Works › Sophistical Refutations, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 707–710
Tractate V. Chapter I
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TRACTATUS V. DE ACRIBUS ET ACERRIMIS ORATIONIBUS.
CAPUT I. De acrium et non acrium orationum distinctione.
Solutis jam recta solutione omnibus orationibus ad metas sophisticae disputationis ducentibus, nunc agendum est de orationibus quae dignae sunt solvi, et quae indignae quae disputandae sunt a respondente. Dicimus igitur quod oportet intelligere respondentem primo secundum generalem divisionem orationis: quoniam generaliter omnium orationum sophisticarum aliae sive quaedam sunt faciles conspici ad solvendum: aliae autem sive quaedam sunt difficiles conspici secundum quid, quantum ad apparentiam, et in quo quantum ad non existentiam paralogizant audientem respondentem qui audit opponentem. Frequenter enim faciles orationes eaedem in genere vel secundum unum et eumdem locum sophisticum sunt illis difficilibus scilicet, faciles enim frequenter sunt secundum eumdem locum sophisticum secundum quem sunt difficiles. Nam eamdem orationem quantum ad causam apparentiae et non existentiae, oportet variare cum alia oratione quae fit secundum idem, hoc est, secundum eumdem locum sophisticum. Unde eadem oratio facilis et difficilis aliis quidem sive diversis responsionibus videtur esse secundum dictionem: hoc autem secundum fallaciam in dictione: aliis autem responsionibus videtur esse secundum accidens vel alium locum sophisticum extra dictionem. Et hujus causa est, quia nunquam sophisma translatum ad diversos respondentes, vel melius ad diversas orationes secundum quamlibet fallaciam non similiter est manifestum: sed una est oratio ad conspiciendum facilis, et alia difficilis ad conspiciendum quamlibet fallaciam.
Eadem ergo est videre in his orationibus quae sunt secundum aequivocationes, qui modus paralogismorum est facillimus: eo quod in sermone (quem continue usitamus) evenit, quod scilicet quaedam in aequivocatione sunt orationes sive paralogismi faciles, et quaedam difficiles: haec enim quaedam aequivocorum etiam a quibuslibet respondentibus conspici sunt manifesta, ut in aequivocis per casum et fortunam: nam etiam orationes paralogismorum secundum dictionem pene omnes, scilicet communes sunt ridiculae, hoc est ridiculosae et faciles ad solvendum, ut patet per inductionem in omnibus, et maxime in aequivocatione. Ut patet per exemplum si dicatur, vir ferebatur gradatim sedens: quae oratio est multiplex: eo quod gradatim potest sumi a gradior, deris, verbo: et sic oratio est falsa: quia sedens ut sic non ferebatur. Vel potest sumi a gradu: et sic oratio est vera: quia sedens ferri potest per gradus gestatorios: et hoc quilibet conspicere potest. Et in alio exemplo similiter, Boreas est purus: si enim dicatur purus, quia innocens, oratio falsa est: quia sic Boreas non est purus: quia perdidit et afflixit frigore pauperem. Si vero purus sit nubibus depuratus, sic Boreas est purus, quia dissipat nubes. Et in tertio exemplo, utra boum pariet ante? et respondetur, quod neutra: sed posterius, hoc est, per posteriorem corporis partem ambae: quia porta generationis posterius est. Est tamen oratio aequivoca: quia ante potest dicere prius tempore vel loco, vel partem corporis anterius. Eodem autem modo et aliarum orationum et pene plurium quae in communi sermone usitantur, plures sunt faciles: illae autem aliarum orationum (quae secundum aequivocationem sunt) ideo difficiles sunt, quod etiam peritissimos latere videntur.
TRACTATE V. CONCERNING SHARP AND VERY SHARP SPEECHES.
CHAPTER I. Concerning the distinction of sharp and non-sharp speeches.
Now that all the speeches leading to the goals of sophistical disputation have already been solved by right solution, we must now deal with speeches which are worthy to be solved and which unworthy, which must be disputed by the respondent. Therefore we say that the respondent ought first to understand according to the general division of speech, since generally of all sophistical speeches some are easy to inspect for solving, but others are difficult to inspect according to something, as to the appearance, and in what way, as to non-existence, they paralogize the hearing respondent who hears the opponent. For frequently the easy speeches are the same in genus or according to one and the same sophistical place as those difficult ones; for easy speeches are frequently according to the same sophistical place according to which difficult ones are. For it is necessary to vary the same speech as to the cause of appearance and non-existence with another speech which is made according to the same thing, that is, according to the same sophistical place. Hence the same speech, easy and difficult, to some responses or diverse responses seems to be according to diction, and this according to a fallacy in diction; but to other responses it seems to be according to accident or another sophistical place outside diction. And the cause of this is that a sophism transferred to diverse respondents, or better to diverse speeches, is never manifest in the same way according to any fallacy; rather one speech is easy to inspect, and another difficult for inspecting any fallacy.
Therefore the same thing is to be seen in these speeches which are according to equivocations, which mode of paralogisms is easiest, because in speech which we continually use it happens that certain speeches or paralogisms in equivocation are easy and certain are difficult. For some of these equivocal cases are manifest to be inspected even by any respondents, as in equivocal terms by chance and fortune. For even the speeches of paralogisms according to diction, almost all of them, namely the common ones, are laughable, that is, ridiculous and easy to solve, as is clear by induction in all cases, and especially in equivocation. As is clear through an example, if it is said: a man was being carried step-by-step while sitting. This speech is multiple, because step-by-step can be taken from the verb gradior, graderis, and thus the speech is false, because one sitting was not being carried in this way. Or it can be taken from a step, and thus the speech is true, because one sitting can be carried by carrying-steps; and anyone can inspect this. And similarly in another example, Boreas is pure. For if he is called pure because innocent, the speech is false, because thus Boreas is not pure, since he destroyed and afflicted the poor man with cold. But if pure is purified of clouds, thus Boreas is pure, because he scatters clouds. And in the third example: which of the cows will bring forth before? And it is answered that neither will, but afterward, that is, through the posterior part of the body both will, because the gate of generation is posterior. Yet the speech is equivocal, because before can mean prior in time or place, or the anterior part of the body. But in the same way, also of other speeches, and almost of several which are commonly used in speech, many are easy; but those of other speeches which are according to equivocation are difficult for this reason, that they seem to escape even the most expert.
Hujus autem probatio est per signum: quoniam etiam peritissimi litigant saepe de nominibus. Ut, verbi gratia, utrum idem sive unum significat uno modo dictum de omnibus, et similiter ens et unum vel aliquid et hujusmodi, quae per prius et posterius dicuntur de omnibus; alii autem hoc non dicunt uno modo per unam rationem dici de omnibus. Secundum etiam rationem Zenonis et Parmenidis et Melissi qui unum omnia esse dixerunt, solvunt in eo quod multipliciter dicant dici unum ens de substantia et accidente, nec esse omnia unum et ens sive unitate generis et rationis, sicut ante dictum est in aequivocatione esse faciles ad solvendum et difficiles orationes. Similiter autem etiam est in accidente, et in his singulis locis sophisticis in dictione et extra dictionem, quod aliae quidem de numero orationum sive paralogismorum sunt faciles veri, hoc est, ad conspiciendum qualiter solvantur: aliae vero secundum easdem fallacias sunt difficiliores: unde in orationibus quibuslibet sumere in quo genere locorum sophisticorum sit, et utrum sit vere elenchus veram concludens contradictionem, vel non elenchus in aliquo contra contradictionem non facile similiter (hoc est, secundum unam similitudinem) est in omnibus: sed in quibusdam est facilius, in quibusdam autem difficilis. Sic ergo patet qualiter quaedam oratio est difficilis, et quaedam facilis ad solvendum.
Eadem autem oratio quae difficilis est in se, acris dicitur in comparatione ad respondentem: quia acrem facit eum et morsum sua difficultate: unde acris oratio est, quae maxime facit dubitare respondentem, eo quod haec maxime mordet et tenet et impedit respondentem qualiter solvenda sit. Et haec subdividitur: quia duobus acris est duplex: haec enim una scilicet est in orationibus syllogizatis, quae non peccant in forma, sed in materia, scilicet illa de qua dubium est quam interrogationum sive praemissarum eligat quis respondentium ad interimendum, utrum scilicet majorem vel minorem: et ita mordet respondentem. Illa autem alia dubitatio acris est in orationibus litigiosis sive non syllogizatis, nisi apparenter, sicut in his quae peccant in forma syllogismi; in illis enim dubitatur quomodo aliquis dicat respondendo et solvendo propositum sive de proposito quod vera solutione volunt solvere.
But the proof of this is through a sign, since even the most expert often contend about names. For example, whether the same or one signifies in one way when said of all things, and similarly being and one or something and things of this sort, which are said of all things according to prior and posterior; but others do not say that this is said of all things in one way through one account. Also, according to the argument of Zeno and Parmenides and Melissus, who said that all things are one, they solve it in that they say that one being is said multiply of substance and accident, and that all things are not one and being by unity of genus and account, just as it was said before in equivocation that there are speeches easy and difficult to solve. But similarly also it is in accident, and in these individual sophistical places in diction and outside diction, that some from the number of speeches or paralogisms are easy of the truth, that is, for inspecting how they are solved; but others according to the same fallacies are more difficult. Hence in any speeches to take in what genus of sophistical places it is, and whether it is truly a refutation concluding a true contradiction, or not a refutation in something against contradiction, is not similarly easy, that is, according to one likeness, in all cases; but in some it is easier, in some more difficult. Thus therefore it is clear how one speech is difficult and another easy to solve.
But the same speech which is difficult in itself is called sharp in comparison to the respondent, because by its difficulty it makes him sharp and bitten. Hence a sharp speech is one which most makes the respondent doubt, because it most bites and holds and hinders the respondent as to how it must be solved. And this is subdivided, because in two ways the sharp is twofold. For the one is in syllogized speeches, which do not sin in form but in matter, namely that one about which there is doubt which of the questions or premises one of the respondents should choose for destruction, whether the major or the minor; and thus it bites the respondent. But the other sharp doubt is in contentious speeches or those not syllogized except apparently, as in those which sin in the form of the syllogism; for in those it is doubted how someone should speak by responding and solving the proposed thing, or concerning the proposed thing which they wish to solve by true solution.
Est autem quidem syllogistica sive syllogizata quidem, sed peccans in materia acerrima (hoc est, valde acris) sed ex qua maxime apparentibus praemissis sive probabilibus et falsis quam maxime probabile interimitur. Et haec quidem est causa et ratio, quare cum una est oratio (hoc est, syllogismus ostensivus ex probabilibus concludens probabile) transposita in duobus conversivis syllogismis de contradictione, hoc est, sumpto contradictorio conclusionis cum altera praemissarum omnes probabiles habebit paralogismos, tres scilicet, unum ostensivum qui concludit ex probabilibus falsum: et alterum ostensivum qui cum contradictorio conclusionis cum majori propositione concludit oppositum minoris: et alium conversivum qui ex contradictorio conclusionis sumpto cum minori praemissa concludit oppositum majoris: et sic omnes syllogismos tres, ostensivum scilicet et duos conversivos secundum unam similitudinem probabilem habebit: et respondens in talibus cruciatur nesciens quo se vertat ad respondendum orationi: talis enim oratio semper in omnibus syllogismis ostensivis et conversivis secundum unam similitudinem probabilem vel interimet vel construet negando vel affirmando: quoniam affirmativa et negativa in talibus aequaliter sunt probabiles: propter quod necessarium est dubitare respondentem quid eligat ad respondendum.
Maxime ergo inter syllogizatas est hujusmodi oratio acris et amara quae facit conclusionem ex interrogationibus sive praemissis quae sunt ex aequo probabiles, et in ostensivis et conversivis syllogismis. Secunda autem post jam acris est, quae concludit ostensive ex omnibus praemissis similibus et falsis probabilibus: haec enim similiter (hoc est, secundum unam similitudinem) faciet dubitare quae interrogationum praemissarum interimenda sit, quando per interemptionem solvendum est: hoc autem est difficile et acre: quia respondens tunc scit propter conclusionem falsam, aliquam praemissarum interimendam: quam autem interimendum sit utrum majorem vel minorem est difficile videre et dubium: hae igitur orationes inter syllogizatas sunt acriores.
Litigiosarum autem sive non syllogizatarum orationum quae in forma syllogismi peccant, acris una quidem est quae primum quidem statim dubia est, utrum syllogizata est vel non, et utrum secundum falsum quod in conclusione est per interemptionem vel secundum divisionem sive distinctionem sit solutio: et haec quidem est acris sive acerrima: quia in illa ex pluribus est dubitatio. Secunda post istam acris, est inter litigiosas sive non syllogizatas, quae quidem manifesta est, quoniam quidem solvenda est vel per divisionem vel per interemptionem. Non autem evidens est per quam interrogationum praemissarum, utrum scilicet majoris vel minoris debeat solvi per interemptionem vel per distinctionem: quia nesciunt utrum major vel minor interimenda vel distinguenda sit, et utrum secundum conclusionem vel aliquam interrogationem praemissarum interimendo vel distinguendo solvendum sit, praecipue si praemissae quae sumuntur ad talem conclusionis falsae illationem sint valde improbabilis et valde falsae.
But the syllogistic speech or one syllogized, yet sinning in matter, is very sharp, that is, sharply sharp, but from it, with premises very apparent or probable and false, what is especially probable is destroyed. And this indeed is the cause and reason why, when there is one speech, that is, a demonstrative syllogism from probabilities concluding something probable, transposed in two convertive syllogisms concerning contradiction, that is, with the contradictory of the conclusion taken with one of the premises, it will have all the probable paralogisms, namely three: one demonstrative which concludes the false from probabilities; and another demonstrative which, with the contradictory of the conclusion together with the major proposition, concludes the opposite of the minor; and another convertive which, from the contradictory of the conclusion taken with the minor premise, concludes the opposite of the major; and thus it will have all three syllogisms, namely the demonstrative and the two convertive, according to one probable likeness. And the respondent is tortured in such things, not knowing where he should turn himself for responding to the speech; for such a speech always in all demonstrative and convertive syllogisms according to one probable likeness will either destroy or construct by denying or affirming, since affirmative and negative in such things are equally probable. Because of this it is necessary for the respondent to doubt what he should choose for responding.
Therefore especially among syllogized speeches a speech of this kind is sharp and bitter, which makes a conclusion from questions or premises which are equally probable, both in demonstrative and in convertive syllogisms. But the second speech sharp after this is one which concludes demonstratively from all premises similar, false, and probable. For this similarly, that is, according to one likeness, will make one doubt which of the questions of the premises must be destroyed, when it must be solved through destruction. But this is difficult and sharp, because then the respondent knows, on account of the false conclusion, that some premise must be destroyed; but which one must be destroyed, whether the major or the minor, is difficult and doubtful to see. Therefore these speeches are sharper among those syllogized.
But of contentious speeches or non-syllogized speeches which sin in the form of syllogism, one sharp speech is indeed that which first is immediately doubtful, whether it has been syllogized or not, and whether the solution is according to the false which is in the conclusion through destruction, or according to division or distinction; and this is sharp or very sharp, because in it there is doubt from several things. The second sharp after this, among contentious or non-syllogized speeches, is one which indeed is manifest, since it must be solved either through division or through destruction. But it is not evident through which question of the premises, namely of the major or the minor, it must be solved through destruction or through distinction, because they do not know whether the major or the minor must be destroyed or distinguished, and whether it must be solved according to the conclusion or by destroying or distinguishing some question of the premises, especially if the premises which are taken for such a false inference of the conclusion are very improbable and very false.
Adhuc autem et aliam divisionem tales habent orationes: quandoque enim propositionum sua gravitate quam faciunt, non sunt digna quaedam despici, hoc est, quod a respondente despiciantur: aliquando autem despicienda sunt sicut nullam habentia gravitatem: nam quando opponens intendit probare falsum, et deest sibi aliqua talium praemissarum interrogationum, ita quod omittit eam de qua tota vel maxime sequitur oratio sive solutio intenta, et propter quam sequitur conclusio sicut effectus propter causam, et ipse opponens non assumit hanc ut praemissam: tunc non syllogizat conclusionem intentam, et fatuus est syllogismus: quia tunc male ex vitio proprio opponit, et non ex vitio orationis: et hoc quilibet statim videt: et ideo oratio despicienda est. Quandoque autem omittit aliquam causarum quae extrinsecus assumuntur aliquando ad explanationem propositi vel ad dilatationem: tunc non propter hoc despiciendus est opponens ullo modo: sed tunc oratio quidem est habilis ad conclusionem, sed ipse interrogans increpandus est, quod non bene interrogat: quia non sufficienter explanat quod interrogat.
Oportet enim scire quod quemadmodum contingit tripliciter solvere, ita tripliciter contingit interrogare sive opponere. Est enim quodammodo solvere bene quandoque et hoc est solvere ad orationem: quandoque autem contingit solvere apparenter, et hoc est solvere ad interrogationem: quandoque autem contingit solvere neutro modo neque vere neque apparenter, sed tantum interimere impediendo opponentem. Per cautelas enim similiter tripliciter contingit interrogare et syllogizare ad positionem intentam sive construendo sive destruendo, quod est vere et bene opponere: et est opponere ad hominem respondentem scilicet, quod est apparenter opponere: et ad tempus occupandum impediendo respondentem: et tunc pluris temporis egens est solutio ut deliberet respondens quomodo de his respondeat quae inutiliter opponit interrogans, quam sit disputatio principalis quae praesentis temporis est inter opponentem et respondentem in quantum tempus exigitur ad veram propositae disputationis solutionem.
Further, such speeches also have another division. For sometimes, because of the gravity of the propositions which they make, certain ones are not worthy to be despised, that is, to be despised by the respondent; but sometimes they must be despised as having no gravity. For when the opponent intends to prove what is false, and some one of such premises of the questions is lacking to him, so that he omits that from which the whole speech or intended solution, or especially it, follows, and because of which the conclusion follows as an effect because of a cause, and the opponent himself does not assume this as a premise, then he does not syllogize the intended conclusion, and the syllogism is foolish, because then he objects badly from his own fault and not from a fault of the speech; and anyone immediately sees this; and therefore the speech must be despised. But sometimes he omits one of the causes which are sometimes assumed extrinsically for the explanation of the proposed thing or for its enlargement; then on account of this the opponent must not be despised in any way, but then the speech indeed is apt for the conclusion, yet the one asking must be rebuked because he does not ask well, since he does not sufficiently explain what he asks.
For one must know that just as it happens to solve in three ways, so it happens to ask or oppose in three ways. For in a certain way there is sometimes solving well, and this is solving to the speech; but sometimes it happens to solve apparently, and this is solving to the question; but sometimes it happens to solve in neither way, neither truly nor apparently, but only to destroy by hindering the opponent. For through safeguards similarly it happens in three ways to ask and syllogize to the intended position, either by constructing or by destroying, which is to oppose truly and well; and there is opposing to the respondent as a man, namely what is to oppose apparently; and there is opposing for occupying the time by hindering the respondent. And then the solution needs more time, so that the respondent may deliberate how he should respond to these things which the questioner uselessly opposes, than the principal disputation which at the present time is between the opponent and the respondent, insofar as time is required for the true solution of the proposed disputation.
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