§ 1. Monarchy is the principate of one man, whom all the rest obey. Aristotle divides it into two kinds in book 3 of the Politics, chapter 7: into “βασιλείαν,” or kingdom, and “τυραννίδα,” tyranny. He defines “Βασιλείαν” as “Τὴν μοναρχίαν τὴν πρὸς κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν,” that which regards the common utility. Lipsius defines it as: “The rule of one man, conferred, accepted, and conducted by custom or laws for the good of those who obey.” But he says that tyranny is “μοναρχίαν πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος,” a monarchy which regards the utility of the monarch.
This, therefore, is the general distinction between a legitimate kingdom and a tyrannical one: a king regards the good of his subjects, a tyrant his private good. For either the lust for dominion, by which the human race is crushed, or other things which appear good fascinate the tyrant; the safety of his subjects rouses the king. Nevertheless, that safety also requires him sometimes to assume dominion. For this reason, as Tranquillus is our authority, Augustus deprived certain federated cities, which through license were rushing headlong toward destruction, of their liberty. He acted rightly and prudently if he did so not in order that he himself might rule, but lest they perish.
A strict law has indeed been imposed upon every magistrate: amid so great an abundance, amid so unrestrained a power, amid so great an importunity from friends seeking their own things, to keep watch over the advantages of strangers—often ungrateful men, and sometimes enemies. But the useful is what Plato has defined for us: “Δίκαιον τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον,” “The just is the utility of the established government.” This is also what Antigonus admonished his son when he was exulting in a youthful manner: “Know, my son, that our kingdom is a splendid servitude.” Excellently said, if his deeds had corresponded to his words; for a servant regards the utility of his master, not his own.
§ 2. The kinds of kingdom are exceedingly various, differing not so much in power and breadth of sovereignty as in custom, law, and usage. For some devolve by hereditary right upon sons and male-line relatives, as do the kingdoms of the Spains, Gaul, and Britain, and many principalities of Europe. Others are given by election, as are the empire of the Romans, the kingdom of the Poles, and ecclesiastical principalities.
Some kingdoms are free, so that absolute power over all things is in the hands of one king: war, peace, sacrifices, and the pronouncement of law. This kingdom is called “παμβασιλεία” and exists without any law. The other kingdoms are constituted by laws.
§ 3. Aristotle defines “Παμβασιλείαν” as “ὅταν ᾖ πάντων κύριος εἷς ὤν”: when one man, existing alone, is lord of all things, or when a king commands everyone according to his own will. He himself compares this kingdom with household government. For just as a household is an economic kingdom, so a city is a political kingdom. Such a kingdom is described in Daniel 5:19: “Whom he wished, he killed; and whom he wished, he struck; and whom he wished, he exalted; and whom he wished, he humbled.” Thus did that Chaldean, whether by right or by injury.
The Persian kingdom at one time did not differ greatly from it. Although founded upon laws, it nevertheless sometimes crushed the laws by violent power. When Xerxes summoned the princes of Asia to deliberate about bringing war upon the Greeks, he showed himself the sole monarch. He affirmed that he had summoned them lest he use his counsel alone; but they should know that it belonged to them to obey him rather than to advise him.
Nor indeed is the rule of the Turks very different; to its subjects it is savage and burdensome, if ever any rule was. For that tyrant pronounces himself the absolute lord of life, death, and all fortunes. The Muscovite also governs his people altogether despotically, as if they were slaves. That saying of Mahomet Vesitus is known: the Muscovite and the Turk alone are lords of their kingdoms. The tyranny of the Inga in Brazil was formerly not dissimilar. There no one possessed property of his own, but held it by the benefit of the Inga, nor did that property pass to heirs. Nevertheless, certain laws have been given to the Muscovite prince, as also to the Turk,
but where there is so great a power, lawless license generally reigns.
Nevertheless, in the heroic ages rules of this sort were formerly legitimate and just. For if someone had transmitted an art to a multitude, freed them from servitude, gathered together those who were scattered, or affected them with some distinguished benefit, kings were created by willing people; and because they were regarded as rare examples of good and just men, the people freely entrusted themselves to their prudence and virtue without agreements and laws. For they did not prepare the protections of right and laws where they suspected no outrage and no injury.
A prince will not readily exercise absolute power even in a just cause—for example, by killing an accused man unheard, although he himself knows that the man is guilty.
An anonymous book On the Right of Free Monarchy has been published which approves the tyrannies of barbarian kings and pretends that 1 Kings, chapter 8, supports such great evils. But even authors who are not pious refute those impious things: Lorichius, Commonplaces, “On the Institution of the Prince,” title “On the Power of Princes”; Buchanan, On the Law of the Scottish Kingdom; Haffenreffer on the passage in Deuteronomy, chapter 17; Althusius, Politics, chapter 19; Gentilis, Royal Disputation; Hunnius; Keckermann; and very many others. Indeed, there are among them those who judge that proceedings can be taken against such rulers by public authority: Lansius, discourse On the Royal Law, theses 94 and 101; Johann Gerhard, One Hundred Political Questions, final decade. But more concerning these matters elsewhere.
Nor was a reason lacking by which those men might defend their kings, namely: “τὸ καθόλου μόνον λέγειν τὸν νόμον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν.” A law speaks only universally and does not adapt itself to those things which happen; and thus in every art it is foolish to judge according to written prescriptions. But I shall speak of this matter in its own place. Let us now proceed in explaining the divisions of kingdoms.
§ 4. There both formerly were, and now are seen, various forms of kingdoms which prescribe definite laws to the supreme power. There are four principal forms. For sometimes the prince possessed the right of declaring and conducting war, pronouncing law, and performing sacrifices. The same man was commander, judge, ruler, and pontiff. In certain places he pronounced law and commanded the citizens, but did not possess the right of conducting war. In some places he bore only the care of sacrifices.
There were many kings who performed all those functions, but according to the prescription of laws. For Romulus and his successors administered the commonwealth according to laws. Then the kings and leaders of the Jews who flourished after the Babylonian captivity were commanders, judges, rulers, and pontiffs. This is generally the arrangement of all sovereignties which exist today, except that they abstain from the priesthood. Yet there is also great variety among them, according as it has seemed good to each commonwealth to guard itself against the license of those who reign.
§ 5. Kingdoms which endured only in war were very few and rare. At Rome in the greatest dangers a consul named a dictator, who, when the war had been conducted, abdicated his magistracy. His command was plainly royal and almost without laws, but nevertheless depended upon the people who moderated it; for at one time they made the master of the horse equal to the dictator.
Among the Spartans there was a perpetual dictatorship so far as the direction of wars was concerned. For at home the supreme power was in the hands of the ephors, not the king. The king possessed no right of life and death over citizens except in the camp; a Roman dictator was permitted to kill a citizen even without his cause having been pleaded. Plato in his letters vehemently commends a power tempered by so gentle an equality, being, of course, a lover of the people and of liberty according to the institution of the Greeks. Otherwise, that order impeded the greatest affairs and was a cause of disasters to the Spartans. Aristotle, book 3 of the Politics, chapter 14, calls it military command: “αὕτη οὖν ἡ βασιλεία, οἷον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων, καὶ ἀΐδιός ἐστι. This kingdom, therefore, is, as it were, a certain military prefecture of commanders, and it is perpetual.”
Under the name of so mild a command, lest he be hateful to the free cities of Greece because of the royal title, Philip of Macedon attempted to establish his tyranny. For in the council of Greece he brought it about that he was decreed leader of the war, as if he were about only to undertake dangers against the Persians and by no means to violate the liberty of Greece.
In former times Agamemnon possessed a similar power, when Europe and Asia collided in a prolonged duel. For in assemblies and in the gathering of kings he endured curses and abuse; even Thersites and every most foul man called the king “Δημοβόρον βασιλέα,” “devourer of the people.” But outside the assembly, in battle and on expeditions, he possessed “καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν,” the right of killing. He himself professes this in Iliad 2:
Ὃν δέ κ᾽ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης — — οὔ οἱ Ἄρκιον ἔσσεται φυγέειν κύνας, ἠδ᾽ οἰωνούς· Πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.
But whomever I shall discover to have withdrawn from the battle, it will not be easy for him to escape the dogs and birds, for the power of death is in my hands.
Homer himself sufficiently indicates that this kind of command is useful neither in time of war nor in time of peace, since by disputes in the assembly they take authority away from the commander and fight only according to their own judgment. Hence the anger of Achilles brought it about that nearly all Greece perished, and yet Agamemnon could not compel him to battle.
§ 6. Another kind of kings is recalled by Aristotle, whom in book 3 of the Politics, chapter 14, he calls “αἰσυμνήτας.” They were often employed by the ancient Greeks. Princes evidently chose certain persons by their vote either to preside throughout their whole life and always, or for a definite time, or for definite affairs, as when the Mytilenaeans chose Pittacus against the exiles. “αἰσυμνητεία” seems to have arisen from almost the same causes as the dictatorship, so that constitutions otherwise free and popular might more easily be composed by the rule of one man.
§ 7. We rarely read that kings were created solely for the sake of sacrifices, nor are they judged worthy of the name of kings. At Rome a King of Sacred Rites was created. Livy, book 2, and Dionysius, book 5, give the cause. Livy’s words are: “After the kings had been expelled and liberty obtained, care was then taken for divine matters; and because certain public rites had habitually been performed by the kings themselves, lest there should be any longing for kings, they created a king of sacrifices. They subjected that priesthood to the pontiff, lest the honor added to the name should obstruct liberty, which at that time was their first care.”
Dionysius says that he was designated by the pontiffs and augurs; Aulus Gellius, book 15, chapter 27, that he was created in the centuriate assembly. He possessed not only no political or royal dignity, but was not even permitted to hold a magistracy; indeed, he was not permitted even to address the people. Moreover, after the sacrifice had been made before the assembly, he hurried away in flight. He was therefore a mockery of the expelled kings rather than a king.