Works › Sophistical Refutations, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 643–644
Tractate VI. Chapter II
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CAPUT II. De praeambulis ad intellectum eorum quibus aliquis ducitur ad metam nugationis.
Ad intellectum autem eorum quibus aliquis ducitur ad metam nugationis, praeintelligendum est, quod nugatio est inutilis repetitio ejusdem ex eadem parte orationis, sicut ex parte praedicati vel ex parte subjecti. Si enim idem simul ponatur ex parte subjecti, et iterum repetatur ex parte praedicati, non erit nugatio. Ad hoc autem intelligendum (quod ejusdem repetitio facit nugationem) notandum quod repetitio ejusdem, aut fit sub eodem nomine, aut fit manente eadem habitudine nominis, aut sub diversa habitudine. Si fit manente habitudine, sic semper est nugatio, quod est ejusdem repetitio inutilis, et exterminari non potest, sive sit repetitio ejusdem manente copulatione, sive fiat sine copulatione: ut homo homo currit: vel homo et homo currit: vel homo currit currit: vel homo currit et currit. Si autem diversa sit habitudo sic, quod unum fit subjectum vel praedicatum et alterum determinatio ejus, non est nugatio, ut homo homo, homo est, humanus vel rationalis homo: vel homo currit currit, hoc est, continue vel velociter currit: non est nugatio, sicut in V Topicorum, ubi dicit Aristoteles quod quidam secundum levitatem assignaverunt proprium ignis dicentes, quod ignis est corpus levissimum corporum: ibi enim fit ejusdem repetitio sub habitudinis diversis: quia corpus ibi ponitur cum recto ut determinet dependentiam verbi ex parte appositi: sed ponitur corporum in obliquo ad determinandum excessum et respectum superlativi: nec increpat Aristoteles hoc proprium quod sit iterum nugatio, sed ideo quia ejusdem repetitio in diversa habitudine conturbat audientem: et ideo non est optime assignatum proprium, sed tamen est proprium. Et hic intellectus accipitur ex quodam capitulo quod est epistola de Caloagaton, quod est idem quod de bono bono, hoc est, perfecto bono.
Si autem repetatur idem sub diverso nomine et ex eadem parte orationis, hoc fit aut sub nominibus synonimis, aut sub non synonimis. Si fit sub synonimis: aut hoc fit ad repraesentandum idem secundum idem, aut repraesentandum aliud et aliud. Si primo modo fit, semper est nugatio. Si secundo modo, ut si unum sit ut nomen rei, alterum ut pronomen vel cognomen ejusdem, non est nugatio, ut Marcus Tullius Cicero Augur Scaevola. Illa enim sunt pronomina vel cognomina vel agnomina Marci Tullii: sicut et hic, Boetius Annius Severinus. Primum enim est necessarium, et alia adduntur causa explanationis. Si autem sit ad repraesentandum idem et eodem modo: tunc semper est nugatio. Si autem repetitur idem sub diversis nominibus non synonimis: hoc non potest esse nisi per intellectum unius in altero: et hoc oportet, quod sit altero duorum modorum quo intelligitur unum in altero: aut enim unum intelligitur in altero, ita quod actu et intellectu est in illo: aut ita intelligitur unum in altero, quod positum est in ipso: sicut quod est dependens, intelligitur in eo quod secundum rem dependet ad ipsum, sicut subjectum intelligitur in passione per se. Si primo modo unum in alio intelligatur, tunc se habent ad invicem sicut superius et inferius: et sic superius erit pars essentialis inferioris, inferius autem pars subjectiva superioris. Et tunc altero duorum modorum contingit: aut enim additur superius inferiori, aut e converso inferius additur superiori. Si superius addatur inferiori: tunc semper fit nugatio: eo quod superius et potentia et actu et intellectu repetitur in inferiori: quare est inutilis repetitio. Si autem e converso inferius addatur superiori, hoc dupliciter fieri potest: aut enim fit haec additio ad aliquid unum figurandum quod ex inferiori et superiori constituatur conjunctum ex utroque, aut additur inferius superiori, ut superius ex inferiori specificetur. Priori modo semper est nugatio: quia illud unum quod constituitur, satis importatur per inferius: et inutilis est repetitio superioris. Si autem secundo modo fiat, non est nugatio: quia repetitio inferioris non est inutilis, ut animal homo. Si autem unum intelligatur in alio potentia, hoc iterum potest esse dupliciter: quia aut unum intelligitur in altero sibi coaequaevo, aut unum intelligitur in altero quod est posterius illo. Si est unum in altero sibi coaequaevo: tunc hoc est sicut unum correlativorum est in altero, quod additum illi non facit nugationem: quia additur non inutiliter, sed ad determinationem respectu relativi, ut cum dicitur duplum dimidii. Si autem additur sicut posterius priori, sicut additur passio in qua passione potentia intelligitur subjectum, hoc dupliciter fieri potest: quia passio aut est convertibilis cum suo subjecto, aut inconvertibilis. Si convertibilis, sic semper est nugatio in additione: quia inutiliter repetitur subjectum in nomine passionis, ut cum dicitur simum nasus. In simo enim intelligitur nasus: et nihil est simum nisi nasus quidam1. Si autem non est convertibilis, sed in minus quam subjectum: tunc ad determinandum subjectum additur proprietas subjecto, et tunc est nugatio: ut cum dicitur nasus simus: et sic facile patere potest quando repetitio ejusdem ex eadem parte orationis facit nugationem, et quando non.
CHAPTER II. Concerning the preliminaries for understanding those things by which someone is led to the goal of nugation.
But for understanding those things by which someone is led to the goal of nugation, it must be understood beforehand that nugation is a useless repetition of the same thing from the same part of speech, as from the part of the predicate or from the part of the subject. For if the same thing is posited at once from the part of the subject and again is repeated from the part of the predicate, it will not be nugation. But for understanding this, that repetition of the same thing makes nugation, it must be noted that repetition of the same thing is made either under the same name, or while the same relation of the name remains, or under a diverse relation. If it is made while the relation remains, thus it is always nugation, which is the useless repetition of the same thing, and it cannot be banished, whether it is a repetition of the same thing with the copulation remaining, or whether it is made without copulation: as, a man a man runs; or, a man and a man runs; or, a man runs runs; or, a man runs and runs. But if the relation is diverse in such a way that one becomes subject or predicate and the other its determination, it is not nugation, as man man, man is, a human or rational man; or a man runs runs, that is, runs continually or swiftly; it is not nugation, as in book V of the Topics, where Aristotle says that some assigned the property of fire according to lightness, saying that fire is the lightest body of bodies. For there repetition of the same thing is made under diverse relations, because body is there posited with the nominative in order to determine the dependence of the verb from the part of the apposite; but bodies is posited in the oblique case to determine the excess and respect of the superlative. Nor does Aristotle criticize this property because it is again nugation, but because repetition of the same thing in a diverse relation disturbs the hearer; and therefore the property is not assigned best, but nevertheless it is a property. And this understanding is taken from a certain chapter which is an epistle about the Caloagathon, which is the same as about the good good, that is, perfect good.
But if the same thing is repeated under a diverse name and from the same part of speech, this is done either under synonymous names or under non-synonymous names. If it is done under synonyms, either this is done for representing the same thing according to the same thing, or for representing one thing and another. If it is done in the first mode, it is always nugation. If in the second mode, as if one is as the name of the thing and the other as a pronoun or cognomen of the same thing, it is not nugation, as Marcus Tullius Cicero Augur Scaevola. For those are pronouns or cognomina or agnomina of Marcus Tullius, as also here, Boethius Annius Severinus. For the first is necessary, and the others are added for the sake of explanation. But if it is for representing the same thing and in the same mode, then it is always nugation. But if the same thing is repeated under diverse non-synonymous names, this cannot be except through the understanding of one in the other. And this must be in one or the other of the two modes by which one is understood in another: for either one is understood in another in such a way that actually and intellectually it is in that; or one is understood in another in such a way that it is posited in it, as what is dependent is understood in that on which it depends according to reality, as a subject is understood in a passion per se. If in the first mode one is understood in another, then they stand to one another as higher and lower; and thus the higher will be the essential part of the lower, and the lower the subjective part of the higher. And then it happens in one of two modes: for either the higher is added to the lower, or conversely the lower is added to the higher. If the higher is added to the lower, then nugation is always made, because the higher is repeated in the lower both potentially and actually and intellectually; wherefore it is a useless repetition. But if conversely the lower is added to the higher, this can be made in two ways: for either this addition is made for figuring some one thing which is constituted from the lower and the higher conjoined from each, or the lower is added to the higher so that the higher is specified from the lower. In the prior mode there is always nugation, because that one thing which is constituted is sufficiently implied through the lower, and the repetition of the higher is useless. But if it is made in the second mode, it is not nugation, because the repetition of the lower is not useless, as animal man. But if one is understood in another potentially, this again can be in two ways, because either one is understood in another coaeval with itself, or one is understood in another which is posterior to it. If one is in another coaeval with itself, then this is as one of correlatives is in another, which when added to it does not make nugation, because it is not added uselessly, but for the determination with respect to the relative, as when double of half is said. But if it is added as posterior to prior, as a passion is added in which passion the subject is understood potentially, this can be in two ways, because the passion is either convertible with its subject or inconvertible. If convertible, thus there is always nugation in the addition, because the subject is uselessly repeated in the name of the passion, as when snub nose is said. For in snub nose is understood, and nothing is snub except a certain nose1. But if it is not convertible, but is in fewer things than the subject, then the property is added to the subject for determining the subject, and then there is nugation, as when snub nose is said; and thus it can easily be clear when repetition of the same thing from the same part of speech makes nugation, and when not.
Adhuc autem praenotandum est, quod ars ducendi ad nugationem consistit in hoc quod unum per intellectum est in alio. Ex hoc enim contingit ejusdem iteratio et inutilis multiplicatio. Sed pluralitas modorum intelligendi unum in alio est triplex: quia unum scilicet intelligitur in alio ut prius in posteriori: et hoc dupliciter, vel tanquam superius in inferiori, ut animal in homine, vel ut subjectum in passione, ut nasus in simo, et unum in alio ut in coaequaevo ad quod determinatur respectus ejus, ut unum relativum in alio: quorum trium exempla sunt: Socrates est homo: homo est animal rationale: ergo Socrates est animal rationale. Quia in homine intelligitur animal rationale. Et nasus est simus: simus autem quidam nasus: ergo simus est nasus nasus. Duplum est dimidii: et duplum est dimidii duplum: ergo duplum est duplum dimidii duplum: quia in dimidio intelligitur duplum.
Praenotandum etiam, quod apud sophistam deductio ad nugationem est violentior et magis intenta quam deductio ad solaecismum.
Further it must be prenoted that the art of leading to nugation consists in this, that one thing is in another through the intellect. For from this there happens the iteration of the same thing and useless multiplication. But the plurality of modes of understanding one thing in another is threefold, because one is understood in another as prior in posterior; and this in two ways, either as higher in lower, as animal in man, or as subject in passion, as nose in snub; and one thing is in another as in a coaeval thing to which its respect is determined, as one relative in another. Examples of these three are: Socrates is a man; man is a rational animal; therefore Socrates is a rational animal, because in man rational animal is understood. And a nose is snub; but a snub is a certain nose; therefore a snub is nose nose. Double is of half; and double is the double of half; therefore double is the double double of half, because in half double is understood.
It must also be prenoted that among the sophist deduction to nugation is more violent and more intended than deduction to solecism.
Notes
- Consider here how he wishes snubness to be a passion convertible with nose. (Considera hic quomodo vult simitatem esse passionem cum naso convertibilem.) ↩
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