 tum fuisse ; tum Marcionitarum, Manichæorum, Priscillianistarum tribuentium mundum corporeum principio malo. Nullo pacto vero attingimus hic quæstionem, utrum Deus in creatione et formatione rerum usus sit Angelorum ministerio.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 25 tum fuisse ; tum Marcionitarum, Manichæorum, Priscillianistarum tribuentium mundum corporeum principio malo. Nullo pacto vero attingimus hic quæstionem, utrum Deus in creatione et formatione rerum usus sit Angelorum ministerio.
31. Third, we say that God alone is the efficient cause of the world in order to exclude both the error of Simon Magus, Menander, and others, who contended that the world was created through angels as through a principal cause, and the error of the Marcionites, Manichaeans, and Priscillianists, who attributed the corporeal world to an evil principle. But we do not in any way touch here the question whether God, in the creation and formation of things, used the ministry of angels.
§ II. The Dogma Of Creation From Scripture.
32. His rite constitutis expendimus imprimis § 11. Dogma creationis ex scriptura. PROP. II. Ex scripturis clare edocemur Deum, ipsumque solum, de nihilo mundum condidisse. Prob. la Pars, nempe Deum, ipsumque solum, condidisse mundum. Creatio, in Sacra Scripura, a) describitur ut actio divina, et ceu nota characteristica Dei ; dicitur in Sacra Scriptura 6) Deus creavisse omnia ; expresse asseritur c) Deum solum omnia condidisse. Ergo. Prob. antec. Ex V. T. Ps. 32, 6-9. Verbo Domini, ait Psalmista, cæli firmati sunt : et spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum, Quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt : ipse mandavit et creata sunt. Et iterum Ps. 145, 6. Qui (Deus) fecit cœlum, et terram, et omnia quæ in eis sunt. Atque Ps. 134, 6. Omnia quæcumque voluit, Dominus fecit in cælo, et in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis, Porro Isaias, 40, 26. Levate in excelsum oculos vestros, videte, quis creavit hæc : qui educit in numero militiam eorum, et omnes ex nomine vocat : præ multitudine fortitudinis, et roboris, virtutisque ejus, neque unum reliquum fuit. Et 44, 24. Hæc dicit Dominus redemptor tuus, et for
26 De Deo Creatore. mator tuus ex utero : Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, extendens cælos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus mecum. Jeremias, 10, 12. Qui fecit terram in fortitudine sua, et prudentia sua extendit cælos. 2 Esdr. 9 , Tu ipse, Domine solus : tu fecisti cælum et cælum cælorum, et omnem exercitum eorum : terram, et universa, quæ in ea sunt : maria, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt : et tu vivificas omnia hæc, et exercitus cœli te adorat. Et auctor libri Sapientiæ, 9, 1. Deus patrum meorum, et Domine misericordiæ, qui fecisti omnia verbo tuo. Ex N. T. Act, 14, 14. Viri quid hæc facitis ? et nos mortales sumus, similes vobis homines, annuntiantes vobis ab his vanis converti ad Deum vivum, qui fecit cœlum, et terram, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt. Et Paulus, Col. 1, 16. Quoniam in ipso (Filio) condita sunt universa in coelis, et in terra, visibilia, et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates : omnia per ipsum, et in ipso creata sunt. Atque iterum, Heb. 11, 3. Fide intelligimus, aptata esse sæcula verbo Dei : ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Et Joannes, Apoc. 4, 11. Dignus es Domine Deus noster accipere gloriam, et honorem, et virtutem, quia tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam, erant et creata sunt. Prob 2a. Pars , nempe Deum condidisse mundum ex nihilo. Gen. 1., 1. seq. legitur : "In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.. Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas. Dixitque Deus : Fiat lux. Et facta est lux."-Et 2. 1. "Igitur perfecti sunt cæli et terra et omnis ornatus eorum."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 27 Plures Theologi ad probandum veram creationem, nempe productionem mundi ex nihilo, vim faciunt in ipso verbo hebraico barah ; idque eruditissimis animadversionibus conficere student. Non desunt tamen qui ex sola illa voce propositum dogma probari posse negant ; sive quia verbum barah non habet ex se vim significandi solam productionem ex nihilo, sive quia nec habet, aiunt, ex usu Scripturarum (Cf. Petav. De oper, sex dierum, 1. 1., c. 1. a. n. VIII.- Perrone, de Deo Creatore, de Mundo cap. 1. in not.- Schwetz, Theol. dogm. etc.) Satius ergo erit ab hoc argumento abstinere, eo vel magis quod in promptu sint aliæ evidentissimæ rationes ad rem ostendendam. Dato enim quod verbum barah possit significare tum productionem ex nihilo, tum productionem ex præexistente subjecto ; ex aliis regulis exegeseos determinari potest quo sensu adhibeatur in 1. Gen. Adhiberi autem ad significandum veram creationem, constat a) Ex scopo Moysis. Agnoscunt omnes Moysem rerum productionem describere ut Israelitas doceret tum unitatem Dei, tum Deum esse rerum omnium principium et Auctorem, atque ita eos averteret ab erroribus et fabulis gentium. Data opera igitur loquitur de origine mundi, et non, ut aiunt, per transennam ; ac proinde si aliqua materia infecta existeret, ex qua facta sint omnia, et de illo principio mentionem facere debuisset, ut Israelitæ recte de hac re sentirent. Atqui nihil de materia infecta dicit ; ergo. Argumentum hoc est Tertulliani c. Herm. c. 20. dicentis : "Quum in omni operatione tria sint principalia, qui facit, quod facit, et ex quo facit, tria
28 De Deo Creatore. nomina sunt edenda in legitima operis enarratione, persona factoris, species facti, forma materiæ. Si materia non editur, ubi et opera et operator eduntur, apparet, ex nihilo eum operatum ... Eo ipso dum non ostenditur ex aliquo factum, manifestatur ex nihilo factum, et non periclitatur, ne ex aliquo factum existimetur, quando nihil ex quo factum ostenditur." b) Ex contextu. In cit 1. Gen. vel agitur de prima omnino rerum origine, vel de rei (materiæ) jam existentis formatione ; vel de creatione prima, vel de creatione secunda. Atqui non agitur de secunda. Ergo. Prob. min. In sequentibus versibus loquitur Moyses de creatione secunda, et quidem in oppositione versus primi ; ergo in versu primo de prima omnino creatione agit-semper ac agit de creatione secunda mentionem injicit de materia præexistente. Ita, ex. gr. , terra est, quæ "protulit herbam virentem et facientem semem juxta genus suum ;" et "formavit Dominus Deus hominem ex limo terræ." In primo autem versu nulla fit mentio de materia præjacente. -Si illud creavit in 1. Gen. significaret secundam creationem, dicendum esset Deum formavisse "terram inanem et vacuam ;" quod quam absurdum sit facile apparet, præsertim supponendo materiam ingenitam et æternam-Cum certo constet in versibus seqq . loqui Moysem de creatione secunda, si de eadem loqueretur etiam in primo versu, nullo pacto aperuisset veram rerum originem, contra scopum, quem fatentibus omnibus sibi proposuerat. c) Ex sensu Hebræorum . Concedere videtur ipse Larroque recentiores rabinos sentire cum Christianis
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 29 in hac re. Plura documenta de eodem sensu antiquorum videre est apud Paulum Fagium "Annotata ad Genesim" cap.1. Extat in "Biblia critica, Amstelædami 1690.-Contenti erimus textu, qui habetur 2 . Machab . 7., 13. seqq. "Peto nate, ut aspicias ad cælum et terram et ad omnia quæ in eis sunt, et intelligas quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus, et genus humanum. " Quibus verbis Mater Machabæorum hortatur filium suum natu minimum ad tyranni tormenta sustinenda. Unde didicerat mulier illa quod effugerat aciem vel præstantissimorum inter gentes philosophorum ?-cæterum hoc testimonium, vel solum, thesim probat, uti patet. d) Ex aliis locis. In pluribus ex antea recitatis testimoniis dicitur Deus fecisse omnia : sed si ex subjecto præexistente fecisset, illud subjectum non ipse fecisset, ideoque non omnia fecisset ; ergo. In aliis testimoniis dicitur Deus omnia fecisse solo imperio suæ voluntatis, verbo virtutis suæ ; sed hoc falsum esset, si ex aliqua præexistente materia res fecisset, ergo. In cit. testimonio Isaiæ. 48. et alibi dicitur Deus primus et novissimus ; sed non posset sic dici primus, si et materia aliqua æterna esset ; ergo.- quod argumentum est Tertulliani c. Hermog. c. 6. "Ego primus, et quomodo primus, cui materia coæterna est ? Inter coæternos autem et contemporales prior non est, aut et materia prima est. Extendi cælos solus ; ex Hermogene simul materia coextendit."
26 De Deo Creatore. mator tuus ex utero : Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, extendens cælos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus mecum. Jeremias, 10, 12. Qui fecit terram in fortitudine sua, et prudentia sua extendit cælos. 2 Esdr. 9 , Tu ipse, Domine solus : tu fecisti cælum et cælum cælorum, et omnem exercitum eorum : terram, et universa, quæ in ea sunt : maria, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt : et tu vivificas omnia hæc, et exercitus cœli te adorat. Et auctor libri Sapientiæ, 9, 1. Deus patrum meorum, et Domine misericordiæ, qui fecisti omnia verbo tuo. Ex N. T. Act, 14, 14. Viri quid hæc facitis ? et nos mortales sumus, similes vobis homines, annuntiantes vobis ab his vanis converti ad Deum vivum, qui fecit cœlum, et terram, et omnia, quæ in eis sunt. Et Paulus, Col. 1, 16. Quoniam in ipso (Filio) condita sunt universa in coelis, et in terra, visibilia, et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates : omnia per ipsum, et in ipso creata sunt. Atque iterum, Heb. 11, 3. Fide intelligimus, aptata esse sæcula verbo Dei : ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Et Joannes, Apoc. 4, 11. Dignus es Domine Deus noster accipere gloriam, et honorem, et virtutem, quia tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam, erant et creata sunt. Prob 2a. Pars , nempe Deum condidisse mundum ex nihilo. Gen. 1., 1. seq. legitur : "In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.. Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas. Dixitque Deus : Fiat lux. Et facta est lux."-Et 2. 1. "Igitur perfecti sunt cæli et terra et omnis ornatus eorum."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 27 Plures Theologi ad probandum veram creationem, nempe productionem mundi ex nihilo, vim faciunt in ipso verbo hebraico barah ; idque eruditissimis animadversionibus conficere student. Non desunt tamen qui ex sola illa voce propositum dogma probari posse negant ; sive quia verbum barah non habet ex se vim significandi solam productionem ex nihilo, sive quia nec habet, aiunt, ex usu Scripturarum (Cf. Petav. De oper, sex dierum, 1. 1., c. 1. a. n. VIII.- Perrone, de Deo Creatore, de Mundo cap. 1. in not.- Schwetz, Theol. dogm. etc.) Satius ergo erit ab hoc argumento abstinere, eo vel magis quod in promptu sint aliæ evidentissimæ rationes ad rem ostendendam. Dato enim quod verbum barah possit significare tum productionem ex nihilo, tum productionem ex præexistente subjecto ; ex aliis regulis exegeseos determinari potest quo sensu adhibeatur in 1. Gen. Adhiberi autem ad significandum veram creationem, constat a) Ex scopo Moysis. Agnoscunt omnes Moysem rerum productionem describere ut Israelitas doceret tum unitatem Dei, tum Deum esse rerum omnium principium et Auctorem, atque ita eos averteret ab erroribus et fabulis gentium. Data opera igitur loquitur de origine mundi, et non, ut aiunt, per transennam ; ac proinde si aliqua materia infecta existeret, ex qua facta sint omnia, et de illo principio mentionem facere debuisset, ut Israelitæ recte de hac re sentirent. Atqui nihil de materia infecta dicit ; ergo. Argumentum hoc est Tertulliani c. Herm. c. 20. dicentis : "Quum in omni operatione tria sint principalia, qui facit, quod facit, et ex quo facit, tria
28 De Deo Creatore. nomina sunt edenda in legitima operis enarratione, persona factoris, species facti, forma materiæ. Si materia non editur, ubi et opera et operator eduntur, apparet, ex nihilo eum operatum ... Eo ipso dum non ostenditur ex aliquo factum, manifestatur ex nihilo factum, et non periclitatur, ne ex aliquo factum existimetur, quando nihil ex quo factum ostenditur." b) Ex contextu. In cit 1. Gen. vel agitur de prima omnino rerum origine, vel de rei (materiæ) jam existentis formatione ; vel de creatione prima, vel de creatione secunda. Atqui non agitur de secunda. Ergo. Prob. min. In sequentibus versibus loquitur Moyses de creatione secunda, et quidem in oppositione versus primi ; ergo in versu primo de prima omnino creatione agit-semper ac agit de creatione secunda mentionem injicit de materia præexistente. Ita, ex. gr. , terra est, quæ "protulit herbam virentem et facientem semem juxta genus suum ;" et "formavit Dominus Deus hominem ex limo terræ." In primo autem versu nulla fit mentio de materia præjacente. -Si illud creavit in 1. Gen. significaret secundam creationem, dicendum esset Deum formavisse "terram inanem et vacuam ;" quod quam absurdum sit facile apparet, præsertim supponendo materiam ingenitam et æternam-Cum certo constet in versibus seqq . loqui Moysem de creatione secunda, si de eadem loqueretur etiam in primo versu, nullo pacto aperuisset veram rerum originem, contra scopum, quem fatentibus omnibus sibi proposuerat. c) Ex sensu Hebræorum . Concedere videtur ipse Larroque recentiores rabinos sentire cum Christianis
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 29 in hac re. Plura documenta de eodem sensu antiquorum videre est apud Paulum Fagium "Annotata ad Genesim" cap.1. Extat in "Biblia critica, Amstelædami 1690.-Contenti erimus textu, qui habetur 2 . Machab . 7., 13. seqq. "Peto nate, ut aspicias ad cælum et terram et ad omnia quæ in eis sunt, et intelligas quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus, et genus humanum. " Quibus verbis Mater Machabæorum hortatur filium suum natu minimum ad tyranni tormenta sustinenda. Unde didicerat mulier illa quod effugerat aciem vel præstantissimorum inter gentes philosophorum ?-cæterum hoc testimonium, vel solum, thesim probat, uti patet. d) Ex aliis locis. In pluribus ex antea recitatis testimoniis dicitur Deus fecisse omnia : sed si ex subjecto præexistente fecisset, illud subjectum non ipse fecisset, ideoque non omnia fecisset ; ergo. In aliis testimoniis dicitur Deus omnia fecisse solo imperio suæ voluntatis, verbo virtutis suæ ; sed hoc falsum esset, si ex aliqua præexistente materia res fecisset, ergo. In cit. testimonio Isaiæ. 48. et alibi dicitur Deus primus et novissimus ; sed non posset sic dici primus, si et materia aliqua æterna esset ; ergo.- quod argumentum est Tertulliani c. Hermog. c. 6. "Ego primus, et quomodo primus, cui materia coæterna est ? Inter coæternos autem et contemporales prior non est, aut et materia prima est. Extendi cælos solus ; ex Hermogene simul materia coextendit."
32. Having duly established these things, we first examine the dogma of creation from Scripture.
Proof of the first part, namely that God, and God alone, founded the world. Creation, in Sacred Scripture, is described as a divine action and as a characteristic mark of God; in Sacred Scripture it is said that God created all things; and it is expressly asserted that God alone founded all things. Therefore.
Proof of the antecedent. From the Old Testament: Psalm 32:6-9. "By the word of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "the heavens were established, and by the spirit of his mouth all their power. For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." And again Psalm 145:6: "He [God] made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." And Psalm 134:6: "All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he made in heaven and on earth, in the sea and in all abysses." Moreover Isaiah 40:26: "Lift up your eyes on high and see who created these things: who brings out their host by number and calls them all by name; because of the multitude of his strength and power and might, not one was missing." And 44:24: "Thus says the Lord, your redeemer and your former from the womb: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching out the heavens alone, establishing the earth, and no one with me." Jeremiah 10:12: "He made the earth by his strength, and by his prudence he stretched out the heavens." 2 Esdras 9: "You yourself, Lord, alone: you made heaven and the heaven of heavens and all their host; the earth and all things that are in it; the seas and all things that are in them; and you give life to all these things, and the host of heaven adores you." And the author of the book of Wisdom, 9:1: "God of my fathers and Lord of mercy, who made all things by your word."
From the New Testament: Acts 14:14: "Men, why do you do these things? We also are mortal, men like you, announcing to you that you should turn from these vain things to the living God, who made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." And Paul, Colossians 1:16: "For in him [the Son] all things were founded in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created through him and in him." And again Hebrews 11:3: "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that visible things might be made from invisible things." And John, Apocalypse 4:11: "You are worthy, Lord our God, to receive glory and honor and power, because you created all things, and because of your will they were and were created."
Proof of the second part, namely that God founded the world out of nothing. In Genesis 1:1 and following it is read: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But the earth was empty and void, and the Spirit of God was borne over the waters. And God said: Let there be light. And light was made." And Genesis 2:1: "Therefore the heavens and the earth were perfected, and all their adornment."
Many theologians, in order to prove true creation, namely the production of the world out of nothing, lay stress on the Hebrew word barah itself; and they endeavor to establish this by very learned observations. Nevertheless, there are some who deny that the proposed dogma can be proved from that word alone, either because the word barah does not of itself have the force of signifying only production out of nothing, or because, they say, it does not have this force even from the usage of the Scriptures. Compare Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book I, chapter 1, from n. VIII; Perrone, On God the Creator, On the World, chapter 1, in the note; Schwetz, Dogmatic Theology, etc. Therefore it will be better to abstain from this argument, all the more because other most evident reasons are ready at hand for showing the matter.
For, granted that the word barah can signify both production out of nothing and production from a preexisting subject, it can be determined from other rules of exegesis in what sense it is used in Genesis 1. That it is used to signify true creation is clear:
First, from the purpose of Moses. All acknowledge that Moses describes the production of things in order to teach the Israelites both the unity of God and that God is the principle and Author of all things, and thus to turn them away from the errors and fables of the nations. Therefore he speaks deliberately about the origin of the world, and not, as they say, in passing. Consequently, if some unmade matter existed from which all things were made, he ought to have made mention of that principle, so that the Israelites might think rightly about this matter. But he says nothing about unmade matter. Therefore. This argument belongs to Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapter 20, where he says: "Since in every operation there are three principal things, the one who makes, what he makes, and that from which he makes, three names must be given in the legitimate narration of the work: the person of the maker, the kind of thing made, and the form of the matter. If matter is not named, where both the works and the worker are named, it is clear that he worked from nothing ... By the very fact that it is not shown to have been made from something, it is manifested to have been made from nothing; nor is there danger that it be thought to have been made from something, when nothing from which it was made is shown."
Second, from the context. In the cited Genesis 1, either the absolutely first origin of things is being treated, or the formation of a thing, that is, matter, already existing; either the first creation, or the second creation. But the second is not being treated. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. In the following verses Moses speaks of the second creation, and indeed in opposition to the first verse; therefore in the first verse he treats the absolutely first creation. Whenever he treats the second creation, he introduces mention of preexisting matter. Thus, for example, it is the earth which "brought forth green herb making seed according to its kind"; and "the Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth." But in the first verse no mention is made of preexisting matter. If that word created in Genesis 1 signified the second creation, it would have to be said that God formed "the earth empty and void," and how absurd this is easily appears, especially if unbegotten and eternal matter is supposed. Since it is certain that in the following verses Moses speaks of the second creation, if he were speaking of the same in the first verse also, he would in no way have opened up the true origin of things, contrary to the purpose which, by everyone's admission, he had set before himself.
Third, from the sense of the Hebrews. Larroque himself seems to concede that the more recent rabbis agree with Christians in this matter. Many documents concerning the same sense among the ancients may be seen in Paulus Fagius, Annotations on Genesis, chapter 1. It exists in the Biblia Critica, Amsterdam, 1690. We shall be content with the text which is found in 2 Maccabees 7:13 and following: "I ask you, son, to look at heaven and earth and all things that are in them, and to understand that God made them and the human race out of nothing." By these words the mother of the Maccabees exhorts her youngest son to endure the torments of the tyrant. From where had that woman learned what escaped the sharpness of even the most excellent philosophers among the nations? Besides, this testimony, even alone, proves the thesis, as is clear.
Fourth, from other places. In several of the testimonies cited above, God is said to have made all things; but if he had made them from a preexisting subject, he would not himself have made that subject, and therefore he would not have made all things. Therefore. In other testimonies God is said to have made all things by the sole command of his will, by the word of his power; but this would be false if he had made things from some preexisting matter. Therefore. In the cited testimony of Isaiah 48, and elsewhere, God is called the first and the last; but he could not be called first in this way if some matter too were eternal. Therefore. This is Tertullian's argument, Against Hermogenes, chapter 6: "I am the first; and how first, if matter is coeternal with me? But among coeternals and contemporaries there is no prior one, or matter too is first. I stretched out the heavens alone; according to Hermogenes, matter at the same time stretched them out with him."
Proof of the first part, namely that God, and God alone, founded the world. Creation, in Sacred Scripture, is described as a divine action and as a characteristic mark of God; in Sacred Scripture it is said that God created all things; and it is expressly asserted that God alone founded all things. Therefore.
Proof of the antecedent. From the Old Testament: Psalm 32:6-9. "By the word of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "the heavens were established, and by the spirit of his mouth all their power. For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." And again Psalm 145:6: "He [God] made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." And Psalm 134:6: "All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he made in heaven and on earth, in the sea and in all abysses." Moreover Isaiah 40:26: "Lift up your eyes on high and see who created these things: who brings out their host by number and calls them all by name; because of the multitude of his strength and power and might, not one was missing." And 44:24: "Thus says the Lord, your redeemer and your former from the womb: I am the Lord, making all things, stretching out the heavens alone, establishing the earth, and no one with me." Jeremiah 10:12: "He made the earth by his strength, and by his prudence he stretched out the heavens." 2 Esdras 9: "You yourself, Lord, alone: you made heaven and the heaven of heavens and all their host; the earth and all things that are in it; the seas and all things that are in them; and you give life to all these things, and the host of heaven adores you." And the author of the book of Wisdom, 9:1: "God of my fathers and Lord of mercy, who made all things by your word."
From the New Testament: Acts 14:14: "Men, why do you do these things? We also are mortal, men like you, announcing to you that you should turn from these vain things to the living God, who made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." And Paul, Colossians 1:16: "For in him [the Son] all things were founded in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created through him and in him." And again Hebrews 11:3: "By faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that visible things might be made from invisible things." And John, Apocalypse 4:11: "You are worthy, Lord our God, to receive glory and honor and power, because you created all things, and because of your will they were and were created."
Proof of the second part, namely that God founded the world out of nothing. In Genesis 1:1 and following it is read: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But the earth was empty and void, and the Spirit of God was borne over the waters. And God said: Let there be light. And light was made." And Genesis 2:1: "Therefore the heavens and the earth were perfected, and all their adornment."
Many theologians, in order to prove true creation, namely the production of the world out of nothing, lay stress on the Hebrew word barah itself; and they endeavor to establish this by very learned observations. Nevertheless, there are some who deny that the proposed dogma can be proved from that word alone, either because the word barah does not of itself have the force of signifying only production out of nothing, or because, they say, it does not have this force even from the usage of the Scriptures. Compare Petavius, On the Work of the Six Days, book I, chapter 1, from n. VIII; Perrone, On God the Creator, On the World, chapter 1, in the note; Schwetz, Dogmatic Theology, etc. Therefore it will be better to abstain from this argument, all the more because other most evident reasons are ready at hand for showing the matter.
For, granted that the word barah can signify both production out of nothing and production from a preexisting subject, it can be determined from other rules of exegesis in what sense it is used in Genesis 1. That it is used to signify true creation is clear:
First, from the purpose of Moses. All acknowledge that Moses describes the production of things in order to teach the Israelites both the unity of God and that God is the principle and Author of all things, and thus to turn them away from the errors and fables of the nations. Therefore he speaks deliberately about the origin of the world, and not, as they say, in passing. Consequently, if some unmade matter existed from which all things were made, he ought to have made mention of that principle, so that the Israelites might think rightly about this matter. But he says nothing about unmade matter. Therefore. This argument belongs to Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapter 20, where he says: "Since in every operation there are three principal things, the one who makes, what he makes, and that from which he makes, three names must be given in the legitimate narration of the work: the person of the maker, the kind of thing made, and the form of the matter. If matter is not named, where both the works and the worker are named, it is clear that he worked from nothing ... By the very fact that it is not shown to have been made from something, it is manifested to have been made from nothing; nor is there danger that it be thought to have been made from something, when nothing from which it was made is shown."
Second, from the context. In the cited Genesis 1, either the absolutely first origin of things is being treated, or the formation of a thing, that is, matter, already existing; either the first creation, or the second creation. But the second is not being treated. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. In the following verses Moses speaks of the second creation, and indeed in opposition to the first verse; therefore in the first verse he treats the absolutely first creation. Whenever he treats the second creation, he introduces mention of preexisting matter. Thus, for example, it is the earth which "brought forth green herb making seed according to its kind"; and "the Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth." But in the first verse no mention is made of preexisting matter. If that word created in Genesis 1 signified the second creation, it would have to be said that God formed "the earth empty and void," and how absurd this is easily appears, especially if unbegotten and eternal matter is supposed. Since it is certain that in the following verses Moses speaks of the second creation, if he were speaking of the same in the first verse also, he would in no way have opened up the true origin of things, contrary to the purpose which, by everyone's admission, he had set before himself.
Third, from the sense of the Hebrews. Larroque himself seems to concede that the more recent rabbis agree with Christians in this matter. Many documents concerning the same sense among the ancients may be seen in Paulus Fagius, Annotations on Genesis, chapter 1. It exists in the Biblia Critica, Amsterdam, 1690. We shall be content with the text which is found in 2 Maccabees 7:13 and following: "I ask you, son, to look at heaven and earth and all things that are in them, and to understand that God made them and the human race out of nothing." By these words the mother of the Maccabees exhorts her youngest son to endure the torments of the tyrant. From where had that woman learned what escaped the sharpness of even the most excellent philosophers among the nations? Besides, this testimony, even alone, proves the thesis, as is clear.
Fourth, from other places. In several of the testimonies cited above, God is said to have made all things; but if he had made them from a preexisting subject, he would not himself have made that subject, and therefore he would not have made all things. Therefore. In other testimonies God is said to have made all things by the sole command of his will, by the word of his power; but this would be false if he had made things from some preexisting matter. Therefore. In the cited testimony of Isaiah 48, and elsewhere, God is called the first and the last; but he could not be called first in this way if some matter too were eternal. Therefore. This is Tertullian's argument, Against Hermogenes, chapter 6: "I am the first; and how first, if matter is coeternal with me? But among coeternals and contemporaries there is no prior one, or matter too is first. I stretched out the heavens alone; according to Hermogenes, matter at the same time stretched them out with him."
33. NOTA. Objectiones ex Scriptura fere omnes præocupatæ sunt. Etenim ad tria capita facile omnes revocantur. 1. Arguunt ex verbo barah, dicentes
30 De Deo Creatore ex nativa vi et usu Scripturarum non importare productionem ex nihilo. Jam dictum est ex aliis adjunctis evidentissime determinari sensum illius vocis in 1. Gen. 2. Arguunt ex verbis latino creare, et græco ἐποίησε, quæ non habent ex se vim significandi productionem ex nihilo . At nil mirum si latinis et græcis deerat verbum ad significandum rem fere penitus ipsis ignotam. Cæterum quidquid sit de vi vocis in se inspectæ ; iterum ex aliis fontibus sensus determinatur.-3 . Objiciunt quod legitur sap. 11. 18. "Non enim impossibilis erat omnipotens manus tua, quæ creavit mundum ex materia invisa, immittere illis multitudinem ursorum , aut audaces leones." Sed illud creavit ex materia invisa intelligi debet de creatione secunda, de qua loquitur ipse Moyses ; inde tamen non excluditur prima quæ continetur in 1. Gen. Hunc esse verum sensum objecti testimonii patet, sive ex scopo commendandi Dei sapientiam, quæ maxime elucet in rerum varietate aptaque earumdem dispositione, sive ex S. Aug. L. 1. cont. advers . leg. et Proph. ex S. Jo. Damasceno. Lib. 2. de fid. orthod. c. 5. Vide Perrone .
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 31 in qua solvitur quæstio utrum philosophorum a vera Relig. aversorum aliquis mundum a Deo ex nihilo creatum esse docuerit.) Præsertim vero Bosobrius, (Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee etc, Tom. II. ) in dubium saltem revocavit orthodoxiam Origenis et Tertulliani in hac re : quibus Roussean ( Lettre a M. de Beaumont) addidit S. Justinum, Clementem Alexandrinum et alios. Unde statuendum est : 35. PROP. III. Dogma de mundi creatione ex concordi SS. Putrum testimonio certo eruitur. Prob . Innumera sunt SS. Patrum testimonia, quibus integrum dogma catholicum de creatione adstruitur ; sed cum diversi contra diversos errores huic dogmati contrarios magis directe istud propugnaverint, juverit ex ordine eadem testimonia exhibere. a) Contra errorem de materia æterna ingenita. S. Theophilus Antioch, (ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 4. Oper. S. Justini) " Quid autem magni esset, si Deus ex materia subjecta mundum faceret ? Opifex enim apud nos, cum materiam ab aliquo acceperit, ex eo quidquid placuerit effingit. Dei autem potentia in eo spectatur, ut ex nihilo faciat, quæcumque voluerit : quemadmodum animam et motum dare, non est alterius cujusquam præterquam Dei." Et n. 10. Ac primo quidem summo consensu docuere (Prophetæ), Deum ex nihilo omnia creasse. Nihil enim Deo coævum ; sed cum sibi ipse locus sit, nec ulla re egeat, at sæculis antiquior sit, hominem facere voluit, cui innotesceret : huic homini mundum præparavit."- Tatianus (cont. Græcos. n. 5. ) "Universoruni Dominus, quatenus quidem mundus nondum erat creatus, solus erat. Non enim caret initio materia, quemad
30 De Deo Creatore ex nativa vi et usu Scripturarum non importare productionem ex nihilo. Jam dictum est ex aliis adjunctis evidentissime determinari sensum illius vocis in 1. Gen. 2. Arguunt ex verbis latino creare, et græco ἐποίησε, quæ non habent ex se vim significandi productionem ex nihilo . At nil mirum si latinis et græcis deerat verbum ad significandum rem fere penitus ipsis ignotam. Cæterum quidquid sit de vi vocis in se inspectæ ; iterum ex aliis fontibus sensus determinatur.-3 . Objiciunt quod legitur sap. 11. 18. "Non enim impossibilis erat omnipotens manus tua, quæ creavit mundum ex materia invisa, immittere illis multitudinem ursorum , aut audaces leones." Sed illud creavit ex materia invisa intelligi debet de creatione secunda, de qua loquitur ipse Moyses ; inde tamen non excluditur prima quæ continetur in 1. Gen. Hunc esse verum sensum objecti testimonii patet, sive ex scopo commendandi Dei sapientiam, quæ maxime elucet in rerum varietate aptaque earumdem dispositione, sive ex S. Aug. L. 1. cont. advers . leg. et Proph. ex S. Jo. Damasceno. Lib. 2. de fid. orthod. c. 5. Vide Perrone .
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 31 in qua solvitur quæstio utrum philosophorum a vera Relig. aversorum aliquis mundum a Deo ex nihilo creatum esse docuerit.) Præsertim vero Bosobrius, (Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee etc, Tom. II. ) in dubium saltem revocavit orthodoxiam Origenis et Tertulliani in hac re : quibus Roussean ( Lettre a M. de Beaumont) addidit S. Justinum, Clementem Alexandrinum et alios. Unde statuendum est : 35. PROP. III. Dogma de mundi creatione ex concordi SS. Putrum testimonio certo eruitur. Prob . Innumera sunt SS. Patrum testimonia, quibus integrum dogma catholicum de creatione adstruitur ; sed cum diversi contra diversos errores huic dogmati contrarios magis directe istud propugnaverint, juverit ex ordine eadem testimonia exhibere. a) Contra errorem de materia æterna ingenita. S. Theophilus Antioch, (ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 4. Oper. S. Justini) " Quid autem magni esset, si Deus ex materia subjecta mundum faceret ? Opifex enim apud nos, cum materiam ab aliquo acceperit, ex eo quidquid placuerit effingit. Dei autem potentia in eo spectatur, ut ex nihilo faciat, quæcumque voluerit : quemadmodum animam et motum dare, non est alterius cujusquam præterquam Dei." Et n. 10. Ac primo quidem summo consensu docuere (Prophetæ), Deum ex nihilo omnia creasse. Nihil enim Deo coævum ; sed cum sibi ipse locus sit, nec ulla re egeat, at sæculis antiquior sit, hominem facere voluit, cui innotesceret : huic homini mundum præparavit."- Tatianus (cont. Græcos. n. 5. ) "Universoruni Dominus, quatenus quidem mundus nondum erat creatus, solus erat. Non enim caret initio materia, quemad
33. Note. Nearly all objections from Scripture have been anticipated. For they are all easily reduced to three headings.
First, they argue from the word barah, saying that by its native force and the usage of the Scriptures it does not import production out of nothing. It has already been said that the sense of that word in Genesis 1 is most evidently determined from the other circumstances.
Second, they argue from the Latin word creare and the Greek word ἐποίησε, which do not of themselves have the force of signifying production out of nothing. But it is no wonder if the Latins and Greeks lacked a word for signifying a thing almost entirely unknown to them. Besides, whatever may be the force of the word considered in itself, again the sense is determined from other sources.
Third, they object from what is read in Wisdom 11:18: "For your almighty hand, which created the world from unseen matter, was not unable to send upon them a multitude of bears or bold lions." But that phrase created from unseen matter must be understood of the second creation, of which Moses himself speaks; nevertheless the first creation, which is contained in Genesis 1, is not thereby excluded. That this is the true sense of the objected testimony is clear, whether from the purpose of commending God's wisdom, which shines forth especially in the variety of things and in their fitting disposition, or from St. Augustine, book I Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, and from St. John Damascene, book II On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 5. See Perrone.
First, they argue from the word barah, saying that by its native force and the usage of the Scriptures it does not import production out of nothing. It has already been said that the sense of that word in Genesis 1 is most evidently determined from the other circumstances.
Second, they argue from the Latin word creare and the Greek word ἐποίησε, which do not of themselves have the force of signifying production out of nothing. But it is no wonder if the Latins and Greeks lacked a word for signifying a thing almost entirely unknown to them. Besides, whatever may be the force of the word considered in itself, again the sense is determined from other sources.
Third, they object from what is read in Wisdom 11:18: "For your almighty hand, which created the world from unseen matter, was not unable to send upon them a multitude of bears or bold lions." But that phrase created from unseen matter must be understood of the second creation, of which Moses himself speaks; nevertheless the first creation, which is contained in Genesis 1, is not thereby excluded. That this is the true sense of the objected testimony is clear, whether from the purpose of commending God's wisdom, which shines forth especially in the variety of things and in their fitting disposition, or from St. Augustine, book I Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, and from St. John Damascene, book II On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 5. See Perrone.
§ III. The Dogma Of Creation From The Holy Fathers.
34. Quemadmodum Sociniani et alii, ut diximus, negaverunt dogma creationis ex nihilo clare contineri in scripturis ; ita non defuerunt qui temere assererent illud esse Scholasticorum inventum , Ecclesiæ Patribus ignotum (Vid. Jo. Laur. Moshemii Dissert.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 31 in qua solvitur quæstio utrum philosophorum a vera Relig. aversorum aliquis mundum a Deo ex nihilo creatum esse docuerit.) Præsertim vero Beausobrius, (Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee etc, Tom. II. ) in dubium saltem revocavit orthodoxiam Origenis et Tertulliani in hac re : quibus Rousseau ( Lettre a M. de Beaumont) addidit S. Justinum, Clementem Alexandrinum et alios. Unde statuendum est :
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 31 in qua solvitur quæstio utrum philosophorum a vera Relig. aversorum aliquis mundum a Deo ex nihilo creatum esse docuerit.) Præsertim vero Beausobrius, (Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee etc, Tom. II. ) in dubium saltem revocavit orthodoxiam Origenis et Tertulliani in hac re : quibus Rousseau ( Lettre a M. de Beaumont) addidit S. Justinum, Clementem Alexandrinum et alios. Unde statuendum est :
34. Just as the Socinians and others, as we have said, denied that the dogma of creation out of nothing is clearly contained in the Scriptures, so there have not been lacking those who rashly asserted that it is an invention of the Scholastics, unknown to the Fathers of the Church. See Johann Lorenz Mosheim's dissertation in which the question is solved whether any of the philosophers turned away from true religion taught that the world was created by God out of nothing. Especially, however, Beausobre, in Histoire des Dogmes de Manichee, tome II, at least called into doubt the orthodoxy of Origen and Tertullian in this matter; to whom Rousseau, in Lettre a M. de Beaumont, added St. Justin, Clement of Alexandria, and others. Hence it must be established:
35. PROP. III. Dogma de mundi creatione ex concordi SS. Patrum testimonio certo eruitur. Prob . Innumera sunt SS. Patrum testimonia, quibus integrum dogma catholicum de creatione adstruitur ; sed cum diversi contra diversos errores huic dogmati contrarios magis directe istud propugnaverint, juverit ex ordine eadem testimonia exhibere. a) Contra errorem de materia æterna ingenita. S. Theophilus Antioch, (ad Autol. 1. 2. n. 4. Oper. S. Justini) " Quid autem magni esset, si Deus ex materia subjecta mundum faceret ? Opifex enim apud nos, cum materiam ab aliquo acceperit, ex eo quidquid placuerit effingit. Dei autem potentia in eo spectatur, ut ex nihilo faciat, quæcumque voluerit : quemadmodum animam et motum dare, non est alterius cujusquam præterquam Dei." Et n. 10. Ac primo quidem summo consensu docuere (Prophetæ), Deum ex nihilo omnia creasse. Nihil enim Deo coævum ; sed cum sibi ipse locus sit, nec ulla re egeat, at sæculis antiquior sit, hominem facere voluit, cui innotesceret : huic homini mundum præparavit."- Tatianus (cont. Græcos. n. 5. ) "Universorum Dominus, quatenus quidem mundus nondum erat creatus, solus erat. Non enim caret initio materia, quemad
32 De Deo Creatore. modum Deus : nec Deo , ut principii expers, parem habet potestatem, verum creata est : nec ab alio facta est, sed a solo universorum opifice producta." Athenagoras (Legatio pro Christi. n . 4. ) " Nobis autem qui Deum a materia disjungimus,-ac plurimo utrumque intervallo distare demonstramus (Deum enim increatum et æternum esse, ac sola mente ac ratione cognosci posse, materiam autem creatam et corruptioni obnoxiam), nonne immerito atheorum nomen imponitur ?" Origenes (Tom. 1. Com. in Jo., in illud : In principio creavit Deus.) "Secus vero apud nos (Christianos) est, qui credimus ex non entibus Deum entia fecisse, ut Mater illa septem Martyrum in Machabæorum gestis, et Pœnitentiæ Angelus in Pastore docuit. "-Et (de Princ. Præf. n. 4.) "Species eorum, quæ per prædicationem Apostolicam manifesto traduntur, sunt istæ : primo quod unus Deus est, qui omnia creavit atque composuit, quique cum nihil esset, esse fecit omnia."-S. Athanasius (De Incarnat. Verb. D. n. 3.) "Novit enim (Christi fides), res non fortuito factas esse, quia providentia gubernantur : neque ex materia prius existente , quia Deus imbecillis non est : sed Deum omnia, neutiquam prius existentia, ex nihilo per Verbum fecisse, ut essent, uti per Moysem ait 'In principio fecit Deus cœlum et terram. " Tertullianus (Apol. n. 17.) " Quod colimus , Deus unus est, qui totam molem istam cum omni instrumento elementorum, corporum, spirituum , verbo quo jussit, ratione qua disposuit, virtute qua potuit, de nihilo expressit in ornamentum majestatis suæ, unde et Græci nomen κόσμον accommodaverunt." Et (de præscript. cap. 12.) Regula est autem fidei, ut
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 33 jam hinc quid defendamus profiteamur, illa scilicet, qua creditur unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium præter mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit, per verbum suum." Sed Vid. integrum 1. cont. Herm.-S. Augustinus (De Gen. cont. Manich. 1. 1. c. 6. n. 10.) "Non enim debemus similes esse istis, qui omnipotentem Deum non credunt aliquid de nihilo facere potuisse, cum considerant fabros et quoslibet opifices non posse aliquid fabricare , nisi habuerint, unde fabricent.-Omnipotens autem Deus nulla re adjuvandus erat, quam ipse non fecerat, ut quod volebat, efficeret. Si enim ad eas res , quas facere volebat, adjuvabat eum aliqua res, quam ipse non fecerat, non erat omnipotens : quod sacrilegum est credere . " Similia habet S. Ambrosius, Hex. 1. 1. c. 5.-S. Fulgentius de fide ad Pet. c. 3. n. 25. b) Contra errorem de creatione visibilium facta ab Angelis. S. Irenaeus (Cont. haer. 1. 2. c. 2. n. 1-4.) " Qui autem ab Angelis mundum dicunt fabricatum, vel ab alio quodam mundi fabricatore, præter sententiam ejus, qui super omnia Pater est, primo quidem ex hoc ipso peccant, præter voluntatem Dei talem et tantam conditionem Angelos fecisse dicentes : quasi efficaciores sint Angeli, quam Deus, etc. Si autem non præter voluntatem ejus, sed volente et sciente ; -jam non Angeli, vel mundi fabricator causae erunt fabricationis istius, sed voluntas Dei. Sit fortasse hic sermo suasorius , sive seductorius apud eos, qui ignorant Deum, et qui hominibus assimilant eum inopibus, et his, qui non possunt statim aliquid ex parato fabricare, sed indigentibus multis organis ad eorum fabricationem : non autem verisimilis in totum
34 De Deo Creatore. apud eos, qui sciunt, quoniam nullius indigens omnium Deus, Verbo condidit omnia et fecit, neque Angelis indigens adjutoribus ad ea, quæ fiunt : neque virtute aliqua valde inferiori ab illo, et ignorante Patrem ; neque aliqua labe, neque ignorantia, ut is, qui inciperet eum cognoscere, homo fieret : sed ipse in semetipso, secundum id, quod est inenarrabile, et inexcogitabile nobis, omnia prædestinans fecit, quemadmodum voluit ; omnibus consonantiam, et ordinem suum, et initium creationis donans ; spiritualibus quidem spiritualem et invisibilem, et supercœlestibus cœlestem, et Angelis angelicam, et animalibus animalem, et natantibus aquatilem, et terrigenis terrigenam, omnibus aptam qualitatis substantiam : omnia autem, quæ facta sunt, infatigabili Verbo fecit. "- S. Cyrillus Alex. (Thes. 1. 6. c. 2.) "Præcipua Dei veri proprietas est, ut a nihilo possit substantias producere. " Et (Cont. Juli. 1. 2.) "Potestas creandi divinæ solummodo inest naturæ : hæc est inter alias Deo convenientes dignitates præcipua." Vid. Patres qui consubstantialitatem Verbi defenderunt. c) Contra errorem Emanatismi et Pantheismi generatim. S. Aug. (De Gen. imperf. c. 1. n. 2.) "Hanc ergo Trinitatem dici unum Deum, eumque fecisse , et creasse omnia, quæ sunt, in quantum sunt, Catholica disciplina credi jubet, ita ut creatura omnis sive intellectualis sive corporalis, non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihilo." Et (De Gen. c. Manich. 1. 1. c. 2. n. 4.) "Hæc facta sunt : nec ea genuit de se ipso, ut hoc essent, quod ipse est ; sed ea fecit de nihilo, ut non essent æqualia nec ei, a quo facta sunt, nec Filio ejus, per quem facta sunt. " Lactantius (De
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 35 inst . 1. 2. c. 6.) "Si Deus est mundus, et partes ejus utique immortales sunt ; ergo et homo Deus est, quia pars est (ut dicitis) mundi. Si homo ; ergo et jumenta, et pecudes, et cetera genera bestiarum, et avium, et piscium ; quoniam et illa eodem modo sentiunt, et mundi partes sunt. At hoc tolerabile est : nam et hæc colunt Ægyptii. Sed res eo pervenit, ut et ranae, et culices, et formicæ dii esse videantur, quia et ipsis inest sensus , et partes mundi sunt. Ita semper argumenta ex falso petita ineptos et absurdos exitus habent. "-Vid. etiam Origenem (De Orat. n. 23.) ; S. Maximum (Schol. in Dionys. c. 2. § 3.) ; S. Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 85. n. 12.
32 De Deo Creatore. modum Deus : nec Deo , ut principii expers, parem habet potestatem, verum creata est : nec ab alio facta est, sed a solo universorum opifice producta." Athenagoras (Legatio pro Christi. n . 4. ) " Nobis autem qui Deum a materia disjungimus,-ac plurimo utrumque intervallo distare demonstramus (Deum enim increatum et æternum esse, ac sola mente ac ratione cognosci posse, materiam autem creatam et corruptioni obnoxiam), nonne immerito atheorum nomen imponitur ?" Origenes (Tom. 1. Com. in Jo., in illud : In principio creavit Deus.) "Secus vero apud nos (Christianos) est, qui credimus ex non entibus Deum entia fecisse, ut Mater illa septem Martyrum in Machabæorum gestis, et Pœnitentiæ Angelus in Pastore docuit. "-Et (de Princ. Præf. n. 4.) "Species eorum, quæ per prædicationem Apostolicam manifesto traduntur, sunt istæ : primo quod unus Deus est, qui omnia creavit atque composuit, quique cum nihil esset, esse fecit omnia."-S. Athanasius (De Incarnat. Verb. D. n. 3.) "Novit enim (Christi fides), res non fortuito factas esse, quia providentia gubernantur : neque ex materia prius existente , quia Deus imbecillis non est : sed Deum omnia, neutiquam prius existentia, ex nihilo per Verbum fecisse, ut essent, uti per Moysem ait 'In principio fecit Deus cœlum et terram. " Tertullianus (Apol. n. 17.) " Quod colimus , Deus unus est, qui totam molem istam cum omni instrumento elementorum, corporum, spirituum , verbo quo jussit, ratione qua disposuit, virtute qua potuit, de nihilo expressit in ornamentum majestatis suæ, unde et Græci nomen κόσμον accommodaverunt." Et (de præscript. cap. 12.) Regula est autem fidei, ut
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 33 jam hinc quid defendamus profiteamur, illa scilicet, qua creditur unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium præter mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit, per verbum suum." Sed Vid. integrum 1. cont. Herm.-S. Augustinus (De Gen. cont. Manich. 1. 1. c. 6. n. 10.) "Non enim debemus similes esse istis, qui omnipotentem Deum non credunt aliquid de nihilo facere potuisse, cum considerant fabros et quoslibet opifices non posse aliquid fabricare , nisi habuerint, unde fabricent.-Omnipotens autem Deus nulla re adjuvandus erat, quam ipse non fecerat, ut quod volebat, efficeret. Si enim ad eas res , quas facere volebat, adjuvabat eum aliqua res, quam ipse non fecerat, non erat omnipotens : quod sacrilegum est credere . " Similia habet S. Ambrosius, Hex. 1. 1. c. 5.-S. Fulgentius de fide ad Pet. c. 3. n. 25. b) Contra errorem de creatione visibilium facta ab Angelis. S. Irenaeus (Cont. haer. 1. 2. c. 2. n. 1-4.) " Qui autem ab Angelis mundum dicunt fabricatum, vel ab alio quodam mundi fabricatore, præter sententiam ejus, qui super omnia Pater est, primo quidem ex hoc ipso peccant, præter voluntatem Dei talem et tantam conditionem Angelos fecisse dicentes : quasi efficaciores sint Angeli, quam Deus, etc. Si autem non præter voluntatem ejus, sed volente et sciente ; -jam non Angeli, vel mundi fabricator causae erunt fabricationis istius, sed voluntas Dei. Sit fortasse hic sermo suasorius , sive seductorius apud eos, qui ignorant Deum, et qui hominibus assimilant eum inopibus, et his, qui non possunt statim aliquid ex parato fabricare, sed indigentibus multis organis ad eorum fabricationem : non autem verisimilis in totum
34 De Deo Creatore. apud eos, qui sciunt, quoniam nullius indigens omnium Deus, Verbo condidit omnia et fecit, neque Angelis indigens adjutoribus ad ea, quæ fiunt : neque virtute aliqua valde inferiori ab illo, et ignorante Patrem ; neque aliqua labe, neque ignorantia, ut is, qui inciperet eum cognoscere, homo fieret : sed ipse in semetipso, secundum id, quod est inenarrabile, et inexcogitabile nobis, omnia prædestinans fecit, quemadmodum voluit ; omnibus consonantiam, et ordinem suum, et initium creationis donans ; spiritualibus quidem spiritualem et invisibilem, et supercœlestibus cœlestem, et Angelis angelicam, et animalibus animalem, et natantibus aquatilem, et terrigenis terrigenam, omnibus aptam qualitatis substantiam : omnia autem, quæ facta sunt, infatigabili Verbo fecit. "- S. Cyrillus Alex. (Thes. 1. 6. c. 2.) "Præcipua Dei veri proprietas est, ut a nihilo possit substantias producere. " Et (Cont. Juli. 1. 2.) "Potestas creandi divinæ solummodo inest naturæ : hæc est inter alias Deo convenientes dignitates præcipua." Vid. Patres qui consubstantialitatem Verbi defenderunt. c) Contra errorem Emanatismi et Pantheismi generatim. S. Aug. (De Gen. imperf. c. 1. n. 2.) "Hanc ergo Trinitatem dici unum Deum, eumque fecisse , et creasse omnia, quæ sunt, in quantum sunt, Catholica disciplina credi jubet, ita ut creatura omnis sive intellectualis sive corporalis, non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihilo." Et (De Gen. c. Manich. 1. 1. c. 2. n. 4.) "Hæc facta sunt : nec ea genuit de se ipso, ut hoc essent, quod ipse est ; sed ea fecit de nihilo, ut non essent æqualia nec ei, a quo facta sunt, nec Filio ejus, per quem facta sunt. " Lactantius (De
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 35 inst . 1. 2. c. 6.) "Si Deus est mundus, et partes ejus utique immortales sunt ; ergo et homo Deus est, quia pars est (ut dicitis) mundi. Si homo ; ergo et jumenta, et pecudes, et cetera genera bestiarum, et avium, et piscium ; quoniam et illa eodem modo sentiunt, et mundi partes sunt. At hoc tolerabile est : nam et hæc colunt Ægyptii. Sed res eo pervenit, ut et ranae, et culices, et formicæ dii esse videantur, quia et ipsis inest sensus , et partes mundi sunt. Ita semper argumenta ex falso petita ineptos et absurdos exitus habent. "-Vid. etiam Origenem (De Orat. n. 23.) ; S. Maximum (Schol. in Dionys. c. 2. § 3.) ; S. Aug. Enarr. in Ps. 85. n. 12.
35. Proposition III. The dogma of the creation of the world is certainly drawn from the concordant testimony of the holy Fathers.
Proof. The testimonies of the holy Fathers by which the whole Catholic dogma concerning creation is established are innumerable. But since different Fathers more directly defended this dogma against different errors contrary to it, it will be useful to present those testimonies in order.
First, against the error of eternal, unbegotten matter. St. Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, book II, n. 4, in the works of St. Justin: "But what great thing would it be if God made the world from subject matter? For a craftsman among us, when he has received matter from someone, fashions from it whatever he has wished. But the power of God is seen in this, that he makes from nothing whatever he has willed; just as to give soul and motion belongs to no one other than God." And n. 10: "And first, indeed, with highest agreement they [the Prophets] taught that God created all things out of nothing. For nothing is coeval with God; but since he is his own place and needs no thing, and is older than the ages, he willed to make man, to whom he would become known; for this man he prepared the world." Tatian, Against the Greeks, n. 5: "The Lord of all, insofar as the world had not yet been created, was alone. For matter is not without a beginning as God is; nor, as lacking a principle, does it have power equal to God. Rather, it was created, and was not made by another, but was produced by the sole maker of all things." Athenagoras, Legation for the Christians, n. 4: "But as for us, who separate God from matter and demonstrate that each is distant from the other by a very great interval - for God is uncreated and eternal and can be known by mind and reason alone, but matter is created and liable to corruption - is the name of atheists imposed on us undeservedly?" Origen, tome I of the Commentary on John, on the words In the beginning God created: "But it is otherwise among us [Christians], who believe that God made beings from non-beings, as that mother of the seven martyrs in the deeds of the Maccabees, and the Angel of Repentance in the Shepherd, taught." And in On First Principles, preface, n. 4: "The kinds of things which are manifestly handed down through the apostolic preaching are these: first, that there is one God, who created and composed all things, and who, when nothing existed, made all things to be." St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word of God, n. 3: "For [the faith of Christ] knows that things were not made by chance, because they are governed by providence; nor from matter previously existing, because God is not weak; but that God made all things, not at all existing before, out of nothing through the Word, so that they might be, as he says through Moses: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth.'" Tertullian, Apology, n. 17: "What we worship is one God, who, by the word by which he commanded, by the reason by which he disposed, and by the power by which he was able, brought forth from nothing this whole mass, with the whole apparatus of elements, bodies, and spirits, for the adornment of his majesty; whence also the Greeks adapted the name kosmos." And in On Prescription Against Heretics, chapter 12: "Now the rule of faith, that we may profess from this point what we defend, is namely that by which it is believed that there is altogether one God, and no other besides the founder of the world, who produced all things from nothing through his Word." But see the whole book Against Hermogenes. St. Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book I, chapter 6, n. 10: "For we ought not to be like those who do not believe that almighty God could have made something from nothing, when they consider that craftsmen and any artisans cannot fabricate something unless they have something from which they may fabricate. But almighty God needed to be helped by no thing which he himself had not made, in order to effect what he willed. For if, for those things which he willed to make, some thing which he himself had not made helped him, he was not almighty; and it is sacrilegious to believe this." St. Ambrose has similar things, Hexaemeron, book I, chapter 5; and St. Fulgentius, On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3, n. 25.
Second, against the error concerning the creation of visible things as made by angels. St. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book II, chapter 2, nn. 1-4: "But those who say that the world was fashioned by angels, or by some other maker of the world, contrary to the opinion of him who is Father over all things, first indeed sin from this very fact, saying that the angels made such and so great a constitution contrary to the will of God, as though angels were more effective than God, etc. But if not contrary to his will, but with him willing and knowing, then neither angels nor the maker of the world will be the causes of this fabrication, but the will of God. Perhaps this discourse is persuasive or seductive among those who do not know God, and who liken him to needy men and to those who cannot immediately fabricate something from what is ready, but need many instruments for their fabrication. But it is not at all plausible among those who know that God, needing nothing, founded and made all things by the Word, needing neither angels as helpers for the things which are made, nor some power very inferior to him and ignorant of the Father, nor some stain, nor ignorance, so that a man might be made who would begin to know him. Rather, he himself in himself, according to that which is unspeakable and inconceivable to us, predestining all things, made them as he willed, giving to all things their harmony and order and beginning of creation: to spiritual things a spiritual and invisible nature, to supercelestial things a celestial nature, to angels an angelic nature, to living things an animal nature, to swimming things an aquatic nature, to earth-born things an earthly nature, and to all things the substance of a quality suited to them. But all things which were made, he made by his indefatigable Word." St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, book VI, chapter 2: "The chief property of the true God is that he can produce substances from nothing." And Against Julian, book II: "The power of creating belongs only to the divine nature; this is chief among the other dignities fitting to God." See the Fathers who defended the consubstantiality of the Word.
Third, against the error of emanatism and pantheism generally. St. Augustine, On Genesis Unfinished, chapter 1, n. 2: "Catholic teaching commands that this Trinity be believed to be one God, and that he made and created all things which are, insofar as they are; so that every creature, whether intellectual or corporeal, is not from the nature of God, but was made by God from nothing." And On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book I, chapter 2, n. 4: "These things were made; nor did he beget them from himself so that they would be what he is, but he made them from nothing, so that they would be equal neither to him by whom they were made, nor to his Son through whom they were made." Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book II, chapter 6: "If God is the world, then certainly its parts are immortal; therefore man too is God, because he is a part, as you say, of the world. If man is God, then also beasts of burden, cattle, and the other kinds of beasts, birds, and fish are God, since these too sense in the same way and are parts of the world. But this is tolerable, for the Egyptians worship even these. Yet the matter comes to this, that frogs, gnats, and ants seem to be gods, because sense exists in them also and they are parts of the world. Thus arguments taken from what is false always have foolish and absurd outcomes." See also Origen, On Prayer, n. 23; St. Maximus, Scholia on Dionysius, chapter 2, § 3; St. Augustine, Exposition on Psalm 85, n. 12.
Proof. The testimonies of the holy Fathers by which the whole Catholic dogma concerning creation is established are innumerable. But since different Fathers more directly defended this dogma against different errors contrary to it, it will be useful to present those testimonies in order.
First, against the error of eternal, unbegotten matter. St. Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, book II, n. 4, in the works of St. Justin: "But what great thing would it be if God made the world from subject matter? For a craftsman among us, when he has received matter from someone, fashions from it whatever he has wished. But the power of God is seen in this, that he makes from nothing whatever he has willed; just as to give soul and motion belongs to no one other than God." And n. 10: "And first, indeed, with highest agreement they [the Prophets] taught that God created all things out of nothing. For nothing is coeval with God; but since he is his own place and needs no thing, and is older than the ages, he willed to make man, to whom he would become known; for this man he prepared the world." Tatian, Against the Greeks, n. 5: "The Lord of all, insofar as the world had not yet been created, was alone. For matter is not without a beginning as God is; nor, as lacking a principle, does it have power equal to God. Rather, it was created, and was not made by another, but was produced by the sole maker of all things." Athenagoras, Legation for the Christians, n. 4: "But as for us, who separate God from matter and demonstrate that each is distant from the other by a very great interval - for God is uncreated and eternal and can be known by mind and reason alone, but matter is created and liable to corruption - is the name of atheists imposed on us undeservedly?" Origen, tome I of the Commentary on John, on the words In the beginning God created: "But it is otherwise among us [Christians], who believe that God made beings from non-beings, as that mother of the seven martyrs in the deeds of the Maccabees, and the Angel of Repentance in the Shepherd, taught." And in On First Principles, preface, n. 4: "The kinds of things which are manifestly handed down through the apostolic preaching are these: first, that there is one God, who created and composed all things, and who, when nothing existed, made all things to be." St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word of God, n. 3: "For [the faith of Christ] knows that things were not made by chance, because they are governed by providence; nor from matter previously existing, because God is not weak; but that God made all things, not at all existing before, out of nothing through the Word, so that they might be, as he says through Moses: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth.'" Tertullian, Apology, n. 17: "What we worship is one God, who, by the word by which he commanded, by the reason by which he disposed, and by the power by which he was able, brought forth from nothing this whole mass, with the whole apparatus of elements, bodies, and spirits, for the adornment of his majesty; whence also the Greeks adapted the name kosmos." And in On Prescription Against Heretics, chapter 12: "Now the rule of faith, that we may profess from this point what we defend, is namely that by which it is believed that there is altogether one God, and no other besides the founder of the world, who produced all things from nothing through his Word." But see the whole book Against Hermogenes. St. Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book I, chapter 6, n. 10: "For we ought not to be like those who do not believe that almighty God could have made something from nothing, when they consider that craftsmen and any artisans cannot fabricate something unless they have something from which they may fabricate. But almighty God needed to be helped by no thing which he himself had not made, in order to effect what he willed. For if, for those things which he willed to make, some thing which he himself had not made helped him, he was not almighty; and it is sacrilegious to believe this." St. Ambrose has similar things, Hexaemeron, book I, chapter 5; and St. Fulgentius, On the Faith to Peter, chapter 3, n. 25.
Second, against the error concerning the creation of visible things as made by angels. St. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book II, chapter 2, nn. 1-4: "But those who say that the world was fashioned by angels, or by some other maker of the world, contrary to the opinion of him who is Father over all things, first indeed sin from this very fact, saying that the angels made such and so great a constitution contrary to the will of God, as though angels were more effective than God, etc. But if not contrary to his will, but with him willing and knowing, then neither angels nor the maker of the world will be the causes of this fabrication, but the will of God. Perhaps this discourse is persuasive or seductive among those who do not know God, and who liken him to needy men and to those who cannot immediately fabricate something from what is ready, but need many instruments for their fabrication. But it is not at all plausible among those who know that God, needing nothing, founded and made all things by the Word, needing neither angels as helpers for the things which are made, nor some power very inferior to him and ignorant of the Father, nor some stain, nor ignorance, so that a man might be made who would begin to know him. Rather, he himself in himself, according to that which is unspeakable and inconceivable to us, predestining all things, made them as he willed, giving to all things their harmony and order and beginning of creation: to spiritual things a spiritual and invisible nature, to supercelestial things a celestial nature, to angels an angelic nature, to living things an animal nature, to swimming things an aquatic nature, to earth-born things an earthly nature, and to all things the substance of a quality suited to them. But all things which were made, he made by his indefatigable Word." St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, book VI, chapter 2: "The chief property of the true God is that he can produce substances from nothing." And Against Julian, book II: "The power of creating belongs only to the divine nature; this is chief among the other dignities fitting to God." See the Fathers who defended the consubstantiality of the Word.
Third, against the error of emanatism and pantheism generally. St. Augustine, On Genesis Unfinished, chapter 1, n. 2: "Catholic teaching commands that this Trinity be believed to be one God, and that he made and created all things which are, insofar as they are; so that every creature, whether intellectual or corporeal, is not from the nature of God, but was made by God from nothing." And On Genesis Against the Manichaeans, book I, chapter 2, n. 4: "These things were made; nor did he beget them from himself so that they would be what he is, but he made them from nothing, so that they would be equal neither to him by whom they were made, nor to his Son through whom they were made." Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book II, chapter 6: "If God is the world, then certainly its parts are immortal; therefore man too is God, because he is a part, as you say, of the world. If man is God, then also beasts of burden, cattle, and the other kinds of beasts, birds, and fish are God, since these too sense in the same way and are parts of the world. But this is tolerable, for the Egyptians worship even these. Yet the matter comes to this, that frogs, gnats, and ants seem to be gods, because sense exists in them also and they are parts of the world. Thus arguments taken from what is false always have foolish and absurd outcomes." See also Origen, On Prayer, n. 23; St. Maximus, Scholia on Dionysius, chapter 2, § 3; St. Augustine, Exposition on Psalm 85, n. 12.
36. NOTA. Quoad S. Justinum martyrem, certum est eum expresse docuisse dogma de creatione ex nihilo. Nam (Apolog. 2. n. 22.) ait : "Atque illud etiam necessarium est, ut mihi quidem videtur, animadvertere , non creatorem illum a Platone, sed opificem appellari deorum ; cum inter utrumque plurimum sit, ipsius Platonis judicio, discriminis. Creator enim, nulla re alia indigens, sua virtute et potestate id quod fit efficit. Opifex vero, accepta ex materia condendi facultate, opus suum constituit." Et n. 23. "Nam materiæ vim, utpote ingenitam, et, ut opinatur Plato, æqualem opifici et coævam, obluctari par est ipsius voluntati. Ei enim qui non creavit, nulla est in id, quod est increatum, potestas ; unde nec vis ulla ei inferri potest, cum ab omni externa necessitate liber sit. Ad hæc respiciens Plato sic scripsit : Necesse est ut vim Deo inferri non posse dicamus. " Vid. etiam Dial. cum Tryph. n. 5. Quæ igitur ab eo dicta repugnare videntur veritati catho-
36 De Deo Creatore. licæ, facile explicantur, sive quia agit de creatione secunda, uti cum dicit : "omnia illum ab initio ex informi materia condidisse accepimus ;" sive quia aliqua ex Platone simpliciter refert, sed non approbat, iisdemque aliquando utitur ad redarguendum philosophos ex veritatibus ab iis concessis. Vid. Gatti, Institutiones Apologetico-Polemicæ, tom. 1. diss. 2. § 2 . Quoad S. Methodium, certum est totum in eo esse (de lib. arb. ap. Photium cod. 236.), ut demonstret Deum ex nihilo omnia produxisse. Solummodo ad id probandum utitur quibusdam minus validis argumentis ; uti est illud : creantur qualitates ex nihilo , ergo et substantiæ produci possunt. Quoad Eusebium Cæsaræensem, plura objiciuntur ex iis quæ scribit in Demonstr. Evang. 1. IV. c. 1. , ubi improbare videtur illam expressionem "res factas ex nihilo . " Sed diximus (n. 6.) illud ex nihilo plures habere sensus. Eusebius illud improbat eo sensu , quod nihil sit causa efficiens, vel materialis. Unde dicit : " Quomodo nihil esse possit alteri causa subsistendi ?" Vid. De Aguir. Theol. S. Anselmi, Tom . I tr. 2. disp. 15. c. 7. sec. 2.
36 De Deo Creatore. licæ, facile explicantur, sive quia agit de creatione secunda, uti cum dicit : "omnia illum ab initio ex informi materia condidisse accepimus ;" sive quia aliqua ex Platone simpliciter refert, sed non approbat, iisdemque aliquando utitur ad redarguendum philosophos ex veritatibus ab iis concessis. Vid. Gatti, Institutiones Apologetico-Polemicæ, tom. 1. diss. 2. § 2 . Quoad S. Methodium, certum est totum in eo esse (de lib. arb. ap. Photium cod. 236.), ut demonstret Deum ex nihilo omnia produxisse. Solummodo ad id probandum utitur quibusdam minus validis argumentis ; uti est illud : creantur qualitates ex nihilo , ergo et substantiæ produci possunt. Quoad Eusebium Cæsaræensem, plura objiciuntur ex iis quæ scribit in Demonstr. Evang. 1. IV. c. 1. , ubi improbare videtur illam expressionem "res factas ex nihilo . " Sed diximus (n. 6.) illud ex nihilo plures habere sensus. Eusebius illud improbat eo sensu , quod nihil sit causa efficiens, vel materialis. Unde dicit : " Quomodo nihil esse possit alteri causa subsistendi ?" Vid. De Aguir. Theol. S. Anselmi, Tom . I tr. 2. disp. 15. c. 7. sec. 2.
36. Note. As to St. Justin Martyr, it is certain that he expressly taught the dogma of creation out of nothing. For in Apology II, n. 22, he says: "And it is also necessary, as it seems to me, to observe that he is called by Plato not the creator but the craftsman of the gods, since, by Plato's own judgment, there is very great difference between the two. For a creator, needing no other thing, effects by his own power and authority that which comes to be. But a craftsman, having received from matter the faculty of founding, establishes his work." And n. 23: "For it is fitting that the power of matter, as being unbegotten and, as Plato thinks, equal to and coeval with the craftsman, should resist his will. For one who did not create has no power over that which is uncreated; hence no force can be brought against it, since it is free from every external necessity. Looking to these things Plato wrote thus: It is necessary that we say force cannot be brought against God." See also the Dialogue with Trypho, n. 5. Therefore, the things said by him which seem to conflict with Catholic truth are easily explained: either because he is treating the second creation, as when he says, "we have received that he founded all things from the beginning from unformed matter"; or because he simply reports certain things from Plato, but does not approve them, and sometimes uses the same things to refute the philosophers from truths conceded by them. See Gatti, Apologetico-Polemical Institutions, tome 1, dissertation 2, § 2.
As to St. Methodius, it is certain that his whole effort in On Free Will, according to Photius, codex 236, is to demonstrate that God produced all things out of nothing. Only, in order to prove this, he uses certain less valid arguments; such as this one: qualities are created out of nothing, therefore substances too can be produced.
As to Eusebius of Caesarea, many objections are made from those things which he writes in Demonstratio Evangelica, book IV, chapter 1, where he seems to disapprove that expression "things made out of nothing." But we have said, n. 6, that out of nothing has several senses. Eusebius disapproves it in the sense that nothing is an efficient or material cause. Hence he says: "How can nothing be for another the cause of subsisting?" See De Aguirre, Theology of St. Anselm, tome I, tract 2, disputation 15, chapter 7, section 2.
As to St. Methodius, it is certain that his whole effort in On Free Will, according to Photius, codex 236, is to demonstrate that God produced all things out of nothing. Only, in order to prove this, he uses certain less valid arguments; such as this one: qualities are created out of nothing, therefore substances too can be produced.
As to Eusebius of Caesarea, many objections are made from those things which he writes in Demonstratio Evangelica, book IV, chapter 1, where he seems to disapprove that expression "things made out of nothing." But we have said, n. 6, that out of nothing has several senses. Eusebius disapproves it in the sense that nothing is an efficient or material cause. Hence he says: "How can nothing be for another the cause of subsisting?" See De Aguirre, Theology of St. Anselm, tome I, tract 2, disputation 15, chapter 7, section 2.
§ IV. The Dogma Of Creation Compared With The Prescription Of Reason.
37. Increduli generatim, sed præsertim Philosophi elapsi sæculi , eorumque sectatores, ut Renan, creationem ex nihilo cum rationis principiis pugnare statuunt. Saltem, aiunt nonnulli, inter quos Rousseau, hujusmodi creatio est incomprehensibilis. Ju
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 37 verit ergo hanc veritatem catholicam ad normam rationis exigere ; paucis tamen, ne fusius in philosophia pertractata ex integro repetamus.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 37 verit ergo hanc veritatem catholicam ad normam rationis exigere ; paucis tamen, ne fusius in philosophia pertractata ex integro repetamus.
37. Unbelievers generally, but especially the philosophers of the past century and their followers, such as Renan, hold that creation out of nothing conflicts with the principles of reason. At least, some say, among whom is Rousseau, that creation of this kind is incomprehensible. It will therefore be useful to examine this Catholic truth according to the norm of reason; yet briefly, lest we repeat in full what has been treated more extensively in philosophy.
38. Constat quidem productionem ex nihilo veteribus philosophis fuisse vel penitus incompertam, vel saltem valde obscuram ; eamque eos docuisse qui jam revelatione divina erant edocti. At hoc ostendit quanta veritate dictum sit in Conc. Vat . Const. 1. c. IV. "Fides et ratio opem quoque sibi mutuam ferunt ; cum recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret, ejusque lumine illustrata rerum divinarum scientiam excolat ; fides vero rationem ab erroribus liberet ac tueatur, eamque multiplici cognitione instruat. " Verum ex philosophorum ignorantia nullo pacto arguitur dogma creationis sola revelatione cognosci ; ut enim statim patebit, ex principiis naturali lumine notis evidenter deduci potest.
38. It is indeed established that production out of nothing was either entirely unknown to the ancient philosophers, or at least very obscure, and that those taught it who had already been instructed by divine revelation. But this shows with how much truth it was said in the Vatican Council, Constitution, chapter IV: "Faith and reason also bring mutual help to each other; since right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and, enlightened by its light, cultivates the science of divine things; while faith frees and guards reason from errors, and furnishes it with manifold knowledge." But from the ignorance of the philosophers it is in no way argued that the dogma of creation is known by revelation alone; for, as will immediately be clear, it can be evidently deduced from principles known by the natural light.
39. Itaque in creatione possumus considerare possibilitatem et factum ; quoad utrumque indicabimus quid possit, quid debeat ratio.
39. Therefore in creation we can consider possibility and fact. With respect to both we shall indicate what reason can do and what it must do.
40. Ac imprimis, possibilitas spectari potest negative vel positive. Negative, si nulla ratione creationis repugnantiam probari contendimus ; quod fit solvendo objectiones : ex dictis autem art. I. hoc quisque facile præstabit. Positive, si positivis argumentis directe ostendimus posse Deum aliquid ex nihilo producere. Hæc vero positiva demonstratio possibilitatis creationis haberi potest tum a priori tum a posteriori : a priori, quatenus inspecta vel sola Dei infinita perfectione, talis modus agendi ad extra est ei tribuendus ; a posteriori, quatenus admissa rerum contingentium existentia, necesse est admittere fa-
38 De Deo Creatore. ctum, ac proinde ejusdem possibilitatem ; ab esse enim ad posse valet illatio. Hujus duplicis demonstrationis exemplum paulo inferius dabitur.
38 De Deo Creatore. ctum, ac proinde ejusdem possibilitatem ; ab esse enim ad posse valet illatio. Hujus duplicis demonstrationis exemplum paulo inferius dabitur.
40. And first, possibility can be considered negatively or positively. Negatively, if we contend that no contradiction in creation can be proved by any argument; this is done by solving objections, and from what was said in article I anyone will easily accomplish this. Positively, if by positive arguments we directly show that God can produce something out of nothing. This positive demonstration of the possibility of creation can be had both a priori and a posteriori: a priori, insofar as, once even the infinite perfection of God alone has been considered, such a mode of acting outside himself must be attributed to him; a posteriori, insofar as, once the existence of contingent things has been admitted, it is necessary to admit the fact, and consequently the possibility of the same; for the inference from being to possibility is valid. An example of this twofold demonstration will be given a little below.
41. At vero demonstratio possibilitatis creationis non debet necessario antevertere demonstrationem facti ; licet enim rei possibilitas ontologice præcedat ejusdem existentiam, logice tamen potest hæc illam antecedere . Revera existentia rerum creatarum præsens nobis fit experientia tam interna quam externa : possumus ergo statim inquirere causam earum efficientem, modumque ipsum, quo productæ sunt ; atque ita ratiocinando agnoscere factum productionis ex nihilo . Quo in casu notitia de possibilitate creationis latet quidem implicita in aliqua ex præmissis, sed explicite non demonstratur nisi post cognitionem facti. Hoc autem non obesse certitudini de facto creationis, facile patet consideranti numquam impossibile demonstrari posse quod factum evidenter ostenditur.
41. But the demonstration of the possibility of creation need not necessarily precede the demonstration of the fact. For although the possibility of a thing ontologically precedes its existence, nevertheless logically the latter can precede the former. In reality, the existence of created things becomes present to us by both internal and external experience. Therefore we can immediately inquire into their efficient cause and the very mode by which they were produced; and thus, by reasoning, recognize the fact of production out of nothing. In this case the knowledge of the possibility of creation lies indeed implicit in some one of the premises, but it is not explicitly demonstrated until after knowledge of the fact. But that this does not harm certitude concerning the fact of creation is easily clear to one considering that what is evidently shown to be a fact can never be demonstrated to be impossible.
42. Quoad methodum demonstrandi factum creationis, voluerunt aliqui illud probari posse a priori. At falluntur omnino. Etenim demonstratio a priori est demonstratio per causas ; causa autem creans est Deus. Jamvero vel Deus in se inspectus habet necessariam connexionem cum creatura ; et jam non libere creat, contra id quod ratio et fides docent, ut videbimus : vel non habet hanc necessariam connexionem, et jam ex cognitione Dei nequit inferri existentia creaturæ, seu factum creationis. Hæc quidem juxta doctrinam communiter receptam ; non enim hic est locus ad trutinam revocandi systemata quædam singularia. Superest igitur ut factum creationis probetur a posteriori.
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 39
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 39
42. As to the method of demonstrating the fact of creation, some have wished that it could be proved a priori. But they are entirely mistaken. For an a priori demonstration is a demonstration through causes; but the creating cause is God. Now either God, considered in himself, has a necessary connection with the creature, and then he does not create freely, contrary to what reason and faith teach, as we shall see; or he does not have this necessary connection, and then from the knowledge of God the existence of the creature, or the fact of creation, cannot be inferred. This indeed follows the commonly received doctrine; for this is not the place to recall certain singular systems to the scales. It remains, therefore, that the fact of creation be proved a posteriori.
43. His delibatis, ad rem nostram sufficit statuere sequentem PROP. IV. Doctrina de origine mundi per veram creationem non modo a præscripto rationis nullatenus dissidet ; sed cum eodem penitissime convenire evidenter ostenditur. Prob. I. Convenit cum præscripto rationis ut aliqua tribuatur Deo actio ad extra, quæ sit omnino independens ; sic enim ejus operatio ejus essendi modo respondebit. Atqui, sublata creatione, nulla superest actio ad extra, quæ sit omnino independens ; siquidem quæcumque alia operatio necessario supponit subjectum ex quo et in quo Deus operetur. Ergo . Prob . II. Admittenda est in Deo potentia aliquid faciendi : hæc potentia enim per se dicit perfectionem-est etiam in creaturis. Atqui nihil posset Deus facere, nisi possit aliquid creare. Ergo. Decl. min. Non loquimur hic de Dei operationibus ad intra ; quia illas solum ex fide tenemus, et qui dogma Trinitatis admittit, facile admittit etiam creationem- quia operationes ad intra proprie non tribuuntur potentiæ Dei-quia quemadmodum potentia in creatura dicit potestatem ponendi actum, et non actum ipsum ; ita in Deo dicit potestatem ponendi terminum, et non terminum ipsum : termini autem operationum Dei ad intra identificantur re cum ipsa natura divina. Cæterum iisdem argumentis indicatis in maj. prop. ostenditur tribuendam Deo esse potentiam aliquid producendi extra se. Unde prob. min. Si aliquid posset Deus facere extra se, et nihil posset creare ; aliquid posset producere ex subjecto, quod esset vel ipse Deus, vel ali
40 De Deo Creatore quid a Deo distinctum ; atqui neutrum dici potest ; ergo nisi posset creare, nihil posset facere. Prob. hæc min. quoad 1am partem. Si Deus aliquid extra se produceret ex se tamquam subjecto, destrueretur Dei simplicitas--immutabilitas-incideremus in omnia absurda Pantheismi. Prob. eadem minor quoad 2am partem. Illud subjectum a Deo distinctum vel esset aliquid productum, vel aliquid improductum ; si primum dicas, redibit semper eadem quæstio, a quo et quomodo fuit productum ; et tunc vel devenimus tandem ad aliquod subjectum productum ex nihilo, et habemus assumptum ; vel admittenda esset series infinita, quæ aperte repugnat. Sin vero alterum dicas, tunc admittenda essent duo entia improducta, seu entia ex se ; quod multis argumentis ostenditur impossibile in metaphysica. Satis nobis erit eloquentissimis verbis Tertulliani (con. Hermog. c. 7-8.) unum afferre argumentum ad probandum non potuisse Deum mundum condere ex subjecto improducto, ex materia ingenita. " Quomodo ergo, ita subjicere Deo materiam, æternam æterno, innatam innato, auctricem auctori ? dicere audentem : et ego prima, et ego ante omnia, et ego a quo omnia : par fuimus, simul fuimus, ambo sine initio, sine fine : ambo sine auctore, sine Deo . Quis me Deus subjicit contemporali, coætaneo ? Si quidem Deus dicitur ; habeo et ego meum nomen. Aut ego sum Deus, aut ille materia : quia ambo sumus quod alter est nostrum. Putas itaque materiam Deo non comparasse quam scilicet subjiciat illi ? Atqui etiam præponit illam Deo, et Deum potius subjicit materiæ, cum vult de materia cuncta fecisse. "
: Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 41 Prob. III. argumento D. Thomæ ( 1. p. q. 44. a. 1., et q . 45. a. 2.). Quidquid est per participationem debet esse causatum ab illo, quod est per essentiam ; atqui solus Deus est per essentiam et omne aliud a Deo est ens per participationem : ergo omne aliud a Deo est causatum a Deo. Atqui non omne aliud a Deo esset causatum ab ipso, si nihil Deus fecisset ex nihilo ; siquidem tunc omnia fecisset ex aliquo præsupposito, quod non fuisset causatum ab ipso . Ergo. Decl. Multiplici sensu dicitur Deus esse per essentiam, et dicuntur alia a Deo entia per participationem. Sic ex. gr. dicitur Deus ens per essentiam , quatenus illud ens convenit ei essentialiter. Sed non hæc est significatio, quæ assumitur in hoc argumento ; nam etiam homo est animal per essentiam, quatenus illud animal convenit ei essentialiter, nec tamen inde sequitur hominem esse causam efficientem omnium animalium. Sic etiam ex. gr. quidquid existit extra Deum dicitur ens per participationem, quatenus esse participat, accipit a Deo. Sed neque hæc est significatio, quæ assumitur in præsenti argumento ; secus enim, uti patet, assumeretur ut principium probationis id, quod est probandum. Cæteris ergo omissis, dicimus hic Deum ens per essentiam quatenus est ipsa essendi plenitudo per se subsistens : et aliud a Deo ens per participationem, quatenus prædicatum ens ei competit cum limitatione, ac proinde quidquid est extra Deum est finitum. Quo posito : Prob. illa maj . Omne finitum est mutabile, siquidem est capax augmenti ; omne mutabile est contingens ; omne contingens non habet in se rationem essendi, sed ultimo in ente necessario. Ergo omne
42 De Deo Creatore. finitum, seu quidquid est ens per participationem, debet esse causatum ab ente necessario, seu ab eo quod est ens per essentiam , nempe a Deo. NOTA. I. Ex datis probationibus facile innotescit dogma creationis ex nihilo non modo penitissime cum præscripto rationis convenire ; sed esse unicum modum explicandi rerum originem, qui rectæ rationis principiis respondeat. Etenim rerum contingentium existentia supposita, vel numquam devenimus ad aliquod ens necessarium, quod eas produxerit, admittendo absurdam seriem infinitam ; et habetur atheismus : vel dicitur Deus eas ex se produxisse , et habetur pantheismus : vel produxisse ex materia ingenita, et habetur dualismus : vel tandem produxisse ex nihilo , et habetur dogma creationis. Nihil aliud excogitari potest. Atqui atheismus, pantheismus, dualismus repugnant rectæ rationi, Ergo dogma creationis est unica via rerum originem explicandi modo rationi conformi. NOTA. II. Abstinemus a multiplicandis, atque a datis argumentis fusius evolvendis quia hæc supponimus ex philosophia. Qui plura cupit, consulat D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 1. 5.; et c. g. 1. 2. cap. 15. 16.
40 De Deo Creatore quid a Deo distinctum ; atqui neutrum dici potest ; ergo nisi posset creare, nihil posset facere. Prob. hæc min. quoad 1am partem. Si Deus aliquid extra se produceret ex se tamquam subjecto, destrueretur Dei simplicitas--immutabilitas-incideremus in omnia absurda Pantheismi. Prob. eadem minor quoad 2am partem. Illud subjectum a Deo distinctum vel esset aliquid productum, vel aliquid improductum ; si primum dicas, redibit semper eadem quæstio, a quo et quomodo fuit productum ; et tunc vel devenimus tandem ad aliquod subjectum productum ex nihilo, et habemus assumptum ; vel admittenda esset series infinita, quæ aperte repugnat. Sin vero alterum dicas, tunc admittenda essent duo entia improducta, seu entia ex se ; quod multis argumentis ostenditur impossibile in metaphysica. Satis nobis erit eloquentissimis verbis Tertulliani (con. Hermog. c. 7-8.) unum afferre argumentum ad probandum non potuisse Deum mundum condere ex subjecto improducto, ex materia ingenita. " Quomodo ergo, ita subjicere Deo materiam, æternam æterno, innatam innato, auctricem auctori ? dicere audentem : et ego prima, et ego ante omnia, et ego a quo omnia : par fuimus, simul fuimus, ambo sine initio, sine fine : ambo sine auctore, sine Deo . Quis me Deus subjicit contemporali, coætaneo ? Si quidem Deus dicitur ; habeo et ego meum nomen. Aut ego sum Deus, aut ille materia : quia ambo sumus quod alter est nostrum. Putas itaque materiam Deo non comparasse quam scilicet subjiciat illi ? Atqui etiam præponit illam Deo, et Deum potius subjicit materiæ, cum vult de materia cuncta fecisse. "
: Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 41 Prob. III. argumento D. Thomæ ( 1. p. q. 44. a. 1., et q . 45. a. 2.). Quidquid est per participationem debet esse causatum ab illo, quod est per essentiam ; atqui solus Deus est per essentiam et omne aliud a Deo est ens per participationem : ergo omne aliud a Deo est causatum a Deo. Atqui non omne aliud a Deo esset causatum ab ipso, si nihil Deus fecisset ex nihilo ; siquidem tunc omnia fecisset ex aliquo præsupposito, quod non fuisset causatum ab ipso . Ergo. Decl. Multiplici sensu dicitur Deus esse per essentiam, et dicuntur alia a Deo entia per participationem. Sic ex. gr. dicitur Deus ens per essentiam , quatenus illud ens convenit ei essentialiter. Sed non hæc est significatio, quæ assumitur in hoc argumento ; nam etiam homo est animal per essentiam, quatenus illud animal convenit ei essentialiter, nec tamen inde sequitur hominem esse causam efficientem omnium animalium. Sic etiam ex. gr. quidquid existit extra Deum dicitur ens per participationem, quatenus esse participat, accipit a Deo. Sed neque hæc est significatio, quæ assumitur in præsenti argumento ; secus enim, uti patet, assumeretur ut principium probationis id, quod est probandum. Cæteris ergo omissis, dicimus hic Deum ens per essentiam quatenus est ipsa essendi plenitudo per se subsistens : et aliud a Deo ens per participationem, quatenus prædicatum ens ei competit cum limitatione, ac proinde quidquid est extra Deum est finitum. Quo posito : Prob. illa maj . Omne finitum est mutabile, siquidem est capax augmenti ; omne mutabile est contingens ; omne contingens non habet in se rationem essendi, sed ultimo in ente necessario. Ergo omne
42 De Deo Creatore. finitum, seu quidquid est ens per participationem, debet esse causatum ab ente necessario, seu ab eo quod est ens per essentiam , nempe a Deo. NOTA. I. Ex datis probationibus facile innotescit dogma creationis ex nihilo non modo penitissime cum præscripto rationis convenire ; sed esse unicum modum explicandi rerum originem, qui rectæ rationis principiis respondeat. Etenim rerum contingentium existentia supposita, vel numquam devenimus ad aliquod ens necessarium, quod eas produxerit, admittendo absurdam seriem infinitam ; et habetur atheismus : vel dicitur Deus eas ex se produxisse , et habetur pantheismus : vel produxisse ex materia ingenita, et habetur dualismus : vel tandem produxisse ex nihilo , et habetur dogma creationis. Nihil aliud excogitari potest. Atqui atheismus, pantheismus, dualismus repugnant rectæ rationi, Ergo dogma creationis est unica via rerum originem explicandi modo rationi conformi. NOTA. II. Abstinemus a multiplicandis, atque a datis argumentis fusius evolvendis quia hæc supponimus ex philosophia. Qui plura cupit, consulat D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 1. 5.; et c. g. 1. 2. cap. 15. 16.
43. These things having been touched on, it is enough for our purpose to establish the following:
Proposition IV. The doctrine concerning the origin of the world through true creation not only in no way differs from the prescription of reason, but is evidently shown to agree with it most deeply.
First proof. It agrees with the prescription of reason that some action outside himself be attributed to God which is altogether independent; for thus his operation will correspond to his mode of being. But if creation is removed, no action outside himself remains which is altogether independent, since every other operation necessarily supposes a subject from which and in which God operates. Therefore.
Second proof. A power of making something must be admitted in God; for this power of itself denotes a perfection, and it is also in creatures. But God could make nothing unless he could create something. Therefore.
Explanation of the minor. We are not speaking here of God's operations within himself: because we hold those only from faith, and one who admits the dogma of the Trinity easily admits creation also; because operations within God are not properly attributed to the power of God; and because, just as in a creature power denotes the power of positing an act, and not the act itself, so in God it denotes the power of positing a terminus, and not the terminus itself. But the termini of God's operations within himself are really identified with the divine nature itself. Moreover, by the same arguments indicated in the major of the proposition, it is shown that a power of producing something outside himself must be attributed to God.
Hence the minor is proved. If God could make something outside himself and could create nothing, he could produce something from a subject, which would be either God himself or something distinct from God. But neither can be said. Therefore, unless he could create, he could make nothing.
This minor is proved as to the first part. If God produced something outside himself from himself as from a subject, God's simplicity and immutability would be destroyed, and we would fall into all the absurdities of pantheism.
The same minor is proved as to the second part. That subject distinct from God would be either something produced or something unproduced. If you say the first, the same question always returns, by whom and in what way it was produced; and then either we finally arrive at some subject produced out of nothing, and we have what was assumed, or an infinite series would have to be admitted, which is openly repugnant. But if you say the second, then two unproduced beings, or beings from themselves, would have to be admitted; and this is shown impossible by many arguments in metaphysics. It will be enough for us, in the most eloquent words of Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapters 7-8, to bring forward one argument to prove that God could not have founded the world from an unproduced subject, from unbegotten matter: "How, then, can they dare so to subject matter to God: eternal to eternal, unborn to unborn, authoress to author, saying: I too am first, I too am before all things, and I too am that from which are all things; we were equal, we were together, both without beginning, without end; both without author, without God. What God subjects me to one contemporary and coeval with me? If indeed he is called God, I too have my own name. Either I am God, or he is matter, because we both are what the other of us is. Do you think, therefore, that he has not compared matter with God, since he subjects it to him? But he even sets it before God, and rather subjects God to matter, when he wills that God made all things from matter."
Third proof, from the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 1, and q. 45, a. 2. Whatever is by participation must be caused by that which is by essence; but God alone is by essence, and everything other than God is a being by participation. Therefore everything other than God is caused by God. But not everything other than God would be caused by him if God had made nothing out of nothing, since then he would have made all things from something presupposed which had not been caused by him. Therefore.
Explanation. In many senses God is said to be by essence, and things other than God are said to be beings by participation. Thus, for example, God is said to be being by essence insofar as being belongs to him essentially. But this is not the meaning assumed in this argument; for man too is animal by essence, insofar as animal belongs to him essentially, yet it does not follow from this that man is the efficient cause of all animals. So also, for example, whatever exists outside God is said to be being by participation insofar as it participates in being, receiving it from God. But neither is this the meaning assumed in the present argument; otherwise, as is clear, what is to be proved would be assumed as the principle of proof. Therefore, omitting the rest, we say here that God is being by essence insofar as he is the very fullness of being subsisting through itself; and that what is other than God is being by participation insofar as the predicate being belongs to it with limitation, and consequently whatever is outside God is finite. This being posited:
That major is proved. Everything finite is mutable, since it is capable of increase; everything mutable is contingent; everything contingent does not have in itself the reason of being, but ultimately has it in necessary being. Therefore everything finite, or whatever is being by participation, must be caused by necessary being, or by that which is being by essence, namely by God.
Note I. From the proofs given, it easily becomes known that the dogma of creation out of nothing not only agrees most deeply with the prescription of reason, but is the only mode of explaining the origin of things which corresponds to the principles of right reason. For, once the existence of contingent things is supposed, either we never arrive at any necessary being which produced them, by admitting an absurd infinite series, and atheism is had; or God is said to have produced them from himself, and pantheism is had; or he is said to have produced them from unbegotten matter, and dualism is had; or finally he is said to have produced them out of nothing, and the dogma of creation is had. Nothing else can be thought up. But atheism, pantheism, and dualism are repugnant to right reason. Therefore the dogma of creation is the only way of explaining the origin of things in a manner conformable to reason.
Note II. We abstain from multiplying arguments and from unfolding the given arguments more fully, because we presuppose these things from philosophy. Whoever desires more should consult St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, aa. 1 and 5; and Contra Gentiles II, chapters 15-16.
Proposition IV. The doctrine concerning the origin of the world through true creation not only in no way differs from the prescription of reason, but is evidently shown to agree with it most deeply.
First proof. It agrees with the prescription of reason that some action outside himself be attributed to God which is altogether independent; for thus his operation will correspond to his mode of being. But if creation is removed, no action outside himself remains which is altogether independent, since every other operation necessarily supposes a subject from which and in which God operates. Therefore.
Second proof. A power of making something must be admitted in God; for this power of itself denotes a perfection, and it is also in creatures. But God could make nothing unless he could create something. Therefore.
Explanation of the minor. We are not speaking here of God's operations within himself: because we hold those only from faith, and one who admits the dogma of the Trinity easily admits creation also; because operations within God are not properly attributed to the power of God; and because, just as in a creature power denotes the power of positing an act, and not the act itself, so in God it denotes the power of positing a terminus, and not the terminus itself. But the termini of God's operations within himself are really identified with the divine nature itself. Moreover, by the same arguments indicated in the major of the proposition, it is shown that a power of producing something outside himself must be attributed to God.
Hence the minor is proved. If God could make something outside himself and could create nothing, he could produce something from a subject, which would be either God himself or something distinct from God. But neither can be said. Therefore, unless he could create, he could make nothing.
This minor is proved as to the first part. If God produced something outside himself from himself as from a subject, God's simplicity and immutability would be destroyed, and we would fall into all the absurdities of pantheism.
The same minor is proved as to the second part. That subject distinct from God would be either something produced or something unproduced. If you say the first, the same question always returns, by whom and in what way it was produced; and then either we finally arrive at some subject produced out of nothing, and we have what was assumed, or an infinite series would have to be admitted, which is openly repugnant. But if you say the second, then two unproduced beings, or beings from themselves, would have to be admitted; and this is shown impossible by many arguments in metaphysics. It will be enough for us, in the most eloquent words of Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapters 7-8, to bring forward one argument to prove that God could not have founded the world from an unproduced subject, from unbegotten matter: "How, then, can they dare so to subject matter to God: eternal to eternal, unborn to unborn, authoress to author, saying: I too am first, I too am before all things, and I too am that from which are all things; we were equal, we were together, both without beginning, without end; both without author, without God. What God subjects me to one contemporary and coeval with me? If indeed he is called God, I too have my own name. Either I am God, or he is matter, because we both are what the other of us is. Do you think, therefore, that he has not compared matter with God, since he subjects it to him? But he even sets it before God, and rather subjects God to matter, when he wills that God made all things from matter."
Third proof, from the argument of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 1, and q. 45, a. 2. Whatever is by participation must be caused by that which is by essence; but God alone is by essence, and everything other than God is a being by participation. Therefore everything other than God is caused by God. But not everything other than God would be caused by him if God had made nothing out of nothing, since then he would have made all things from something presupposed which had not been caused by him. Therefore.
Explanation. In many senses God is said to be by essence, and things other than God are said to be beings by participation. Thus, for example, God is said to be being by essence insofar as being belongs to him essentially. But this is not the meaning assumed in this argument; for man too is animal by essence, insofar as animal belongs to him essentially, yet it does not follow from this that man is the efficient cause of all animals. So also, for example, whatever exists outside God is said to be being by participation insofar as it participates in being, receiving it from God. But neither is this the meaning assumed in the present argument; otherwise, as is clear, what is to be proved would be assumed as the principle of proof. Therefore, omitting the rest, we say here that God is being by essence insofar as he is the very fullness of being subsisting through itself; and that what is other than God is being by participation insofar as the predicate being belongs to it with limitation, and consequently whatever is outside God is finite. This being posited:
That major is proved. Everything finite is mutable, since it is capable of increase; everything mutable is contingent; everything contingent does not have in itself the reason of being, but ultimately has it in necessary being. Therefore everything finite, or whatever is being by participation, must be caused by necessary being, or by that which is being by essence, namely by God.
Note I. From the proofs given, it easily becomes known that the dogma of creation out of nothing not only agrees most deeply with the prescription of reason, but is the only mode of explaining the origin of things which corresponds to the principles of right reason. For, once the existence of contingent things is supposed, either we never arrive at any necessary being which produced them, by admitting an absurd infinite series, and atheism is had; or God is said to have produced them from himself, and pantheism is had; or he is said to have produced them from unbegotten matter, and dualism is had; or finally he is said to have produced them out of nothing, and the dogma of creation is had. Nothing else can be thought up. But atheism, pantheism, and dualism are repugnant to right reason. Therefore the dogma of creation is the only way of explaining the origin of things in a manner conformable to reason.
Note II. We abstain from multiplying arguments and from unfolding the given arguments more fully, because we presuppose these things from philosophy. Whoever desires more should consult St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, aa. 1 and 5; and Contra Gentiles II, chapters 15-16.