The Nineteenth Method: Inquiry

On Inquiry (Investigation) — The Nineteenth Method

Inquiry ¹ is that which expounds the divine scriptures by the investigation and untying of difficulties; of which there are three species: ² the Problem, the Question, and the Disputation.

The Problem ³ — which is also called a “problematic Question” — is that in which the reply to a proposed interrogation about the holy letters is given rather by inquiring ambiguously than by determining anything certain; or whose answer settles nothing by firm assertion, but still leaves what had been proposed to be inquired into more diligently: as happens in almost all the questions which Augustine, in the twelve books On Genesis to the Letter, rather (as he himself confesses) sought than found. ⁴

The Question — which some call an “Inquiry” (Percontatio), others a “Simple question,” others a “little question” (Quæstiuncula) — is that in which the reply to the proposed interrogations is given with a certain and firm assertion, and a simple brevity: as is done in the two books of the Evangelical Questions of St. Augustine. ⁵

The Disputation ⁶ — which by some is called a Debate (Disceptatio), a Contest (Decertatio), and a Composite Question — is that which, upon some part of the sacred volumes, with contraries brought in on both sides (the reasonings and argumentations both of heretics and of catholics), disputes most amply and most learnedly: whether to defend, in an apologetic manner, the truth of the divine scripture shaken by the engines of heretics, or to exercise and more and more sharpen the powers of the wit. Above all mortals in this kind of disputation there prevailed Augustine, bishop of Hippo, ⁷ especially in the books of disputations against the Manichees and against the Pelagians. Examples of the three species of this Method, adapted to one and the same proposition by St. Augustine, are these:

An Example of a Problem

Or of a problematic Question, upon the lie by which the Egyptian midwives deceived Pharaoh, from Augustine in the Questions on Exodus.

Concerning the lie of the midwives, by which they deceived Pharaoh, it is wont to be asked whether such lies are approved by divine authority — since it is written that God did well to the midwives. ⁸

Response. It is answered that it is uncertain whether God, out of mercy, pardoned the lie, or whether he judged the lie itself worthy of reward. For the midwives did one thing in saving the little infants alive, another in lying to Pharaoh; for in saving them alive there was a work of mercy, but that lie they used for their own sake, lest Pharaoh should harm them — which could pertain not to praise, but to pardon. Yet no authority for lying is to be taken from this; but this Question must be discussed more diligently by other examples, which are found in the scriptures like to this.

An Example of a Simple Question

Upon the same lie of the midwives, from Augustine’s book To Consentius, Against Lying.

Since God did good to the lying midwives, and built them houses, it is rightly asked whether he approved their lie. ⁹

Response. That it is written that God did good to the midwives — it was not so done because they lied, but because toward men they were merciful for God’s sake. In them it was not the deceit that was rewarded, but the good-will, the kindness of the mind, not the iniquity of the liar. For just as it would not be strange and absurd if God should be willing to pardon certain evil works committed by them at some earlier time on account of later good ones, so it is not to be wondered at that, at one time, in one case, God, beholding both — that is, the thing done mercifully and the thing done deceitfully —

…both rewarded the good, and on account of it pardoned that evil. It remains, therefore, that we understand a reward to have been rendered to those women for their humanity and mercy — a reward, to be sure, temporal, not eternal.

An Example of a Disputation

Upon the same lie of the midwives, from Augustine’s book On Lying, to Consentius.

The Proposition of the Disputation

Great is the question about lying, which often troubles us in our very daily acts — some thinking that one must sometimes lie with a certain honorable, dutiful, and merciful lie, but others affirming that a good man ought in no way to lie.

The Arguments of the Adversaries

Those, then, who agree with the Priscillianist heretics that it is sometimes lawful to lie ¹⁰ — that is, to declare a falsehood with the will to deceive — bring forward testimonies for their opinion out of the sacred letters: recalling that Sarah, when she had laughed, denied to the angels that she had laughed; ¹¹ that Jacob, questioned by his father, answered that he himself was Esau, his elder son; ¹² and that the Egyptian midwives lied (that the Hebrew infants being born might not be killed), with God even approving and rewarding them. ¹³ And, choosing many examples of this kind, they recall the lies of those men whom you would not dare to blame; and thus [urge] that you must confess that a lie can sometimes be not only not worthy of reproof, but even worthy of praise. They add also — whereby they may press not only those devoted to the divine books, but all men and common sense — saying: If someone flees to you who by your lie could be freed from death, will you not lie? If a sick man asks something which it is not expedient for him to know, one who might even be more gravely afflicted by your not answering — will you dare either to speak the truth to the man’s ruin, or rather to keep silence, than to aid his health by an honorable and merciful lie? By these and such [arguments] they think themselves most abundantly pressed [to conclude] that, if the cause of counsel requires it, we may sometimes lie.

The Arguments of the Catholics

On the contrary, those to whom it seems that one must never in any way lie act much more strongly, using first the divine authority: since in the Decalogue itself it is written, Thou shalt not bear false witness ¹⁴ — under which category every lie is comprehended; for whoever declares anything bears witness to his own mind. But, lest anyone contend that not every lie is to be called false witness, what will he say to that which is written, Make no manner of lie ¹⁵ and The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul ¹⁶? — which, lest anyone suppose it can be understood with certain liars excepted, let him read in another place, Thou shalt destroy all that speak a lie. ¹⁷ Whence the Lord himself with his own mouth thus says: Let there be in your mouth, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatever is more than this, is of evil. ¹⁸ Hence also the Apostle, when he enjoined that the old man must be put off — by which name all sins are understood ¹⁹ — consequently says, laying it among the first: Wherefore, putting away lying, speak the truth. ²⁰

The Determination of the Disputation

These things, therefore, being considered on both sides, those seem to me rather to be heard who say that one must in no wise lie. ²¹ For all the testimonies of the scriptures counsel nothing else than that one must never lie at all.

The Refutation of the Heretical Objections

Nor are we frightened by those examples of lies brought forward from the old books; for there, whatever was done can be taken figuratively, although it really happened — and whatever is done or said figuratively is not a lie. ²² For every statement is to be referred to that which it states; and everything done or said figuratively states this, which it signifies to those to whom it was uttered to be understood. Whence it is to be believed that those men, who are recorded to have been worthy of authority in prophetic times, said and did prophetically all the things that are written of them, and that no less prophetically there befell them whatever so befell — so that by the same prophetic Spirit they were judged fit to be committed to memory and to writing. But concerning the midwives — since we cannot affirm that, by a prophetic spirit meant to signify some future truth, they reported one thing for another to Pharaoh — we say that they were approved and rewarded by God not for the lie, but for their charity and affection toward the innocent infants of the Hebrews. But what, if someone flees to me who could be freed by my lie? what, if a sick man who is to be healed by my lie consults me — shall I lie? Far be it: for he who lies slays the soul. ²³ Wherefore, since by lying eternal life is lost, one must never lie for anyone’s temporal life; for it is not fitting that one should die spiritually, that another may live bodily. ²⁴ In no way, therefore, and on no pretext, do we determine that one must lie.