LatineEnglish
Second Article. Whether Creation Is A Transient Or Immanent Action.
12. Actio immanens communiter dicitur ea, cujus terminus manet in ipso agente ; actio vero transiens est illa, cujus terminus est extra principium a quo procedit. "Est, " inquit D. Th. c. g. 1. 2. c. 1 , " duplex rei operatio. Una quidem, quæ in ipso operante manet, et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut
10 De Deo Creatore. sentire, intelligere et velle ; alia vero, quæ in exteriorem rem transit, quæ est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et ædificare." Non desunt qui ad constituendam actionem transeuntem , præter terminum extra principium agens positum, requirant applicationem virtutis agentis ad aliquod subjectum in quo operatur.
10 De Deo Creatore. sentire, intelligere et velle ; alia vero, quæ in exteriorem rem transit, quæ est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et ædificare." Non desunt qui ad constituendam actionem transeuntem , præter terminum extra principium agens positum, requirant applicationem virtutis agentis ad aliquod subjectum in quo operatur.
12. An immanent action is commonly said to be one whose terminus remains in the agent itself; a transient action, however, is one whose terminus is outside the principle from which it proceeds. "There is," says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 1, "a twofold operation of a thing. One remains in the operator itself and is the perfection of the operator itself, as sensing, understanding, and willing; the other passes over into an exterior thing, and is the perfection of the thing made which is constituted through it, as heating, cutting, and building." There are some who, in order to constitute a transient action, require, besides a terminus placed outside the acting principle, the application of the agent's power to some subject in which it operates.
13. His positis, qui actionem transeuntem sola termini positione extra principium agens constitui doceret, facile responderet creationem esse actionem transeuntem, si quidem creatura est extra Deum creantem ; qui vero applicationem virtutis agentis ad subjectum ulterius requireret, consequenter diceret creationem, cum nullum præsupponat subjectum, non esse actionem transeuntem. Sed nec potest dici simpliter immanens, nam terminus creationis est certe extra Deum : unde solum pantheistæ docuerunt : "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. " Spinoza, Eth. Pars. I. de Deo, prop. XVIII .
13. These things having been posited, one who taught that a transient action is constituted solely by the placing of the terminus outside the acting principle would easily answer that creation is a transient action, since indeed the creature is outside God creating. But one who further required the application of the agent's power to a subject would consequently say that creation, since it presupposes no subject, is not a transient action. Yet neither can it be called simply immanent, for the terminus of creation is certainly outside God. Hence only the pantheists have taught: "God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of all things." Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, On God, proposition XVIII.
14. Quid ergo ? Dicunt creationem esse actionem formaliter immanentem et virtualiter transeuntem , quatenus manet quidem in Deo, sed vim habet ponendi effectum ad extra, Suarez Met. dist. 20. sect. 4. n. 3. Quare cum certum sit apud Theologos creationem non esse actionem simpliciter immanentem, disputatur utrum sit formaliter transiens, vel formaliter immanens et virtualiter transiens.
14. What then? They say that creation is an action formally immanent and virtually transient, insofar as it indeed remains in God, but has the power of placing an effect outside himself. Suarez, Metaphysics, disputation 20, section 4, n. 3. Therefore, since it is certain among theologians that creation is not an action simply immanent, the question is disputed whether it is formally transient, or formally immanent and virtually transient.
15. Vera ratio dubitandi petenda est ex iis quæ docent plures Philosophi de natura actionis, quæ breviter in mentem hic revocanda sunt. In quolibet effectu possumus tria considerare . Primo ejus habitudinem ad causam, a qua pro-
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 11 cedit ; secundo ejus habitudinem ad subjectum, in quo recipitur ; tertio ipsum fieri talis effectus, seu quemdam ab agente in factum effluxum, qui est medius inter effectum et causam ejus. Hic effluxus est motus, qui dicitur actio relate ad causam, passio relate ad subjectum. Calefactio, ex. gr., prout producitur ab igne effundente suum calorem, dicitur actio ; prout recipitur in ligno, quod immutatur et calefit, dicitur passio ; prout est via et tendentia ad terminum dicitur motus . Et quamvis hæc tria (motus , actio , passio) entitative non distinguantur, videntur tamen distingui modaliter. Si quæratur ubinam subjectetur effluxus ille, respondent plures, in actionibus transeuntibus , in quibus proprie verificatur ratio motus, effluxum esse quidem agentis ut a quo , sed non ut in quo ; seu subjectum ejus non esse ipsum agens, sed potius patiens , cujus proinde dicitur esse perfectio .
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 11 cedit ; secundo ejus habitudinem ad subjectum, in quo recipitur ; tertio ipsum fieri talis effectus, seu quemdam ab agente in factum effluxum, qui est medius inter effectum et causam ejus. Hic effluxus est motus, qui dicitur actio relate ad causam, passio relate ad subjectum. Calefactio, ex. gr., prout producitur ab igne effundente suum calorem, dicitur actio ; prout recipitur in ligno, quod immutatur et calefit, dicitur passio ; prout est via et tendentia ad terminum dicitur motus . Et quamvis hæc tria (motus , actio , passio) entitative non distinguantur, videntur tamen distingui modaliter. Si quæratur ubinam subjectetur effluxus ille, respondent plures, in actionibus transeuntibus , in quibus proprie verificatur ratio motus, effluxum esse quidem agentis ut a quo , sed non ut in quo ; seu subjectum ejus non esse ipsum agens, sed potius patiens , cujus proinde dicitur esse perfectio .
15. The true reason for doubting must be sought from those things which many philosophers teach about the nature of action; these are to be briefly recalled here.
In any effect we can consider three things: first, its relation to the cause from which it proceeds; second, its relation to the subject in which it is received; third, the very coming-to-be of such an effect, or a certain efflux from the agent into the thing made, which is intermediate between the effect and its cause. This efflux is motion, which is called action in relation to the cause, and passion in relation to the subject. Heating, for example, insofar as it is produced by fire pouring forth its heat, is called action; insofar as it is received in wood, which is changed and heated, it is called passion; insofar as it is a way and tendency toward a terminus, it is called motion. And although these three - motion, action, passion - are not distinguished entitatively, nevertheless they seem to be distinguished modally.
If it is asked where that efflux is subjected, many answer that in transient actions, in which the notion of motion is properly verified, the efflux is indeed of the agent as that from which, but not as that in which; or, its subject is not the agent itself, but rather the patient, of which therefore it is said to be the perfection.
In any effect we can consider three things: first, its relation to the cause from which it proceeds; second, its relation to the subject in which it is received; third, the very coming-to-be of such an effect, or a certain efflux from the agent into the thing made, which is intermediate between the effect and its cause. This efflux is motion, which is called action in relation to the cause, and passion in relation to the subject. Heating, for example, insofar as it is produced by fire pouring forth its heat, is called action; insofar as it is received in wood, which is changed and heated, it is called passion; insofar as it is a way and tendency toward a terminus, it is called motion. And although these three - motion, action, passion - are not distinguished entitatively, nevertheless they seem to be distinguished modally.
If it is asked where that efflux is subjected, many answer that in transient actions, in which the notion of motion is properly verified, the efflux is indeed of the agent as that from which, but not as that in which; or, its subject is not the agent itself, but rather the patient, of which therefore it is said to be the perfection.
16. Jamvero quando disputatur inter Theologos utrum creatio sit actio formaliter transiens, vel formaliter immanens et solum virtualiter transiens ; tota quæstio versatur in eo, utrum admittendus sit ille effluxus medius inter Creatorem et terminum creationis. Qui enim doctrinam expositam de actione generatim, applicant etiam creationi, consequenter dicunt : 1. Volitionem divinam esse principium creationis, sed non ipsam actionem creativam. (Vid. Becanum, de attrib. div. cap. XVII., 2.) 2. Actionem creativam formaliter sumptam esse ipsum fieri creaturæ, seu ejus effluxum a Deo ; cumque hic effluxus sit extra Deum, a quo veluti egreditur, creationem vocant actionem formaliter transeuntem. "Supponi
12 De Deo Creatore. mus ergo," inquit Suarez, 1. c., n. 21., "cum Arist., 9 Met. , text. 16, actiones, quæ habent terminum factum extra causam agentem, esse in ipso passo seu termino, et non in agente. Et juxta hanc sententiam dicimus, dependentiam creaturæ, ut est quidam fluxus a Deo, habere veram rationem actionis transeuntis . Et probatur primo, quia in calefactione ignis et omnibus similibus, dependentia, qua fit calor in passo, non alia ratione est actio caloris existentis in igne, nisi quia est fluxus quidam caloris ab illo manans ; sed dependentia qua fit creatura a Deo est fluxus quidam manans ab ipso Deo ; ergo habet veram rationem actionis ." 3. Creationem in creatura esse modum quemdam realiter distinctum ab ipso esse creaturae . "Dico tertio," ait idem Eximius Doctor, n. 15.: "hæc dependentia, quæ est in creatura, non est res omnino distincta realiter a termino creationis, neque est sola relatio resultans ex termino creationis, sed est modus quidam ex natura rei distinctus ab ipso termino. In his omnibus æquiparamus creationem omnibus aliis dependentiis, in quibus omnia illa fere sunt certa, et ab eis sumitur argumentum satis efficax per inductionem et similitudinem, quia differentia, quod actio sit ex subjecto, vel non ex subjecto, nihil ad hæc omnia refert, ut facile ex dictis patet, et magis constabit ex solutionibus argumentorum.”
12 De Deo Creatore. mus ergo," inquit Suarez, 1. c., n. 21., "cum Arist., 9 Met. , text. 16, actiones, quæ habent terminum factum extra causam agentem, esse in ipso passo seu termino, et non in agente. Et juxta hanc sententiam dicimus, dependentiam creaturæ, ut est quidam fluxus a Deo, habere veram rationem actionis transeuntis . Et probatur primo, quia in calefactione ignis et omnibus similibus, dependentia, qua fit calor in passo, non alia ratione est actio caloris existentis in igne, nisi quia est fluxus quidam caloris ab illo manans ; sed dependentia qua fit creatura a Deo est fluxus quidam manans ab ipso Deo ; ergo habet veram rationem actionis ." 3. Creationem in creatura esse modum quemdam realiter distinctum ab ipso esse creaturae . "Dico tertio," ait idem Eximius Doctor, n. 15.: "hæc dependentia, quæ est in creatura, non est res omnino distincta realiter a termino creationis, neque est sola relatio resultans ex termino creationis, sed est modus quidam ex natura rei distinctus ab ipso termino. In his omnibus æquiparamus creationem omnibus aliis dependentiis, in quibus omnia illa fere sunt certa, et ab eis sumitur argumentum satis efficax per inductionem et similitudinem, quia differentia, quod actio sit ex subjecto, vel non ex subjecto, nihil ad hæc omnia refert, ut facile ex dictis patet, et magis constabit ex solutionibus argumentorum.”
16. Now when theologians dispute whether creation is an action formally transient, or formally immanent and only virtually transient, the whole question turns on this: whether that efflux intermediate between the Creator and the terminus of creation must be admitted. For those who apply the doctrine set forth concerning action generally also to creation consequently say: first, that the divine volition is the principle of creation, but not the creative action itself. See Becanus, On the Divine Attributes, chapter XVII, 2. Second, that creative action, taken formally, is the very coming-to-be of the creature, or its efflux from God; and since this efflux is outside God, from whom it proceeds as it were, they call creation an action formally transient. "Therefore we suppose," says Suarez, in the cited place, n. 21, "with Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 16, that actions which have a terminus made outside the acting cause are in the patient itself, or terminus, and not in the agent. And according to this opinion we say that the dependence of the creature, as it is a certain flux from God, has the true notion of a transient action. And it is proved first, because in the heating by fire and in all similar cases, the dependence by which heat comes to be in the patient is an action of the heat existing in the fire for no other reason than because it is a certain flux of heat flowing from it; but the dependence by which the creature comes to be from God is a certain flux flowing from God himself; therefore it has the true notion of action." Third, that creation in the creature is a certain mode really distinct from the very being of the creature. "I say third," says the same Excellent Doctor, n. 15, "this dependence, which is in the creature, is not a thing entirely really distinct from the terminus of creation, nor is it only a relation resulting from the terminus of creation, but it is a certain mode distinct from the terminus itself by the nature of the thing. In all these things we equate creation with all other dependencies, in which nearly all those things are certain, and from them a sufficiently effective argument is taken by induction and likeness, because the difference, namely that the action is from a subject or not from a subject, makes no difference to all these things, as is easily clear from what has been said, and will be clearer from the solutions of the arguments."
17. Qui e contra vel non admittunt totam illam doctrinam de actione, vel saltem, applicari posse negant creationi, consequenter docent : 1. Creationem active sumptam esse ipsam volitionem divinam. "Deus enim, " inquit D. Th. de pot. q. 3. a. 3. c., "non
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 13 agit actione media inter ipsum et effectum, sed ejus actio considerata ex parte Dei , una est, et realiter eadem cum ejus potentia et essentia (ad distinctionem actionis creaturæ , quæ realiter differt ab ipsa) licet etc. " Unde c. g. 1. 2. c. 10. ait : " Quia vero nihil est suiipsius principium, quum divina actio non sit aliud quam ejus potentia, manifestum est ex prædictis quod potentia non dicitur in Deo sicut principium actionis, sed sicut principium facti. Et quia potentia respectum ad alterum importat in ratione principii (est enim potentia activa principium agendi in aliud, ut per philosophum Metaphysic. v, text. comm. 17 patet) manifestum est quod potentia dicitur de Deo per respectum ad facta, secundum rei veritatem, non per respectum ad actionem, nisi secundum modum intelligendi, prout intellectus noster diversis conceptionibus utrumque considerat, scilicet divinam potentiam et ejus actionem. " 2. Negant effluxum veluti medium inter Creatorem et terminum creationis . 3. Tradunt creationem in creatura esse ipsum esse ejus cum reali relatione ad Creatorem . " Unde relinquitur, (1. p. q. 45. a. 3.,) quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse. "
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 13 agit actione media inter ipsum et effectum, sed ejus actio considerata ex parte Dei , una est, et realiter eadem cum ejus potentia et essentia (ad distinctionem actionis creaturæ , quæ realiter differt ab ipsa) licet etc. " Unde c. g. 1. 2. c. 10. ait : " Quia vero nihil est suiipsius principium, quum divina actio non sit aliud quam ejus potentia, manifestum est ex prædictis quod potentia non dicitur in Deo sicut principium actionis, sed sicut principium facti. Et quia potentia respectum ad alterum importat in ratione principii (est enim potentia activa principium agendi in aliud, ut per philosophum Metaphysic. v, text. comm. 17 patet) manifestum est quod potentia dicitur de Deo per respectum ad facta, secundum rei veritatem, non per respectum ad actionem, nisi secundum modum intelligendi, prout intellectus noster diversis conceptionibus utrumque considerat, scilicet divinam potentiam et ejus actionem. " 2. Negant effluxum veluti medium inter Creatorem et terminum creationis . 3. Tradunt creationem in creatura esse ipsum esse ejus cum reali relatione ad Creatorem . " Unde relinquitur, (1. p. q. 45. a. 3.,) quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse. "
17. Those, on the contrary, who either do not admit that whole doctrine concerning action, or at least deny that it can be applied to creation, consequently teach: first, that creation taken actively is the divine volition itself. "For God," says St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 3, corpus, "does not act by an action intermediate between himself and the effect, but his action, considered on the part of God, is one, and really the same as his power and essence, in distinction from the action of a creature, which really differs from it, although, etc." Hence in Contra Gentiles II, c. 10, he says: "But because nothing is the principle of itself, since the divine action is nothing other than his power, it is manifest from the foregoing that power is not said in God as a principle of action, but as a principle of the thing made. And because power imports a respect to another in the notion of a principle - for active power is a principle of acting upon another, as is clear through the Philosopher, Metaphysics V, text 17 - it is manifest that power is said of God by respect to things made, according to the truth of the thing, not by respect to action, except according to the mode of understanding, insofar as our intellect considers both by diverse conceptions, namely divine power and his action." Second, they deny an efflux as though intermediate between the Creator and the terminus of creation. Third, they hand down that creation in the creature is the very being of it, with a real relation to the Creator. "Hence it remains," Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, "that creation in the creature is nothing but a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being."
18. Ex his manifestum est cur Auctores primæ sententiæ creationem vocant actionem formaliter transeuntem ; actio enim creativa, juxta eos, formaliter consistit in illo effluxu, qui est extra Deum : cur e contra Auctores alterius sententiæ creationem dicunt actionem formaliter immanentem et virtualiter transeuntem ; nam, juxta illos, creatio active sumpta formaliter est ipsa Dei voluntas, quæ vim habet ponendi effectum extra se .
14 De Deo Creatore.
14 De Deo Creatore.
18. From these things it is manifest why the authors of the first opinion call creation an action formally transient: for creative action, according to them, formally consists in that efflux which is outside God. It is also manifest why, on the contrary, the authors of the other opinion say that creation is an action formally immanent and virtually transient: for, according to them, creation taken actively is formally the very will of God, which has the power of placing an effect outside itself.
19. Nos abstinemus hic a quæstione generali, utrum actio, sive sit creaturæ sive Dei, præter creationem, dicat illum effluxum medium inter causam et effectum. Nec tamen putamus præsentem quæstionem dirimi posse negando generatim dari modos ex natura rei distinctos a substantiis . Licet enim aliquis asseruerit hos modos communiter rejici a philosophis , notum est a plurimis Theologis, qui et præstantissimi philosophorum sunt, agnosci. Suarez , ex . gr., si quid peccat in hac re, est quia plures admittit quam fortasse par sit ; sed et D. Th. en, inter cætera , quæ docet , (Totius Logicæ Summa inter opusc. Aquinatis recensetur n. 44.) : " Modus autem essendi alicujus rei potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut est proprietas realis alicujus realiter differens ab eo, sicut dicimus de aliquo , iste habet bonum modum , quia est mansuetus et concors. Constat autem quod mansuetudo et concordia quas dicimus modos, res sunt differentes ab eo cujus sunt. Secundo modo dicitur modus res concepta : uno modo respectu suiipsius : alio modo , ut est concepta : qui quidem diversi modi considerandi non sumuntur ex diversis in re existentibus, sed ex habitudine ad diversa, sub qua habitudine res intelligitur ; verbi gratia : substantia secundum quod est subjectum accidentium, significatur per modum substantiæ, quia substantia dicitur a substando : secundum autem quod a nullo priore dependet cui innitatur, significatur ut ens per se : et isti modi sunt idipsum quod substantia, differentes sola ratione animæ concipientis ipsam secundum diversas habitudines : quæ ratio non est ficta, sed accipitur a re, ita enim in re est : nam et substantia substat accidentibus et nulli innititur."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 15
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 15
19. We abstain here from the general question whether action, whether it belongs to a creature or to God, apart from creation, denotes that efflux intermediate between cause and effect. Nor do we think that the present question can be settled by generally denying that there are modes distinct from substances by the nature of the thing. For although someone has asserted that these modes are commonly rejected by philosophers, it is known that they are acknowledged by very many theologians, who are also most excellent philosophers. Suarez, for example, if he errs at all in this matter, errs because he admits more such modes than perhaps is fitting. But see St. Thomas among the other things which he teaches - the Summa of All Logic is numbered among the opuscula of Aquinas as n. 44: "Now the mode of being of some thing can be taken in two ways. In one way, as a real property of something really differing from it, as when we say of someone, this man has a good mode, because he is gentle and harmonious. But it is clear that gentleness and harmony, which we call modes, are things differing from that of which they are modes. In a second way, a mode is called a thing conceived: in one way with respect to itself; in another way, as it is conceived. These diverse modes of considering are not taken from diverse things existing in reality, but from a relation to diverse things, under which relation the thing is understood. For example: substance, according as it is the subject of accidents, is signified by the mode of substance, because substance is so called from standing under. But according as it depends on no prior thing on which it rests, it is signified as being per se. And these modes are the very same thing as substance, differing only by the reason of the soul conceiving it according to diverse relations. This reason is not fictitious, but is taken from the thing; for so it is in reality: substance both stands under accidents and rests on nothing."
20. Quare præsenti quæstioni unice attendentes , dicimus : PROP . I. Creatio est actio ex sese immanens, et solum virtualiter transiens . Prob . I. arg. D. Th. 1. c., quod sic exponi potest : Creatio active sumpta vel est actio simpliciter immanens , vel formaliter transiens, vel formaliter immanens et solum virtualiter transiens ; atqui primum et alterum dici nequit. Ergo . Prob. min. Quod non sit simpliciter immanens conceditur hic ab omnibus. Sed nec est formaliter transiens . Nam eatenus esset formaliter transiens, quatenus, ex dictis , consisteret in effluxu medio inter Creatorem et creaturam ; atqui hujusmodi effluxus non datur ; ergo . Prob . hæc min. Effluxus medius inter causam agentem et effectum, ex dictis de natura actionis, proprie vocatur motus, qui dicitur actio vel passio prout refertur ad causam vel ad subjectum ; atqui in creatione non datur motus ; tum quia motus est actus existentis in potentia, et ante creationem nihil est in potentia ; tum quia realis motus requirit duos terminos reales , et in creatione terminus a quo est nihil. Ergo . Prob . II. Creatio active sumpta est Dei volitio, vi cujus ex nihilo aliquid producitur extra Deum ; atqui talis volitio est ex sese immanens et solum virtualiter transiens. Ergo . Decl. Nulli dubium est creationem active sumptam esse aliquo sensu volitionem divinam, sive intelligatur hæc esse principium actionis creativae, sive ipsa formaliter actio. Pariter certum est, in præ
16 De Deo Creatore. senti quæstione, vi hujus volitionis divinæ poni terminum extra Deum ; ac proinde creationem esse actionem aliquo modo transeuntem.-Solum ergo probari debet eamdem volitionem esse ex sese immanentem ; ideoque etc. Prob. min. quoad hanc partem. Quod identificatur cum divina essentia est certe immanens Deo ; atqui volitio divina, vi cujus aliquid ex nihilo producitur, identificatur cum divina voluntate, quæ idem est cum divina essentia. Ergo . Prob. hæc min. Si non identificaretur cum divina essentia, vel esset in seipsa, vel in termino creationis. Atqui non in seipsa, actio enim natura sua requirit subjectum, in quo sit ; non in termino creationis siquidem omnis actio est natura sua prior termino, ac proinde etiam creatio est natura prior re creata. Ergo . Verum est quod creatio est instantanea ; ut enim docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a 3. ad 3. "in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et factum esse . Et in his quod fit, est ; sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde cum creatio sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est." Possumus tamen distinguere diversa naturae instantia, et sic concipere prius voluntatem divinam principium creationis, deinde actionem (in hypothesi adversariorum), et tandem terminum actionis creativae. Actio illa videtur exigere aliquod subjectum in quo sit, actio enim transiens, qualis illa esset, est accidens. At in illo medio instanti quodnam esset ejus subjectum ? Non quidem Deus ; tum quia repugnat ut Deus sit subjectum alicujus accidentis, tum quia
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 17 jam actio illa esset immanens et non transiens. Neque creatura, quae erit solum in instanti posteriori. Dices cum Suarez 1. c. n. 27. "Multi ergo negant hanc dependentiam, quæ est creatio, esse accidens, asserentes esse modum substantialem rei quae creatur. Unde quatenus illud fieri concipitur ut prius natura suo termino , concedendum est non esse in subjecto, sed concipi quasi in se ; quod non est inconveniens ." Resp. Videri valde inconveniens concipere existentem in illo instanti medio, de quo agimus, modum rei creatae sine re creata cujus est modus. Hoc saltem admitti nequit, nisi gravi cogente ratione, quae hic deesse videtur.
16 De Deo Creatore. senti quæstione, vi hujus volitionis divinæ poni terminum extra Deum ; ac proinde creationem esse actionem aliquo modo transeuntem.-Solum ergo probari debet eamdem volitionem esse ex sese immanentem ; ideoque etc. Prob. min. quoad hanc partem. Quod identificatur cum divina essentia est certe immanens Deo ; atqui volitio divina, vi cujus aliquid ex nihilo producitur, identificatur cum divina voluntate, quæ idem est cum divina essentia. Ergo . Prob. hæc min. Si non identificaretur cum divina essentia, vel esset in seipsa, vel in termino creationis. Atqui non in seipsa, actio enim natura sua requirit subjectum, in quo sit ; non in termino creationis siquidem omnis actio est natura sua prior termino, ac proinde etiam creatio est natura prior re creata. Ergo . Verum est quod creatio est instantanea ; ut enim docet D. Th. 1. p. q. 45. a 3. ad 3. "in his quae fiunt sine motu, simul est fieri et factum esse . Et in his quod fit, est ; sed cum dicitur fieri, significatur ab alio esse, et prius non fuisse. Unde cum creatio sit sine motu, simul aliquid creatur et creatum est." Possumus tamen distinguere diversa naturae instantia, et sic concipere prius voluntatem divinam principium creationis, deinde actionem (in hypothesi adversariorum), et tandem terminum actionis creativae. Actio illa videtur exigere aliquod subjectum in quo sit, actio enim transiens, qualis illa esset, est accidens. At in illo medio instanti quodnam esset ejus subjectum ? Non quidem Deus ; tum quia repugnat ut Deus sit subjectum alicujus accidentis, tum quia
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 17 jam actio illa esset immanens et non transiens. Neque creatura, quae erit solum in instanti posteriori. Dices cum Suarez 1. c. n. 27. "Multi ergo negant hanc dependentiam, quæ est creatio, esse accidens, asserentes esse modum substantialem rei quae creatur. Unde quatenus illud fieri concipitur ut prius natura suo termino , concedendum est non esse in subjecto, sed concipi quasi in se ; quod non est inconveniens ." Resp. Videri valde inconveniens concipere existentem in illo instanti medio, de quo agimus, modum rei creatae sine re creata cujus est modus. Hoc saltem admitti nequit, nisi gravi cogente ratione, quae hic deesse videtur.
20. Therefore, attending only to the present question, we say:
Proposition I. Creation is an action of itself immanent, and only virtually transient.
The first proof is from the argument of St. Thomas in the cited place, which can be set forth as follows: Creation taken actively is either an action simply immanent, or formally transient, or formally immanent and only virtually transient. But the first and the second cannot be said. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. That it is not simply immanent is conceded here by all. But neither is it formally transient. For it would be formally transient only insofar as, from what has been said, it would consist in an efflux intermediate between the Creator and the creature. But no efflux of this kind is given. Therefore.
Proof of this minor. An efflux intermediate between an acting cause and an effect, from what has been said about the nature of action, is properly called motion, which is called action or passion according as it is referred to the cause or to the subject. But in creation no motion is given: both because motion is the act of something existing in potency, and before creation nothing is in potency; and because real motion requires two real termini, and in creation the terminus from which is nothing. Therefore.
Second proof. Creation taken actively is God's volition, by the force of which something is produced out of nothing outside God. But such volition is of itself immanent and only virtually transient. Therefore.
Explanation. It is doubtful to no one that creation taken actively is in some sense the divine volition, whether this be understood to be the principle of creative action, or formally the action itself. Likewise it is certain, in the present question, that by the force of this divine volition a terminus outside God is placed; and consequently that creation is in some way a transient action. Therefore it remains only to prove that the same volition is of itself immanent; and therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor as to this part. What is identified with the divine essence is certainly immanent to God. But the divine volition, by the force of which something is produced out of nothing, is identified with the divine will, which is the same as the divine essence. Therefore.
Proof of this minor. If it were not identified with the divine essence, it would be either in itself or in the terminus of creation. But it is not in itself, for action by its nature requires a subject in which it is; nor is it in the terminus of creation, since every action is by nature prior to its terminus, and consequently creation too is by nature prior to the thing created. Therefore.
It is true that creation is instantaneous; for as St. Thomas teaches, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3, "in those things which come to be without motion, the coming-to-be and the having-been-made are simultaneous. And in these things, what comes to be, is; but when it is said to come to be, it is signified to have being from another and previously not to have been. Hence, since creation is without motion, something is simultaneously created and has been created." Nevertheless, we can distinguish diverse instants of nature, and thus conceive first the divine will as the principle of creation, then the action - on the hypothesis of the adversaries - and finally the terminus of the creative action. That action seems to require some subject in which it is, for a transient action, such as that would be, is an accident. But in that middle instant, what would be its subject? Certainly not God, both because it is repugnant that God be the subject of any accident, and because that action would already be immanent and not transient. Nor would the creature be its subject, since the creature will be only in the later instant.
You will say with Suarez, in the cited place, n. 27: "Many therefore deny that this dependence, which is creation, is an accident, asserting that it is a substantial mode of the thing which is created. Hence, insofar as that coming-to-be is conceived as prior by nature to its terminus, it must be conceded that it is not in a subject, but is conceived as if in itself; and this is not inconvenient."
I reply: it seems very inconvenient to conceive, as existing in that middle instant of which we are speaking, the mode of the created thing without the created thing of which it is the mode. This at least cannot be admitted unless some weighty reason compels it, and such a reason seems to be lacking here.
Proposition I. Creation is an action of itself immanent, and only virtually transient.
The first proof is from the argument of St. Thomas in the cited place, which can be set forth as follows: Creation taken actively is either an action simply immanent, or formally transient, or formally immanent and only virtually transient. But the first and the second cannot be said. Therefore.
Proof of the minor. That it is not simply immanent is conceded here by all. But neither is it formally transient. For it would be formally transient only insofar as, from what has been said, it would consist in an efflux intermediate between the Creator and the creature. But no efflux of this kind is given. Therefore.
Proof of this minor. An efflux intermediate between an acting cause and an effect, from what has been said about the nature of action, is properly called motion, which is called action or passion according as it is referred to the cause or to the subject. But in creation no motion is given: both because motion is the act of something existing in potency, and before creation nothing is in potency; and because real motion requires two real termini, and in creation the terminus from which is nothing. Therefore.
Second proof. Creation taken actively is God's volition, by the force of which something is produced out of nothing outside God. But such volition is of itself immanent and only virtually transient. Therefore.
Explanation. It is doubtful to no one that creation taken actively is in some sense the divine volition, whether this be understood to be the principle of creative action, or formally the action itself. Likewise it is certain, in the present question, that by the force of this divine volition a terminus outside God is placed; and consequently that creation is in some way a transient action. Therefore it remains only to prove that the same volition is of itself immanent; and therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor as to this part. What is identified with the divine essence is certainly immanent to God. But the divine volition, by the force of which something is produced out of nothing, is identified with the divine will, which is the same as the divine essence. Therefore.
Proof of this minor. If it were not identified with the divine essence, it would be either in itself or in the terminus of creation. But it is not in itself, for action by its nature requires a subject in which it is; nor is it in the terminus of creation, since every action is by nature prior to its terminus, and consequently creation too is by nature prior to the thing created. Therefore.
It is true that creation is instantaneous; for as St. Thomas teaches, Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3, "in those things which come to be without motion, the coming-to-be and the having-been-made are simultaneous. And in these things, what comes to be, is; but when it is said to come to be, it is signified to have being from another and previously not to have been. Hence, since creation is without motion, something is simultaneously created and has been created." Nevertheless, we can distinguish diverse instants of nature, and thus conceive first the divine will as the principle of creation, then the action - on the hypothesis of the adversaries - and finally the terminus of the creative action. That action seems to require some subject in which it is, for a transient action, such as that would be, is an accident. But in that middle instant, what would be its subject? Certainly not God, both because it is repugnant that God be the subject of any accident, and because that action would already be immanent and not transient. Nor would the creature be its subject, since the creature will be only in the later instant.
You will say with Suarez, in the cited place, n. 27: "Many therefore deny that this dependence, which is creation, is an accident, asserting that it is a substantial mode of the thing which is created. Hence, insofar as that coming-to-be is conceived as prior by nature to its terminus, it must be conceded that it is not in a subject, but is conceived as if in itself; and this is not inconvenient."
I reply: it seems very inconvenient to conceive, as existing in that middle instant of which we are speaking, the mode of the created thing without the created thing of which it is the mode. This at least cannot be admitted unless some weighty reason compels it, and such a reason seems to be lacking here.
21. Ex dictis facile est intelligere doctrinam, quam D. Th. tradit cit. a. 3. q. 45. Paucis sic exponi potest. Creatio considerari potest active et passive. Active considerata significat actionem divinam, quæ est ejus essentia, cum relatione ad creaturam. Unde Dei volitio potest quidem dici principium creationis passive, at nullo modo creationis active ; siquidem est ipsa creatio activa, quatenus ei conjungitur connotatio relationis ad creaturam . Et quamvis relatio de se non sit activa, satis est quod sit conjuncta practicæ volitioni divinæ , quæ certe est activa.
21. From what has been said, it is easy to understand the doctrine which St. Thomas hands down in the cited article 3 of question 45. It can be set forth briefly as follows. Creation can be considered actively and passively. Considered actively, it signifies the divine action, which is his essence, with relation to the creature. Hence God's volition can indeed be called the principle of passive creation, but in no way the principle of active creation, since it is active creation itself, insofar as the connotation of a relation to the creature is joined to it. And although relation of itself is not active, it is enough that it be joined to the practical divine volition, which certainly is active.
22. Passive autem considerata "creatio," inquit D. Th. q. 3. de pot. a. 3., "nihil aliud est realiter quam relatio quædam ad Deum cum novitate essendi. " Quæ relatio est dependentiæ ; "non enim," inquit c. g. 1. 2. c. 18., "creatio est mutatio, sed est ipsa dependentia esse creati ad principium, a quo in
18 De Deo Creatore. stituitur. " Quibus conformiter in Sum. The. I. c. ait : "Relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse creatio passive accepta est in creatura et est creata."
18 De Deo Creatore. stituitur. " Quibus conformiter in Sum. The. I. c. ait : "Relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quædam ad Creatorem ut ad principium sui esse creatio passive accepta est in creatura et est creata."
22. Considered passively, however, "creation," says St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 3, "is really nothing other than a certain relation to God with newness of being." This relation is one of dependence; for, he says in Contra Gentiles II, c. 18, "creation is not mutation, but is the very dependence of created being upon the principle by which it is established." In conformity with these statements, he says in Summa Theologiae I, in the cited place: "It remains that creation in the creature is nothing but a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being. Creation taken passively is in the creature and is created."
23. Advertendum tamen est quod " Cum ... Deus sit, " (1. p . q. 13. a. 1. c.) " extra totum ordinem creaturæ et omnes creaturæ ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso ; manifestum est quod creaturæ realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum ; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas , sed secundum rationem tantum, in quantum creaturæ referuntur ad ipsum. " Est quidem realis hæc relatio in creatura, siquidem nihil deest ex iis , quæ, uti docet D. Th. Opusc. 48. , requiruntur ad relationem realem constituendam . Dantur enim duo termini reales, Deus et creatura - hi termini sunt inter se realiter distincti-fundamentum relationis est reale in creatura, est enim ipsum ejus esse a Creatore acceptum. Est autem creatio relatio solum rationis in Deo ; nam nihil reale ei advenit ex hoc quod creaturas producat in iisque operetur. Nec tamen sequitur Deum esse Dominum creaturarum secundum rationem et non secundum rem. Etenim ait D. Th. cit. a. q. 13 . ad 5. "cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam , qua creatura refertur ad ipsum ; cum relatio subjectionis realiter sit in creatura ; sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed. realiter sit Dominus : eo enim modo dicitur Dominus quo creatura ei subjecta est ."
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 19
Disp. I. De Mundi Origine. 19
23. Yet it must be noted that, "since God," Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, corpus, "is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are ordered to him and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really referred to God himself; but in God there is no real relation of him to creatures, but only according to reason, insofar as creatures are referred to him."
This relation is indeed real in the creature, since nothing is lacking from those things which, as St. Thomas teaches in Opuscule 48, are required for constituting a real relation. For two real termini are given, God and creature; these termini are really distinct from each other; and the foundation of the relation is real in the creature, for it is the very being of it received from the Creator.
But creation is a relation only of reason in God, for nothing real comes to him from the fact that he produces creatures and operates in them. Nor, however, does it follow that God is Lord of creatures according to reason and not according to reality. For St. Thomas says in the cited article, q. 13, ad 5: "Since God is referred to the creature according to that reason by which the creature is referred to him, and since the relation of subjection is really in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not only according to reason but really; for he is called Lord in the mode in which the creature is subject to him."
This relation is indeed real in the creature, since nothing is lacking from those things which, as St. Thomas teaches in Opuscule 48, are required for constituting a real relation. For two real termini are given, God and creature; these termini are really distinct from each other; and the foundation of the relation is real in the creature, for it is the very being of it received from the Creator.
But creation is a relation only of reason in God, for nothing real comes to him from the fact that he produces creatures and operates in them. Nor, however, does it follow that God is Lord of creatures according to reason and not according to reality. For St. Thomas says in the cited article, q. 13, ad 5: "Since God is referred to the creature according to that reason by which the creature is referred to him, and since the relation of subjection is really in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not only according to reason but really; for he is called Lord in the mode in which the creature is subject to him."
24. Dices : Dici nequit creationem in creatura nihil aliud esse, quam ipsum ejus esse cum relatione inde resultante. Nam eodem manente esse creaturæ potest diversa in ea haberi realis relatio ; atqui diversa realis relatio postulat diversum fundamentum ; ergo.-Prob. maj.: potest idem esse creaturæ produci per creationem a Deo solo, vel a Deo cum creatura ut instrumento elevato ; potest idem esse accidentis produci naturaliter in subjecto et ex subjecto, vel supernaturaliter sine subjecto ; atqui in his casibus, eodem manente esse creaturæ, diversa haberetur relatio ; ergo. Atque hæc dicitur esse præcipua ratio, ob quam Suarez, 1. c. nn. 12. 13., admittit modum substantialem, in quo formaliter constituit actionem creativam. Resp. Nobis , ut suo loco dicetur, probabilius est creaturam nec per elevationem esse posse causam instrumentalem creationis ; nihil ergo dicendum de hoc casu. Sed videtur concedendum accidens posse produci sine subjecto, seu creari ; sicut enim per miraculum conservari potest sine subjecto ita et fieri, et sic fieret ad modum substantiæ. Jamvero ut cætera prætereamus, quando naturaliter producitur accidens ex subjecto et in subjecto, ad mentem Suarez admitti potest effluxus ille veluti medius ; tota enim ratio cur hic effluxus negatur in creatione est quia deest subjectum in quo recipiatur : quando vero idem accidens producitur ad modum substantiæ per creationem, juxta dicta negandus est idem effluxus. Quare si diversa exurgit relatio in utroque casu, ratio non erit quia datur diversus modus ex natura rei distinctus ab esse accidentis ; sed quia in uno casu datur, in alio deest idem modus.
- 20 De Deo Creatore
- 20 De Deo Creatore
24. You will say: it cannot be said that creation in the creature is nothing other than its very being with the relation resulting from it. For, while the being of the creature remains the same, there can be a diverse real relation in it; but a diverse real relation requires a diverse foundation. Therefore. The major is proved: the same being of a creature can be produced by creation from God alone, or from God together with a creature as an elevated instrument; the same being of an accident can be produced naturally in a subject and from a subject, or supernaturally without a subject. But in these cases, while the being of the creature remains the same, there would be a diverse relation. Therefore. And this is said to be the principal reason why Suarez, in the cited place, nn. 12-13, admits a substantial mode in which he formally constitutes creative action.
I reply: for us, as will be said in its own place, it is more probable that a creature cannot be an instrumental cause of creation, not even through elevation; therefore nothing need be said about this case. But it seems that it must be conceded that an accident can be produced without a subject, or be created; for just as by a miracle it can be conserved without a subject, so also it can come to be without a subject, and thus it would come to be after the manner of a substance. Now, to pass over the rest, when an accident is naturally produced from a subject and in a subject, according to the mind of Suarez that efflux as though intermediate can be admitted; for the whole reason why this efflux is denied in creation is that the subject in which it would be received is lacking. But when the same accident is produced after the manner of a substance through creation, according to what has been said, the same efflux must be denied. Therefore, if a diverse relation arises in each case, the reason will not be that there is given a diverse mode, distinct by the nature of the thing from the being of the accident, but that in one case the same mode is given, and in the other it is lacking.
I reply: for us, as will be said in its own place, it is more probable that a creature cannot be an instrumental cause of creation, not even through elevation; therefore nothing need be said about this case. But it seems that it must be conceded that an accident can be produced without a subject, or be created; for just as by a miracle it can be conserved without a subject, so also it can come to be without a subject, and thus it would come to be after the manner of a substance. Now, to pass over the rest, when an accident is naturally produced from a subject and in a subject, according to the mind of Suarez that efflux as though intermediate can be admitted; for the whole reason why this efflux is denied in creation is that the subject in which it would be received is lacking. But when the same accident is produced after the manner of a substance through creation, according to what has been said, the same efflux must be denied. Therefore, if a diverse relation arises in each case, the reason will not be that there is given a diverse mode, distinct by the nature of the thing from the being of the accident, but that in one case the same mode is given, and in the other it is lacking.