Works › Sophistical Refutations, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 677–680
Tractate II. Chapter VI
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CAPUT VI. De solutione paralogismorum secundi modi figurae dictionis.
Hae autem orationes (quae sunt juxta secundum modum figurae dictionis) per commutationem praedicamenti quantum ad aptationem communis solutionis, et quantum ad manifestationem falsitatis syllogismi, sunt similes his quae dictae sunt de primo modo figurae dictionis. Verbi gratia siquidem supponatur, quod omne illud quod quis est habens in praeterito vel praesenti, et postea in futuro non habet, amisit: et hoc concedat respondens, et arguat in oppositum opponens dicens quod unum solum amittens digitum de decem digitis postea non habebit decem digitos, et inferat, ergo decem digitos amisit. Aut dicendum solvendo, quod haec est commutatio praedicamenti: quia in praemissa dicit, quod omne quod quis habens vel habuit, et postea non habet, amisit: ubi quod dicit substantiam: et quod intulit, sed decem habuit et unum solum non habuit, significat quid discretae quantitatis: et sic mutat praedicamentum. Patet ergo, quod opponens interrogans primo, quod habet, quod substantiam significat et colligit in eo quod quanta: quia assumens sub eo quod est, quod accipit quanta, ac si quanta sub eo quod est, quod, continerentur: quod non est verum: et ideo infert syllogismum: ergo decem amisit: quod non sequitur: quia mutatur quid in quantum: quia ex hoc quod conceditur: quidquid vel omne quod habuisti et non habes amisisti, non necessario sequitur, quanta habuisti et non habes, tanta amisisti: decem enim sunt quanta. Nec est hic paralogismus quod mutetur singulare et plurale, ut quidam dixerunt: quod patet ex hoc quod si commutatio numeri esset causa falsitatis, tunc remota causa cessaret effectus: hic autem proposito eodem numero, plurali scilicet, adhuc remanet idem peccatum, ut si dicatur sic: quaecumque habuisti et non habes nunc, amisisti: decem habuisti et non habes nunc: ergo decem amisisti. Hoc est idem peccatum quod prius: et non est numeri commutatio. Si ergo dixisset a principio opponens loco ejus, quod, ponens quanta quae sub quod assumuntur, sic: si quanta quis habuit et non habet, tanta amisit? nullus respondentium tanta dedisset eum necessario amisisse: sed dedisset sub disjunctione, quod aut tanta amisit, quanta habuit, aut aliquid eorum, sive aliquid quod summam quam habuit, diminuit.
Similis modus solvendi est quando mutatur quid in ad aliquid: ut si quis opponentium probet hanc conclusionem apparenter, quoniam dabit quis quod non habet, sic: iste dat unum solum: et id quod habet, non est unum solum: ergo dat quod non habet. Unum enim solum (cum dicat habitorum dissociationem cum aliis) relativum est, sicut et dicens associationem, et habet suum correlativum in suo nomine sicut et sociatum: sicut enim sociatum sociato est sociatum, ita dissociatum dissociato dissociatum: idem enim eidem est idem, et aequale aequali est aequale, et sic de aliis. Et si quis objiciat quod relativum est res unius generis, solum autem circuit omnia genera: est enim sola substantia, sola quantitas, sola qualitas, et sic de aliis: et sic solum non dicit qualitatem. Hoc est nihil: quia relatio in se considerata, res est unius generis: considerata autem in extremis ad quae determinatur suus respectus, circuit omnia genera. Solvitur ergo iste paralogismus sic: arguens non conclusit, quod non dedit quod non habuit: quia non habens unum solum, dedit unum solum: sed dedit ut non habuit: ut autem notat respectum dissociati ab aliis: quia haec dictio exclusiva, solum, non significat ut substantia, nec significat quantum, sed significat ut se habet aliquid ad aliquid ut illi dissociatum: et hoc dicit ad aliquid et non quid, vel quantum, vel quale: unde dedit non cum alio sociatum, habuit autem cum alio sociato.
CHAPTER VI. Concerning the solution of paralogisms of the second mode of figure of diction.
But these speeches, which are beside the second mode of figure of diction, through the commutation of predicament, as to the adaptation of the common solution and as to the manifestation of the falsity of the syllogism, are similar to those things which were said about the first mode of figure of diction. For example, if it is supposed that everything which someone has in the past or present and afterward in the future does not have, he has lost; and the respondent grants this, and the opponent argues to the opposite, saying that someone losing only one finger of ten fingers afterward will not have ten fingers, and he infers: therefore he has lost ten fingers. Or in solving one must say that this is a commutation of predicament, because in the premise he says that everything which someone has or had and afterward does not have, he has lost, where what signifies substance; and what he inferred, but he had ten and did not have only one, signifies a what of discrete quantity, and thus he changes the predicament. Therefore it is clear that the opponent, first asking what he has, which signifies substance, gathers in it what quantities, because by assuming under that which is what he accepts quantities, as if quantities were contained under that which is what; but this is not true. And therefore he infers a syllogism: therefore he has lost ten, which does not follow, because what is changed into how much. For from this which is granted, whatever or everything which you had and do not have, you have lost, it does not necessarily follow: however many things you had and do not have, so many you have lost; for ten are quantities. Nor is this paralogism that singular and plural are changed, as certain persons have said; and this is clear from the fact that if commutation of number were the cause of falsity, then once the cause had been removed the effect would cease. But here, with the same number proposed, namely plural, the same fault still remains, as if it is said thus: whatever things you had and do not have now, you have lost; you had ten and do not have them now; therefore you have lost ten. This is the same fault as before, and it is not commutation of number. Therefore if from the beginning the opponent had said, in place of what, putting quantities which are assumed under what, thus: if as many things as someone had and does not have, so many has he lost? none of the respondents would have granted that he necessarily lost so many; but he would have granted under a disjunction that either he lost as many as he had, or something of them, or something which diminished the sum which he had.
A similar mode of solving occurs when what is changed into relation: as if one of the opponents apparently proves this conclusion, that someone will give what he does not have, thus: this man gives one only; and what he has is not one only; therefore he gives what he does not have. For one only, since it states the dissociation of things had from others, is relative, just as also what states association is relative, and has its correlative in its name as also the associated does. For as the associated is associated with the associated, so the dissociated is dissociated from the dissociated; for the same is the same as the same, and the equal is equal to the equal, and so with the others. And if someone objects that a relative is a thing of one genus, but only runs through all genera, for there is only substance, only quantity, only quality, and so with the others, and thus only does not state quality, this is nothing, because relation considered in itself is a thing of one genus, but considered in the extremes to which its respect is determined, it runs through all genera. Therefore this paralogism is solved thus: the arguer did not conclude that he did not give what he did not have, because not having one only, he gave one only; but he gave as he did not have. But as notes the relation of something dissociated from others, because this exclusive word, only, does not signify as substance, nor does it signify quantity, but signifies as something has itself to something as dissociated from it; and this says relation and not what, or how much, or what sort. Hence he gave what was not associated with another, but he had it associated with another.
Hic autem modus solvendi tali confirmatur exemplo per simile dicente modum et unum quid: ut si quaeratur, putasne quod aliquis non habet, dabit? et dicente respondente, quod non, interrogando accipiat oppositiones, si aliquis quid (hoc est, aliquid) dabit cito quod non habet cito? et dicente respondente, quod sic, concludat oppositiones sic: iste dat cito quod non habet cito: ergo dat quod non habet. Constat quod causa falsitatis est, quia sub quod accipit cito, quod non dicit quod, sed modum habendi quod: et manifestum est quod non vero syllogismo syllogizavit, quia non accipit directe sub medio: quia cito dare non dicit hoc dare quod est substantia, sed modum dandi significat.
Aliud autem exemplum per quod confirmatur idem, est quia ut aliquis non habet aliquid, dabit aliquis, ut quod delectabiliter habet, cum tristitia dabit: et non ex hoc sequitur, quod dat quod non habet, sed quod hoc quod dat, non dat ut habet. Similes autem illi paralogismi sunt omnes hujusmodi orationes, in quibus mutatur quid in aliquid: sicut si quaeratur sic: putasne iste ea quam non habet manu percutiet aliquem: ponente respondente, quod non, contra opponens arguat dicens: sed non habet unam solam manum: et percutit una sola manu: ergo percutit ea quam non habet. Idem est hic: putasne eo (quem non habet) oculo videbit aliquis? et dicente respondente, non, opponens contra hoc probet dicens: non habet unum solum oculum: et uno solo oculo videt: ergo videt oculo quem non habet. In omnibus enim his una sola est solutio syllogismi manifestans falsitatem.
Solvunt autem quidam falsa solutione inductos de commutatione quid in ad aliquid paralogismos, quod bene contingit aliquem dare quod non habet dando unum solum, et non habendo unum solum et oculum et manum et denarium, qui plura habet in oculis et manibus et denariis: et hoc probant a simili: quia quidam (hoc est, aliquis) habet quod non accepit ab aliquo: quia accepit unum solum, et non habet unum solum: ergo habet quod accepit. Et arguunt a simili, quod similiter dando unum solum, et non habendo unum solum, dat quod non habet: et hoc dicunt contingere a simili: quia hic habet unum ab hoc dante sibi denarium, et non habet unum solum simpliciter, sed unum cum alio: sicut ergo habet quod non accepit: sic contingit eum dare quod non habet.
Alii autem solvunt primam interrogationem interimentes majorem, scilicet concedunt, quoniam contingit aliquem quod non habet accipere: sicut patet in eo qui ab aliquo vinum suave sive dulce, quod in acceptione conversum est, corrupto vino in ipsa acceptione: et sic dicunt, quod etiam contingit dare quod non habet. Sed improbatio istarum solutionum est id quod prius dictum est in solutione paralogismorum compositionis et divisionis. Isti enim non solvunt ad orationem, sed ad hominem instantes et non solventes per orationem: quia si esset ad orationem haec solutio, tunc dantem oppositum utriusque istarum solutionum non possibile esset solvere, sed dantem oppositum utriusque istarum solutionum adhuc contingit solvere: ergo istae solutiones non sunt ad orationem. Si enim damus, quod nemo dat quod non habet, neque aliquis habet quod non accepit. Adhuc per commutationem praedicamenti contingit solvere: et hoc probatur, quod scilicet tenet haec ratio per simile: quia si aliquis dicat per distinctionem esse solutionem alicujus paralogismi, ut si est quidem uno modo: tunc dicimus quod est, hoc est, dicimus quod verum est in uno sensu: est autem in alio sensu quod non, hoc est, quod tunc in alio sensu est falsum: et sic est solutio per distinctionem, et est recta solutio. Si autem simpliciter debet dici respondens, hoc est, uno modo, et non distinguat nec solvat per distinctionem: quia sic dat oppositum rectae solutionis: tunc dato tali opposito rectae solutionis adhuc sine impedimento concludet opponens intentam in sophismate conclusionem, sive in paralogismo: quia respondens syllogismi falsitatem non manifestat: sed si hoc est, et si (sive quamvis) exponens non concludat contra respondentem paralogismum, nihilominus tamen non erit solutio recta: quia quod non concludat, est propter impedimentum in solutione ad hominem et non ad orationem. In praedictis autem solutionibus omnibus datis oppositis solutionum illarum nec adhuc dicimus fieri syllogismum verum, sed potius paralogismum: ergo tales non sunt verae solutiones.
But this mode of solving is confirmed by such an example through a like case, stating a mode and one what. For if it is asked, do you think that someone will give what he does not have? and when the respondent says no, let him by questioning accept opposites, whether someone will give some what, that is, something, quickly which he does not have quickly; and when the respondent says yes, let him conclude the opposites thus: this man gives quickly what he does not have quickly; therefore he gives what he does not have. It is established that the cause of falsity is that under what he accepts quickly, which does not state the what, but the mode of having the what; and it is manifest that he did not syllogize by a true syllogism, because he does not accept directly under the middle, because to give quickly does not state this giving which is substance, but signifies the mode of giving.
But another example through which the same thing is confirmed is that as someone does not have something, someone will give it, as what he has delightfully he will give with sadness; and from this it does not follow that he gives what he does not have, but that what he gives he does not give as he has it. But like that paralogism are all speeches of this kind, in which what is changed into something, as if it is asked thus: do you think that this man will strike someone with the hand which he does not have? When the respondent posits no, against this let the opponent argue, saying: but he does not have one hand only, and he strikes with one hand only; therefore he strikes with the hand which he does not have. It is the same here: do you think that someone will see with the eye which he does not have? And when the respondent says no, against this the opponent proves, saying: he does not have one eye only, and with one eye only he sees; therefore he sees with an eye which he does not have. For in all these there is one sole solution of the syllogism manifesting falsity.
But certain people solve with a false solution the paralogisms introduced concerning the commutation of what into relation, saying that it well happens that someone gives what he does not have by giving one only and not having one only, and an eye and a hand and a denarius, since he has several things in eyes and hands and denarii. And they prove this from a like case, because someone, that is, some man, has what he did not receive from someone, because he received one only and does not have one only; therefore he has what he received. And they argue from a like case that similarly, by giving one only and not having one only, he gives what he does not have; and they say that this happens from a like case, because this man has one from this giver giving him a denarius, and he does not have one only simply, but one with another. Therefore just as he has what he did not receive, so it happens that he gives what he does not have.
But others solve the first question by destroying the major, namely they grant that it happens that someone receives what he does not have, as is clear in one who receives from someone sweet or pleasant wine, which is changed in the receiving, the wine having been corrupted in the very receiving; and thus they say that it also happens to give what one does not have. But the disproof of these solutions is what was said before in the solution of the paralogisms of composition and division. For these people do not solve to the speech, but press to the man and do not solve through the speech, because if this solution were to the speech, then it would not be possible to solve one giving the opposite of each of these solutions; but it still happens that one giving the opposite of each of these solutions can be solved. Therefore those solutions are not to the speech. For if we grant that no one gives what he does not have, nor does anyone have what he has not received, it still happens to solve through commutation of predicament; and this is proved, namely that this reasoning holds through a similar case: because if someone says through distinction that there is the solution of some paralogism, as if indeed it is in one way, then we say that it is, that is, we say that it is true in one sense; but in another sense it is what is not, that is, then it is false in another sense; and thus there is solution through distinction, and it is right solution. But if the respondent must speak simply, that is, in one way, and does not distinguish or solve through distinction, because thus he gives the opposite of right solution, then, with such an opposite of right solution given, the opponent will still without impediment conclude the intended conclusion in the sophism or in the paralogism, because the respondent does not manifest the falsity of the syllogism. But if this is so, and if, or although, the one expounding does not conclude a paralogism against the respondent, nevertheless it will not be right solution, because the fact that he does not conclude is because of an impediment in a solution to the man and not to the speech. But in all the aforesaid solutions, when the opposites of those solutions have been given, we still do not say that a true syllogism is made, but rather a paralogism; therefore such are not true solutions.
Amplius autem et hae orationes in quibus commutatur quid in quale, sunt ex hujusmodi orationibus in quibus ex commutatione praedicamenti incidit fallacia figurae dictionis. Et ut melius intelligatur, praesupponatur quod aliquis scripserit orationem, quae dum scribitur sit vera, et per commutationem rerum in oratione signatarum, facta et falsa: et arguatur sic, primo praemissa interrogatione: putasne quod scriptum est, scripsit quis? et dicente, quod sic, arguat opponens: scriptum autem est quoniam tu sedes: falsa oratio per rerum mutationem: erat autem haec oratio vera cum scribebatur: ergo scribebatur simul oratio falsa et vera. Est autem haec fallacia figurae dictionis: quia concessit respondens, quod hoc quod scriptum est, scripsit quis: et hoc significat substantiam: assumpsit autem, quod falsum scripsit, quod est qualem orationem scribere: et sic commutavit quid in quale: nam falsam vel veram orationem esse, non hoc (hoc est, substantiam et quid) sed talem significat esse orationem: et sic mutavit quid in quale. Et eadem oratio sic commutata per rerum mutationem est etiam in opinione: quia (sicut in Praedicamentis dictum est) oratio et opinio, rerum mutatione, susceptiva sunt contrariorum veri et falsi.
Si forte aliquis dicat, quod commutatio praedicamenti non est causa fallaciae, sed potius commutatio rerum et temporis, et hoc probet: quia remota commutatione temporis et rerum, non incidit fallacia: bene enim sequitur: quidquid aliquis scripsit, hoc etiam in hoc tempore scriptum est: falsam orationem scripsit quis hic intus: ergo in hoc tempore falsa oratio scripta est: bonum est argumentum: et tamen quid in quale mutatur: ergo commutatio ejus quod est quid in quale, non facit fallaciam. Si, inquam, sic dicatur, dico quod commutatio temporis facit mutationem in qualitate orationis, sed non in processu vel decursu syllogistico: unde quod argumentatio in tali casu tenet, hoc est, gratia materiae et terminorum: forma tamen syllogismi non valet: eo quod quale fuit in minori sub quid, quod pro medio sumpsit in majori: et hoc planum est: sed quia per scriptum falsum omne hic et nunc restringitur ad id quod scriptum est, ideo tenet gratia terminorum: hic enim et nunc non scribitur quale ut quale, sed quid. Simile est hic: quidquid vidisti heri, vides hodie: sed heri vidisti album: ergo hodie vides album. Hic est commutatio quid in quale, et est fallacia figurae dictionis.
Et si objiciatur, quod quidquid non est nisi geminatum quid, et ideo non habet virtutem distribuendi, nisi pro eo quod dicit quid: quid autem dicit quod omnium praedicamentorum, ut dicitur in primo Topicorum, ergo videtur quod bene dicitur, et argumentum est bonum: heri vidisti album: ergo hodie vides album: quia album dicit quid in genere qualitatis. Dicendum quod hoc verum est, quod quidquid distribuit pro omni quod est quid in omni genere praedicamentorum: sed concretum sive quale non dicit quid ut quid, sed dicit quale: sed abstractum dicit quid ut quid. Et ideo bene sequitur, si sic arguatur: quidquid vidisti heri, vides hodie: sed heri vidisti albedinem: ergo hodie vides albedinem.
Further, those speeches in which what is changed into what sort are from speeches of this kind in which the fallacy of figure of diction occurs from commutation of predicament. And so that it may be better understood, let it be presupposed that someone has written a speech which, while it is being written, is true, and through a change of the things signified in the speech has become false; and let it be argued thus, with the question first set forth: do you think that what is written, someone wrote? And when he says yes, let the opponent argue: but it is written that you sit, a false speech through the change of things; but this speech was true when it was being written; therefore a false and true speech was being written at once. But this is a fallacy of figure of diction, because the respondent granted that someone wrote this which is written, and this signifies substance; but he assumed that he wrote a false thing, which is to write a speech of such a sort, and thus he changed what into what sort. For to be a false or true speech does not signify this, that is, substance and what, but signifies the speech to be such; and thus he changed what into what sort. And the same speech thus changed through the change of things is also in opinion, because, as was said in the Categories, speech and opinion, by change of things, are receptive of the contraries true and false.
If perhaps someone says that commutation of predicament is not the cause of the fallacy, but rather the change of things and time, and proves this because, when the change of time and things has been removed, the fallacy does not occur, for it follows well: whatever someone wrote, this also was written at this time; someone wrote a false speech here inside; therefore at this time a false speech was written; the argument is good, and yet what is changed into what sort; therefore commutation of that which is what into what sort does not make a fallacy. If, I say, it is said thus, I say that the change of time makes a change in the quality of the speech, but not in the syllogistic process or course. Hence that the argumentation holds in such a case is by reason of the matter and the terms; nevertheless the form of the syllogism is not valid, because what sort was in the minor under what, which he took as middle in the major; and this is plain. But because through the written false thing every here and now is restricted to that which is written, therefore it holds by reason of the terms. For here and now a what sort as what sort is not written, but a what. It is similar here: whatever you saw yesterday, you see today; but yesterday you saw a white thing; therefore today you see a white thing. Here there is a commutation of what into what sort, and it is a fallacy of figure of diction.
And if it is objected that whatever is nothing except a doubled what, and therefore does not have the power of distributing except for that which says what; but what says the what of all predicaments, as is said in the first book of the Topics; therefore it seems that it is well said, and the argument is good: yesterday you saw a white thing; therefore today you see a white thing, because white says what in the genus of quality. One must say that this is true, that whatever distributes for every thing which is what in every genus of predicaments; but the concrete or what sort does not say what as what, but says what sort; whereas the abstract says what as what. And therefore it follows well if it is argued thus: whatever you saw yesterday, you see today; but yesterday you saw whiteness; therefore today you see whiteness.
Si quis autem objiciens adhuc dicat, quod album non videtur nisi albedo videatur, et e converso: quia qualitas non videtur nisi in subjecto: et sic convertibilia sunt videre album, et videre albedinem: et quicumque videt album, videt albedinem: et quicumque videt albedinem, videt album. Et si convertibilia sunt eodem addito utrobique sive utrique, quidquid sequitur ex uno, sequitur ex altero: sed cum addito (quod est major propositio) ex hoc quod est, vidisti albedinem, sequitur conclusio sic: quidquid vidisti heri, vides hodie. Et addo: heri vidisti albedinem. Sequitur bona argumentatione: ergo hodie vides albedinem: ergo convertibili addito ad majorem propositionem: convertibili dico cum minori propositione majorem, etiam sequitur sic: quidquid vidisti heri, vides hodie: album vidisti heri: ergo album vides hodie. Ad hoc dicendum, quod forma hujus argumentationis non valet: quia sumitur quale ut quale et non ut quid sub quidquid, quod distribuitur pro his quae sunt quid ut quid: quod autem hoc sequatur in praedicto casu, quod scilicet non videtur album nisi videatur albedo, hoc est gratia terminorum et per accidens, scilicet quia album non videtur nisi albedine movente visum.
Quidam tamen dixerunt rationibus supradictis, quod argumentatio bona est: quidquid heri vidisti, vides hodie: album vidisti heri, ergo album vides hodie. Et si objicitur, ponatur quod res quam heri vidisti albam, sit hodie nigra, dicunt quod adhuc argumentatio bona est sed major falsa: dicunt enim quod quidquid distribuit pro omnibus rebus quae se habent ad quidquid heri quis vidit: hodie autem non sic se habet: et ideo falsa est major. Sed prior responsio verior est. Si tamen album substantive sumatur, tunc verum est, quod quidquid vidisti heri, vides hodie: sed album vidisti heri: ergo album vides hodie. Quia substantivum album supponit pro eo quod est vel quod fuit album. In talibus autem quantum ad praesentem intentionem non est vis magna: non enim intenditur hic nisi quod ex commutatione praedicamenti quid in quale vitiatur processus.
Similiter de hujusmodi orationibus est, quando mutatur quid in modum, ut putas quod discit quis, hoc discit? discit autem, hoc est tarde cito: ergo tarde discere, est cito discere. Patet quod commutatur quid in modum: et levia sunt hujusmodi, et ideo transeunda. Et similiter et fallacia figurae dictionis si mutatur quid in quando, ut putas quod ambulat quis hoc calcat? et dicente, quod sic, objicit in contrarium: sed ambulat totam diem: ergo calcat totam diem. Et est commutatio praedicamenti: quia in majori sub quod, dicit substantiam, assumit cum vel quando ambulat. Similiter est quando mutatur quid in ubi, sicut si sic dicatur: quidquid bibit aliquis, hoc bibit: sed scypho bibit aliquis: ergo scyphum bibit. Mutatur quid in ubi: quia scyphus dicit locum ut vas in quo bibit, et non dicit quid. Similiter est quando mutatur numerus singularis in pluralem sic: omne quod scit aliquis, aut addiscens aut inveniens novit: ergo omnia quae scit aliquis aut addiscens aut inveniens novit. Quod non est verum demonstratis duobus, quorum unum est per se inveniens: aliud autem novit addiscens per auditum: ambo enim haec simul non addiscens novit, nec inveniens. Solutio autem est, quod omne quod novit, significat demonstratum, aut addiscens
But if someone still objecting says that a white thing is not seen unless whiteness is seen, and conversely, because quality is not seen except in a subject, and thus seeing a white thing and seeing whiteness are convertible; and whoever sees a white thing sees whiteness, and whoever sees whiteness sees a white thing. And if they are convertible when the same addition is added on both sides or to each, whatever follows from one follows from the other. But with the addition, which is the major proposition, from this which is, you saw whiteness, the conclusion follows thus: whatever you saw yesterday, you see today. And I add: yesterday you saw whiteness. It follows by good argumentation: therefore today you see whiteness; therefore, with the convertible added to the major proposition, I mean the major as convertible with the minor proposition, it also follows thus: whatever you saw yesterday, you see today; you saw a white thing yesterday; therefore you see a white thing today. To this one must say that the form of this argumentation is not valid, because a what sort as what sort, and not as what, is taken under whatever, which is distributed for those things which are what as what. But that this follows in the aforesaid case, namely that a white thing is not seen unless whiteness is seen, is by reason of the terms and accidentally, namely because a white thing is not seen unless whiteness moves the sight.
Certain people, however, have said from the aforesaid reasonings that the argumentation is good: whatever you saw yesterday, you see today; you saw a white thing yesterday; therefore you see a white thing today. And if it is objected, let it be posited that the thing which you saw white yesterday is black today, they say that the argumentation is still good but the major is false. For they say that whatever distributes for all realities which have themselves toward whatever someone saw yesterday; but today it does not so have itself, and therefore the major is false. But the prior response is truer. If, however, white is taken substantively, then it is true that whatever you saw yesterday, you see today; but you saw a white thing yesterday; therefore you see a white thing today. Because the substantive white supposes for that which is or was white. But in such matters, as to the present intention, there is no great force; for nothing is intended here except that from the commutation of the predicament what into what sort, the process is vitiated.
Similarly concerning speeches of this kind it is so when what is changed into mode, as: do you think that what someone learns, he learns? But he learns, that is, slowly, quickly; therefore to learn slowly is to learn quickly. It is clear that what is changed into mode; and things of this sort are light, and therefore to be passed over. And similarly there is a fallacy of figure of diction if what is changed into when, as: do you think that what someone walks, he treads? And when he says yes, he objects to the contrary: but he walks the whole day; therefore he treads the whole day. And there is commutation of predicament, because in the major under what, he states substance, and he assumes with or when he walks. Similarly it is when what is changed into where, as if it is said thus: whatever someone drinks, this he drinks; but someone drinks in a cup; therefore he drinks a cup. What is changed into where, because cup states a place as the vessel in which he drinks, and does not state what. Similarly it is when singular number is changed into plural thus: everything which someone knows, he knows either by learning or by discovering; therefore all things which someone knows, he knows either by learning or by discovering. This is not true when two things have been shown, one of which he discovers by himself, and the other he knows by learning through hearing; for he does not know both these together by learning, nor by discovering. But the solution is that everything which he knows signifies a thing shown, or by learning
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