§ 1. Let the Senate, both in a free state and in a Monarchy, be the chief dignity and
power. Its dignity indeed derives from birth and census, but more from the selection of prudence and virtue. God gave Moses a Senate. For although God himself taught him, although he instructed him for two periods of forty days and nights on the mountain, and although he spoke to him face to face as to a friend, he nevertheless joined to him seventy Elders, to whom he gave of his own spirit, so that he might show that by a singular divine power and kindness he favors those who are lawfully summoned to public counsel. This is so true that we see the excellent decrees and most holy opinions and laws of even the most wicked men, and daily make use of the state which they instituted.
But because the highest authority is needed in public counsel, it came about from ancient times that those nearest in dignity were Counselors to Kings. Thus there were seven Princes of the Persians, concerning whom Artaxerxes says in 1 Ezra 7:14: “For you have been sent from the presence of the King and his seven Counselors to visit Judea and Jerusalem.” And at verse 15 the King and his Counselors offer gifts. Therefore Ezra says that God inclined his mercy before the King, his Counselors, and all the powerful Princes of the kingdom. God numbers Counselors among the highest blessings, Isaiah 1:25: “And I shall turn my hand toward you, smelt your dross to purity, and take away all your tin.”
And Proverbs 15:22: “Thoughts are dissipated where there is no counsel; but where there are many Counselors, they are confirmed.” Aristotle also says most truly that counsel is the most divine of the things that exist among men. Although the Roman Senate was drawn from Romulus’s dregs, nevertheless to Cineas it seemed an assembly of Kings. It was called the counsel of the whole world, the most ample order, and the glory of the Empire. But if those commendations possessed any appearance of truth in that Senate, they are most true in the present Empire.
For who denies that the Senate of the German Empire is a royal assembly, in which preside the Emperor of the Romans and seven Electors, one of whom displays the power and insignia of a King, while the others possess an almost royal power and three possess the majesty of the Priesthood? To these are added so many Princes, Counts, and Legates of numerous and powerful cities, chosen from their Senates, that I could in no way believe that even the Senate of Rome at its most flourishing equaled them. For that ancient Senate under the Kings, drawn from a gathered people and an asylum, ought not to be compared with the Senate-house of any city today. Formerly that band of one hundred was often a Senate in meadows, when the rustic Senate-house had Fathers with hide-clad hearts.
At first one hundred, then two hundred, and under Priscus three hundred were appointed; in Caesar’s time they exceeded a thousand, when criminal and sordid men from every nation had been thrust into it. The Senate of the Empire therefore represents the dignity of the Empire excellently. Add that, for the advantage of that time and by a good moderation of concord, Senators were chosen from the plebs and through the suffrages of the plebs. Formerly the dignity of Princes and Senators in other kingdoms was not dissimilar, but it endures almost only in Germany.
§ 2. In order that the Senate may retain its majesty, care must be taken that unworthy men are not elected; therefore those who are one day to enter that order must be trained early. Cicero in book 3 of On the Laws wishes the Senate to be composed of Magistrates. This is a most excellent plan, for the man most fit to give counsel concerning the state is one who has governed the state or some part of it. Yet a man must not be admitted if he has administered a Magistracy badly. Thus, if he has been charged with treason, extortion, or electoral corruption, let him not sit in the most ample order unless acquitted by judgment. Next, since it is more dangerous for an inexperienced man to command than to be a Senator, it appears no more fitting that one who has held a Magistracy should be in the Senate than that one who is to command should be taken from the Senate. Hence above I especially approved those who early employ in deliberations the men who are being educated in the hope of governing the state. The great Emperor Augustus agrees with me. Although he kept an unprofitable crowd from the Senate-house, he nevertheless permitted the children of Senators, so that they might more quickly become accustomed to the state, immediately to assume the broad stripe upon taking the toga of manhood and to attend the Senate-house. Thus Augustus acted. Yet I scarcely think those younger men gave opinions; I judge that they were instructed by hearing others.
Formerly the names of unworthy men were erased from the roll; when they were passed over by the Censor, they were said to be removed from the Senate. Yet they did not perpetually lack the Senate-house, but were sometimes chosen by a subsequent Censor; indeed, some were afterward created Censors, as I shall later say of Salinator. We learn that in ancient times there was great virtue among Senators because they were readily removed. Marcus Valerius Maximus and Gaius Junius Bubulcus Brutus removed Lucius Antonius from the Senate because he had repudiated the wife whom he had married as a virgin without summoning any of his friends into counsel. Valerius, book 2, chapter 9.
Thus Marcus Porcius Cato removed Lucius Flamininus from the number of Senators because in his province he had beheaded a certain condemned man with an axe, choosing the time of execution according to the whim and for the spectacle of a little woman by whose love he was held. Regard for the consulship which he had held, and the authority of his brother, the Consular Titus Flamininus, could have restrained him. But both a Censor and a Cato—twofold examples of severity—he resolved to mark him all the more because he had polluted the majesty of the most ample honor by so foul a crime and had not cared that the eyes of a prostitute, delighted by human blood, and the suppliant hands of King Philip were recorded among the same ancestral images.
Why should I speak of the censorship of Fabricius Luscinus? His age has related and posterity will relate that he did not retain Cornelius Rufinus in the Senatorial order, though he had most splendidly held two consulships and a dictatorship, because he had acquired ten pounds of silver vessels, as though luxurious by evil example. By my faith, the very letters of our age appear to me to stand amazed when they are compelled to accommodate their service to such severity and to fear lest they be thought to commemorate deeds not of our City. For it is scarcely credible that within the same sacred boundary ten pounds of silver were both an invidious census and poverty was regarded as most contemptible.
Marcus Antonius and Lucius Flaccus, as Censors, removed Duronius from the Senate because, while Tribune of the plebs, he had repealed a law carried to restrain the expenses of banquets—a marvelous cause of the mark.
For how imprudently Duronius ascended the Rostra to say these things: “Bridles have been imposed upon you, Quirites, which must in no way be endured; you have been bound and constrained by the bitter bond of servitude. For a law has been carried which orders you to be frugal. Let us therefore repeal that dominion encrusted with the rust of savage antiquity. For what need is there of liberty if it is not lawful for those who wish it to perish through luxury?”
This was a most just reason why he should be removed from the Senate; in the case of Flamininus, an even more just one.
Augustus, as Dio relates in book 52, diminished the number and purified it. For he exhorted each man to be judge of himself according to the consciousness of his birth and life, and so persuaded fifty voluntarily to reduce themselves to their proper order. Augustus did not act rightly in this. For he did not purify the Senate by that method. First,
who, once admonished by Augustus, would dare to enter the Senate-house against his will, if not about to pay penalties, certainly about to hear insults? Next, there were a thousand; of these, the more modest departed, and by this very fact were better than those who remained and hardened themselves against the admonitions. Therefore, a little afterward he reformed the Senate-house by another and more effective remedy. The same Dio says in book 54: Τριάκοντα ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐξελέξατο, καὶ ἐκείνους ἐκέλευσε καθὰ πέντε εἰς πινάκια γράψαντες ἑλέσθαι. He chose thirty of the best men and ordered them to write names on tablets in groups of five and to choose. I do not understand this as though only five had been written by each man—that is, one hundred fifty—and the best chosen from them; that number is far too small. Rather, since there were more than a thousand Senators, he wished the names of all to be transferred separately from the roll which he had ordered publicly posted onto tablets, five by five, so that the thirty Censors might judge concerning each group of five.
§ 3. The ancients judged it equitable that the power of the Senate should be very great: “Whatever the Senate has decreed, let them do.” Yet this was afterward limited, for the provision was changed: “Commands, powers, and legateships—when the Senate has decreed and the people ordered—shall depart from the City.” And: “All Magistrates shall possess auspices and judicial power; from these shall the Senate be composed; its decrees shall be valid. But if an equal or greater power has prohibited them, let the written senatorial decrees be preserved. Let that order be free from every vice; let it be an example to the rest.”
The power over war, embassies, and treaties belonged to the Senate. The month of February was customarily allotted to hearing embassies. Decrees of the Senate possessed the force of law; afterward the people were asked whether the Quirites willed and ordered it. But when the people’s power had been transferred to the Prince, he was accustomed to enact laws, but from the authority of the Senate. Evil Princes, however, were insulting toward the Senate. Julius, while Consul and not yet Dictator, kept it from the Senate-house through fear. Antonius, not yet Triumvir, threatened Cicero in Philippic 11 with workmen to demolish his house if he did not attend. Nero fined a Senator under the title that he was infrequent in attendance. The same Antonius surrounded the Senate with armed men so that opinions could not be given freely. But it is shameful to possess a public council and oppress it. Formerly nothing could be done with the people except by the authority of the Senate; afterward seditious citizens, by disparaging the Fathers to the Princes, won the people to themselves, and, having become more powerful, oppressed the people itself.
§ 4. It is not fitting for too many to be chosen into the Senate, for it cannot happen that many unworthy of that order are not admitted. Accordingly, although the Roman Empire extended most widely under Augustus, a thousand Senators was considered too great a crowd. Next, that number cannot conveniently be assembled or asked for opinions. Yet the Venetians are not therefore to be censured because, although they do not possess a twentieth part of the Roman Empire, they have nevertheless constituted a Senate twice as numerous; for they are said to number two thousand on the roll. But it must be said that this Great Council represents an assembly rather than a Senate, although it is an assembly not of the plebs but of the nobility. For in that great meeting of the nobility Magistrates are created, dignities and duties of offices are conferred, and supplements are given to other councils in which the Elders deliberate. Various councils have been instituted. From them one which they call the Pregadi is constituted, into which men who excel in prudence and experience are chosen from the Great Council; it generally has no more than two hundred twenty Senators. This properly represents a Senate: they transact all matters of peace and war and the greatest affairs, and decree with great power. Yet at last matters return to fewer men, for whatever the ten Sages establish with the agreement of the Six and the Fifteen is held valid.
§ 5. A Senator had the right not merely to say what and for as long as he wished concerning the matter proposed, but even to speak concerning the state although the Magistrates had not referred that matter. They adorned their tunic with the broad stripe; afterward they used silvered carriages, as is found in Aurelian’s concession in Vopiscus. Formerly they could be accused before the people by Tribunes and others; afterward the Prefect of the City alone was their Judge. Alexander Severus wished Senators to be punished only by the Senate. Spartianus in Severus.
Emperors and Kings were also accustomed to grant many privileges to Senators, and not undeservedly, for to give counsel is more than to give money: Βουλῆς γὰρ ὀρθῆς οὐδὲν ἀσφαλέστερον—nothing is safer than good counsel. For force without counsel collapses under its own mass, the more swiftly the greater its weight. One who does not wish to err needs counsel, not impulse.
§ 6. I admonish the Prince to employ no less care in choosing his highest Counselors than in entrusting lesser Magistracies. Indeed, if many unsuitable men are chosen, the state is moved more gravely from the very first beginning. Vopiscus says rightly in Aurelian:
First of all, excessive license; then an abundance of affairs; moreover, wicked friends, detestable attendants, most avaricious Eunuchs, courtiers either foolish or detestable, and—what cannot be denied—ignorance of public affairs. But I heard my father say that Diocletian the Prince, when already a private man, said that nothing was more difficult than to command well. Four or five men assemble and form one plan for deceiving the Emperor; they say what must be approved. The Emperor, who is enclosed at home, does not know the truth; he is compelled to know only what they say. He appoints Judges who ought not to be appointed; he removes from the state those whom he ought to retain. Why say more? As Diocletian himself said, a good, cautious, excellent Emperor is sold. These are Diocletian’s words, which I inserted so that your prudence might know that nothing is more difficult than a good Prince.
Consider, reader, the deeds of our age, and you will grieve that the same things happen in almost every court. In every state and every Empire it has always been possible to find more men ready with the hand and illustrious in war than good in counsel. The lot of Princes is pitiable: they possess armies prepared to undergo dangers for the majesty of the Empire, yet discover few who advise rightly and prudently and whom they may safely trust—so much so that many have possessed three or four, and some not even one, who were both prudent and faithful. Therefore the most prudent Consul in book 1 of On Duties prefers Counselors to warriors. And Euripides says well: “The counsel of one man surpasses the hands of many.”
§ 7. The marks and endowments of a good Senator and Counselor are as follows.
First, in a Senator and Counselor I require a settled age, or rather old age, exercised in affairs.
The Senate has its mild name from old men.
I wish young men to be employed in counsels, but for hearing and disputing, not for deciding. The greatest states have been shaken by young men, sustained and restored by old men. For when rash and audacious young men approach the helm,
the greatest and most wretched shipwrecks occur. What Paulus Aemilius said concerning an Emperor—that, if not in age, he ought at least to be an old man in character—also befits the Emperor’s council. For there is a most prudent saying of Alfonso the Great: Counselors of Kings ought either to be Kings or to possess the minds of Kings. For if they govern a King, they ought to be endowed with the mind of one who governs. If so great a virtue falls into a youthful mind, it does not readily persevere; the mind is soft, unstable through age, and exposed to deceits. The body of old men is weak with years, but their mind strong with wisdom. In young men there is, to say it in a word, νέα φροντίς, youthful care. Yet even if the disposition is good, that saying remains:
Αἱ ἄρισται φύσεις μεγίστης παιδείας δέονται.
The best disposition needs the greatest discipline.
The second virtue is silence, the safeguard of secrets. For we ought not to doubt that a Prince and a state whose counsels are divulged are betrayed by their own Counselors; by this most of those counsels are rendered ineffectual and do harm. Silence is rare in a multitude. Therefore many use few Counselors. The remedy is that many should judge what must be done, few should know what you are about to do, and sometimes no one besides the Prince. For this reason states sometimes entrust secret matters to very few men. “Be silent” is a golden precept. Taciturnity is the best and safest bond for administering an affair.
For this reason I think that the Prince’s council in which deliberation occurred was called the silentium. Paulus Diaconus says in book 22 of the Miscellaneous History that Copronymus held one every day against images. The same author in book 21 says that Leo celebrated a silentium in the hall of nineteen couches against the holy images; and in book 23 that Irene, after holding a silentium in Justinian’s Triclinium, remitted taxes. That place was called the silentiarium, Diaconus, book 16; the silentiarii kept watch there, and Senators were chosen from them. Accordingly, the council and the place were called silentium and silentiarium so that all might be reminded of secrecy. Cedrenus says concerning Phocas that Phocas contradicted Maurice in the silentium. Among the Persians no one is conscious of the counsels except taciturn and faithful nobles, among whom even a divinity of Silence is worshiped. Ammianus, book 21.
The third virtue is that he should not cling to his own opinion but willingly exchange it for a better judgment. Far from the Senate-house and court be those Laconians—as Tacitus calls them—who are enemies of any counsel, however excellent, which they themselves did not bring, and obstinate against experienced men. They err because they judge liberty to be placed in obstinacy, not in moderation. Spartianus relates that Severus was asked by a Greek what he bore most grievously at Rome. He replied: “When ministers obstinately contradict my opinion, and this upon no foundation whatever.”
Fourth, let them take care not to deal privately with the legates of other Princes; rivals easily purchase them for themselves at a small price. I said above that among the Romans it was held a crime of treason to receive privately the legates or Commanders of enemies. Nothing brought so much envy upon Scipio Asiaticus as certain services rendered to Antiochus. Even now, what was charged against Barnevelt besides a certain familiarity with the Spaniards, which he nevertheless excuses?
The fifth and most necessary virtue is liberty of mind, so that they may not be beholden to neighboring, hostile, or rival Princes. This will chiefly be judged from whether they are bound to them by feudal right, whether they possess properties in their territories, whether they are increased with gifts and honors by the opposing party, and whether they court foreign friendships. For it is a sign that they by no means trust their own Prince and therefore—because trust binds trust—that they are not faithful. But if a Counselor is compelled by fear to suppress the best counsels, it is just as if a soldier ready in spirit and robust in body were forbidden by the Commander to free his sword from its sheath when the enemy makes an attack. Princes who order good counsels to be concealed in the Senate-house sin with no less loss than those who order weapons to be concealed in the battle line.
The sixth virtue is that they themselves should know their own condition. They themselves will certainly bear the outcome of bad counsel; for until now no one has been found to whom evil counsels have not given an evil outcome, although for a time they drew some interest from prosperity. Claudian in book 1 glories that evil counsels thus returned upon Eutropius:
How well it has been arranged upon earth That the fruit of a counsel presses upon its first authors! Thus the seer who, while the river had been dry for many years, Advised that the Thunderer be appeased by a murdered guest, First stained the altars invented by Busiris; And he fell as the victim of the savage rite which he had prescribed. Thus the craftsman of the bull and inventor of torments, Who had fashioned deadly bronze for a novel suffering, First felt the untried work when the Sicilian tyrant compelled him, And taught his own bull to bellow.
Nero’s companions, envying Burrus and Seneca, destroyed the Prince. “Do you endure these things? Do you fear those men? Do you not know that you are Caesar, and that you possess power over them, not they over you?” They said these things before Nero, and afterward were the first to experience the insults and savagery of the bloodthirsty beast.
Let this therefore be fixed: whoever has given counsel for another’s destruction should be rejected as guilty. Nero’s mother, the cause of so many crimes, at last herself suffered her son’s savagery. This has never failed, not even in our own time.
The seventh virtue is that counsels should be timely. Those counsels whose time has passed are generally accustomed to appear best. To give after a disaster the counsel by which it could have been avoided is to reproach the Prince with folly. Perseus in flight stabbed a Counselor who gave counsels too late. Selim acted barbarously and with Ottoman cruelty when he killed the author of a counsel whose outcome had been evil. It is the Counselor’s duty to determine concerning a matter to be done, to foretell what evils will arise and by what means they can be guarded against. Anyone can be Prometheus after the deeds.
The eighth virtue is diligent study of political affairs and knowledge of history and examples with great judgment. For it belongs to the highest arrogance or negligence to neglect the judgments of good men. There is an oracle in Tacitus, book 1 of the Histories: to advise a Prince what he ought to do is a task of great labor. Therefore remedies for the evils of the state are not found among cups; speech, study, and exercise are needed. Fortune also follows all things done with the highest reason and counsel. Livy, book 5. But if fortune deserts the doer, the fruit of good counsel is nevertheless most salutary in itself.
The ninth virtue is that they should avoid precipitation and employ speed only when there is danger in delay. Whatever is done by impulse rarely grows strong. Therefore they say that Tiberius never deliberated twice about the same matter, because the first counsel was mature and complete. It is not royal to act rashly. Nicetas says: Μὴ βασιλικὸν τὸ αὐτόματον, καὶ ἀνακριβὲς ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι· τὸ δὲ περιεσκεμμένον καὶ χρόνιον.
It is not royal to act without counsel and inaccurately, but considerately and slowly.
The tenth virtue is to put aside all passions early, for after the mind has changed it is not lawful to recall what has already been advised. Avarice must especially be put aside. Wherever gain shines forth, public safety is sold without regard. Regard for private affairs has always hindered and will hinder public counsels. Livy, book 2. Hope belongs here:
Few honor Kings, not kingdoms; The splendor of the court summons more.
The second passion is favor or hatred. All men oppose their enemies with greater zeal than they assist their friends, for the spur of anger is sharper, and the desire for vengeance is hostile to counsels. The third is the evil of envy, by which spite commands some men to oppose the advancement of others—an immense evil and, what you may marvel at, sometimes more powerful than their own advantages.
The eleventh virtue is sincerity, which requires him to bring forward that which he judges true and salutary. For the best counsels are not those which are most pleasant but those which are true and salutary, as Solon wisely said. Frederick wished two things to be absent in giving counsel: simulation and dissimulation. Therefore one who so moderates his words that, whatever happens, he may appear to have spoken rightly must not be held in the place of a Counselor. It belongs to a wicked man to conceal the truth at the beginning, speak with the Prince’s fortune rather than counsel the Prince, and at last twist his opinion in the direction toward which the affair inclines. Sincerity must therefore be regarded; a man is not always to be heard because he once advised well. Indeed, he is not to be held of better faith merely because he advised more prudently. Great, though frequently voluntary, is the unhappiness of Princes: although they do everything so that they may possess sincere Counselors and friends, they are nevertheless very often deceived. The cause is that they do not test them sufficiently.
The twelfth virtue is that his reputation should be honorable. For the first judgment concerning a Prince is formed from this: if he chooses good Counselors, a good judgment; if evil ones, an evil judgment. Therefore let him choose good Counselors, men who fear God and love truth, and finally prudent men; for not every friend can be a Counselor. A Counselor of evil reputation stains the best counsel with his own disgrace. Therefore, when a wicked man had given an excellent counsel, the Lacedaemonians ordered the same counsel to be proposed by another man and used the counsel after changing its author. The reputation of the Prince, and much more that of the Senate, consists in the estimation of the individual members. That saying remains perpetually in men’s minds:
Τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ἕκαστος, οἷσπερ ἥδεται ξυνών.
Each man is such as are those whose company delights him. Few continually observe the Prince’s life, but all observe those of his Counselors, and from them speak about the Prince most willingly and most dangerously.
The thirteenth virtue is fortitude. It is easy to speak bravely among equals in the Senate-house; but if the countenance of Tiberius or the savagery of Gaius threatens the speaker, you will now scarcely find one who advises what is right. Xerxes thanked Demaratus because he alone had spoken the truth; but this was Xerxes’ fault, for until then he had preferred to hear pleasant things rather than true ones. Let Princes remove fear if they desire to hear good counsels. Theopompus, when asked what method there was for preserving a kingdom, replied: if the Prince permits his friends a just liberty of speaking and vindicates, so far as can be done, the injuries of his subjects. If Counselors are brave, they will neither shape their opinions according to the royal countenance nor, when harassed by the reproaches of many, depart from what is right. Meanwhile, the King to whom it is dangerous to give good counsel has perished.
Let the Counselor therefore be brave and endure private disadvantages for the public good.
The fourteenth virtue is that, after hearing others, if he judges their counsels better, he should willingly and gladly change his own, and should regard this as the conduct of a wise man. For to change an evil thing into a good or better one is not levity. If, while you were walking on the right road, another informed you of an easier shortcut, you would immediately follow it. Would you not do this for the safety of the state? Above I admonished him not to be an enemy of another’s counsel. Here I inculcate again and again that you should not consider a change of counsel unbecoming to a grave, knowledgeable, and experienced man, even in extreme old age. It belongs to the highest felicity to have seen and chosen the best things at first sight; but that man is superior who declares that he has seen less than another. No one can be more faithful in giving counsel than one who, after renouncing his own, approves another’s. He wishes provision to be made for the Prince’s safety rather than for his own reputation. This is a rare and arduous virtue. You would sooner find one who counsels rightly than one who bears with an equitable mind the rejection of his own counsel. Ahithophel, whose counsel was as the counsel of God, could advise nothing for himself except hanging. Not even Seneca, of the Stoic sect, approves that proud promise in book 4 of On Benefits, chapter 24: that a wise man never repents of his deed, never amends what he has done, and never changes his counsel. And in chapter 28: “It is not levity to depart from a recognized and condemned error; and it must be frankly confessed: I thought otherwise; I was deceived. But this is the perseverance of proud folly: What I have once said, of whatever kind it is, shall be fixed and ratified.”
The fifteenth virtue is that he should be frequent in attendance and should not seek evasions in odious causes. They took pledges. Cicero lays down the law in book 3 of On the Laws: “Let either cause or fault attach to the Senator who is not present.” Indeed, if he is faithful, let him thrust himself forward voluntarily, admonish and press, and be troublesome for the safety of the state. Thus acted Cato, concerning whom Plutarch writes in Caesar. But to Cato, who frequently foretold impending things, this remained: at first to obtain the name of an importunate and meddlesome Counselor, afterward that of a prudent but unhappy one.
More unhappy than Cato was Harpagus, who paid the penalties of right counsel. Seneca, book 3 of On Anger, chapter 15. He therefore entered the number of those who showed by great disasters how dearly good counsels cost the friends of Kings. I do not doubt that Harpagus too advised his King and the Persians of something of this kind, by which the King was offended and set his children before him to be eaten; then he asked whether the seasoning pleased him. Afterward, when he saw him sufficiently filled with his own evils, he ordered their heads to be brought and asked how he had been received. Words did not fail the wretched man, nor did his mouth close: “At a King’s table,” he said, “every dinner is pleasant.” What did he gain by this flattery? That he was not invited to the leftovers.
The sixteenth virtue is that he should not dispute about the state outside the Senate, in circles or at banquets. Cicero says rightly: “Let a Senator speak in the proper place and manner.” That is, in a lawful Senate, lawfully convened, in his own order, setting forth his opinion clearly and briefly and refuting others with modesty, if there is need. The place of the Senate was the Senate-house, sometimes a temple, outside or within the City. Afterward the place in which the Counselors of Princes debated grave affairs of the Empire was called the Consistory; indeed, the Consistory was the very Senate of Princes. Lampridius calls the fifty most learned Jurists under Alexander the “Consistory of the Prince”; with their assistance he made senatorial decrees and edicts. They also call that Senate θεῖον συνέδριον and βασιλικὸν συνέδριον, as Hesychius does. Their dignity was great; the chief notaries
who were of the Consistory are mentioned in book 2 of the Theodosian Code. Hence there is frequent mention of Consistorians, Novel 13; hence Counts of the Sacred Consistory and Counts of the Daily Consistory. Afterward it was also called the Sanctuary. In these places, therefore, and in this manner, let a Senator give his opinion. To hawk his opinion everywhere belongs to foolish vanity.
It pertains to place and manner that the one who possesses power should consult the Senate. Formerly this right belonged to the King, Interrex, Dictator, Consuls, Praetors, Tribunes, and Prefect of the City. Cicero says: “The Consul, Praetor, Master of the People and Horse, and the man whom the Fathers appoint for the purpose of directing the election of Consuls shall possess the right of conducting business with the people and Fathers; and the Tribunes whom the plebs shall choose for themselves shall possess the right of conducting business with the Fathers. Let them carry to the plebs whatever will be the Senate’s judgment. Let the business conducted with the people and with the Fathers be moderate.” Here he also names the Master of the Horse. To deliberate about the state without the Prince’s command is deservedly numbered among crimes of treason, because it belongs to the supreme power, or to him to whom that power has entrusted it, to convoke the supreme council. Next, when men deliberate about the highest interests against the Prince’s will, by this very fact they in some measure depose the Prince, for they assume for themselves the right of deciding, whether it pleases the Prince or altogether displeases him.
The eighteenth virtue is that he should be well skilled in law and the state. There is a golden law in Cicero: “Let him understand the causes of the people.” Augustus joined to himself fifteen experienced men illustrious for prudence, as Xiphilinus relates, and with them settled affairs arising daily. Tiberius chose twenty Senators by lot for six months. Not rightly by lot, which often falls upon the worst men; nor ought it to have been for six months, for many lawsuits and many affairs come to different men and need new instruction. It is necessary to hear those who preceded them. Those deliberate best who take examples for future affairs from the past. Dio, book 10. Stobaeus 94 praises a saying of Bias: Μία ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τὸ καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι, γνῶναι περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος. There is one beginning of advising well: that you know the matter about which the discourse is—not only the matter itself, but also its circumstances.
The nineteenth virtue is that he should be intermediate between the highest and lowest rank. Thus he should neither be a rank-and-file Senator, because he neither benefits the state and is despised, nor undertake all things, because he draws the dangers of all upon himself. Those who presided over the Prince’s council were called Proedri. Phocas instituted that dignity. The supreme man was called πρωτοπρόεδρος; he sometimes governed all things while the appearance of power remained with the Prince. But perpetual experience has taught that this is most difficult. The highest favor and estimation do not endure long; therefore let him especially maintain the middle. It is permitted him to proceed between abrupt obstinacy and shameful obedience along a path free from ambition and dangers. Let Counselors follow courageous and faithful physicians whose sole purpose is to protect or recover the Prince’s health and who are exempt from, and unconcerned with, other matters. A different man whose object is set upon those other things will advance through disasters of the fatherland to wealth and honors.
The twentieth virtue of a Counselor is that he should not offer himself to the Prince. For a man who, through intercessions and prayers, contrives to be able to give counsel to the Prince is convicted of loving the splendor and resources of the court more than the state. The Prince must therefore hold as suspect those who sell counsels for a price, for at the same price they will drag the Prince over precipices. If Princes therefore seek true counsels, let them seek Jehoiadas, Isaiahs, Ambroses—holy men. Those who are prodigal of counsels and speeches, who thrust themselves forward without being asked and instead ask of their own accord, mix in their own advantage. It is indeed marvelous that, although giving counsel is a task of the greatest labor, many possess audacity in giving it but few patience in receiving it. Amid the crowds of men selling counsels, I see few buyers.
The twenty-first virtue is experience and, from it, knowledge. I prefer to hear Hannibal concerning an army rather than a hundred Philosophers. For authority belongs to experience. Knowledge and use possess great power for persuasion. In truth, for the highest governors of Empire those who advise pious and honorable things are the instruments of a good age, as Symmachus says in epistle 16. Such men are the highest resources of a Prince. Σύμβουλος ἀγαθὸς χρησιμώτατον καὶ βασιλικώτατον ἁπάντων κτημάτων ἐστίν—a good Counselor is the most useful and most royal of all possessions.
The twenty-second virtue is piety, by which all human affairs are rightly governed. For those who assemble without God and take counsel against the Lord and his Christ meditate vain things.
Hence I admonish the Prince not readily to hear those who know affairs neither by experience, reading, nor hearing, for they pronounce most confidently lest they appear ignorant. No method is more effective for beating them back than to demand the reason for what they say; for the reasoning of an imprudent opinion is commonly much more imprudent.
The twenty-third virtue is to be content with the present condition and hostile to change unless it most manifestly tends toward the better. Change reveals many disadvantages which previously lay hidden. The poor, indebted, ambitious, envious, and imprudent are eager for change. Doubts must sometimes be proposed to test them so that they may open their minds; meanwhile, they must be seriously restrained and, if they are restless, sent away.
The twenty-fourth virtue is not to be a flatterer. If a physician has once mixed poison, you always turn away from him. If a Counselor has ever sinned by praising your vices or extolling your virtues beyond the truth, do not admit him to a second consultation; much less should you hear flatterers alone. The society of men who nourish the Prince’s vices by flattery must be avoided; much less, therefore, must their counsels be heard. Although at the beginning they lie hidden, nevertheless what they conceal in the root is disclosed in the branches, and what lies hidden in the leaves shines forth in the fruit. They consider pleasing the Prince their sole fruit.
The twenty-fifth virtue is that he should not be excessively audacious. For audacious counsels are fitter for changing affairs than preserving them. The authors of audacious counsels will be beaten back if they are compelled to pursue with their hand what they advise with their mouth. I therefore prefer a Counselor who is too cautious to one who is too audacious, for the Prince will employ him more safely. Indeed, those who are more cautious and appear timid are braver than audacious men when the matter has been reached. The reason is that they come prepared for outcomes and difficulties; rashness, because it is struck by an unforeseen missile, casts down the spirit more quickly than it assumed it. Boasters are the most timid. Just as inflated wineskins swell more splendidly than full ones but become flaccid at a slight puncture, so men ferocious in words expire at the first blow of danger: in peace they are lions; in battle, deer.
The twenty-sixth virtue, and the truest criterion of a Counselor, is whether, when he can, he assists the Prince not only by counsel but also by deed.
Πᾶς λόγος ἐστὶ μάταιος, ὁ μὴ τετελεσμένος ἔργῳ.
Καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξις τὸν λόγον ἔχει.
Every counsel which is not completed by deed is vain; and every deed possesses its rationale.
For example, a Prince of Germany advises the Emperor to wage war against the Turks. If he assists with provisions, soldiers, and money, he is a true friend, who assists by deed in a doubtful affair when there is need of deed. To assist citizens by counsel and aid is most praiseworthy. But if the advocate of war is a veteran military Commander and demands an immense stipend for his own labor, who doubts that he is advancing his own interest, not the public one?
And so much concerning the endowments and office of Counselors. Let us now consider what must be done by the Prince in this matter.
§ 8. The highest prudence of a Prince is that he should persuade himself with certainty that he needs counsel, and that this is a great part of prudence: not to trust in one’s own prudence. For true prudence seeks safeguards for itself from elsewhere. God, because he knows and foresees all things of all affairs, does not need counsel; the wisest of men ought to employ another’s prudence. This is so necessary that the ancients, ignorant of the divine majesty yet suspecting something concerning divinity, invented the story that Jupiter convened a council of the gods; much more did they judge counsel necessary for Kings. For if, when doubts arise in private affairs, each man consults his friends, how much more is this necessary in the state itself, where the affairs are both greater and more intricate? Nor should the Prince think that he possesses sufficient wisdom in himself. He is a man—that is, ignorant of many things, not rightly instructed concerning many, and, even if he moderates his passions, he has not yet put them off. Many private men surpass the Prince in prudence. Therefore, just as he uses the labor of others and creates lesser magistrates—Viceroys, Governors, Legates, Praetors, and Consuls—so also in directing all these let him join another’s prudence to his own. It belongs to supreme majesty not so much to be surrounded by an army and to glory in the splendor of a bodyguard and dwelling, as to make the prudence of the most illustrious and wisest men its own. No Princes have perished except those who neglected the counsels of prudent men. Aristotle spoke truly, but because he wrote to a foolish young man, he admonished in vain:
Εἰ δὲ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον θειότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐκ εἰς τὰ πάρεργα καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια τὴν σπουδὴν ἐστὶ σοὶ καταναλίσκειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μέγιστον αὐτὸς καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι μαθεῖν βέλτιον· τίς γὰρ δὴ ποτ’ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειε τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πράττειν μὴ βεβουλευμένον σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἀνοίας, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην εὐβουλίαν τῆς διανοίας; Ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἄριστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολιτευομένους λόγῳ πρότερον, ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις συγγινομένους πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἢ τοῖς μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τῶν βαρβάρων ἔχοντας, τοῦτο πρότερον περιμαθήσαντας ἔχειν αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀκρόπολίς ἐστι σωτηρίας, ἡ διὰ τοῦ λόγου γινομένη τοῦ συμφέροντος θεωρία.
Moreover, among human affairs it is most august to make use of deliberation. Therefore your zeal must not be expended upon superfluous and commonplace matters; rather, you must labor to the extent of your strength both to learn thoroughly and to possess the art itself of deliberating well. For who of sound mind would doubt that, if someone has done something without counsel, this is a sign of madness, but if with reason as his guide, of wisdom? One may also observe that all those who enjoy the best constitution among the Greeks first meet in speech before they meet in deeds. Likewise among those Barbarians who excel in dignity, speech precedes deeds, since they well know that the perception and knowledge of advantage which arises through reason and discourse is a kind of citadel of safety.
Accordingly, that opinion of Antoninus Pius was worthy of the majesty of a ruler: “It is more equitable that I should follow the counsels of so many and such great friends than that so many and such great friends should follow me alone.” None of the most prudent Princes arranged so great a mass of affairs without great assistants. I have discovered this: all kingdoms, cities, and nations possessed prosperous government so long as true counsels prevailed among them. Wherever favor, fear, and pleasure corrupted them, soon afterward their resources were diminished; then their government was taken away; finally slavery was imposed upon their kingdoms, and death or exile took away the King.
Guevara says in book 1, chapter 43, of The Dial of Princes: “I do not know why Princes and magnates, although they are so solicitous in seeking the best physicians for the care of the body, are so negligent in seeking wise men for the government of kingdoms and dominions, since in infinitely many ways the harm of bad government in a state is surely graver than the illness of the Prince himself or of the governor. Until now, indeed, we have neither read nor seen that either a King or his kingdom perished through a scarcity of physicians; but through a scarcity of wise Counselors we have seen innumerable Kings and very many kingdoms desolated, collapse, and be overthrown. Through a scarcity of physicians one man can be endangered; but through a scarcity of a wise man great discord can be introduced among the people. For when some tumult grows among the citizens, one timely counsel is more beneficial than a hundred purgations with rhubarb.”
And a little afterward: “These things are said to this end: that Princes, Prelates, and magnates, persuaded by these reasons, may transfer some part of the very great diligence which they employ in seeking physicians, and of the very large sums which they expend upon their salaries and largesses, to seeking out wise men whom they themselves may consult and may join to the court Senate. For if men understood how greatly it matters to have a wise governor of a household, or even one wise man, they would purchase him with all their resources. Princes and magnates appear greatly worthy of compassion who lose many days in a month and many hours in a day, conversing about wars, buildings, arms, banquets, beasts, hunts, medicine, and other things, yet neglect the counsels of prudent men themselves.”
Rash is the soldier who advances unarmed into the battle line, and no less imprudent the Prince who undertakes the state without counsel.
§ 9. It is fitting that the Prince should know and act upon this: all services are surpassed by that of the man who assists by good counsel. Guevara, Dial, book 3, chapter 55, introduces Aurelius speaking thus: “I charge my son Commodus to pay you a reward for your services. But I ask the immortal gods to return thanks to you for your counsels. Nor is it in vain that I say that I charge my son with the former and ask the latter of the gods. For one man can pay the reward of many services; but all the gods are needed to reward one good counsel. The greatest and most excellent benefit with which a friend can affect a friend is this: if he is fortunate in giving him good counsel in a difficult affair. And not without cause do I wish him to be fortunate, not merely to give counsel. For it commonly happens that those who wished to heal us by their counsels cast us into even greater dangers.”
But if the Prince wishes to ascribe all things to himself, he nevertheless ought to remember that counsel is often wanting even to the wisest man:
Καὶ κυβερνήτῃ ἀγαθῷ ἐνίοτε ναυαγεῖν.
An experienced pilot sometimes suffers shipwreck. Matters so hidden often occur that no way out can be found.
Πολλὰ καὶ παράδοξα αἱ καθ’ ἀνθρώπους τύχαι κατεργάζονται.
The things that happen to men produce many and unexpected results. Why should the Prince not waver in such matters? Rather, why should he not employ the highest wisdom, which consists in judging others wiser than himself?
If he thinks himself wise, let him not believe that experienced and elderly men are foolish. Let him at least persuade himself of this: no one is so wise that greater wisdom is not necessary for him.
Οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς ἅπαντα σοφός.
No one by himself is wise in all things. Therefore, making use of Bias’s answer—when asked about what matter all ought most to be solicitous, he replied that they should seek good counsels and good advisers—let the Prince himself also fortify himself with an assembly of wise Counselors.
§ 10. Finally, so that all things may proceed more rightly, let the Prince consult with many when the matter does not require secrecy. There are many advantages in this. For when some adduce advantages, others disadvantages; some dangers, others arguments for justice, others for the dignity of the Prince; when some are timid, some bold, and they also have rivalries among themselves, truth cannot remain hidden amid so great an agitation. Indeed, the Prince himself will recognize the passions of all. Then all together will strain every sinew to give such counsels that they cannot be censured by others in so great an assembly. But if the counsels turn out badly, the fault will belong to all. A few can conspire to advise advantageously and ambitiously for themselves, not as friends of the state; among many and diverse men, for whom diverse things are advantageous, the same calculation does not exist. For this reason many are more readily trusted than individuals, as Pliny admonished in the Panegyric. The counsels of good men are strengthened when they perceive that prudent and faithful advisers hold the same view. Cicero, epistle 13 to Caelius.
§ 11. Let Kings beware lest they seem to convene a council merely for appearance, as Bellus reports in discourse 23 is done in England. “But because certain public matters sometimes arise which concern the good or even the injury of the kingdom and subjects—for example, to establish a new law, to examine or reject other laws, to levy money for a war already resolved upon, or to make provision for similar matters pertaining to the state—then, and in similar cases, Kings have been accustomed, for modesty’s sake, to preserve the ancient custom: namely, to convene Parliaments, in which the estates and orders of the kingdom are assembled, that is, the clergy, nobles, and commons, so that, after the business in question has been examined by them, their decrees may then be confirmed or rejected by the Kings. And although in antiquity these Parliaments enjoyed authority and liberty, so that the Kings were political and civil heads rather than Lords and Monarchs, nevertheless from Edward III down to the present times the authority of the Kings has been so fortified that Parliaments are rather certain masks of royal desires. By them, in framing doubtful measures, the Kings evade labor and inconvenience, and in dangerous matters, loss, rather than wishing to moderate their power by them. For in them whatever is advised or decreed is valid only if royal confirmation is added. Indeed, they not only cannot decree anything or perform any act; they cannot even assemble except at the royal nod. Kings are accustomed to admit to them whomsoever they please and remove the same men from them. They have, in fact, become so formidable to all that no one in Parliaments or outside them dares to oppose the royal will even by the slightest word, unless he wishes to procure loss and ruin for himself. Thus, just as those who sit in Parliaments are slaves and subjects, so the actions and counsels proceeding from them must necessarily be servile.”
Thus he; yet I fear that he speaks hyperbolically, for it is certain that the nobles of Britain possess their liberty. But however the matter stands, nobles must not be convened merely for custom’s sake. For if these men possess dignity and greatness of spirit, they perceive with indignation that they are being mocked and that it is a cruel jest when they must either say all things to gratify the King or undergo danger. The King’s familiars also hold them in contempt and derision, and frequently boast that it has already been determined among themselves what ought to be decreed.
§ 12. In great kingdoms, where various nations and peoples coalesce into one body, various councils and colleges must necessarily be instituted. Use has arranged this in various states, but it is now best observed in the most extensive kingdoms of Spain. I have noted these things, which escaped Roman industry.
The first is this. The causes of all men of all nations were brought before the Roman Senate and tossed about among experts and the inexperienced alike; in Spain the councils of the individual peoples are separate. Hence that diversity: there is a Council of Italian Affairs, by which Neapolitan, Sicilian, and Milanese affairs are directed; a Council of Belgian Affairs, of Indian Affairs, and of War; the individual kingdoms of Spain have their own distinct councils. There is the Council of State, which is the most honored; the Council of Religion, which is the most powerful; and the Council of Commanderies and Taxes. It was therefore the highest prudence to assign one people to one college; for in this way men easily become knowledgeable in its affairs and are not disturbed by variety. A man who commanded troops in India or governed cities there will readily give counsel about governing barbarous nations; yet the same man will not be held expert in Belgian or Neapolitan affairs, because of the diversity of laws and dispositions.
The second is what I regard as the soul of councils: namely, that in the Council of State, where the highest affairs of the kingdom are conducted, the King should have great Princes, or men equal to Princes, whose interest it most greatly is that the authority of the King should remain safe and sound. In that council, however, there are not only Princes but also Archbishops and Prelates, as in Spain the Commander of Alcántara and of the other orders, such as Santiago and Calatrava, who also possess the right of attending the Council of War.
The third is that in these councils affairs are for the most part conducted in the most orderly fashion, though not with the greatest speed. For the King has with him most experienced Counselors, who present the case to the King in person, orally or in writing, generally both orally and in writing. The King then privately rereads and weighs those writings and sends the matter to some college for discussion; he afterward hears the opinion of the Counselors, or they decide it with the King face to face, or send their view to him in writing. For this reason justice is administered with the greatest constancy, and I think that until now there has been no monarchy in which fewer errors have been made in government.
§ 13. But if one must say generally what the Prince ought chiefly to require in councils, I shall speak briefly. It will be of the greatest importance that they be ordered to write their counsels and reasons, to read briefly from the writing, and, if after hearing the opinions of all they wish to remove, add, or change something, that this should be permitted, provided they offer their amended counsel to the Prince in a certain form and manner, so that all can easily be bound together in one booklet. At present, dictated opinions are faultily taken down by notaries, with a loss of time; they do not always grasp the sense rightly; and Counselors form their counsel in the consistory—that is, in the arena itself. If they are ordered to write, they will do it at home and after meditation; they will set forth their opinion quickly; then, when they know that their opinions are to be preserved in the archive and in the mind and hand of the Prince, they will take great
care to hold an opinion which they understand themselves to be leaving to posterity as a monument of fidelity and prudence. For the written letter remains and exposes an error after many years. Opinions of this kind by Cicero and others survive, from which one may gather with what zeal they delivered their opinions. Nor do I want an effeminate Counselor to whom the labor of writing is burdensome. For if he writes familiar letters in a private matter, why should he not set forth his opinion accurately and diligently with his pen for the public safety?
Augustus did this, and for this reason alone was worthy of government. Suetonius relates it thus in chapter 84: “He practiced eloquence and liberal studies eagerly and with the greatest labor from his earliest age. During the war at Mutina, amid so great a mass of affairs, he is said to have read, written, and declaimed every day. For afterward he never spoke either in the Senate, before the people, or before the soldiers except from a speech meditated and composed, although he did not lack the extemporaneous faculty for unforeseen matters. And lest he expose his memory to danger or consume time in memorizing, he established the practice of reading everything aloud. More serious conversations with individuals, and even with his own Livia, he held only in writing and from a notebook, lest he say more or less extemporaneously. He delivered speeches with a sweet and distinctive tone of voice and continually devoted himself to a voice trainer; but sometimes, when his throat was weakened, he addressed the people through the voice of a herald.”
Will a faithful Counselor not be able to do what so great an Emperor did? And so much concerning the Senate and Counselors.