How Adam and Eve were in the state of innocence and on their fall, according to the words of the Psalm: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared to senseless beasts and became like them.”
“Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared to senseless beasts and became like them.” Psalm 48. This prophetic word is most fittingly expounded above all concerning the first transgressor, namely Adam, although it is also most truly understood concerning every sinner who turns himself away from God. Three things are noted in these words. First, the excellence by which he was exalted: “Man, when he was in honor,” etc. Second, his failure by which he was corrupted: “did not understand.” Third, his misery to which he was condemned: “he was compared to beasts.”
§ I
As to the first, the excellence with which Adam was honored in the state of innocence is evident in three respects: first with regard to his soul, second with regard to his body, and third with regard to dominion over things.
His soul was exalted in great grace, wondrous justice, and exceptional knowledge. God bestowed sanctifying grace, through which a person merits, upon both parents, namely Adam and Eve. Augustine likewise says in Book XII of The City of God, concerning the angels, that God was at once creating nature in them and bestowing grace.
There is, however, a difference of opinion on this point, according to Thomas in the First Part, question 95, article 1. Some say that the first man was not created in grace, but that grace was afterward bestowed upon him before he sinned. Others say that he was created with grace, for Ecclesiastes 7 says, “God made man upright.” It appears to pertain to the uprightness of the first state in which God made man that reason was subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul. The first subjection was the cause of the second and the third. For as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower things were subject to it, as Augustine says.
It is evident, however, that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin. It is thus evident that the subjection by which reason was subordinated to God was not according to nature alone, but according to the gift of supernatural grace. Hence Augustine says in Book XIII of The City of God that after the commandment was transgressed, as soon as divine grace abandoned them they were ashamed of the nakedness of their bodies. They felt the movement of their disobedient flesh as though it were the reciprocal punishment of their disobedience.
With respect to justice, insofar as justice is a general virtue, the first man was exalted by the honor of every virtue. Hence Augustine also says in a certain homily, as is contained in On Penance, distinction 2, that when the prince of vices, namely the devil, saw Adam made from the slime of the earth in the image of God, adorned with chastity, composed by temperance, and splendid with charity, he envied all these things and stripped Adam of all those goods.
To explain this, Thomas says in the First Part, question 95, article 3, that the uprightness of the first human state required that man possess all the virtues in some manner. Yet it must be considered that certain virtues by their nature imply no imperfection, such as charity and justice. Virtues of this kind were in the state of innocence without qualification, both as habit and as act.
Others, however, imply imperfection by their nature, either on the part of their act or on the part of their matter. If such imperfection does not conflict with the perfection of the first state, virtues of this kind could nevertheless exist in the state of innocence. Examples are faith, which concerns things not seen, and hope, which concerns things not possessed. The perfection of the first state did not extend so far that man saw God in His essence or possessed God through final enjoyment; thus faith and hope could be present in the first state both as act and as habit.
If, however, a perfection belonging to the nature of a virtue conflicts with the perfection of the first state, such a virtue could be present there as a habit but not as an act. This is evident concerning penance, which is sorrow for a sin committed, and mercy, which is sorrow for another’s misery. Both sorrow and guilt or misery conflict with the perfection of the first state. Therefore virtues of this kind were in the first man as habits, but not as acts. The first man was so disposed that, if sin had occurred, he would have grieved, and if he had seen misery in another, he would have relieved it as far as he could.
With respect to knowledge, man was exalted in honor by knowing God, the angels, and the other creatures. According to Thomas in the First Part, question 94, article 1, the first man did not see God in His essence, unless perhaps it is said that he saw Him in rapture when God sent sleep upon Adam, as is said in Genesis 2. The reason he did not see God in His essence is that no one who sees God in His essence can turn away from God by an act of will, which is to sin. All who see God in His essence, while they see Him in this way, are so established in the love of God that they cannot fail to love Him, since He is the highest good; hence they cannot sin.
Since Adam sinned, therefore, it is evident that he did not see God in His essence. Nevertheless, he saw or knew God by a clearer knowledge than we now possess, and thus his knowledge was in a certain manner intermediate between the knowledge of the present state and the knowledge of the heavenly homeland. For the higher and more like God a creature is, the more clearly God is seen through it, just as a person is seen more perfectly through a mirror in which his image is reflected more distinctly. Hence God is seen far more eminently through intelligible effects than through sensible and bodily ones.
In the present state, however, a person is hindered from the full and lucid consideration of intelligible effects because he is distracted and occupied by sensible things. But Ecclesiastes 7 says, “God made man upright.” This divinely established uprightness consisted in lower things being subject to higher, and higher things not being hindered by lower. Hence the first man was not hindered by external things from the clear and firm contemplation of intelligible effects, which arose from the irradiation of the first truth perceived by him either through his natural condition or through grace.
When Damascene says that the first man, dwelling in paradise, possessed a blessed life, and Augustine in Book XIV of The City of God says that the first human beings were blessed in that memorable place of beatitude, namely paradise, this must not be understood of the perfect beatitude that consists in the vision of the divine essence. Rather, they possessed a blessed life according to a certain natural mode.
Likewise, when the Master of the Sentences says in Book IV, distinction 1, that in the state of innocence man saw God without a medium, this is understood of a medium through whose knowledge we arrive at something unknown, such as the middle term of a demonstration. The first man did not need to reach knowledge of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as is necessary for us. Instead, in the effects themselves—especially intelligible effects—he knew God in his own manner. Yet he saw God through a certain medium that was seen at the same time; this is called seeing through a medium, as when a person is seen through a mirror and is seen simultaneously with the mirror.
The first man’s soul likewise could not see the angels in their essence, but it nevertheless possessed a more excellent knowledge of them than we do, because its knowledge of interior intelligible things was more certain and fixed than ours. On account of such eminence of knowledge, Gregory says in Book IV of the Dialogues that man in paradise was accustomed to enjoy the words of God and, through loftiness of vision, to be present with the spirits of the blessed angels.
The first man also possessed knowledge of all things that can be known naturally; hence he gave names to the animals, as Genesis 2 says, and names ought to agree with the natures of things. To explain this, Thomas says in the First Part, question 94, article 3, that things were originally established by God not only to exist in themselves but also to be principles of other things. They were therefore produced in a perfect state in which they could be principles of others.
A man can be the principle of another not only through bodily generation but also through instruction and governance. Therefore, just as the first man was established perfect in body so that he could generate, he was also established perfect in soul so that he could instruct and govern others. No one can instruct unless he possesses knowledge; therefore the first man was so established by God that he possessed knowledge of everything in which a human being is naturally fitted to be instructed. These are all the things virtually contained in self-evident first principles, namely whatever human beings can know naturally.
For governing his own life and the lives of others, however, there is required not only knowledge of things that can be known naturally, but also knowledge of things surpassing natural knowledge, because man is ordered toward a certain supernatural end. In the same way, knowledge of the things of faith is necessary for us in governing our lives. Hence the first man received from God as much knowledge of these supernatural things as was necessary for governing human life according to that state.
The first man did not know other things that cannot be known by natural study and are not necessary for governing human life, such as people’s thoughts, future contingencies, and certain particular facts, such as that pebbles lie in a river, and the like. In the science of naturally knowable things, Adam would not have advanced with respect to the number of things known, but with respect to the manner of knowing, because things he first knew intellectually he would afterward have known experimentally. With respect to supernatural knowledge, however, he would also have advanced in the number of things known through new revelations, just as angels advance through new illuminations.
The first man possessed knowledge of all things and species of things infused into his mind by God. This was granted only to the first man, for others who would have proceeded from him in the state of innocence would not have possessed such knowledge through infused species, but through the instruction of others and their own investigation.
With respect to the body, man in the state of innocence was exalted in honor as to immortality, impassibility, and the pleasantness of his place. Before sin, man was in a certain way immortal, because he would not have incurred death if he had not sinned. Hence the apostle says in Romans 5, “Through one man,” namely Adam, “sin entered into the world, and through sin death.” The opinion of those who say that even if man had not sinned it would still have been necessary for him to die is rejected and anathematized, as is evident in On Consecration, distinction 5, chapter “It pleased.”
For fuller explanation of this matter, it should be known, according to Thomas in the First Part, question 97, article 1, that something may be called incorruptible in three ways. In one way, from the side of matter: either because it has no matter, as an angel has none, or because it has matter that is in potency to only one form, as a heavenly body does. This is called incorruptible according to nature.
In another way, something is called incorruptible from the side of form, because some disposition inheres in a thing naturally corruptible and wholly prevents corruption. This is called incorruptible according to glory. As Augustine says in his epistle to Dioscorus, God made the soul of such powerful nature that from its beatitude the fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption overflow into the body.
In a third way, something is called incorruptible from the side of its efficient cause. In this way man in the state of innocence would have been incorruptible and immortal. As Augustine says in the book Questions of the Old and New Testament, God made man so that for as long as he did not sin he would flourish in immortality, and thus would himself be the author either of life or of death. His body was not indissoluble through some vigor of immortality existing within it. Instead, there was in the soul a certain power supernaturally given by God through which it could preserve the body from all corruption for as long as the soul itself remained subject to God.
Man was also aided in maintaining this immortality by eating from the tree of life, which stood in the middle of paradise. To explain this, Thomas says in the First Part, question 97, article 4, that man possessed two remedies in the state of innocence for preserving life against two defects.
The first defect in man is the loss of moisture through the action of natural heat, which is the soul’s instrument. Against this defect man was aided by eating from the other trees of paradise, just as we are now aided by the foods we consume. The second defect arises because, as the Philosopher says in On Generation, what is generated from foreign nourishment and joined to the preexisting moisture diminishes the species’ active power. Thus water added to wine is indeed converted to the flavor of wine, but as more and more is added, it diminishes the wine’s strength, until at last the wine becomes watery.
Accordingly, we see that at first the species’ active power is strong enough to convert from nourishment not only what is sufficient to restore what has been lost, but also what suffices for growth. Afterward, what is generated no longer suffices for growth, but only for restoring what has been lost. At last, in old age, it does not suffice even for this, whereupon diminution and finally the natural dissolution of the body follow.
Against this defect man was aided by the tree of life, for it possessed a power to strengthen the active power of the species against the weakness arising from the admixture of what is foreign. Hence Augustine says in Book XIV of The City of God that food was present for man lest he hunger, drink lest he thirst, and the tree of life lest old age dissolve him.
Because the power of every body is finite, the power of the tree of life could not extend so far as to give the body the power to endure for an infinite time, but only for a determinate time. Hence, once consumed, the said tree preserved from corruption for a time determined by God. When that time had ended, man would either have been translated to the spiritual life of glory or would have needed to eat again from the tree of life. Thus the tree of life caused immortality not without qualification, but in a certain manner.
Man in that state also possessed impassibility in a certain manner. For “passion” is spoken of in two ways. In one way, properly, and in this sense something is said to suffer when it is removed from its natural disposition. Among natural things, contraries act and suffer upon one another, one removing the other from its natural disposition.
In this way, in the state of innocence, man was impassible both in soul and in body, for he could have prevented passion just as he could have prevented death, if he had remained without sin. Hence he would not have felt the pain of heat or cold, nor would he have been subject to any illness.
In another way, “passion” is taken generally for any change, even if that change pertains to the perfection of nature. Thus understanding or sensing is said to be a kind of undergoing. In this second way man in the state of innocence was passible and underwent change both in soul and in body. For he understood and sensed by seeing, hearing, and the like; and he slept, because sleeping does not remove a man from his natural disposition but is ordered toward the good of nature. Yet the first man did not undergo suffering when the rib from which Eve was formed was separated from Adam. Nor would women have suffered pain in giving birth, for that pain followed in them from sin. Thomas, First Part, question 97, article 2.
There would also have been certain passions of the soul in man in the state of innocence. To explain this, Thomas says in the First Part, question 95, article 2, that of all the passions of the soul—that is, those which are in the sensitive appetite—some are ordered toward good, such as love, joy, and desire, while others are ordered toward evil, such as fear and sorrow. In the first state no evil was present or imminent, and no good was absent which a good will might desire to possess at that time, as is evident from Augustine in Book XIV of The City of God. Therefore none of the passions that regard evil, such as fear, sorrow, and the like, were in Adam. Likewise, neither were those passions which regard a good not possessed but still to be obtained, such as burning covetousness.
Those passions, however, which can concern a present good, such as joy and love, or a future good to be possessed in its own time, such as desire and hope that does not afflict, existed in the state of innocence, though otherwise than in us. For in us the sensitive appetite, in which the passions reside, is not wholly subject to reason. Hence passions in us sometimes precede and impede the judgment of reason, while at other times they follow the judgment of reason insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys reason. In the state of innocence, however, appetite was wholly subject to reason. Therefore no passions of the soul were in man except those that followed from reason or the judgment of reason. Thus the flesh did not then lust against the spirit as it does now.
In eating the fruits of the trees of paradise, of which Genesis 2 says, “Eat of every tree that is in paradise,” man—who would then have needed food for his sustenance—would have experienced greater delight than he does now. For sensible delight is the greater, the purer the nature and the more sensitive the body. Yet the concupiscible appetite would not have raised itself inordinately over that delight, because it was regulated by reason. In the same way, a sober man feels no less delight in food he has taken than a glutton does, but his concupiscible appetite rests less upon delight of this kind. Thomas, First Part, question 98, article 2.
As to the act of generation in the state of innocence: although certain ancient doctors, considering the foulness of concupiscence found in carnal union in the present state, held that there would have been no generation through carnal union in the state of innocence, Gregory Nazianzen says that the human race would have multiplied in paradise as the angels were multiplied, without intercourse, by the operation of divine power. He says that before sin God made male and female with regard to the mode of generation that would exist after sin, which He foreknew.
But Thomas, in the First Part, question 98, article 2, rejects this with the argument he gives there, determining that generation in that state of innocence would have taken place through union. Hence Genesis 2 says that woman was made as a help for man, namely for generation. Yet, as Thomas says, two things must be considered in carnal union according to the present state. One belongs to nature, namely the conjunction of male and female for generation. In every generation an active and a passive power are required. Therefore, since in all things in which there is distinction of sex the active power is in the male and the passive power in the female, the order of nature requires that male and female come together in union for generation.
The other thing that may be considered is a certain deformity of immoderate concupiscence, which would not have existed in the state of innocence, when the lower powers were wholly subject to reason. Hence Augustine says in Book XIV of The City of God: Far be it from us to suspect that offspring would not have been produced in that state without the disease of lust. Rather, those members would have been moved by a command of the will, as the others are, and without heat or an enticing sting, with tranquility of soul and body.
Nor would continence then have been praiseworthy as it is now. For at the present time continence is praised not because fertility is defective but because disordered lust is removed; then, however, there would have been fertility without lust. And as Augustine says in Book XIV of The City of God, in that state a husband would have entered the womb of his wife without any corruption of her integrity. For the male seed could have been introduced while the integrity of the female organ remained unharmed.
There would have been no suffering or anxiety from hunger or thirst. At the proper time, when it was fitting for nature, man would have eaten and drunk before hunger or thirst afflicted him. He would have slept without any disquiet or disturbance from terrifying dreams. Because of the most temperate air, he would have been without the pain of heat or cold, and he would have been burdened by no illness.
As to the pleasantness of his place, man was exalted in honor because, although he was made bodily from the slime of the earth in the region of Damascus, he was nevertheless transferred into the earthly paradise. To explain this paradise, it should be known, according to Augustine in Book VIII of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that there are three general opinions concerning paradise. One is held by those who wish paradise to be understood only bodily; another by those who understand it only spiritually, that is, as the Church; and a third by those who take paradise in both ways. Augustine himself, in Book XIII of The City of God, admits that this third opinion pleases him. And this is reasonable, for in everything handed down by Scripture the truth of the history must be held as the foundation, and spiritual expositions must be built upon it, according to Thomas in the Second Part, question 103, article 1.
Paradise, therefore, as Isidore says in the book Etymologies, is a place situated in the eastern regions, whose name is translated from Greek into Latin as “garden.” It is fittingly said to be situated in the east, for it must be believed to have been established in the noblest place of the whole earth. Since the east is the right side of heaven, according to the Philosopher in Book II of On Heaven and the World, and the right is nobler than the left, it was fitting that paradise be established in the eastern region.
What Bede says, that paradise reaches as far as the circle of the moon, is not true if it is understood simply with respect to position. It can nevertheless be expounded as meaning that it rises as far as the place of the lunar globe, not through eminence of position but through likeness, because there is a perpetual temperateness of the air there, as Isidore says. In this it is likened to the heavenly bodies, which are without contrariety.
Augustine also says in Book VIII of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis that the place of paradise must be believed to be exceedingly remote from human knowledge. The sources of the four rivers said in Genesis 2 to arise there are said to have been found somewhere else, although, after running underground through long tracts of country, they broke out in other places above ground. For who does not know that some waters commonly do this? And because that place is shut off from our habitation by barriers of mountains or seas, or by some torrid region that cannot be crossed, writers on places make no mention of it.
The tree of life which stood in the middle was a certain material tree, so called because its fruit had the power of preserving life, as was said above. Spiritually, however, it signified Christ, who is the Wisdom of God the Father and the tree of life in Proverbs 3. Or it signified the sacrament of the Eucharist or the good of obedience.
The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was likewise a material tree, so named because of the future event: after eating from it, man learned by experiencing punishment what difference there was between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. Spiritually it may signify free choice. The aforesaid and the other trees were produced actually on the third day.
As Damascene says, paradise was a divine royal dwelling and a worthy abode for the one who was made according to the image of God. It shone round about with temperate, exceedingly fine and pure air, and was adorned with ever-flowering plants. The same author says that no irrational animals dwelt in paradise, although by a certain dispensation animals were brought there to Adam when he gave them names, and the serpent came there through the operation of the devil; according to Bede, it had a maiden’s face. Now no one dwells there except Enoch and Elijah, as is said.
Third, Adam was exalted by the honor of dominion. Hence the Lord said in Genesis 1, “Let us make man,” and so forth, “that he may rule over the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, and the beasts of the earth.” To explain this, Thomas says in the First Part, question 96, article 1, that in the state of innocence, before disobedience, nothing resisted man which naturally ought to be subject to him. All animals, however, are naturally subject to man, as is evident from three things.
First, it is evident from the course of nature itself in the generation and use of natural things. In generation one proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, as in the generation of a human being; and likewise in the use of natural things, the more imperfect things yield to the use of the more perfect. Plants use the earth for their nourishment, animals use plants, and human beings use plants and animals. Hence man naturally rules over animals.
Second, this is evident from the order of divine providence, which governs lower things through higher ones. Since man is above the other animals because he was made in the image of God, the other animals are fittingly subjected to his governance.
Third, this is evident from a property of man and of the other animals. In other animals there is found, according to natural estimation, a certain participation in prudence with respect to certain particular acts. In man, however, there is found universal prudence, which is reason concerning all things that can be done. Everything that exists by participation is subject to that which exists essentially and universally. Thus it is evident that animals are naturally subject to man.
The disobedience toward human beings which is now evident in animals followed as a punishment for man’s guilty disobedience, because he himself was disobedient to God. There would nevertheless have been natural discord among the brute animals themselves, but they all would have been subject to man’s dominion, just as some are now domesticated by him.
It should also be known, according to Thomas in the same question, article 2, that when Genesis 1 speaks of man as presiding over every creature, this is understood of the creature which is not made in the image of God. For man did not rule over the angels. But in the state of innocence the soul ruled by command over its sensitive powers—namely, the irascible and concupiscible powers, which in some degree obey reason—and in the same way over the brute animals. Man ruled over the natural powers and over the body itself not by commanding them but by using them. Thus in the state of innocence he ruled over plants and inanimate things not by commanding or changing them, as by changing one species into another or changing the course of the heavenly bodies, but by using their aid without impediment.
Even in the state of innocence there would have been inequality among human beings, not only with respect to sex and age but also with respect to the soul, as regards justice and knowledge. For man did not act from necessity but through free choice, by which he has the capacity to apply his mind more or less to acting or knowing something. Hence some would have advanced more in justice and knowledge than others.
There could also have been inequality on the part of the body. According to the diverse disposition of the air and the diverse position of the stars, some would have been stronger in body, more beautiful, taller, of better temperament, and better begotten than others. Nevertheless, in those who were surpassed there would have been no defect or sin of either soul or body.
There would also have been dominion of one human being over others in the state of innocence. For that state was not more exalted than the condition of the angels; yet among the angels some rule over others, whence there is one order called the Dominations. For a fuller explanation of this matter, it should be known, according to Thomas in the First Part, question 96, article 4, that dominion is taken in two ways.
In one way it is taken as opposed to servitude. In this sense someone to whom another is subjected as a slave is called a lord, and there would have been no dominion of this kind in the state of innocence. For a person rules over another as a slave when he refers the one whom he rules to his own utility, that is, the utility of the ruler. Such dominion cannot exist without punishment to the subjects, which would not have existed in the state of innocence. In this sense Augustine says in Book XIX of The City of God that God did not will rational man, made in His image, to rule over anything except the irrational—not man over man, but man over cattle.
In a second way dominion is taken as referring generally to one who is subject in any manner whatsoever. In this sense even one who has the office of governing and directing free persons can be called a lord. For someone rules over another as a free person when he directs him toward the proper good of the one directed or toward the common good. Such dominion of one human being over another would have existed in the state of innocence, for two reasons.
First, man is naturally a social animal. Hence human beings in the state of innocence would have lived socially. But the social life of many cannot exist unless someone presides who intends the common good.
Second, if one human being had possessed greater knowledge and justice than another, it would have been unfitting unless this resulted in the benefit of others. Hence Augustine says in Book XIX of The City of God that the just rule not from a desire to dominate but from the duty of taking counsel for others. The order of nature prescribes this, and thus God made man.
God did not create man in paradise, but formed him from the slime of the earth, with a newly created soul infused into that body, when, as it is said, He breathed into his face the breath of life. But God took him and placed him in paradise, as is said in Genesis 2, so that this too would be attributed to the grace of God and not to human nature. For paradise was a place suited to human habitation with respect to the incorruption of the first state. That incorruption did not belong to man according to nature, but is said to have come from a supernatural gift.
He would have dwelt there with his posterity until, after the human race had multiplied from generation to generation to the number of the elect appointed beforehand by God, all would have been transferred together, in soul and body, into the heavenly paradise or empyrean heaven, there clearly to see the essence of God.
Man was placed in paradise to work it and keep it, as is said in Genesis 2. Augustine, in Book VIII of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, expounds this in two ways. In one way it is referred to God: that God would work in man by justifying him. If God’s operation ceases in man, he is immediately darkened, just as the air is if the influx of light ceases. God would also keep him, namely from every corruption and evil.
In another way it may be understood as referring to man: that man would work and keep paradise. Yet that work would not have been laborious as it was after sin, but delightful because of the experience of the power of nature. Nor would that keeping have been against invaders; rather, man was to keep paradise for himself, lest by sinning he should lose it.
The works of the first man would have been more efficacious for meriting than our works. To explain this it should be known, according to Thomas in the First Part, that the quantity of merit may be considered from two sources. In one way, it may be considered from the root of charity and grace. Such quantity of merit corresponds to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God. For whoever does something from greater charity will enjoy God more perfectly.
In another way, the quantity of merit may be considered from the quantity of the work, which is twofold: absolute and proportional. The widow who put two small bronze coins into the treasury did a smaller work in absolute quantity than those who placed great gifts there. But in proportional quantity the widow did more, according to the judgment of the Lord in Luke 11, because her gift exceeded her means to a greater degree.
Nevertheless, each quantity of merit which is considered with respect to the work or labor corresponds to the accidental reward, which is joy in a created good. Therefore, if the quantity of merit is considered on the part of grace, the works of the first man would have been more efficacious for meriting in the state of innocence than after sin, because grace would have been more abundant, with no obstacle to grace found in human nature.
Likewise, if the absolute quantity of the work is considered, his works would have been more efficacious for meriting, because, since man would have possessed greater power, he would have performed greater works. But if proportional quantity is considered, a greater account of merit is found after sin because of man’s weakness. For a small work exceeds the capacity of one who performs it with difficulty more than a great work exceeds the capacity of one who performs it without difficulty.
Although the first man before sin needed grace in order to merit eternal life just as he did afterward, after sin he needed grace for more things than before, both for the remission of sin and for the sustaining of weakness.
On the condition of offspring in the state of innocence, it should first be known that not only males but also females would have been generated in that state. For nature would have proceeded in generation as God instituted it. God instituted male and female in human nature, as is stated in Genesis 1 and 2; therefore, and so forth.
To explain this, Thomas says in the First Part, question 99, article 2, that nothing pertaining to the completion of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. Just as diverse grades of things pertain to the perfection of the universe, so diversity of sex pertains to the perfection of universal human nature. Therefore both sexes would have been produced through generation in the state of innocence. And it appears, as Thomas says, that as many females as males would have been generated.
Nor is it an objection that every agent generates something like itself unless it is impeded by a defect of power or an indisposition of matter. In generation the active power is in the male. Thus, where there would have been no defect of power on the part of the male and no indisposition of matter on the part of the female, it seems that males ought always to have been generated.
Thomas replies that the generation of a female occurs not only from a defect of active power and an indisposition of matter, as the objection maintains, but sometimes from some extrinsic accident. Thus the Philosopher says in the book On Animals that the north wind assists the generation of males, but the south wind the generation of females. Sometimes it occurs from a disposition of the soul, by which the body is readily changed. This could especially have occurred in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul, so that the sex of the offspring would be distinguished according to the will of the one generating. Thus there would be as many females as males, so that each woman would have one man of her own and each man one wife.
Those born in the state of innocence would not immediately have possessed perfect strength and movement of their limbs. For according to Thomas in the place cited above, everything generated is imperfect before it is perfected. Children in the state of innocence would have been produced through generation. Therefore they would at first have been imperfect in bodily size and strength. Hence newborns would not immediately have possessed sufficient power to move their limbs for every kind of act, but only for acts fitting to childhood, such as sucking the breast by themselves and other things of this kind.
Would children have been born with justice? Some say that they would not have been born with gratuitous justice, which is the principle of meriting and is called sanctifying grace, but with original justice. For this was a certain gift divinely given to the whole of human nature. This appears to be so because original sin, which is opposed to that justice, is said to be a sin of nature. Hence it is transmitted from parent to posterity just as original justice would have been transmitted.
But as Thomas says in the First Part, question 100, article 1, since the root of original justice, in whose rectitude man was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of reason to God—a subjection effected by sanctifying grace—it must be said that if children had been born in original justice, they would also have been born with sanctifying grace. The same has been said of the first man, namely that he was created with grace.
Yet grace would not for this reason have been natural, because it would not have been transmitted by the power of the seed. Rather, it would have been bestowed upon a human being as soon as he possessed a rational soul. Likewise, as soon as the body is disposed, the rational soul is infused by God, although the soul is not derived by propagation.
Likewise, newborn children would not have possessed the perfect use of reason. The reason, according to Thomas in the First Part, question 101, article 2, is that the use of reason depends in some manner upon the use of the sensitive powers. Hence, when the senses and the interior sensitive powers are bound, a person does not possess the perfect use of reason, as is evident in those who sleep and those who are frenzied.
The sensitive powers are certain powers of bodily organs. Therefore, when their organs are impeded, their acts must be impeded and, consequently, so must the use of reason. In children the impediment to these sensitive powers comes from the excessive moisture of the brain. Hence they do not possess the perfect use of reason, just as they do not possess the perfect use of their other members.
Therefore, in the state of innocence children would not have possessed the perfect use of reason that they were to have at a mature age. Yet they would have possessed a more perfect use than they now do with respect to those things that pertained to them according to that state.
Likewise, children would not in that state have possessed perfection of knowledge, but would have acquired it in the course of time without difficulty, either by discovery or by learning. It is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses. Nevertheless, those children would have possessed sufficient knowledge to direct them in the works of justice in which human beings are directed, and they would naturally have possessed the universal principles of law much more fully then than we possess them now.
Those born in the state of innocence would not have been confirmed in justice. Thomas explains this in the First Part, question 100, article 2. It is evident that children in their natural condition would not have possessed more perfection than their parents in the state of generation. But for as long as the parents generated, they would not have been confirmed in justice.
For a rational creature is confirmed in justice by being made blessed through the open vision of God. One who possesses this vision cannot fail to adhere to God, since God is the very essence of goodness, from which no one can turn away, because nothing is desired except under the aspect of good. Hence the little children would not have been born confirmed in justice.
Therefore, if Adam had not sinned, the children born from him would not indeed have contracted original sin, which is the cause of hell. Nevertheless, those generated from him could in another way become children of hell, namely by sinning through free choice. Thus he would not have transmitted to his posterity a necessity of not sinning such that they would have been altogether unable to sin.
§ II
As to the second principal point noted above, namely the efficacy of the sin by which man, exalted by such honor, was deprived of it, the words say, “he did not understand.” Indeed Adam and Eve did not understand—that is, they neither considered nor acknowledged the great dignity bestowed upon them among God’s benefits. Instead they adhered to His adversary, the devil, and withdrew from their Lord and benefactor, transgressing the command He had given them, namely to abstain from eating the fruit of the tree of good and evil.
The tree whose fruit the Lord forbade him was not evil in itself, but the command was given so that man, well created, might exercise himself in the virtue of obedience and thereby seek to acquire merit, as Gregory says in the final book of the Moralia, and in cause 11, question 3, “What, therefore?”
For the virtue of obedience appears more clearly when one observes a prohibition concerning something which is not evil in itself except because it is prohibited than it would if something evil in itself were prohibited.
Eve indeed did not understand the deception of the ancient serpent when he said, “On whatever day you eat from it, you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.” She thought that he said this to her with the intention of counseling, not deceiving her, so as to make her condition more excellent—as though God had begrudged them the knowledge of good and evil and had therefore forbidden them to eat that fruit. Hence the apostle also says that the woman was seduced.
And as Augustine says, although this seduction of the woman preceded the sin of the deed, namely the sin of gluttony in taking the fruit, the sin of pride preceded the seduction itself. Thus Augustine says in On Genesis that the woman would not have believed the serpent’s words unless there were already in her mind a love of her own power and a certain proud presumption concerning herself.
While that innocence remained, the seduction could not have occurred, because just as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil. Therefore her intellect could not assent to any false estimation as though it were true. But once innocence had been lost through that pride, a false estimation entered beneath it, so that she believed what the devil was persuading her was true, according to Thomas in the First Part, question 95, article 4.
Adam did not understand how grave a sin the thing forbidden him by the Lord was. For although he did not believe the serpent’s words were true, as the woman did, he was nevertheless overcome by Eve’s persuasion—not indeed by a love of concupiscence, which did not yet exist, but by a love of a certain benevolence by which a friend is sometimes overcome so as to serve a friend in evil. Thus Adam ate from the tree lest he make his companion sorrowful, thinking that what was very grave was venial, that is, easily remitted.
Neither understood the evil that was to follow from their transgression, namely the death of soul and body in themselves and in the whole human race. Therefore the Lord had said, “Dying, you shall die,” referring to each death.
For just as, by remaining in their innocence, observing the command, and generating children, they would have poured into them the original justice which they themselves possessed, as was said above, so by transgressing that command of the Lord they transmitted original sin to all who descended from them by carnal propagation. Hence it was not transmitted to Christ, because although He descended from them according to bodily substance, He did not descend by carnal propagation as all others do.
Original sin, insofar as it is the cause of both deaths, is contracted from conception by the soul when it is infused into the body, and no one can be freed from it except through the grace of the Mediator. Hence Augustine, speaking of actual and original sin, says: Therefore, since a human being has been made another person from the one who begot him, he is not held liable for another’s sin without his own consent. Immediately afterward, concerning original sin, he adds: Man therefore drew guilt, namely the guilt of original sin, because he was one with him and in him—that is, in Adam—according to seminal power when what Adam committed was done. Cause 1, question 4, “And so now.”
The same Augustine says in On Consecration, distinction 4: Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that every human being conceived through the intercourse of male and female is born with original sin, and for this reason is born a child of wrath and liable to death unless freed through the grace of the Mediator.
It should also be known that if the woman alone had sinned and not Adam, she alone would have been condemned unless she had repented. The human race would not thereby have been infected with original sin, as it was when Adam sinned, for the active principle of human generation was in him.
Neither understood when, after their fault, they were called by God with the words, “Adam, where are you?” They were being sought so that they might confess their sin and be cleansed by repentance. But because they did not do this and instead excused themselves, turning the cause of their fault back upon another—upon God or upon the serpent—they were therefore cast out of paradise, where they were compared to senseless beasts, and so forth.
§ III
As to the third point, by which is noted the misery to which man was condemned when it is said, “he was compared to beasts,” and so forth: that God compared human beings to beasts after sin is evident from what is said in Genesis 3, that God made them coats of skins. And, as though mocking them, He said through an angel, “Behold, Adam has become like one of us,” as though He were saying: He wished to be God and has become like a beast; therefore I make for him a beastly coat.
He became like the beasts in the first place because, as Ecclesiastes 3 says, “The destruction of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of each is equal,” since each is subject to bodily death.
Second, just as beasts are ruled by the passions of the concupiscible and irascible powers and do not restrain them by reason, which they lack, so human beings are like beasts when they follow the passions of the vices and do not regulate them by the reason they possess. Hence they are of a worse condition.
Third, beasts wage war against one another. So too sinners fight one another over the things, wills, or possessions they covet, according to James 4: “Whence are wars and quarrels among you, if not from your desires?” and so forth, as will appear below.
Fourth, just as beasts delight to live in unclean places, so human beings delight to live amid uncleanness and to remain in it, according to the words of Joel: “They have rotted like beasts in their own dung.”
Fifth, just as beasts are subjected to many labors, to hunger and thirst, and to other miseries, so too are human beings, according to the words of Ecclesiastes: “All his days are full of labor and misery, nor does he rest by night.” And to the first man it was said in Genesis 3, “In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread.”
It should be noted that man is said to have been made like not only beasts, but senseless beasts. Although all beasts lack wisdom, some of them nevertheless possess a certain skill or a certain prudential instinct, as the horse does in comparison with the ass. Hence asinus is said to derive from a, meaning “without,” and sensus, meaning “sense”—as though without sense. Man after sin appears to have been made like such a beast.
The ass is a sluggish animal for labor; so too man is sluggish in doing good. The ass commonly walks along dangerous and bad roads, and is not turned or led away by shouts or gestures unless it is harshly beaten. Sometimes not even by this is it brought onto the right road, as happened with Balaam’s ass when it was pressed by his spurs. Thus man after sin walks along difficult roads that lead to death; he is not turned from them by the cries of admonition and is scarcely corrected by scourges.
The ass walks slowly, and if it sometimes runs, its course endures only a little while. So too a sinner, even if he sometimes fervently begins some good works, does not persevere in them. Concerning the punishment and pride of our first parents, see the titles on Pride in the second part of our Summa.
Yet because the Psalm says, “I was made as a beast before You, and I am always with You,” a sinner who morally puts aside the evil qualities of the ass and takes on the good ones—namely that it is a patient and simple animal and a friend of peace—will be with God. As a figure of this, the Son of God, having become man, sat upon the ass and its colt, which signified those converted from the Jews and the gentiles, and entered Jerusalem, which is called the vision of peace.
According to Augustine in The City of God, the earthly paradise figures the Church militant. Just as all who remained in innocence in that place would, when the number of the elect begotten from time to time was complete, finally have been transferred to the heavenly paradise to see and enjoy the essence of God, immediately glorified in soul and body, so those who live in the Church militant and depart with innocence or perfect repentance, every debt of punishment having been discharged, pass to the glory above in their souls. The bodies of all the elect, however, will rise together at the end to be glorified—excepting Christ, who, rising from the dead, now dies no more, together with His mother, as is handed down by the saints, already glorified in body.
In paradise itself each sex was present. For although woman is said to be an occasioned male and was made as a help for man, the end of each is nevertheless the blessed life. Indeed, lest she be despised as more imperfect, she was formed in the nobler place, namely paradise, although Adam was made in the region of Damascus and transferred there, as Ambrose notes in distinction 40, “That.”
Moreover, two persons, namely Adam and Eve, were not made from the beginning. Rather, first the man was made from slime and then the woman from his rib with respect to the body; with respect to their souls, both were created from nothing. According to Ambrose, God did this because, wishing to establish one nature of human beings and beginning it from a single principle, He removed from nature the possibility of many and diverse origins. Cause 33, question 5, final chapter.
Or, according to Augustine, one man, namely Adam, was made, from whom the others would arise, having authority from God as though His vicar. Cause 33, question 5, “This image.” Or one was made in order to commend the mystery of unity and peace which human beings ought to preserve with one another.
The fourfold river of paradise is sacred doctrine, by which the Church militant is watered so that it may be made fruitful and produce abundant and sweet fruits of virtue. It is fourfold either because sacred Scripture is divided into four parts: the legal or Mosaic part; the prophetic and evangelical part, for which the Apocalypse stands in the New Testament; the historical part, such as the books of Kings and others, and Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament; and the sapiential part, as in the books of Solomon and others, and in the epistles of the apostles in the New Testament.
Or the river is fourfold because of the fourfold sense of Scripture: literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical. Or, according to Isidore, it signifies the sound doctrine of the first four universal councils, distinction 15, chapter 1.
The tree of life in the middle of paradise, which gives vigor and preserves from corruption, is obedience and the soul’s total subjection to God. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is one’s own will rebelling against God; eating from it is the execution of that will, which leads to the death of the soul. The other trees of paradise are the other kinds of virtues in which human beings would also have exercised themselves.
In each person there is found a certain spiritual marriage, according to the Master in Book II of the Sentences. Sensuality is in that person as Eve; the spirit, or rational appetite, is as Adam. Just as woman ought to be subject to man, cause 33, question 5, final chapter, so sensuality ought to be subject to reason, and then the human being is well governed.
The manner of the common, daily spiritual fall was sufficiently signified in the fall of our first parents, as Gregory notes in distinction 6, “Testament.” With God’s permission the ancient serpent approaches to tempt, and he first attacks the woman—that is, sensuality—as the weaker. He proposes or suggests to sensuality something to be done which God has prohibited, under the appearance of a useful and delightful good: this is the apple.
If reason does not immediately resist and repel it, but neglects to do so and permits sensuality to converse with the suggestion, then, even if conscience feels remorse over the prohibition of what is suggested, it nevertheless wavers under the suggestion and takes from the apple, as if thereby to obtain some great good. Not content with this, sensuality suggests it to Adam—that is, to reason—so that reason too may assent with it: namely, that it not only take sensual pleasure, but that reason also consent against God’s prohibition. When reason has been overcome by passion in this way, it falls into the death of the soul.
For in sensible delight or complacency alone there is only a venial sin, according to Thomas; but in the consent of reason to a thing prohibited by command there is mortal sin, whether reason expressly consents or whether it is negligent and does not reject the danger contrary to the command.
Through any mortal sin a person is stripped of all virtues. As a figure of this, it is said that they knew they were naked, On Penance, distinction 2, “The wise man.” Ashamed of this—for sin induces shame because of its foulness—and because of the stirrings of the flesh rising within them, they sewed fig leaves together to cover their shame, making aprons for themselves in place of lower garments. This occurs spiritually when, after sin, a person fashions vain and useless thoughts for himself in order to excuse his excesses in sins.
The sinner, placed by number, though not by merit, in the paradise of the Church, is called by God through inspiration so that he may confess his sin and receive pardon. But if he does not humbly confess his sin, and instead excuses himself and assigns the occasion to another, as our first parents did, God does not pardon him, as Gregory shows in the Moralia and Gratian in On Penance, distinction 1, § “From these.”
Indeed, one who perseveres in evil when it is notorious is cast out of the paradise of the Church: by sentence he is excluded from it also in number, so that he cannot take from the tree of life, that is, participate in the sacrament of the Eucharist, as Gratian notes in cause 11, question 3, § “And so evidently.”
From this it is also evident that while someone is occupied with God and himself, he does not sin; but when he associates with others, especially evil people, or entangles himself in these lower things, he easily falls.
Hence Ambrose says: “When Adam was alone, he did not transgress, because his mind adhered to God,” On Penance, distinction 2.
Yet neither holiness of place, nor solitude, nor greatness of condition can make a person secure. Hence Gregory says: “No hidden places whatsoever can save a soul without grace, as we see in the erring inhabitants of those very places. For what is more delightful than paradise? And yet man fell from paradise by sinning,” distinction 40.
And he was fittingly cast out of paradise, according to Ambrose: “He who cast the nobility of God out of himself is deprived of the nobility of the place,” distinction 40, “Adam.”
Man possessed the nobility of God because he was made in the image and likeness of God, as is said in Genesis 1, for he possessed within himself the grace of the virtues and the gleaming splendor of piety, in which is the brightness of glory and the image of the Father’s substance, says Ambrose in On Penance, distinction 2, “That soul.”
Or, according to the Master of the Sentences in Book I, distinction 3, man is said to have been made in the image of God with respect to his natural endowments, insofar as in the one soul there are three powers—memory, understanding, and will—which are really distinct and yet are one soul. So in the most holy Trinity there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and yet one essence.
He is said to have been made in the likeness of God with respect to the gratuitous gifts added above nature. Hence Ambrose says, “To be like God is to possess justice and wisdom and to be perfect in virtue.”
When the root of the human race—that is, our first parents—was corrupted by sin, all their posterity, which was then in them according to seminal reason, was infected with original sin and made liable to perdition. But because Christ descended from Adam according to bodily substance, not according to carnal propagation through the commingling of man and woman, but from a virgin alone, He alone escaped original sin. Nor can anyone be saved and rescued from damnation except through grace, according to Augustine in On Consecration, distinction 4, “Hold most firmly.”
And because man offended through sensible things, he is restored to grace through sensible things. Because contraries are cured by contraries, just as by proudly and disobediently using a sensible apple he was depraved and incurred damnation, so by taking the sensible sacraments, to which he subjects himself for God’s sake, he is justified.
The sacraments of the New Law so signify grace itself or its effect that they also cause grace. The sacraments of the Old Testament, however, only signified it and did not confer it, according to Thomas in Book IV, distinction 1.
Various remedies and medicines against original sin are therefore given. In the New Testament, after the Gospel was promulgated, there is only one common to every nation: baptism with water conferred in the form of the Church. Matthew, final chapter: “He who believes and is baptized will be saved,” namely by preserving baptismal grace or restoring it through penance.
For adults, when baptism with water cannot be had, the baptism of the Spirit—that is, the intention to receive it together with faith—is sufficient, and much more is the baptism of blood, that is, martyrdom. On Consecration, distinction 4, “In place of baptism.” Those lacking the use of reason can be assisted toward salvation only through baptism with water, unless they are killed for Christ.
In the Old Testament, with respect to those possessing the use of reason, personal faith in Christ, held implicitly, cleansed from original sin one who was not yet purified. That faith was nevertheless professed by some sacrifice, offering, express invocation of God, or the like.
With respect to the little boys descended from Abraham until the Passion of Christ, circumcision cleansed them from original sin—that is, the faith of their parents, whose profession was circumcision itself, so that circumcision was not the cause by which remission occurred but a cause without which it did not occur.
For the females of Abraham’s race there was the same mode of healing that existed among other nations, namely the faith of the parents, not merely habitual but actually directed toward the salvation of the child. Its profession was some sacrifice, vocal prayer, or outward invocation of God, which functioned as a sacrament. In this way the authority of Gregory in On Consecration, distinction 4, “What formerly,” is to be understood.
Actual sins added to original sin, especially mortal ones, were never erased except through interior penance, that is, contrition. Hence Augustine says, “Do not suppose that anyone can pass from error to truth, or from any great or small sin to correction, without penance,” On Penance, distinction 1, “No one,” and the chapter “There are three.”
And our first parents, as Augustine says in On Penance, distinction 1, just as they are believed to have been the first placed in the world, are also believed to have greatly repented of their transgression; hence they were saved by the Passion of Christ.
But in the New Testament, especially after the Church’s command concerning confession was promulgated, in On Penance and Remission, “Every,” contrition does not suffice for salvation unless vocal confession duly made to a priest is added when the opportunity is present. In this way is understood what Ambrose says in the book On Paradise: “No one can be justified from sin unless he has first confessed his sin,” On Penance, distinction 1—namely, at least in intention; but afterward, in its own time, he must confess it in act, otherwise he would incur damnation.
Baptism and the other sacraments do not profit except in the holy Church, and hence they do not profit heretics or those who remain in mortal sin. For, as Jerome says, “One who is polluted by any stain of sin cannot be said to belong to the Church or to be subject to Christ,” On Penance, distinction 1, “Ecclesiastical.”
Hence Augustine also says: “The Church compared to paradise shows us that her baptism can indeed be received by people even outside her, but that no one outside her can either receive or retain the salvation of blessedness. For the happiness of the life commemorated in paradise is not in Mesopotamia or Egypt, to which those rivers came. Thus the baptism of the Church can exist outside the Church, but the gift of a good life is found only within the Church,” On Consecration, distinction 4, “The Church.”
Because the glorious God foreknew the fall of the human race, He arranged that the first man should from the beginning prophetically foreannounce the reparation accomplished through the Incarnation and Passion, from which the Church’s sacraments have their power—not insofar as man errs, with respect to redemption, because man did not foreknow his own fall, according to the Master in Book II, but with respect to the dignity and exaltation of human nature.
Adam’s sleep signifies the sleep of Christ’s death upon the cross. Then a wife was formed from a rib in his side, because from there the Church, the bride of Christ, is formed in spiritual being through the sacraments, chiefly baptism and the Eucharist, the greatest in efficacy and in being. These were figured by the water and blood flowing from His side when it was pierced by the lance.
Eve was made from the bone of Adam’s rib, while the place in him was filled with flesh in its stead, because that from which the Church was strengthened and formed—namely, the Incarnation of the Son of God—was the source from which the Son of God was, as it were, weakened by assuming passible flesh.
Adam, awakening, prophetically announced this when he said, “A man shall leave father and mother.” For the Son of God according to His divinity has no mother; hence “to leave” means not to have. According to His humanity He has no father, because He was conceived and born from a virgin. “And he shall cleave to his wife,” namely the Church, by an indissoluble bond; “and the two”—namely the human and divine natures—“shall be in one flesh,” that is, in one person.
In detestation of the vice of gluttony and commendation of abstinence, Ambrose says: “That we may know fasting is no novelty: God first established a law in paradise. The law of fasting began from the Lord God; transgression of the law began from the devil. The serpent counseled gluttony; the Lord decreed fasting. Thus gluttony expelled the one reigning in paradise, while abstinence recalled the one wandering.” Thus far Ambrose, distinction 35, “On the sixth day.”
Morally, complacency in one’s own will [expelled the human race], and conversely the obedience of Christ brought the human race back to heaven.
§ IV
It should be noted that in calculating the duration of the years of the first and second ages there is a great difference between the reckoning of years given by the Hebrews, which is in Jerome’s translation now used by the Church, and the reckoning of the Septuagint translators.
According to the Hebrews, the first age, namely from Adam to the Flood, lasted 1,656 years. The second age, from Noah after the Flood to Abraham, contains 292 years. But according to the Septuagint, the first age completes 2,242 years. The second age, namely from Noah after the Flood to Abraham, has 940 years. Thus, taking the first and second ages together, the second computation—that is, the Septuagint’s, which Bede and many others follow—exceeds the first, that of the Hebrews, which Vincent follows in the Historical Mirror, by 1,234 years.
The reason for this difference is that in the case of many of those fathers the Septuagint translation assigns one hundred years more at the time they begot children than the Hebrews do, as though in each of those fathers.
Adam begot Seth in the 130th year of his life, but according to the Septuagint in his 230th year. Seth begot Enos in the 105th year of his life, but according to the Septuagint in the 205th. Enos begot Cainan in his 90th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 190th. Cainan begot Mahalaleel in his 70th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 170th. Mahalaleel begot Jared in his 65th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 145th. Jared begot Enoch in his 162nd year, but according to the Septuagint in his 172nd.
Enoch begot Methuselah in his 70th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 165th; and he was translated into the earthly paradise in the sixteenth year. Methuselah begot Lamech in his 187th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 167th. Lamech begot Noah in his 182nd year, but according to the Septuagint in his 188th.
Noah begot Shem, Ham, and Japheth; in the 500th year of his life he began to build the ark, and in his 600th year, when he entered the ark with his sons and their wives, eight persons in all, the Flood came.
In the second age, namely after the Flood, Shem, from whom the race of the Jews proceeded, begot Arphaxad in the second year according to both opinions. Arphaxad begot Salah in the 35th year of his life, but according to the Septuagint in his 135th. Salah begot Eber in his 30th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 130th. Eber begot Peleg in his 34th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 134th. Peleg begot Reu in his 30th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 130th; in Peleg’s time the earth was divided into various languages.
Reu begot Serug in his 30th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 130th. Serug begot Nahor in his 30th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 130th. Nahor begot Terah in his 29th year, but according to the Septuagint in his 79th. Terah, in his 70th year, begot Abraham, Nahor, and Haran, and the Septuagint gives the same. The third age begins with Abraham.
No sufficient reason can be assigned for this disagreement between the Hebrews and the Septuagint translators in calculating the years of the first and second ages. Its determination must therefore be left to the Holy Spirit, who arranged it in this way not without mystery, for the greater merit of faith and our humiliation.
Augustine, however, says in The City of God that this proceeded from an error of the first copyists working from the seventy-two translators, who did not carefully attend to the number of the years. Although the Hebrew computation is judged more true, the computation of the Septuagint is nevertheless more commonly held.
Because human beings lived for so long in the first age, some said that their years were not of so great a span—that is, twelve months—as ours, but that their year was thirty-six days, so that one of our years comprised ten of theirs. But Augustine in The City of God rejects this opinion by what is said in the seventh chapter concerning the tenth month and the fifteenth day of that month. There it is shown that their years were like ours in number of days.
As to why such persons are read to have begotten children so late, although they were occupied with marriage rather than virginal continence, Augustine assigns two reasons. Either, just as they lived for so long, they also became fit for generation late; or those of whom Scripture speaks were not their firstborn. They could have begotten many others earlier, just as they did afterward, but those persons were named first because, although born after others, they were preferred to them in dignity or in presiding over others, and because from them the genealogy of Christ was to be woven, since Christ descended from them and not from the others they had begotten.
Thus the evangelist Matthew, describing Christ’s genealogy, said, “Jacob begot Judah and his brothers,” although Judah was not the firstborn but the fourth. He placed Judah, omitting the others, because Christ descended from him according to the flesh.
Adam and Eve, therefore, as is believed, transgressed in the earthly paradise on the very day of their creation—that is, the sixth day of the world—around noon, and a little afterward, around the ninth hour, they were cast out. Hence the new man, Christ, on the same weekday after the revolutions of many years—after 5,199 years from the creation of the world according to the Septuagint translators—on the sixth day of the week, the eighth day before the Kalends of April, was crucified at the sixth hour, paying the debt of that same sin; and, expiring around the ninth hour, He opened the entrance of paradise to the thief.
Our first parents, cast into exile, hastened to human consolation. For they left paradise as virgins; afterward Adam knew his wife Eve.
Accordingly, in the fifteenth year of Adam’s life Cain and his sister Calmana were born. Fifteen years afterward Abel and his sister Delbora were born, as Vincent says in Book II of the Historical Mirror.
It is believed that Adam taught his sons to offer God tithes and first fruits in spirit, or sacrifices. Cain, a farmer and miser, offered God gnawed ears of grain. Abel, a simple and good shepherd of sheep, offered from the fattest of his flock. Because Abel’s life and intention pleased God, his offering was pleasing to God, but Cain’s was not. This is evident because, as is said in another translation, God kindled fire upon Abel’s sacrifice but not upon Cain’s—that is, fire descended from heaven to ignite the sacrifice offered by Abel, but not that offered by Cain.
Seeing this, Cain, envying the goodness of his brother, treacherously killed him in a field near Damascus, as is stated in Genesis 4. When Cain himself was questioned by the Lord about his brother, so that in this way he might acknowledge his sin by confessing it, he excused himself, saying that he did not know. And when the Lord rebuked him for the fratricide, he did not perform penance, but added the evil of despair. As a wanderer and fugitive he went out from the face of God, who had appeared in a subject creature—that is, through an angel in human form—to speak to him.
As a citizen of the earth, Cain was the first to build a city, gathering riches by robbery and violence, inviting his people to acts of brigandage, changing human simplicity through the invention of measures, and leading it into craftiness and corruption. He was the first to set boundaries to land and walled a city because he feared those whom he harmed. On account of his severity, he gathered his people into the city.
In these two first sons of Adam, Cain and Abel, the two cities had their beginning, according to Augustine in The City of God. One is the city of the good, which sojourns on earth and awaits its dwelling in heaven: the heavenly Jerusalem, spiritually built as a city beginning from love of God and advancing, through true humility, even to contempt of self.
The other is the city of the reprobate, which is established in earthly things and descends to the land of darkness. Love of self builds it, advancing through pride even to contempt of God. It is called Babylon, interpreted as confusion, just as Jerusalem is called the vision of peace.
The Church of the saints is therefore said to have begun from righteous Abel, not from Adam, lest it appear to have been interrupted by Adam’s fall and lest it appear to have begun from a sinner. Just as wicked Cain persecuted innocent Abel even to death, so, as the apostle says, all who wish to live devoutly in Christ must suffer persecution from wicked believers or unbelievers, or at least the persecution of their evil examples. In this way the soul’s patience is exercised.
Gregory says: “He refuses to be Abel whom Cain’s malice does not exercise. For the iron of our mind cannot arrive at the edge of truth unless another’s file of depravity has scraped it,” cause 7, question 1, § “There is also another.” This pertains to the gift of knowledge: to conduct oneself well among the wicked, and to shine through patience like lights in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation, without being extinguished by their wicked works.
In Abel was also figured the Passion of Christ, the innocent one killed from envy by his brother—that is, by the Jews, who were of his race. Hence that whole posterity became obstinate and reprobate.
Because there were no other women in the world, the first sons had to take their sisters as wives in order to propagate the human race, as Augustine says in cause 35, question 1, chapter 1. To the same father were born wicked Cain and good Abel, to intimate that the whole mass of the human race was justly condemned in Adam and that anyone from it becoming a vessel unto honor proceeds not from nature but from God’s mercy.
The pursuits of Cain’s sons plainly indicate to which of the aforesaid cities they belong, namely the city of heaven or of hell. Lamech was the first to introduce bigamy contrary to nature and custom, having two wives at once, Genesis 5 [read: Genesis 4]. If Jacob, David, and others had several wives, they did so instructed by the Holy Spirit in order to enlarge the worship of God reserved among that people, as is said in On Divorce, “We rejoice”; but Lamech did so from lust alone.
His descendants also invented certain mechanical arts and curiosities. Jabal invented the portable tents of shepherds, as is stated in Genesis 4; Jubal invented skill in musical sounds or harmonies; Tubalcain invented the smith’s art and the carving of metals; and their sister Naamah invented the art of varied weaving.
Nearly all the secular arts or sciences, whether mechanical, liberal, or philosophical, serving human curiosity, necessity, or even exercise, are read to have been invented by the children of this world. For those arts which did not pertain to their salvation had to be discovered by the study and labor of those who were not children of eternal salvation. Such labor was therefore owed to such people, while the fruit was reserved for these. Thus the Egyptians are despoiled by the Hebrews, so that the words spoken by the Lord fittingly apply to the true Hebrews, that is, the faithful: “Others have labored, and you have entered into their labors.”
Concerning this Lamech, the Master in the Historia and Nicholas of Lyra say that he was a hunter—not for the sake of meat, which was not yet used, as is said in distinction 35, “From the beginning,” but for the skins of animals, so that he might make clothes for himself.
Because he was going blind, he led with him a boy who directed the arrow of his bow toward the beast. When the youth saw the decrepit Cain remaining among the thickets and thought him a beast, he signaled Lamech to shoot an arrow at him as though at a beast. Having done so, Lamech killed Cain with the wound, as he realized from Cain’s cry. Or, according to another account, in anger he also killed the boy. Thus he killed Cain by a wound and the youth by the livid bruise of a wound. Therefore, whereas Cain’s sin was punished sevenfold, Lamech’s was punished seventy-sevenfold, because seventy-seven souls who had gone forth from Lamech perished in the Flood.