Works › Sophistical Refutations, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 597–608
Tractate III. Chapters XX-XXI; Tractate IV. Chapters I-IV
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et haec una, homo est animal rationale mortale: et haec una, homo est risibile: et haec una, homo est albus. A privatione autem hujus unitatis in praedicato vel in subjecto vel in utroque dicitur propositio plures: quia scilicet vel unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno, vel plura de pluribus vel annuntiantur vel proponuntur vel interrogantur, sicut in his exemplis: Socrates et Plato currunt. Vel Plato legit et disputat. Vel Socrates et Plato legunt et disputant. Et quando unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno, vel plura de pluribus, sub unica nota interrogationis interrogantur: tunc enim plures interrogationes ut una: et dicitur plures propter plura interrogata: et dicitur ut una propter hoc quod sub unica nota interrogationis ponuntur, sicut patet in his exemplis, estne Socrates et Plato animal? Legitne Socrates et disputat? Et Socrates et Plato leguntne et disputant? In omnibus enim his est plures interrogationes ut una.
Et ideo unitas notae interrogandi sive modi interrogandi, eo quod formalis est in interrogatione (quia facit interrogationem potentia actu interrogationem) est principium motivum sive causa apparentiae in hac fallacia: propter unitatem enim modi putat aliquis etiam interrogatum esse unum: et causa non existentiae sive defectus sive falsitatis est diversitas sive pluralitas interrogatorum sub una nota interrogationis: et ex his duobus constituitur locus sophisticus, qui dicitur et est fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam.
Ex his patere potest, quare fallacia haec dicitur secundum plures interrogationes ut unam, vel secundum plures enuntiationes ut unam: peccat enim haec fallacia sicut et omnes aliae extra dictionem contra ordinem propositionum in syllogismo dialectico, quae ordine localis habitudinis se habent ad conclusionem. Quia igitur dialectica propositio est interrogatio et per modum interrogationis proponenda respondenti, ideo melius dicitur fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam, quam secundum plures propositiones ut unam. Et hujus ratio est, quia propositio dialectica primo omnium interrogatur, quam proponatur: et sic causa apparentiae primo apparet in interrogatione, et per consequens in propositione: ab eo ergo in quo primo apparet, recipit denominationem, et non ab eo in quo apparet posterius.
Adhuc autem notandum, quod plura contingit interrogare dupliciter: sicut etiam plura contingit significari dupliciter: aut enim plura interrogantur per modum unius in dictione vel oratione una: et talis interrogatio non causat hanc fallaciam quae dicitur secundum plures interrogationes ut unam, sed potius fallaciam aequivocationis vel amphibologiae vel alterius fallaciae in dictione. Si autem plura interrogantur, ut plura significantur per modum plurium sub una nota interrogationis proposita, illud solum facit hanc fallaciam quae dicitur plures interrogationes ut una. Ut, estne hoc et hoc homo, demonstratis Brunello et Socrate? haec enim plura referuntur ad unum quod est una demonstratio in isto nomine. Ita cum dicitur, suntne ista homo, vel in his hoc et hoc? oportet enim semper quod plura in hac fallacia ad unum aliquod referantur, scilicet vel ad unum propositionis, vel generis, vel speciei, vel numeri, vel demonstrationis: quia talis unitas in principium motivum est aliquo modo quae credere facit unam dandam esse responsionem.
Adhuc observandum, quod licet tria possint esse interrogata, vel quatuor, vel forte plura: tamen Aristoteles vocat hanc fallaciam secundum duas interrogationes ut una. Tum quia ita frequenter fit. Tum quia magis latet et decipit in duabus quam in pluribus. Tum quia, ut dicit Pythagoras, principium omnium pluralitatum est dualitas. Tum etiam quia major numerus ponit minorem et non e converso.
and this one: man is a rational mortal animal; and this one: man is risible; and this one: man is white. But from the privation of this unity in the predicate or in the subject or in both, a proposition is called several, because namely either one thing is announced or proposed or asked about several, or several about one, or several about several, as in these examples: Socrates and Plato run. Or Plato reads and disputes. Or Socrates and Plato read and dispute. And when one thing about several, or several about one, or several about several, are asked under a single mark of interrogation, then there are several questions as one; and it is called several because of the several things asked, and it is called as one because they are placed under a single mark of interrogation, as is clear in these examples: are Socrates and Plato animal? Does Socrates read and dispute? And do Socrates and Plato read and dispute? For in all these there are several questions as one.
And therefore the unity of the mark of asking or of the mode of asking, because it is formal in interrogation, for it makes the interrogation that is in potency to be an interrogation in act, is the moving principle or cause of appearance in this fallacy. For because of the unity of mode someone thinks that the thing asked is also one; and the cause of non-existence or defect or falsity is the diversity or plurality of the things asked under one mark of interrogation; and from these two is constituted the sophistical place which is called, and is, the fallacy according to several questions as one.
From these things it can be clear why this fallacy is called according to several questions as one, or according to several enunciations as one. For this fallacy sins, like all the others outside diction, against the order of propositions in a dialectical syllogism, which according to the order of a local relation have themselves toward a conclusion. Therefore, because a dialectical proposition is an interrogation and must be proposed to the respondent by way of interrogation, it is better called the fallacy according to several questions as one than according to several propositions as one. And the reason for this is that a dialectical proposition first of all is asked, before it is proposed; and thus the cause of appearance first appears in the interrogation, and consequently in the proposition; therefore it receives its denomination from that in which it first appears, and not from that in which it appears later.
Again it must be noted that it happens to ask several things in two ways, just as it also happens to signify several things in two ways. For either several things are asked by way of one thing in a diction or in one speech, and such an interrogation does not cause this fallacy which is called according to several questions as one, but rather the fallacy of equivocation or amphibology or another fallacy in diction. But if several things are asked as several things are signified by way of several under one proposed mark of interrogation, only that makes this fallacy which is called several questions as one. As: are this and this a man, with Brunellus and Socrates pointed out? For these several things are referred to one, which is one demonstration in that name. So when it is said, are these a man, or in these this and this? For it is always necessary that several things in this fallacy be referred to some one thing, namely either to one of proposition, or of genus, or of species, or of number, or of demonstration; because such unity is in some way the moving principle which makes one believe that one answer must be given.
Again it must be observed that although three can be the things asked, or four, or perhaps more, nevertheless Aristotle calls this fallacy according to two questions as one: both because it is frequently made so, and because it is more hidden and deceives more in two than in many, and because, as Pythagoras says, the principle of all pluralities is duality, and also because a greater number posits a smaller, and not conversely.
Ex his autem patet, quia quae uniuntur ut plura, aut uniuntur in demonstratione una, aut in aliqua forma: quia omnis demonstratio est respectu alicujus formae. Ut cum dico demonstrato uno caeco et altero vidente, suntne ista caeca vel videntia? una demonstratione uniuntur: et postea in aliqua forma: quia intelligitur ista animalia vel corpora. Quandoque etiam una interrogatio fit de partibus ejusdem contradictionis, ut estne Socrates animal, vel non? Quandoque etiam de partibus est diversarum contradictionum: et sic fit deceptio secundum plures interrogationes ut unam, et maxime propter notam unicam interrogationis, ut dictum est. Sic ergo intelligendum est de fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam.
CAPUT XXI. De fallacia secundum plures interrogationes ut unam.
His praenotatis, dicendum quod paralogismi qui fiunt in eo quod opponentes sophistice plures interrogationes ut unam faciunt, vel unam faciunt: quia faciunt formaliter, quod una nota est interrogationis, et si materialiter plura sint quae interrogantur: propter quam notam unius interrogationis latet ipsos respondentes materialiter plures esse interrogationes: et ideo unius interrogationis assignatur responsio una ab ipsis respondentibus. In aliquibus ergo interrogationibus facile est videre, quoniam interrogatio est plures, et quia non una responsio est reddenda, ut quando plura quaeruntur de uno, ut quando quaeritur utrum terra mare est aut caelum? quae ut plura non unica de uno quaeruntur. In aliquibus autem aliis quae in uno aliquo uniuntur vel uniri videntur, una apparet: et ipsi respondentes concedunt, quod una sit interrogatio, et unicam dant responsionem: et ideo vel ad interrogatum non respondent, ut eis falsum obviat: aut redargui videntur, et videtur eis fieri elenchus. Cujus exemplum est, ut putas hic et hic est homo? demonstratis Socrate et Platone: et si dixerit, hic et hic est homo, inferat opponens: hic et hic est homo: ergo hic et hic est unus homo: ergo qui percusserit hunc et hunc, hominem et non homines percutiet: et hoc inconveniens obviat danti unam responsionem, ut dixisset, iste est homo, et ille est homo. Aut rursum si plura in plurali numero quaerantur de pluribus pluraliter significatis: ut si demonstratis pluribus pluraliter significatis (quorum quaedam sunt bona et quaedam non bona) quaeratur, utrum omnia ista sunt bona aut non bona? utrum enim dixerit respondens, hoc est, quamcumque partem contradictionis dederit: aut accidit ei falsum apparens evidenter, hoc est, manifeste falsum et hoc videbitur ei facere opponens deducendo eum ad manifeste falsum: aut est (hoc est, contingit) quod videbitur eidem respondenti facere elenchum. Si enim dicat, quod sunt bona, statim infert, ergo non bona sunt bona, quod est apparens falsum: aut elenchum faciat ei dicens, ergo haec non bona sunt, quae tu dixisti quod bona.
Quandoque autem in assumptis quibusdam et suppositis et in talibus elenchus fiet verus, ita quod respondens ducitur ad contradictionem: ut si quis concedat et supponat similiter (hoc est, secundum similitudinem unam) unum in singulari et plura in plurali dici diffinitione simili: nam secundum illam suppositionem si caecum est id quod non habet visum, natum autem habere: tunc etiam caeca erunt quae non habent visum, nata autem sunt habere visum: demonstratis ergo duobus quando hoc quidem unum habet visum, illud autem aliud non habet visum, sed est caecum, interrogato suntne ista caeca vel videntia? si unam dederit responsionem vel affirmando vel negando, inferet respondens, quod ambo erunt videntia, vel ambo caeca, quod impossibile est.
From these things it is clear that the things which are united as several either are united in one demonstration or in some form, because every demonstration is with respect to some form. As when I say, with one blind person and another seeing person pointed out: are these blind or seeing? They are united by one demonstration, and afterward in some form, because these are understood to be animals or bodies. Sometimes also one interrogation is made concerning the parts of the same contradiction, as, is Socrates animal or not? Sometimes also it is concerning the parts of diverse contradictions; and thus deception is made according to several questions as one, and especially because of the single mark of interrogation, as was said. Thus therefore one must understand concerning the fallacy according to several questions as one.
CHAPTER XXI. On the fallacy according to several questions as one.
With these things noted beforehand, it must be said that the paralogisms which are made in this, that opponents sophistically make several questions as one, or make one, because they make it formally that there is one mark of interrogation, even if materially there are several things which are asked, on account of which mark of one interrogation it is hidden from the respondents themselves that materially there are several questions; and therefore one answer to one question is assigned by the respondents themselves. Therefore in some interrogations it is easy to see that the interrogation is several and that one answer should not be returned, as when several things are asked about one, as when it is asked whether earth is sea or heaven, which as several are not asked uniquely about one. But in certain other things which are united or seem to be united in some one thing, one appears; and the respondents themselves grant that the interrogation is one, and give one answer; and therefore either they do not respond to the thing asked, so that a false thing meets them, or they seem to be refuted, and a refutation seems to be made for them. An example of this is: do you think this and this is a man, with Socrates and Plato pointed out? And if he says, this and this is a man, let the opponent infer: this and this is a man; therefore this and this is one man; therefore he who strikes this and this will strike a man and not men; and this unsuitable thing meets the one giving one answer, whereas he should have said: this is a man, and that is a man. Or again, if several things in the plural number are asked about several plural things signified, as if, with several plural things pointed out, some of which are good and some not good, it is asked whether all these things are good or not good. For whichever he says as respondent, that is, whichever part of the contradiction he gives, either an evidently apparent falsehood happens to him, that is, a manifest falsehood, and the opponent will seem to make this for him by leading him to a manifest falsehood, or it is, that is, it happens, that he will seem to make a refutation for the same respondent. For if he says that they are good, immediately he infers: therefore non-good things are good, which is an apparent falsehood; or he makes a refutation for him saying: therefore these are non-good things, which you said were good.
Sometimes, however, in certain things assumed and supposed, and in such things, a true refutation will be made, so that the respondent is led to a contradiction: as if someone grants and supposes similarly, that is, according to one likeness, that one thing in the singular and several in the plural are said by a similar definition. For according to that supposition, if blind is that which does not have sight but is naturally apt to have it, then blind things also will be those which do not have sight but are naturally apt to have sight. Therefore, with two things pointed out, when this one has sight, but that other does not have sight but is blind, when it has been asked whether these are blind or seeing, if he gives one answer either by affirming or by denying, the respondent will infer that both will be seeing or both blind, which is impossible.
Attendendum tamen hic, quod si duobus demonstratis, uno caeco, et altero vidente, quaeratur utrum ista sunt caeca vel videntia? si respondeatur una responsione, sive quod sunt caeca, sive quod sunt videntia, non accidit elenchus contradictionis: et cum suppositione, quod sicut caecum est aptum natum videre et non videns, ita caeca apta nata sunt videre et non videntia: quia non ducitur respondens ad oppositum suae responsionis: sive enim inferat quod sunt caeca, sive quod sunt videntia, nihil est contradictionis, nisi forte ex consequenti, ut scilicet inferat, ergo ista sunt caeca: et dicat ulterius, ergo non sunt videntia: et tu dixisti, quod videntia: vel e converso si dicat, quod sunt videntia: ergo non sunt caeca: tu autem dixisti, quod sunt videntia. Si autem respondeat negative et dicat, non sunt caeca: tunc potest accidere elenchus sic: non sunt caeca: ergo haec et haec non sunt caeca: ergo illud demonstrato caeco est videns: et tu dixisti, quod est caecum: et talia facile est reducere ad elenchum.
Scias autem quod haec suppositio, quod similiter sit dicere in singulari sicut in plurali per responsionem, falsa est: quia ex hoc probatur, quia ex ipsis coassumptis veris propositionibus sequitur falsum, et falsum non sequitur nisi ex falso: si respondeat enim ad hanc, suntne ista caeca vel non? unica responsione, et dicat quod ista sunt caeca: taliter ergo respondenti contradictoria sequuntur ista: ista sunt caeca, et ista non sunt caeca: est affirmatio falsa, et negatio vera secundum eum. Similiter ista sunt contraria: ista sunt apta videre non videntia, et ista sunt apta nata videre videntia: et affirmativa falsa, et negativa vera. Similiter istae sunt contradictoriae eidem: ista quae sunt apta nata videre, vident: et ista sunt apta nata videre, et non vident: et est affirmativa falsa, et negativa vera. Sed ex ista negatione quae vera est respondenti, sequitur negatio primae contradictionis quae falsa est cum suppositione hoc modo: si ista sunt apta nata videre, et non vident: et similiter est in singulari et in plurali, ergo ista sunt caeca: sed haec conclusio est respondenti falsa: et falsum non sequitur nisi ex falso: ergo aliqua praemissarum fuit falsa: non ista, ista sunt apta nata videre, et non vident: ergo reliqua, ista scilicet quod eodem modo sit divisio in singulari et in plurali.
Ratio autem qua probatur suppositio falsa esse, est quia peccat secundum figuram dictionis: similis enim est huic, quodcumque tu scis, vel inveniendo vel addiscendo scis: sed ista scis, demonstratis duobus quorum unum invenit et alterum didicit: ergo illa vel addiscendo vel inveniendo scis. Similis enim est talis figuratio in singulari et in plurali: et ideo facit credere, quod sit idem sive positum in singulari sub hoc signo, quidquid vel quodcumque sive positum in plurali sine signo eodem: cum tamen hoc modo sit verum.
Yet it must be attended here that if, with two things pointed out, one blind and the other seeing, it is asked whether these are blind or seeing, if one answer is given, whether that they are blind or that they are seeing, a refutation of contradiction does not happen, even with the supposition that just as the blind thing is apt by nature to see and is not seeing, so blind things are apt by nature to see and are not seeing; because the respondent is not led to the opposite of his answer. For whether he infers that they are blind or that they are seeing, there is nothing of contradiction, except perhaps by consequence, namely if he infers: therefore these are blind, and says further: therefore they are not seeing; and you said that they are seeing; or conversely if he says that they are seeing: therefore they are not blind, but you said that they are seeing. But if he responds negatively and says, they are not blind, then a refutation can happen thus: they are not blind; therefore this and this are not blind; therefore that one, with the blind one pointed out, is seeing; and you said that it is blind. And such things are easily reduced to a refutation.
But you should know that this supposition, that it is similar to speak in the singular as in the plural through an answer, is false; and this is proved from the fact that from the true propositions co-assumed with it a falsehood follows, and a falsehood follows only from the false. For if he responds to this, are these blind or not, by one answer, and says that these are blind, then for one responding in that way these contradictories follow: these are blind, and these are not blind; the affirmation is false and the negation true according to him. Similarly these are contraries: these are apt to see and not seeing, and these are naturally apt to see and seeing; and the affirmative is false and the negative true. Similarly these are contradictory to the same thing: these things which are naturally apt to see, see; and these are naturally apt to see and do not see; and the affirmative is false and the negative true. But from that negation which is true for the respondent there follows the negation of the first contradiction which is false with the supposition in this way: if these are naturally apt to see and do not see, and it is similar in the singular and in the plural, therefore these are blind; but this conclusion is false for the respondent; and a falsehood follows only from a falsehood; therefore one of the premises was false, not this one, these are naturally apt to see and do not see; therefore the remaining one, namely this, that in the same way there is division in the singular and in the plural.
But the reason by which the supposition is proved to be false is that it sins according to the figure of diction; for it is similar to this: whatever you know, you know either by discovering or by learning; but you know these, with two things pointed out, one of which he discovered and the other he learned; therefore you know those either by learning or by discovering. For such a figuration is similar in the singular and in the plural, and therefore it makes one believe that what is posited in the singular under this sign, whatever or whatsoever, is the same as what is posited in the plural without the same sign, although in this way it is true.
De modis autem hujus fallaciae dicendum, quod sunt tres: quia aut quaeruntur plura de uno, ut cum dicitur, estne terra mare et caelum? aut unum de pluribus, ut cum dicitur, estne hic et hic homo? aut plura de pluribus, ut cum dicitur, utrum ista sint videntia aut caeca? demonstrato uno vidente, et alio caeco. Posset tamen dici, quod isti tres modi reducuntur ad duos quorum unus est modus, quando plura ut unum in singulari numero interrogantur de uno: vel unum de pluribus singulariter subjectis, ut estne hic et hic homo? vel estne animal hoc et hoc? secundus autem quando plura de pluribus interrogantur in plurali: et tunc non effugiet contradictionem qui concesserit simpliciter in singulari et plurali dari diffinitiones, ut ante dictum est.
De fallaciis ergo extra dictionem hoc modo determinatum sit: sufficit enim hoc quod dictum est, ad intellectum ejus quod in suis elenchis dixit Aristoteles, et hoc solum quaerimus propter rudium informationem. Non enim quaerimus hic subtilem de quolibet assignare rationem et indagationem: quia videtur nobis quod magis impediat quam expediat ad scientiam eorum quae non propter se, sed propter alia inquiruntur, quorum datur modus generalis in locis, quae potius sunt modus quam philosophia.
TRACTATUS IV. DE REDUCTIONE FALLACIARUM IN IGNORANTIAM ELENCHI.
CAPUT I. De reductione omnium fallaciarum.
Ad sciendum qualiter omnes loci sophistici sive fallaciae reducuntur in ignorantiam elenchi, oportet praescire, quod ignorantia elenchi dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ab ignorantia elenchi secundum quod syllogismus est contradictionis, ut scilicet ignorentur differentiae sive conditiones et syllogismi et contradictionis communiter: et sic ignorantia elenchi non est specialis fallacia, quia non habet speciale principium deceptionis. Et hoc modo omnes fallaciae peccant secundum ignorantiam elenchi: secundum prius tamen et posterius: quia fallaciae in dictione principalius peccant contra elenchum, quam contra syllogismum: eo quod in fallacia in dictione unitas sermonis est causa apparentiae: diversitas autem in re signata est causa non existentiae. Ad contradictionem autem requiritur rei identitas, quae non est in fallaciis in dictione. Contra syllogismum autem peccant ex consequenti, quia syllogismus aliquo modo in forma vocali salvatur in unitate vocis. Ignorantia autem elenchi specialis (ut in antehabitis dictum est) est ignorantia differentiarum sive conditionum quatuor, quae ad contradictionem requiruntur, quae sunt idem, et ad idem, et similiter, et in eodem tempore: et sic specialem habet apparentiam decipiendi: et sic specialis est fallacia dividens hoc commune quod est fallacia sive locus sophisticus, in tredecim cum aliis duodecim fallaciis: et sic ad ignorantiam elenchi non reducuntur aliae fallaciae; sed ipsa cum aliis duodecim reducitur in ignorantiam elenchi communiter dictam.
Quamvis quidam dicant quod ignorantia elenchi semper est contra omnes conditiones elenchi et generales et speciales, sed differenter: quia uno modo ignorantia elenchi est contra conditiones elenchi secundum se: alio autem modo est contra conditiones elenchi ex consequenti. Et quando est contra conditiones elenchi secundum se, tunc est specialis fallacia, in quam aliae non reducuntur. Quando autem est ignorantia elenchi ex consequenti, tunc est generalis. Dicitur enim aliquis ignorare elenchum secundum se, quando ignorat aliquam vel aliquas conditiones contradictionis. Dicitur autem ignorare elenchum ex consequenti, sicut quando eo quod nomen est verum, credit rem esse unam: et ex consequenti, quia putat nomen esse unum et rem unam, credit medium syllogismi esse unum re et nomine: et quia putat medium esse unum, ex consequenti credit syllogismum esse unum et verum: et quia putat syllogismum esse unum, quando concludit contradictorium positioni respondentis, credit elenchum esse unum et verum: et sic ex consequenti ignorat elenchum. Et hoc in idem redit cum eo quod dictum est in priori distinctione.
But concerning the modes of this fallacy one must say that there are three, because either several things are asked about one, as when it is said, is earth sea and heaven; or one thing about several, as when it is said, is this and this a man; or several about several, as when it is said whether these are seeing or blind, with one seeing and another blind thing pointed out. Yet it could be said that these three modes are reduced to two, of which one is the mode when several things as one in the singular number are asked about one, or one thing about several singularly subjected things, as, is this and this a man, or is animal this and this? But the second is when several things about several are asked in the plural; and then he will not escape contradiction who has granted that definitions are given simply in the singular and plural, as was said before.
Therefore concerning the fallacies outside diction let it have been determined in this way. For what has been said suffices for the understanding of that which Aristotle said in his Refutations, and we seek this alone for the instruction of the untrained. For here we do not seek to assign a subtle account and investigation concerning each thing, because it seems to us that it impedes more than it helps toward the knowledge of those things which are investigated not on account of themselves, but on account of other things, of which a general mode is given in places, which are a mode rather than philosophy.
TRACTATE IV. ON THE REDUCTION OF FALLACIES INTO IGNORANCE OF REFUTATION.
CHAPTER I. On the reduction of all fallacies.
For knowing how all sophistical places or fallacies are reduced into ignorance of refutation, one must know beforehand that ignorance of refutation is said in two ways: namely from ignorance of refutation according as it is a syllogism of contradiction, so that the differences or conditions both of syllogism and of contradiction are commonly ignored; and thus ignorance of refutation is not a special fallacy, because it does not have a special principle of deception. And in this way all fallacies sin according to ignorance of refutation, yet according to prior and posterior, because fallacies in diction sin more principally against refutation than against syllogism, because in a fallacy in diction unity of speech is the cause of appearance, but diversity in the thing signified is the cause of non-existence. But for contradiction identity of the thing is required, which is not in fallacies in diction. But they sin against syllogism by consequence, because syllogism is in some way preserved in vocal form in the unity of voice. But special ignorance of refutation, as was said in the foregoing, is ignorance of the four differences or conditions which are required for contradiction, which are same, toward the same, similarly, and at the same time; and thus it has a special appearance of deceiving; and thus it is a special fallacy dividing this common thing which is fallacy or sophistical place into thirteen with the other twelve fallacies. And thus the other fallacies are not reduced to ignorance of refutation, but it itself with the other twelve is reduced into ignorance of refutation commonly so called.
Although some say that ignorance of refutation is always against all conditions of refutation, both general and special, but differently: because in one way ignorance of refutation is against the conditions of refutation according to itself; but in another way it is against the conditions of refutation by consequence. And when it is against the conditions of refutation according to itself, then it is a special fallacy, into which the others are not reduced. But when there is ignorance of refutation by consequence, then it is general. For someone is said to be ignorant of refutation according to itself when he is ignorant of some condition or conditions of contradiction. But he is said to be ignorant of refutation by consequence, as when, because the name is true, he believes the thing to be one; and by consequence, because he thinks the name to be one and the thing one, he believes the middle of the syllogism to be one in thing and name; and because he thinks the middle to be one, by consequence he believes the syllogism to be one and true; and because he thinks the syllogism to be one, when it concludes the contradictory of the respondent's position, he believes the refutation to be one and true; and thus by consequence he is ignorant of refutation. And this returns into the same as what was said in the prior distinction.
Dicunt etiam alii, quod elenchus in communi dicitur ignorari secundum se, et ex consequenti dicuntur ignorari conditiones ejus communes et propriae: quando enim apparens elenchus secundum quamlibet fallaciam proponitur, primo putatur esse elenchus cum non sit: et cum dicit quod istae sint omnes conditiones elenchi, sic ignoratur elenchus primo, et conditiones elenchi ignorantur ex consequenti: et quocumque istorum modorum dicatur, in idem redit: sed id quod primo dictum est, expeditius est et verius ad distinguendum ignorantiam elenchi specialiter dictam ab ignorantia elenchi generaliter dicta.
His ita distinctis, notandum quantum ad generalem reductionem omnium fallaciarum in ignorantiam elenchi, quod modificatio syllogismi est dispositio propositionum in figura et qualitate et quantitate et habitudine medii reali ad extrema ad necessitatem illationis conclusionis. Et ideo duplex est modificatio, sicut duplex est necessitas illationis conclusionis. Quaedam enim est causata a simplici ordine terminorum in figura, et a qualitate et quantitate et ordine duarum propositionum ad inferendum conclusionem: et haec vocatur utilis conjugatio determinata in arte libri Priorum secundum syllogismi generationem et medii inventionem et potestatem inferendi conclusionem: et immodificatio privans hanc modificationem, est privatio ordinis terminorum vel ordinis propositionum in debita qualitate et quantitate et debito situ ad inferendam conclusionem: et haec vocatur inutilis conjugatio determinata in libro Priorum. Est etiam modificatio non simpliciter sive universalis syllogismi, sed ad propositum et realis syllogismi et in materia speciali: et haec est secundum habitudines reales principiorum sive praemissarum ad conclusionem. Et haec est duplex. Una quidem secundum habitudines locales, quae exigitur ad syllogismum dialecticum in materia probabili: et contra hanc peccat immodificatio, quae est privatio habitudinis localis, quando videtur esse et non est: et haec modificatio determinatur in Topicis: et immodificatio pertinet ad hunc librum qui dicitur sophisticorum Elenchorum: quia ex eisdem principiis non potuit determinari vera habitudo localis et existens, et apparens et non existens: et ideo oportuit esse diversas scientias ad determinandum hujusmodi immodificationes: propter quod diversos oportuit esse libros adhuc unius scientiae, quae topica dicitur in communi. Alia autem modificatio specialis in materia necessaria et demonstrativa est, quae determinatur secundum habitudinem medii, quod est causa immediata realis et essentialis non tam conclusionis quam rei conclusae, quae determinatur in libro Posteriorum analyticorum, et ex defectu ejusdem habitudinis causatur immodificatio, quae (ideo quia ex defectu eorumdem principiorum constituentium habitudinem causae ad effectum causatur) determinatur etiam in eodem libro Posteriorum, et vocatur talis deficiens syllogismus falsigraphus, deficiens a modo habitudinis causae ad effectum.
Others also say that refutation in common is said to be ignored according to itself, and its common and proper conditions are said to be ignored by consequence. For when an apparent refutation according to any fallacy is proposed, first it is thought to be a refutation although it is not; and when he says that these are all the conditions of refutation, thus refutation is ignored first, and the conditions of refutation are ignored by consequence. And whichever of those modes is said, it returns into the same thing; but what was first said is more expeditious and truer for distinguishing ignorance of refutation specially so called from ignorance of refutation generally so called.
With these things thus distinguished, it must be noted, as to the general reduction of all fallacies into ignorance of refutation, that the modification of syllogism is the disposition of propositions in figure and quality and quantity, and in the real relation of the middle to the extremes, for the necessity of inference of the conclusion. And therefore modification is twofold, just as the necessity of inference of the conclusion is twofold. For one is caused by the simple order of terms in a figure, and by the quality and quantity and order of two propositions for inferring a conclusion; and this is called a useful conjugation determined in the art of the book of the Prior Analytics according to the generation of syllogism and the discovery of the middle and the power of inferring the conclusion. And the immodification depriving this modification is the privation of the order of terms or of the order of propositions in due quality and quantity and due position for inferring the conclusion; and this is called a useless conjugation determined in the book of the Prior Analytics. There is also a modification not of syllogism simply or universally, but of syllogism to the proposed point and real syllogism and in special matter; and this is according to real relations of principles or premises to the conclusion. And this is twofold. One is according to local relations, which is required for a dialectical syllogism in probable matter; and against this sins immodification, which is the privation of a local relation, when it seems to be and is not. And this modification is determined in the Topics; and immodification pertains to this book which is called the Sophistical Refutations, because from the same principles the true and existing local relation, and the apparent and non-existing one, could not be determined; and therefore there had to be diverse sciences for determining immodifications of this kind; on account of which there had to be diverse books, still of one science, which is called topic commonly. But the other special modification is in necessary and demonstrative matter, which is determined according to the relation of the middle, which is the immediate real and essential cause not so much of the conclusion as of the thing concluded, which is determined in the book of the Posterior Analytics; and from the defect of the same relation there is caused immodification, which, because it is caused from the defect of the same principles constituting the relation of cause to effect, is also determined in the same book of the Posterior Analytics, and such a deficient syllogism is called a falsigraph, deficient from the mode of the relation of cause to effect.
Adhuc autem notandum, quod est syllogismus sive ex quantitate et qualitate et situ propositionum, sive etiam ex habitudine locali ex necessitate consequentiae inferens; et est syllogismus ex quantitate et qualitate et situ terminorum et propositionum, et habitudine locali ex necessitate et inferens et probans et notificans sive certificans: et secundum haec duo sunt iterum duae modificationes, et oppositis his duae immodificationes: et de modificatione syllogismi inferentis tantum jam dictum est, et de ejus opposita immodificatione. Modificatio autem syllogismi probantis sive notificantis, sive etiam certificantis est talis, quod habitudo principiorum ad conclusionem per priora simpliciter vel priora quoad nos certificet et probet et notificet et non per idem: et hunc modum non servat petitio ejus quod est in principio. Unde quamvis talis paralogismus de necessitate inferat, tamen non probat nec certificat: et ideo est immodificatus.
His ita determinatis, patet quod aut dividendum est (sicut divisim determinatum est de ipsis) apparentes syllogismos et apparentes elenchos, aut reducendum est omnes ad elenchi ignorantiam generaliter, et docendum qualiter reducantur generaliter et specialiter: utrumque enim docendum est si ars debeat esse completa. Et quod diximus sic aut sic esse tradendum sub disjunctione, intelligimus quod et hoc et illud sit docendum. Et cum habita sit doctrina qualiter divisim generantur et docentur, subjungendum est qualiter generaliter et specialiter in ignorantiam elenchi reducuntur: hoc enim faciendum est his qui fallaciam ignorantiae elenchi generaliter dictam faciunt commune principium fallendi in omnibus fallaciis: et hoc faciunt omnes qui bene sapiunt in fallaciarum principia scientiam sive cognitionem. Est enim sive contingit omnes dictos modos et species resolvere in elenchi diffinitionem ignoratam: eo quod in qualibet ignoratur aliqua conditio elenchi in quantum est syllogismus contradictionis: et hoc generaliter. Primum quidem considerando si modi immodificati sunt secundum defectum habitudinis localis inferentis syllogismi et probantis: si enim hoc sit, quod deficiat in modo inferentis et probantis syllogismi ignoratur elenchus in aliqua conditione syllogismi inferentis et probantis: et etiam contradictio, et sic ignoratur elenchus per consequens: oportet enim in syllogismo inferente et probante ex his quae posita sunt, debito ordine habitudinis localis vel habitudinis causae accidere de necessitate illationis conclusionem, sic quod ex necessitate locali vel causali accidat conclusio, et non tantum videatur apparenter accidere et non accidat secundum rem. Hoc autem deficit in omni fallacia in qua videtur accidere conclusio ex praemissis: sicut enim jam ante dictum est, fallaciae in dictione peccant contra hoc quod est syllogismum esse ex quibusdam, quia multiplex est vel actu vel potentia vel secundum phantasiam. Multiplex autem dico sive significatione, sive suppositione, ut in figura dictionis. Et si iste syllogismus est non ex quibusdam positis, et sic immodificati sunt paralogismi secundum medium reale simpliciter, principalius tamen peccant contra elenchum, ut innuit Aristoteles, qui dicit quod peccant contra elenchum, et non negat quin peccent contra syllogismum, quamvis non ita principaliter sicut contra elenchum. Et quamvis forte habent aliquo modo ea quae sunt de syllogismo secundum vocem et quantitatem et qualitatem et ordinem propositionum, non tamen habent hoc realiter: quia medium non est unum secundum rem, sed multa aliquo modo, et variatum, non secundum eamdem significationem acceptum in praemissis. Similiter est fallacia secundum ignorantiam elenchi, qui licet immodificatus possit dici, quia habet terminos quatuor, cum syllogismus verus non habeat nisi tres, ut patet: A est duplum respectu B, et est non duplum respectu C, ergo duplum et non duplum: hic quatuor termini sunt A, B, C, duplum et non duplum: tamen in hoc non est vis, quia duo sunt syllogismi in elencho: sed constat quod immodificatus est talis paralogismus quantum ad elenchum: et hoc facile est videre in omnibus aliis.
Again it must be noted that there is a syllogism inferring either from the quantity and quality and position of propositions, or also from a local relation by necessity of consequence; and there is a syllogism from the quantity and quality and position of terms and propositions, and from a local relation, both inferring by necessity and proving and making known or certifying. And according to these two there are again two modifications, and opposed to these two immodifications; and concerning the modification of a syllogism merely inferring it has already been said, and concerning its opposed immodification. But the modification of a syllogism proving or making known, or also certifying, is such that the relation of principles to the conclusion certifies and proves and makes known through things prior simply or prior with respect to us, and not through the same thing; and begging that which is in the beginning does not preserve this mode. Hence although such a paralogism infers of necessity, nevertheless it does not prove or certify; and therefore it is immodified.
With these things thus determined, it is clear that either apparent syllogisms and apparent refutations must be divided, as it has been determined separately about them, or all must be reduced to ignorance of refutation generally, and it must be taught how they are reduced generally and specially. For each must be taught if the art ought to be complete. And what we said, that this or that must be handed down under a disjunction, we understand that both this and that must be taught. And when the teaching has been had about how they are separately generated and taught, it must be added how generally and specially they are reduced into ignorance of refutation. For this must be done by those who make the fallacy of ignorance of refutation generally so called the common principle of deceiving in all fallacies; and all who have a good taste for knowledge or cognition of the principles of fallacies do this. For it is, or it happens, to resolve all the said modes and species into the ignored definition of refutation, because in each some condition of refutation is ignored insofar as it is a syllogism of contradiction; and this generally. First, indeed, by considering whether the immodified modes exist according to the defect of the local relation of an inferring and proving syllogism; for if this is so, that it fails in the mode of an inferring and proving syllogism, refutation is ignored in some condition of an inferring and proving syllogism, and also contradiction, and thus refutation is ignored by consequence. For in an inferring and proving syllogism, from the things which have been posited, in the due order of a local relation or of the relation of cause, the conclusion must happen by necessity of inference, so that the conclusion happens from local or causal necessity, and does not only seem apparently to happen and not happen according to the thing. But this fails in every fallacy in which the conclusion seems to happen from the premises. For as was already said before, fallacies in diction sin against this, that a syllogism be from certain things, because there is a manifold either in act or in potency or according to imagination. But I say manifold either in signification or in supposition, as in the figure of diction. And if that syllogism is not from certain things posited, and thus paralogisms are immodified according to the real middle simply, yet more principally they sin against refutation, as Aristotle intimates, who says that they sin against refutation, and does not deny that they sin against syllogism, although not so principally as against refutation. And although perhaps they have in some way the things which belong to syllogism according to voice and quantity and quality and order of propositions, nevertheless they do not have this really, because the middle is not one according to the thing, but in some way many, and varied, not taken according to the same signification in the premises. It is similar with the fallacy according to ignorance of refutation, which, although it can be called immodified because it has four terms while a true syllogism has only three, as is clear: A is double with respect to B, and is not double with respect to C; therefore double and not double; here there are four terms, A, B, C, double and not double; nevertheless the force is not in this, because there are two syllogisms in a refutation; but it is clear that such a paralogism is immodified as to refutation; and this is easy to see in all the others.
Sciendum quod quia immodificati sunt, per consequens etiam sunt infigurati: quamvis enim figuram vocalem habeant, non tamen habent figuram realem: quia vel medium est multiplex et non debite se habet ad extrema, sicut in fallaciis in dictione: vel secundum rem indebite accipitur, ut in fallaciis extra dictionem: et sic non habet figuram realem. Ex his quae dicta sunt, satis patet de generali reductione in ignorantiam elenchi: et hoc est quod dicere intendimus.
CAPUT II. De reductione aequivocationis et amphibologiae in ignorantiam elenchi, et similiter compositionis et divisionis et accentus.
Deinde in reductione in ignorantiam elenchi, specialiter considerandum est secundum speciales partes sive differentias sive conditiones diffinitionis syllogismi et elenchi: et videbitur quod contra speciales conditiones et differentias peccant loci sophistici speciales: nam illi loci qui sunt de numero illorum locorum qui sunt in dictione, hi quidem sive aliqui vel quidam peccant secundum duplex in nomine vel oratione, ut aequivocatio, vel oratio amphibologica, et similis figuratio in figura dictionis: eo quod uno nomine et una oratione (propter unitatem vocis quae causa est apparentiae in his tribus fallaciis) consuetum est hoc aliquid (hoc est, determinate unum) significare: et plura significantur in his tribus fallaciis una secundum formam prolationis et secundum materiam quae est nomen et oratio: et sic incidit ignorantia elenchi, cum res diversa significetur: eo quod contradictio requirit rem eamdem significare. Hoc dicimus communiter ad significatum et consignificatum et ad modos significandi et quantum ad suppositionem et modos supponendi. In omnibus enim his sub uno nomine vel oratione plura significantur secundum rem, vel plura significantur, vel plura supponuntur, vel pluribus modis in uno nomine vel oratione. Uno dico secundum formam et materiam. Et in his tribus causa apparentiae est in unitate sermonis, et causa defectus est in rei diversitate primo et per se: et ideo tres isti loci sophistici simul unam et similem habent reductionem.
Et si dicat aliquis, quod figura dictionis non habet multiplicitatem, quia non respondetur in ea per distinctionem, dicimus quod hoc est falsum: quia multiplex phantasticum simpliciter multiplex est et in sophisticis, quamvis secundum se non sit simpliciter multiplex: et respondetur ad ipsum per distinctionem sic, cum dicatur non significare vel supponere plura secundum quod unum supponit et videtur supponere plura: propter similem quidem significationem videtur supponere unum in re, cum sint plura quae accipiuntur sub ipsa. In aequivocatione autem et amphibologia actu plura significantur. Et attende quod multiplex phantasticum in reductione magis conjungitur his quae habent multiplex actuale, quam his quae habent multiplex potentiale: quamvis in reductione magis conveniat cum potentiali, quam cum actuali: eo quod sicut in actuali multiplici apparentia est prima in unitate principiorum secundum materiam et formam, et diversitas in re est causa defectus per quam ignoratur elenchus: ita est in figura dictionis similis figuratio in sermone causa deceptionis. Causa autem defectus est in ipsa diversitate per quam deficit ab elencho, et ignorat elenchum. Sic autem non est in multiplicitate potentiali: in hac enim una est oratio vel dictio secundum quod unitas orationis vel dictionis secundum materiam tantum et non secundum formam prolationis et per posterius diversitas in re significata et non primo in re: et ideo figura dictionis magis in reducendo in ignorantiam elenchi similis est multiplicitati potentiali, et magis similem cum aequivocatione et amphibologia habet reductionem, quam cum compositione et divisione et accentu.
One must know that because they are immodified, by consequence they are also unfigured; for although they have a vocal figure, nevertheless they do not have a real figure, because either the middle is manifold and does not duly have itself to the extremes, as in fallacies in diction, or it is taken unduly according to the thing, as in fallacies outside diction; and thus it does not have a real figure. From the things that have been said, enough is clear concerning the general reduction into ignorance of refutation; and this is what we intend to say.
CHAPTER II. On the reduction of equivocation and amphibology into ignorance of refutation, and likewise of composition and division and accent.
Next, in the reduction into ignorance of refutation, one must consider specially according to the special parts or differences or conditions of the definition of syllogism and refutation; and it will be seen that special sophistical places sin against special conditions and differences. For those places which are of the number of those places which are in diction, these indeed, or some or certain of them, sin according to a double in a name or speech, as equivocation, or amphibological speech, and similar figuration in figure of diction; because by one name and one speech, on account of the unity of voice which is the cause of appearance in these three fallacies, it is customary to signify this something, that is, a determinately one thing. And several things are signified in these three fallacies by one according to the form of utterance and according to the matter which is name and speech; and thus ignorance of refutation occurs, since a diverse thing is signified, because contradiction requires signifying the same thing. We say this commonly with respect to the signified and the consignified, and to modes of signifying, and as to supposition and modes of supposing. For in all these, under one name or speech, several things are signified according to the thing, or several are signified, or several are supposed, or in several modes in one name or speech. I say one according to form and matter. And in these three, the cause of appearance is in the unity of speech, and the cause of defect is in the diversity of the thing first and through itself; and therefore these three sophistical places together have one and a similar reduction.
And if someone says that figure of diction does not have multiplicity, because it is not answered in it through a distinction, we say that this is false, because imaginative multiplicity is simply multiplicity and is in sophistical matters, although according to itself it is not simply multiple; and one responds to it through a distinction thus, when it is said that it does not signify or suppose several things according as one supposes and seems to suppose several. Indeed because of similar signification it seems to suppose one thing in reality, when there are several things which are taken under it. But in equivocation and amphibology several things are actually signified. And attend that imaginative multiplicity in reduction is joined more with those which have actual multiplicity than with those which have potential multiplicity, although in reduction it agrees more with the potential than with the actual, because, just as in the actual multiple the appearance is first in the unity of principles according to matter and form, and diversity in reality is the cause of defect through which refutation is ignored, so in figure of diction similar figuration in speech is the cause of deception. But the cause of defect is in the very diversity through which it falls short of refutation and ignores refutation. But it is not so in potential multiplicity; for in this there is one speech or diction insofar as there is unity of speech or diction according to matter only and not according to the form of utterance, and afterward diversity in the thing signified and not first in the thing; and therefore figure of diction, in being reduced into ignorance of refutation, is more similar to potential multiplicity, and has a more similar reduction with equivocation and amphibology than with composition and division and accent.
Compositio autem et divisio sive locus sophisticus compositionis et divisionis reducuntur in ignorantiam elenchi per primam causam sui defectus: eo quod deficiunt in hoc quod in compositione formali non est eadem oratio composita et divisa, et in accentu sub diversitate accentus prolatum nomen formaliter differens. Quamvis enim omnes fallaciae in dictione proveniant, eo quod eisdem nominibus vel orationibus non idem secundum rem significamus, ut in antehabitis dictum est: tamen in diversis diversa est nominis vel orationis identitas: in aequivocatione enim et amphibologia et figura dictionis eisdem nominibus vel orationibus secundum materiam et formam prolationis non eadem significamus: in compositione autem et divisione et accentu eisdem nominibus vel orationibus secundum materiam, et non eisdem secundum prolationis formam non eadem significamus: et idem hic dicemus, quod in compositione et divisione et accentu est oratio et nomen differens non secundum materiam, sed secundum formam.
Oportebat autem tam in syllogismo quam in elencho etiam haec omnia, scilicet et orationem et etiam rem eadem esse et secundum materiam et secundum formam prolationis, si debeat verus elenchus vel verus syllogismus fieri: et si non sit eadem oratio vel nomen secundum formam prolationis et secundum materiam vel secundum utrumque, ignoratur elenchus: quia elenchus est unius et ejusdem, non nominis tantum vel rei tantum, sed rei et nominis, ut in primis dictum est. Et patet quod ignoratur. Cujus probatio est, quia si aliquis respondentium ponat tunicam non esse vestem, et faciens elenchum syllogizet tunicam esse tunicam, et non syllogizet eam esse vestem, quod negavit respondens: opponens talis taliter respondenti non contradicit, et ignorat elenchum: quia contradictio debet esse ejusdem rei et nominis, et ipse non idem nomen syllogizavit: quamvis etiam verum sit illud, quod tunica est tunica; tamen notificante syllogismo non est hoc syllogizatum: quod manifestum est ex hoc, quod adhuc facto syllogismo et conclusio quod tunica est tunica, respondens indiget interrogatione, quoniam vel utrum idem significant quantum ad eum qui interrogat ut inferat conclusionem de tunica: cum positio respondentis fuerit de veste. Dicitur autem tunica et vestis idem: quia derivantur ab eodem: vestis enim est quod vestit, hoc est, tegit: tunica autem dicitur quasi tegica, eo quod tegit. Sic ergo fallaciae in dictione peccantes secundum multiplex, in ignorantiam elenchi reducuntur.
But composition and division, or the sophistical place of composition and division, are reduced into ignorance of refutation through the first cause of their defect, because they fail in this, that in formal composition the composed and divided speech is not the same, and in accent the name uttered under diversity of accent is formally different. For although all fallacies in diction arise because by the same names or speeches we do not signify the same thing according to the thing, as was said in the foregoing, nevertheless in different ones the identity of name or speech is different. For in equivocation and amphibology and figure of diction we do not signify the same things by the same names or speeches according to matter and form of utterance; but in composition and division and accent, by the same names or speeches according to matter, and not the same according to form of utterance, we do not signify the same things. And here we shall say the same, that in composition and division and accent there is a speech and a name differing not according to matter, but according to form.
But both in a syllogism and in a refutation all these things had to be the same, namely both speech and also thing, both according to matter and according to form of utterance, if a true refutation or true syllogism ought to be made; and if the same speech or name is not the same according to the form of utterance and according to matter, or according to both, the refutation is ignored, because a refutation is of one and the same thing, not of name only or of thing only, but of thing and name, as was said at first. And it is clear that it is ignored. The proof of this is that, if one of the respondents posits that a tunic is not a garment, and one making a refutation syllogizes that a tunic is a tunic, and does not syllogize that it is a garment, which the respondent denied, such an opponent in such a way does not contradict the respondent, and ignores refutation; because contradiction ought to be of the same thing and name, and he has not syllogized the same name. Although this also is true, that a tunic is a tunic, nevertheless this has not been syllogized by a notifying syllogism; and this is manifest from the fact that, after the syllogism has been made and the conclusion that a tunic is a tunic, the respondent still needs a question, namely whether they signify the same as to the one who asks, so that he may infer a conclusion about the tunic, since the respondent's position was about a garment. But tunic and garment are said to be the same because they are derived from the same thing; for garment is what clothes, that is, covers; but tunic is said as if covering-thing, because it covers. Thus therefore fallacies in diction sinning according to the manifold are reduced into ignorance of refutation.
CAPUT III. De speciali reductione fallaciae accidentis in ignorantiam elenchi.
Paralogismi autem qui fiunt secundum accidens quoad reductionem specialem in ignorantiam elenchi, manifesti fiunt qualiter reducuntur, diffinito syllogismo. Nam eamdem diffinitionem quae est syllogismi, oportet fieri etiam ipsius elenchi: sed oportet illi diffinitioni adjacere per additionem ipsam contradictionem: et hoc ideo est, quia elenchus addit supra syllogismum: quia elenchus non tantum est syllogismus, sed est syllogismus contradictionis: et sic sunt duo constitutiva veri elenchi: ita in diffinitione oportet utriusque rationem et syllogismi et contradictionis conjungere. Cum igitur generalis sit reductio paralogismorum: quia immodificati sunt, et immodificatus syllogismus non ex necessitate fit secundum aliquid et modificatus. Tamen specialiter et accidentis fallacia, paralogismus est immodificatus: quia ex extranea habitudine medii ad extrema deficit ab illatione necessaria: quod patet in exemplo paralogismi accidentis: quia consequentia haec non est necessaria propter extraneam habitudinem medii ad extrema: si sic dicatur: cum hoc sit, necesse est hoc esse. Sicut cum homo sit, necesse est animal esse. Hoc autem album est, quod est homo vel animal. Ergo necesse est animal esse album. Hoc enim non est necessarium per syllogismum quocumque modo formetur paralogismus. Si enim sic formetur: si homo est, necesse est animal esse: sed homo est albus: ergo necesse est animal esse album. Sic enim formato syllogismo quamvis bonum videatur argumentum, tamen si sic formetur: necesse est animal esse, si homo est: sed homo est albus: ergo necesse est animal esse album: hic aperte est fallacia accidentis. Potest etiam formari sic: si homo, necesse est animal esse: sed animal album est: ergo necesse est hominem esse album: tunc incidit in fallaciam consequentis et accidentis: quia nihil prohibet in eadem oratione vel paralogismo plures esse modos fallendi, ut in antehabitis dictum est, et in sequentibus ostendetur. Patet igitur quod paralogismus accidentis reducitur, quia ignoratur hujus conditio elenchi, quod est necessaria syllogismi consequentia: propter extraneam et accidentalem habitudinem medii ad extrema.
Hoc autem non tantum fit in dialecticis, sed etiam in demonstrativis: sicut enim in dialecticis necessaria non est talis illatio, in qua medium extranee se habet ad extrema: ita neque in demonstrativis si triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, accidit autem triangulo figuram esse, vel accidit ei primam figurarum rectilinearum esse, vel accidit triangulo principium compositionis poligoniarum figurarum esse: eo quod omnis figura poligonia sive multorum angulorum in tot angulos resolvitur, quot numero habet angulos: et si resolvitur in triangulos omnis poligonia figura, sequitur quod triangulus est principium compositionis omnium poligoniarum rectilinearum figurarum: et sic accidit triangulo principium esse: accidit ergo triangulo et figuram esse et primum esse et principium esse. Non tamen potest necessaria et per se illatione concludi passio et trianguli de his quae accidunt triangulo: si enim sic formetur syllogismus: omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: sed triangulus est figura per primum vel principium: ergo figura vel primum vel principium habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Sed est ibi fallacia accidentis et ignorantia elenchi: quia ignorat quod facit consequentiam per se et necessariam: hoc enim est id quod est proprium subjectum et praecisa causa passionis, ut in Posterioribus determinatum est, cui passio convenit omni et semper et secundum ipsum.
CHAPTER III. On the special reduction of the fallacy of accident into ignorance of refutation.
But the paralogisms which are made according to accident, as to their special reduction into ignorance of refutation, become manifest how they are reduced when syllogism has been defined. For the same definition which belongs to syllogism must also be made of the refutation itself; but the contradiction itself must lie adjacent to that definition by addition. And this is so because refutation adds over syllogism, because refutation is not only a syllogism, but a syllogism of contradiction; and thus there are two constitutive things of a true refutation. Thus in the definition it is necessary to join the account of each, both of syllogism and of contradiction. Therefore, since the reduction of paralogisms is general because they are immodified, and an immodified syllogism does not become according to something and modified from necessity. Nevertheless specially also the fallacy of accident is an immodified paralogism, because from the extraneous relation of the middle to the extremes it falls short of necessary inference. This is clear in the example of the paralogism of accident, because this consequence is not necessary because of the extraneous relation of the middle to the extremes, if it is said thus: when this is, it is necessary that this be. As when man is, it is necessary that animal be. But this white thing is what is man or animal. Therefore it is necessary that animal be white. For this is not necessary through syllogism, in whatever way the paralogism is formed. For if it is formed thus: if man exists, it is necessary that animal exist; but man is white; therefore it is necessary that animal be white. For with the syllogism formed thus, although the argument seems good, nevertheless if it is formed thus: it is necessary that animal exist, if man exists; but man is white; therefore it is necessary that animal be white; here there is openly the fallacy of accident. It can also be formed thus: if man, it is necessary that animal exist; but animal is white; therefore it is necessary that man be white. Then it falls into the fallacy of consequent and of accident, because nothing prevents there being several modes of deceiving in the same speech or paralogism, as was said in the foregoing and will be shown in what follows. Therefore it is clear that the paralogism of accident is reduced because this condition of refutation is ignored, which is necessary consequence of syllogism, because of the extraneous and accidental relation of the middle to the extremes.
But this does not happen only in dialecticals, but also in demonstratives. For just as in dialecticals such an inference is not necessary, in which the middle has itself extraneously to the extremes, so neither in demonstratives, if a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but it happens to the triangle to be a figure, or it happens to it to be the first of rectilinear figures, or it happens to the triangle to be the principle of composition of polygonal figures, because every polygonal figure, or figure of many angles, is resolved into as many angles as it has in number; and if every polygonal figure is resolved into triangles, it follows that triangle is the principle of composition of all polygonal rectilinear figures; and thus it happens to triangle to be a principle. Therefore it happens to triangle both to be a figure and to be first and to be a principle. Nevertheless by necessary and per se inference the passion of triangle cannot be concluded of those things which happen to triangle; for if the syllogism is formed thus: every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; but triangle is figure through first or principle; therefore figure or first or principle has three angles equal to two right angles. But there is the fallacy of accident and ignorance of refutation, because it ignores what makes per se and necessary consequence; for this is that which is the proper subject and precise cause of the passion, as was determined in the Posterior Analytics, to which the passion belongs to every instance, always, and according to itself.
Et si dicatur, quod haec illatio est necessaria, sive formetur syllogismus in prima figura, sive in tertia, in quibus ex affirmativis proceditur syllogizando: si enim sic syllogizet aliquis: omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: figura est triangulus: ergo figura habet tres aequales duobus rectis: necessaria videtur illatio. Eodem modo si formetur in tertia figura sic: triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: triangulus est figura vel primum vel principium: ergo figura vel primum vel principium habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: illatio iterum videtur esse necessaria: et ita videtur quod non impediatur illatio necessaria: non ergo videtur quod per hanc reducatur paralogismus accidentis. Ad hoc solvendum secundum Aristotelem dico, quod iste modus peccat contra syllogismum demonstrativum, et non contra dialecticum: quia non concludit passionem de eo quod proprium et praecisum subjectum est passionis, et cui secundum ipsum convenit passio: demonstratio enim talis passionis non potest esse de subjecto quod est figura vel primum vel principium, sed est de his in quantum sunt triangulus cui secundum seipsum talis convenit passio.
Et ideo si elenchus est aliquis vel quidam syllogismus, non erit verus et demonstrativus elenchus, qui fit de subjecto quod non habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, secundum accidens, hoc est, gratia alterius quod accidit ipsi: quia illi per se non convenit, sed per alterum. Si autem secundum hoc aliquis objiciat dicens, quod secundum hoc particularis demonstratio semper fit secundum paralogismum accidentis: ut si sic arguatur: omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, isosceles est triangulus: ergo habet tres aequales duobus rectis: quia isosceles non est per se subjectum et causa praecisa passionis. Dicendum est quod in particulari demonstratione et si non subjiciatur per se subjectum, subjicitur tamen id in quo intellectu et actu ponitur per se subjectum passionis: quia in isoscele actu et intellectu subjicitur triangulus: sed quando subjicitur id cui per se non convenit passio, nec ponitur in ipso, huic non convenit passio nisi per accidens: et hoc est figura et primum et principium, quorum neutrum ponit triangulum: quia per consequens non ponitur antecedens, quamvis e converso antecedens ponat consequens: et ideo argumentatio talis tota est per accidens, et est in demonstrativis paralogismus accidentis.
And if it is said that this inference is necessary, whether the syllogism is formed in the first figure or in the third, in which one proceeds by syllogizing from affirmatives: for if someone syllogizes thus, every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; figure is a triangle; therefore figure has three equal to two right angles, the inference seems necessary. In the same way, if it is formed in the third figure thus: triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; triangle is figure or first or principle; therefore figure or first or principle has three angles equal to two right angles, the inference again seems to be necessary; and thus it seems that necessary inference is not impeded; therefore it does not seem that the paralogism of accident is reduced through this. To solve this according to Aristotle, I say that this mode sins against the demonstrative syllogism and not against the dialectical, because it does not conclude the passion of that which is the proper and precise subject of the passion, and to which the passion belongs according to itself. For a demonstration of such a passion cannot be about a subject which is figure or first or principle, but is about these insofar as they are triangle, to which such a passion belongs according to itself.
And therefore, if a refutation is some syllogism, it will not be a true and demonstrative refutation which is made about a subject which does not have three angles equal to two right angles according to accident, that is, for the sake of another thing which happens to it, because it does not belong to that per se, but through another. But if according to this someone objects, saying that according to this a particular demonstration is always made according to a paralogism of accident, as if it is argued thus: every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; an isosceles is a triangle; therefore it has three equal to two right angles, because isosceles is not the per se subject and precise cause of the passion. One must say that in a particular demonstration, even if the per se subject is not subjected, nevertheless that is subjected in which in understanding and in act the per se subject of the passion is posited, because in the isosceles in act and in understanding triangle is subjected. But when that to which the passion does not belong per se is subjected, nor is it posited in it, the passion does not belong to this except by accident; and this is figure and first and principle, none of which posits triangle, because by the consequent the antecedent is not posited, although conversely the antecedent posits the consequent; and therefore such a whole argumentation is through accident, and in demonstratives it is a paralogism of accident.
Talis autem paralogismus non contemnendus est tanquam levis, quia secundum hunc in operativis artifices qui ordinare habent in artificiis, et omnino sive universaliter scientes et sapientes ab insciis arguuntur: inscii enim quando volunt arguere contra sapientes, maxime secundum accidens faciunt syllogismos, ut dicantur sapientes secundum illam sapientiae determinationem in sexto Ethicorum, quod sapientia est virtus artis et scientiae: secundum hoc enim sapiens est in qualibet arte, cujus experientia illius artis ordinare convenit de artificio, et ejus causam reddere. Sapiens enim si dicat tantam columnam tanto capitello subjiciendam esse, statim argui potest, quod tantae columnae accidit lapidem vel stillum esse: ergo tanto capitello tantus lapis vel stillus subjiciendus est. Qui vero de numero sapientium non possunt dividere quid cui per se et secundum ipsum conveniat, et quid per se non sit secundum ipsum, sed per aliud et per accidens: aut concedunt interroganti sive opponenti quod concludunt: aut quando dividere non possunt, etiamsi non concedunt, tamen concedere videntur; et hoc in sophisticis inconveniens: quia non vult sophista videri reprehensus vel redargutus. Sic igitur patet qualiter secundum specialem modum paralogismus accidentis et in demonstrativis et in dialecticis in ignorantiam elenchi reducatur.
CAPUT IV. De reductione fallaciae secundum quid et simpliciter, et fallaciae secundum ignorantiam elenchi, et fallaciae petitionis principii, et fallaciae secundum non causam ut causam.
Paralogismi autem qui fiunt per locum sophisticum qui dicitur secundum quid et simpliciter, in elenchi ignorantiam reducuntur ex hoc quod ignoratur elenchus in quantum elenchus est, in hoc quod in eis non de eodem et secundum idem est affirmatio et negatio, cum in contradictione potissimum requiratur, quod de eodem et secundum idem sit affirmatio et negatio. Quod autem in paralogismis fallaciae secundum quid et simpliciter non sit affirmatio et negatio de eodem, probatur ex hoc, quod secundum quid albi negatio propria est secundum idem quid secundum quod album dicitur non esse album, ut Indum esse album secundum dentem, Indum non esse album secundum dentem, opposita sunt secundum affirmationem et negationem: et simpliciter albi sive dicere aliquid simpliciter esse album, hujus negatio est simpliciter non esse album, ut hujus quod dico cygnum esse album, negatio est cygnum non esse album: sed secundum quid esse album, non habet oppositam negationem simpliciter non esse album: nec e converso simpliciter album esse, non habet negationem oppositam secundum quid non album esse. Si ergo aliquis opponentium accipit ut simpliciter, quod a respondente non nisi secundum quid album esse datum est, non ad idem refert affirmationem et negationem: et sic non facit elenchum sive contradictionis syllogismum. Videtur tamen facere elenchum esse: eo quod ignoretur quod sit elenchus secundum hanc elenchi conditionem, quod est de eodem esse affirmationem et negationem.
Et si aliquis objiciendo dicat, quod cum sic arguatur dato a respondente, quod Indus non est albus: Indus est albus dentem: ergo est albus: et tu dedisti, quod non est albus: istae sunt vere contradictoriae, Indus est albus, et Indus non est albus: et sic vera est contradictio in talibus paralogismis. Et addat adhuc, quod cum dicitur, Indus non est albus, Indus est albus, affirmatio et negatio sit de eodem subjecto: et sic est vera contradictio. Dicendum quod non est vera contradictio: quia in hac, Indus non est albus, subjicitur Indus secundum se: in hac autem, Indus secundum dentes est albus, non subjicitur Indus secundum se, sed contractus ad partem sui materialem, ut ad dentem: et sic contradictio non est de eodem ut de eodem sive circa idem, nec est de eodem subjecto: et sic peccat contra elenchum: in processu autem a quid ad simpliciter incidit fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Et quamvis sic peccet talis paralogismus contra elenchum, si comparetur conclusio ad id quod datum est a respondente: tamen si eadem conclusio comparetur ad praemissas syllogismi in quibus debet esse sicut causatum in causa secundum necessariam illationem et consequentiam, peccabit etiam contra syllogismum, ut supra (in loco ubi de paralogismis secundum quid et simpliciter agebatur) dictum est: et sic etiam ignoratur syllogismus, et ignoratur elenchus: et haec est duplex ratio reductionis horum paralogismorum.
But such a paralogism is not to be despised as slight, because according to this in operative matters artisans who have to order in the arts, and altogether or universally those knowing and wise, are argued against by the unknowing. For the unknowing, when they wish to argue against the wise, especially make syllogisms according to accident, so that people may be called wise according to that determination of wisdom in the sixth book of the Ethics, that wisdom is a virtue of art and science. For according to this one is wise in any art, whose experience of that art is fitting to order concerning the artifact and render its cause. For if a wise person says that so great a column must be subjected to so great a capital, immediately it can be argued that it happens to so great a column to be stone or a pillar; therefore so great a stone or pillar must be subjected to so great a capital. But those who cannot divide from the number of the wise what belongs to what per se and according to itself, and what is not per se according to itself, but through another and by accident, either grant to the interrogator or opponent what they conclude, or, when they cannot divide, even if they do not grant, nevertheless they seem to grant; and this is unsuitable in sophistical matters, because the sophist does not wish to seem reprehended or refuted. Thus therefore it is clear how according to a special mode the paralogism of accident is reduced into ignorance of refutation both in demonstratives and in dialecticals.
CHAPTER IV. On the reduction of the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, and of the fallacy according to ignorance of refutation, and of the fallacy of begging the principle, and of the fallacy according to non-cause as cause.
But paralogisms which are made through the sophistical place which is called according to qualifiedly and simply are reduced into ignorance of refutation from this, that refutation is ignored insofar as it is refutation, in that in them affirmation and negation are not about the same thing and according to the same thing, although in contradiction it is especially required that affirmation and negation be about the same thing and according to the same thing. But that in paralogisms of the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply affirmation and negation are not about the same thing is proved from this, that the proper negation of white according to a qualification is according to the same qualification according to which white is said not to be white, as for an Indian to be white according to a tooth and for an Indian not to be white according to a tooth are opposed according to affirmation and negation; and of white simply, or of saying that something is simply white, the negation of this is simply not to be white, as of this which I say, that a swan is white, the negation is that a swan is not white. But to be white according to a qualification does not have as opposed negation simply not to be white; nor conversely does simply to be white have as opposed negation not to be white according to a qualification. Therefore if any opponent takes as simply what was given by the respondent only as being white according to a qualification, he does not refer affirmation and negation to the same thing, and thus he does not make a refutation or syllogism of contradiction. Yet he seems to make a refutation, because it is ignored what a refutation is according to this condition of refutation, that affirmation and negation are about the same thing.
And if someone objecting says that, when it is argued thus after it has been given by the respondent that an Indian is not white: an Indian is white as to a tooth; therefore he is white; and you granted that he is not white; these are truly contradictory, an Indian is white and an Indian is not white; and thus there is true contradiction in such paralogisms. And let him add further that when it is said, an Indian is not white, an Indian is white, the affirmation and negation are about the same subject, and thus there is true contradiction. One must say that there is not true contradiction, because in this, an Indian is not white, Indian is subjected according to itself; but in this, an Indian according to the teeth is white, Indian is not subjected according to itself, but contracted to a material part of itself, as to a tooth; and thus the contradiction is not about the same as about the same or around the same, nor is it about the same subject; and thus it sins against refutation. But in the process from qualifiedly to simply the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply occurs. And although such a paralogism thus sins against refutation, if the conclusion is compared to that which was given by the respondent, nevertheless if the same conclusion is compared to the premises of the syllogism in which it ought to be as the caused thing in the cause according to necessary inference and consequence, it will also sin against syllogism, as was said above in the place where the paralogisms according to qualifiedly and simply were treated; and thus syllogism also is ignored and refutation is ignored. And this is the twofold account of the reduction of these paralogisms.
Manifestissimi autem sunt quoad reductionem paralogismi qui prius cum de ignorantia elenchi ageretur, dicti sunt fieri per diffinitionem omissam vel ignoratam ipsius elenchi. Hi enim reducuntur in ignorantiam elenchi, non sicut idem ad seipsum, sed sicut speciale ad generale: eo quod generaliter accipitur ignorantia elenchi secundum quod in ipsum alii loci sophistici reducuntur: in talibus paralogismis fit phantasia vel deceptio per apparentiam et non existentiam secundum omissionem rationis sive diffinitionis elenchi secundum aliquam parabolam vel differentiam ponendam in ratione elenchi. Et dividentibus et determinantibus sic, ut dictum est, communibus ratio reductionis in omnibus locis sophisticis ponenda est: et haec est diminutio sive omissio et ignorantia rationis elenchi secundum quod diffinitur ut syllogismus contradictionis.
Illi autem paralogismi qui fiunt in eo quod sumitur vel petitur hoc quod erat in principio sumptum vel positum secundum quod principium est praemissa in qua petitur conclusio et non probatur: et etiam paralogismi qui fiunt in fallacia secundum non causam ut causam, eo quod inter praemissas ponitur pro causa conclusionis, quod non est causa illationis ejus: manifesti fiunt quoad reductionem per diffinitionem syllogismi et elenchi secundum quod syllogismus est et elenchus. Secundum enim rationem diffinitivam elenchi secundum quam elenchus syllogismus est, oportet accidere conclusionem sive sequi, eo quod haec sunt, ita quod praemissae sint causa propter quam sequitur conclusio: et ab hoc diffinitio syllogismi deficit non causa, et sic ignorat elenchum. Et rursum in syllogismo probante et certificante oportet quod conclusio sequatur ex talibus in quibus non est exprimere id quod in principio ponitur, quia nihil probari potest per idem et seipsum: eo quod non probatur nisi vel ignotum per notum, vel minus notum per magis notum: et hanc particulam elenchi in quantum syllogismus est, non habent, sed ignorant paralogismi qui sunt generati secundum petitionem ejus quod est in principio. Has autem duas fallacias non causam scilicet et petitionem principii in reducendo conjungimus, quod secundum ignorantiam ejusdem particulae diffinitionis elenchi reducantur. Et ideo etiam reductionem petitionis ejus quod est in
But most manifest as to reduction are the paralogisms which, when ignorance of refutation was previously treated, were said to be made through the omitted or ignored definition of the refutation itself. For these are reduced into ignorance of refutation, not as the same to itself, but as special to general, because ignorance of refutation is taken generally according as the other sophistical places are reduced into it. In such paralogisms imagination or deception is made through appearance and non-existence according to the omission of the account or definition of refutation according to some comparison or difference to be placed in the account of refutation. And for those dividing and determining common things in this way, as was said, the account of reduction must be posited in all sophistical places; and this is diminution or omission and ignorance of the account of refutation according as it is defined as a syllogism of contradiction.
But those paralogisms which are made in this, that this which was taken or posited in the beginning is assumed or begged, according as principle is a premise in which the conclusion is begged and not proved, and also paralogisms which are made in the fallacy according to non-cause as cause, because that which is not the cause of the inference of the conclusion is posited among the premises as the cause of the conclusion, become manifest as to reduction through the definition of syllogism and of refutation according as it is syllogism and refutation. For according to the definitive account of refutation according to which a refutation is a syllogism, the conclusion must happen or follow because these things are so, so that the premises are the cause on account of which the conclusion follows; and non-cause falls short of the definition of syllogism from this, and thus ignores refutation. And again in a proving and certifying syllogism it is necessary that the conclusion follow from such things in which it is not possible to express that which is posited in the beginning, because nothing can be proved through the same thing and itself; because only either the unknown is proved through the known, or the less known through the more known. And this particle of refutation, insofar as it is a syllogism, paralogisms which are generated according to begging that which is in the beginning do not have, but ignore. But we join these two fallacies in reducing, namely non-cause and begging the principle, because they are reduced according to ignorance of the same particle of the definition of refutation. And therefore also the reduction of begging that which is in
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