§ 1. A twofold order is established among Magistrates who are placed beneath another and who, in kingdoms and states, possess the necessity of obeying joined with the right of commanding. For some are engaged in governing men, others in administering public resources. Among those engaged in governing men are those who direct them toward the end of the state, so that they may live according to virtue and become happy. Their duties are various, because some actions are honorable and are commanded for the public good, while others are depraved and are prohibited. But because controversies and lawsuits frequently arise and it is not established what is equitable or good, in every well-constituted state investigators and Judges have been established to determine doubtful matters. These in truth possess public and great power. Those, therefore, who arrange the other matters and take counsel for the fatherland are simply called Magistrates, such as the Consuls at Rome. Those who decide controversies have as their subjects only those who come to grips by law, and only in that cause which has been entrusted to them as Judges. We call them Juridical Magistrates and Judges; the Praetors at Rome were of this sort.
The second class of Magistrates is occupied in acquiring, increasing, and preserving the resources of the fatherland; this generally pertains to Quaestors, because they expend care upon the gain of the state. They are therefore curators of the public patrimony—that is, of all revenues and income, public buildings, and ports. Every kingdom and every state, therefore, is completed by Consular, Praetorian, and Quaestorian Magistracy, and all offices and dignities are referred to these classes. By these, therefore, the polity is constituted according to the ancient custom; and this care falls upon the Monarch, the aristocracy, or the people: that the designated Magistrates govern rightly and justly, pronounce law accurately, and handle the resources honestly and purely. I shall therefore speak concerning these matters from ancient and modern customs and laws.
But because, amid so great a variety of affairs, there is need of stable and wise counsel—which in an Aristocracy and Polity we call a Senate, in a Monarchy by the common name a Council, elsewhere a Consistory, and elsewhere a Parliament—there is no other distinction among them if all things are lawfully administered, except that the councils of Monarchs depend upon them, in an Aristocracy they are free, and in a Polity they are confirmed by the suffrages of the people. If all these things, I say, are lawfully administered, the state is well governed. For many dangers arise from the vices of those who deliberate and give opinions. The peculiar evil of a free Senate is the oppression of the people and the elevation of the nobility; nor is there less danger of popularity in a popular Senate, by which first Athens and then Rome perished. Until now fear and flattery have been injurious in the council of Monarchs. Let us furnish the state first with counsel, then with its Magistrates, and these with their laws.