§ 1. Unless I am mistaken, enough has now been said about the parts and members which constitute the commonwealth, and about its author, God, and its nature. We must now treat of its form itself and of the divisions which arise from it.
Form—or, as Aristotle and Plato call it, “τὸ εἶδος,” species, or “τὸ εἶναι” itself, that is, essence—is that which constitutes from human beings the assembly which is called a commonwealth. It is the order of those who command and those who obey, a certain harmony and soul, embracing, binding together, and giving life to diverse dispositions and functions. When this form perseveres one and the same, the species of the commonwealth is said to remain the same. If this is changed, although the buildings, walls, suburbs, and even the human beings remain the same, nevertheless the same commonwealth cannot remain. One commonwealth was established at Rome when, after Tarquin had been expelled, sovereignty was in the hands of the consuls; another when by the royal law power again devolved upon one man.
§ 2. It is customary for all authors to make the form of the commonwealth threefold. For there is monarchy, aristocracy, and polity, or government of the people. This is taken from Plato: “Εἶτ᾽ οὐκ οἶσθ᾽, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται;” If it is not evident to you, some cities are administered by one man, some by the people, and some by the best men. Aristotle, imitating his teacher, says in book 3 of the Politics, chapter 7: “It is necessary that either one, or a few, or many command.” This is the most widely accepted division.
Yet one may observe in it that it is not a “τῶν ἀμέσων” division, that is, one whose members differ with equal breadth. Plato, therefore, sometimes establishes two species. For either one man or several govern the commonwealth. If one, it is called a kingdom or monarchy; if several, they are either a few or the whole people. From this arise two species of “ἀρχῆς τῶν πλειόνων,” rule by several: government by the best and government by the people.
But let us hear Plato, book 3 of the Laws: “There are, as it were, two mothers of constitutions, from which one would speak rightly if one said that all the others had been born. The one is rightly called monarchy, the other democracy, or government of the people; and the Persian nation holds the extreme of the former, while we hold that of the latter.” And in book 5: “Ἐστὸν γὰρ δύο πολιτείας εἴδη. Let there therefore be two species of constitution.”
The same author in the Statesman establishes seven forms of administration: royal, tyrannical, government by the best, government by a few, popular government according to laws, and popular government contrary to laws. Those are six species, three legitimate and three by no means legitimate. The best is separated from these,
namely monarchy, or the principate of one man bound by good writings, that is, by laws. It was necessary to give this warning so that the nature of the commonwealth and all its parts might be examined thoroughly. Nevertheless, since it has thus been accepted, let it stand that there are three legitimate forms of the commonwealth and three departures of those forms from good government. We shall speak of each of them in turn.
§ 3. We now establish that at this time those three species of commonwealth have generally been so tempered that nowhere is a pure monarchy, aristocracy, or polity found. For all emperors, kings, and princes—I do not speak of the Turk and the Muscovite—and any who have a similar form possess a power circumscribed by definite laws; they have bound themselves to their commonwealth by many oaths. This is far more true of those who undertake magistracies among the best men or from the people. Accordingly, almost all the kingdoms of Christians are aristocratic and political monarchies.
The Roman Empire itself possesses a marvelous mixture of the three forms of commonwealth. Its supreme head is the august Emperor, who possesses jurisdiction over all but must judge according to the laws. The best men are the seven electors and the other princes; nor is the nobility without its distinctions and its liberty confirmed by many privileges of the emperors. The people are not excluded either. Free cities possess their own governments; their votes are heard in public assemblies; access to certain highest magistracies lies open to very many. The emperor cannot oppress the princes, nor can they oppress the nobility, since many princes from the nobility are patrons of their own nation. But neither, while the Emperor’s authority remains, do the cities fear the power of neighboring princes.
The Swiss imitate democracy, and formerly either expelled the nobility or reduced it into the ranks; nevertheless, the best men administer affairs. The Venetians indeed possess one duke, but the whole power is in the hands of the best men, or the nobility, which is said to be threefold: old, middle, and new. Nevertheless, a way to the lesser dignities lies open to many citizens, but all things are carried out by the vote and decree of the nobles.
§ 4. I judge this to be the sole cause why the forms of Christian commonwealths are now changed more rarely, whereas we see that formerly at Rome, Athens, and Carthage men for the most part continually pursued revolutions: error arose from the excess of one part. Just as sick bodies are engaged in continual tossing and seek relief from pain by a change of place—because they cannot shake out the evil clinging to their entrails, they embrace variety in their suffering—so is the health of a commonwealth disposed. For when one of its parts, either the prince himself, the best men, or the lowest common people, grows contrary to the laws and with damage and oppression to the other members, the whole body is shaken and torn apart, and it seeks change.
For if a prince employs his power contrary to right, the best men, detesting not so much the prince as the conduct of the prince, prefer governments of the best. But when they see that, after power has been conferred upon a few men, new petty tyrants daily succeed one tyrant, they demand again either a king or government of the people. But when they experience still more inconveniences in the latter, they hate the tribunes and endure much more bitterly a liberty oppressed under the name of liberty.
Yet in this they perpetually err: when they wish to correct the whole commonwealth, they do not act so that, with laws made equal, they may coalesce into one concord and friendship. Rather, they agitate beyond measure that part which seemed to oppress the others and attempt utterly to subdue and destroy it. They then transfer its strength to another part, which they render more insolent than the former. For their intention is not to make the balance equal or moderate the city, but to depress and conquer the other part. Nor do I remember any commonwealth being corrected in which these things were not done.
§ 5. It remains for me to explain what form of commonwealth agrees with diverse nations. For, when the nature and disposition of human beings have been understood, the lawgiver will easily determine the form of the commonwealth, and the magistrate will govern without danger.
Aristotle, book 6 of the Politics, chapter 7, judges that an aristocracy should be established in a place where there is need of heavy-armed soldiers and cavalry. For to support horses for war and maintain heavy armor belongs not to men of small means, but to the rich. If, therefore, the rich are compelled to sustain dangers, take the expense of war upon themselves, and defend the fatherland, it is also just that they obtain the first parts in attaining honors and magistracies, so that benefits and dangers may reside in the same men.
Conversely, where there is need of light-armed soldiers and frequent sorties, government of the people is more suitable. For this must be considered: that those who are exercised in arms should obtain dignity in the commonwealth. Armed men are not accustomed to obey the unarmed for long, nor to lay down their arms except when it has seemed good to them, for they cannot be compelled. He who denies just things to a man holding weapons gives him all things.
§ 6. The inclinations and customs of minds must be considered. For some prefer a king, as did the Persians after the slaughter of the Magi and the Israelites in the time of Samuel. Others abominate the royal condition and even its name, as did the Romans after the Tarquins had been driven from the city. When liberty was restored to Greece through Quinctius, Greece cast birds stunned from the sky by its applause and shouting and threw heaps of flowers upon the proconsul. But the Parthians and several other nations requested a king from the same people.
§ 7. Nor indeed is it expedient for all peoples to be free. And so Augustus deprived many cities of liberty because they did not use it rightly. The Roman people itself, already unlike itself, when vices had grown within it so that they could no longer be sustained by the virtue of their ancestors, could not be the arbiter of its own liberty, since it now distributed honors according to price and partisan zeal, not equitably:
The yearly contests return for sale upon the Field,
their own senator reproaches them.
Saint Augustine perceived this in book 1 of On Free Choice: “Can it ever be unjust that the wicked should be wretched but the good happy? Or that a modest and serious people should itself create magistrates for itself, but a dissolute and worthless people should lack that license? I see that this is an eternal and immutable law. At the same time, I judge that you too see that in that temporal law nothing is just and legitimate which human beings have not derived for themselves from this eternal law. For if that people at one time justly gave honors and at another time justly did not give them, this temporal alternation, in order that it might be just, was drawn from that eternity according to which it is always just for a serious people to give honors and for a frivolous one not to give them.” By this, as though by a balance, we shall weigh which form of commonwealth and which arrangement of magistrates are suitable for each nation.
§ 8. I shall set down examples concerning distant or ancient peoples, lest I touch upon our own vices. These are so peculiar to individual nations that, although they are reproached for them by all other peoples, they nevertheless cherish them at home and do not recognize them.
Those who inhabit the regions within or nearest the tropics are cowardly by nature, headlong through fear, rash, and cruel when they rule. Almost all are of a servile disposition, especially those who,
on account of the heat, are dark in body. For by excessive heat the heat implanted within them is called forth; the vital spirits and those which they call animal spirits are attenuated and weakened, so that neither their passions remain sound nor their reason remains steady. Accordingly, those who inhabit the region around the Cape of Good Hope, the Brazilians, and other peoples, if they were compared with Europeans, could be judged brute beasts rather than human beings. God could give them no better or more desirable gift than a good and merciful king, or absolute monarchy, for they themselves were born to obey; many of them are not only savage but also eaters of human beings.
But those whom the penetrating cold of Boreas burns are strong in boldness, but it is an unreflecting boldness. Therefore they too are less suitable for aristocracy unless they are mingled with foreigners or carefully instructed. Just as temperate regions produce healthier bodies, so they produce better and more moderate dispositions, and therefore dispositions more suited either to rule or to be ruled in a civil manner. Certainly, if we recall ancient things, the Germans, Franks, and before them the Cimbri, Heruli, Goths, and Vandals, and after them the Northmen, Huns, and Danes, proceeding from the north in very great numbers, possessed incredible boldness and savagery; afterward they established the commonwealth with great prudence and moderation.
§ 9. What, then, concerning those cities which are opulent through manifold commerce? They will embrace either the principate of one or government of the people. For if they are within a vast kingdom, they will easily distribute their commerce and will have secure trade. Experience has taught that autonomous and opulent cities which have powerful neighboring princes are often endangered. Accordingly, even cities flourishing and free under the shadow of the Empire formerly selected princes as patrons and protectors for themselves.
Great commercial cities scarcely endure government by the best, the reason for which is this: very many from the lowest common people are most swiftly raised to great riches and to the authority which accompanies riches. The best men and nobles have annual revenues which in no way attain the profits of commerce. It is therefore necessary that one of two inconveniences occur. Either the nobles, imitating the most sumptuous merchants, contract debt, diminish their patrimonies, and, being needy yet retaining their dignity, turn themselves toward evil arts, embezzlement, extortion, and calumnies; or, if they make expenditures equal to their means, they are surpassed by very many of their subjects in liberality, splendor, household, and power, and are therefore despised. But overthrow of the constitution follows contempt. Authority is nevertheless preserved if they obey one man, as occurs in the German Empire, where the Emperor protects the authority of the magistrate.
I understand this to apply where the government of subject provinces is not annexed to the city, as it is among the Venetians. For where they also rule abroad, they have quite enough to support their power and authority.
The Republic of Venice also employs another method. For at one time it enrolled three hundred wealthy citizens at once into the body of the nobility with equal right. By this act it both assisted the treasury and cut off the causes of seditions, by admitting the more powerful citizens into its own party and casting before others the hope of equal dignity.