Works › Prior Analytics, Books I–II
Volume 1 · pp. 795–797
Treatise VII, Chapter V
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CAPUT V.
De exemplo, quid sit et qualiter se habeat ad syllogismum et ad inductionem.
Cum exemplum annexum sit inductioni, eo quod ex multis exemplariter acceptis fit inductio, post inductionem determinandum est de exemplo, quid sit in genere argumentationis, et qualiter se habeat ad syllogismum et ad inductionem.
Dicimus igitur quod exemplum est argumentatio, quando sive in qua medium extremo inesse ostenditur per id quod est simile tertio: et sic exemplum quatuor terminos habere necesse est. Oportet autem in exemplo sumi, quod primum insit tertio per medium, et quod primum sit simile tertio, hoc est, primum inesse tertio per simile tertio, et quod hoc simile sit evidentius. Et hoc ostenditur facilius in terminis sic, ut primum sit malum in quo sit A, B autem sit contra confines inferre bellum: et hoc autem in quo est C sit Athenienses pugnare contra Thebanos: in quo vero D sit pugnare Thebanos contra Phocenses. Si ergo volumus ostendere, quoniam Thebanis, hoc est, contra Thebanos pugnare malum est Athenienses, quod est ostendere primum de tertio per medium: et ideo sumendum est medium, id scilicet, quoniam contra confines pugnare malum est. Et si volumus ostendere primum de medio, hoc ostendemus per simile vel similia tertio: quia hujus quod est primum inesse (quod prius ad medium sumptum est quando primum de tertio concludebatur) fides fit et efficitur ex simili vel similibus notis et notioribus, quam notum sit primum inesse tertio, ut verbi gratia, quoniam Thebanis contra Phocenses confines suos pugnare malum fuit, et quod evidens sit et notum. Sic ergo argumentandum est primum de tertio per medium concludendo sic, confines contra confines pugnare malum est: Athenienses pugnare contra Thebanos, est pugnare confines contra confines: ergo manifestum est malum esse Athenienses pugnare contra Thebanos. Manifestum est enim quoniam B (quod est contra confines pugnare) inest ipsi C, hoc est Athenienses contra Thebanos pugnare: quia hoc est contra confines pugnare: et idem etiam inest ipsi quod est D, quia Thebanos et Phocenses pugnare est confines contra confines pugnare: et ideo utrumque istorum et C et D est contra confines pugnare. Manifestum etiam est quoniam A (quod est malum) inest D, et est manifestius et evidentius quam quod A insit C, hoc est, quod primum inest quarto, quod est simile tertio; manifestius est quam quod primum inest medio: quia quod A inest B (hoc est, primum medio ostenditur per D, quod est simile tertio.
Similiter autem est sive eodem modo si per plura similia fides fit vel fiat medii ad extremum, quo scilicet probetur primum extremum inesse medio: quae tamen omnia sint similia tertio. Et quamvis plura similia inducantur, non tamen omnia induci debent: quia sic esset inductio. Attendendum autem quod in exemplo secundum ea quae dicta sunt, duae sunt argumentationes: ostenditur enim primum de tertio per medium: et hoc fit per syllogismum. Secundo autem quasi in proargumentatione (quae loco prosyllogismi est) ostenditur primum de medio per simile tertio: et in illa argumentatione trahitur fides ab exemplo: in priori autem argumentatione fides trahitur a medio.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Objectio.
Si quis autem opponat, quod non sic diffinit Boetius exemplum in Topicis suis, qui dicit quod exemplum est quando particulare ostenditur de particulari per particulare simile: particulare autem non potest esse medium, sicut ostensum est supra in his quae de inventione medii dicta sunt: et sic falsum videtur esse quod dictum est de ostensione primi de tertio per medium, et ostensione primi de medio per simile tertio.
CHAPTER V.
On Example, What It Is And How It Has Itself To Syllogism And To Induction.
Since example is annexed to induction, because induction is made from many things accepted exemplarily, after induction one must determine about example, what it is in the genus of argumentation, and how it has itself to syllogism and to induction.
Therefore we say that example is an argumentation when, or in which, the middle is shown to belong to an extreme through that which is similar to the third; and thus example must have four terms. But in example one must take that the first belongs to the third through the middle, and that the first is similar to the third, that is, that the first belongs to the third through something similar to the third, and that this similar thing is more evident. And this is shown more easily in terms thus: let the first be evil, in which A is; but let B be to make war against neighbors; and let that in which C is be Athenians fighting against Thebans; but let that in which D is be Thebans fighting against Phocians. Therefore if we wish to show that fighting against Thebans is evil for Athenians, that is, to show the first of the third through a middle, then the middle must be taken, namely this: that fighting against neighbors is evil. And if we wish to show the first of the middle, we will show this through a similar thing or similar things to the third, because faith that the first belongs, which had before been taken to the middle when the first was concluded of the third, is made and effected from a similar thing or from similar things known and better known than that the first belongs to the third, as for example, since for Thebans to fight against the Phocians their neighbors was evil, and this is evident and known. Therefore one must argue the first of the third by concluding through the middle thus: neighbors fighting against neighbors is evil; Athenians fighting against Thebans is to fight neighbors against neighbors; therefore it is manifest that Athenians fighting against Thebans is evil. For it is manifest that B, which is to fight against neighbors, belongs to C itself, that is, Athenians against Thebans fighting, because this is to fight against neighbors; and the same also belongs to that which is D, because Thebans and Phocians fighting is neighbors fighting against neighbors; and therefore each of these, both C and D, is to fight against neighbors. It is also manifest that A, which is evil, belongs to D, and it is more manifest and evident than that A belongs to C, that is, that the first belongs to the fourth, which is similar to the third, is more manifest than that the first belongs to the middle, because that A belongs to B, that is, the first is shown of the middle through D, which is similar to the third.
But it is similar or in the same way if faith of the middle to the extreme is made or would be made through several similar things, by which namely the first extreme may be proved to belong to the middle, provided that all these are similar to the third. And although several similar things are introduced, nevertheless not all ought to be introduced, because thus it would be induction. But it must be attended that in example, according to those things which have been said, there are two argumentations: for the first is shown of the third through the middle, and this is made through syllogism. But secondly, as it were in a pro-argumentation, which is in the place of a prosyllogism, the first is shown of the middle through something similar to the third; and in that argumentation faith is drawn from the example, but in the prior argumentation faith is drawn from the middle.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Objection.
But if someone objects that Boethius does not define example in this way in his Topics, who says that example is when a particular is shown of a particular through a similar particular; but a particular cannot be a middle, as was shown above in those things which were said about the discovery of the middle; and thus what was said about the showing of the first of the third through a middle, and the showing of the first of the middle through something similar to the third, seems to be false.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Solutio.
Sed ad hoc dicendum, sicut dictum est paulo ante, quod in hoc completur diffinitio exempli, quando primum ostenditur de medio per simile tertio: et in tali ostensione oportet evidentius esse, quod primum inest ei quod est simile tertio, quam quod primum inest tertio: et ideo exempli substantia consistit in comparatione primae praemissae ad ultimam conclusionem: et prima praemissa est particularis, et ultima conclusio similiter est particularis: praemissa enim est malum esse Athenienses pugnare contra Phocenses: et ultima conclusio est Athenienses pugnare contra Thebanos: hoc enim fuit probandum per exemplum: et ideo quod primum probatur de medio, non facit exemplum: sed quod primum de tertio per simile tertio, hoc facit exemplum: et ideo nihil est quod objicitur de medio.
Manifestum est igitur ex his, ex quo praemissa est particularis et ultima conclusio est particularis, quoniam id in quo completur exempli ratio, est sicut pars ad partem se habens1. Probatur enim in eo particulare per particulare, et non habet se exemplum ad id per quod probatur, nec ut pars ad totum universale, neque ut totum universale ad partem, sicut est in syllogismis qui per dici de omni probantur: sed se habet sicut pars ad partem, sive sicut particulare ad particulare, quando ambo duo particularia sunt sub eodem communi, sicut Athenienses pugnare Thebanis, et Thebanos pugnare Phocensibus, ambo sunt sub hoc medio quod est confines pugnare contra confines, et hoc esse malum: sed alterum istorum particularium evidens est: et ideo ex illo infertur primum. In hoc igitur exemplum differt a syllogismo. Unde exemplum reducitur ad duos syllogismos, sicut in ante habitis istius capituli ostensum est.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Objectio.
Si autem quis objiciat, quod tunc quando primum concluditur de medio, aut concluditur de medio universaliter sumpto, aut de medio sumpto indefinite. Si concluditur de medio universaliter sumpto, fallacia consequentis erit in argumento, in quo primum de medio concluditur per simile tertio: quia universale infertur ex particulari, quod non contingit: sed potius e converso particulare debet inferri ex universali. Si autem concluditur primum de medio sumpto indefinite: tunc non valet secundum argumentum: eo quod non habet universalem propositionem, ex qua sola fit illatio syllogistica.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Solutio.
Ad hoc autem dicendum quod primum ostenditur de medio universaliter sumpto per simile tertio, sed non ex necessitate, sed potius ex praeconfessione respondentis, scilicet si concedatur similiter esse in uno et in aliis, sicut si Thebanis malum est pugnare contra Phocenses, quod omnibus confinibus sit malum confines impugnare. Et sic cum reducitur in duos syllogismos, secundus de se habet necessitatem: primus autem qui prosyllogismus est vel loco prosyllogismi, probabilis est, non de se, sed ex praeconfessione habet necessitatem2. Primus enim probat primum de medio per
Marginal label (printed page 796): Solution.
But to this it must be said, as was said a little before, that the definition of example is completed in this, when the first is shown of the middle through something similar to the third; and in such a showing it is necessary that it be more evident that the first belongs to that which is similar to the third than that the first belongs to the third. And therefore the substance of example consists in the comparison of the first premise to the ultimate conclusion; and the first premise is particular, and the ultimate conclusion likewise is particular. For the premise is that Athenians fighting against Phocians is evil, and the ultimate conclusion is Athenians fighting against Thebans; for this was to be proved through example. And therefore the fact that the first is proved of the middle does not make example, but the fact that the first is proved of the third through something similar to the third, this makes example; and therefore there is nothing to what is objected about the middle.
Therefore it is manifest from these things, from the fact that the premise is particular and the ultimate conclusion is particular, that that in which the account of example is completed has itself as part to part1. For in it a particular is proved through a particular, and example does not have itself to that through which it is proved either as part to a universal whole or as universal whole to part, as it is in syllogisms which are proved through being said of every one; but it has itself as part to part, or as particular to particular, when both particular things are under the same common thing, as Athenians fighting Thebans and Thebans fighting Phocians are both under this middle, which is neighbors fighting against neighbors and this being evil; but one of those particulars is evident, and therefore from that the first is inferred. Therefore in this example differs from syllogism. Hence example is reduced to two syllogisms, as was shown in the things already had in this chapter.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Objection.
But if someone objects that then, when the first is concluded of the middle, either it is concluded of the middle taken universally, or of the middle taken indefinitely. If it is concluded of the middle taken universally, there will be a fallacy of the consequent in the argument in which the first is concluded of the middle through something similar to the third, because a universal is inferred from a particular, which does not happen; but rather conversely a particular ought to be inferred from a universal. But if the first is concluded of the middle taken indefinitely, then the second argument does not hold, because it does not have a universal proposition, from which alone a syllogistic inference is made.
Marginal label (printed page 796): Solution.
But to this it must be said that the first is shown of the middle taken universally through something similar to the third, but not from necessity; rather it is from the respondent's preconfession, namely if it is conceded that it is similarly in one and in the others, as if, if it is evil for Thebans to fight against Phocians, then it is evil for all neighbors to attack neighbors. And thus when it is reduced into two syllogisms, the second has necessity of itself; but the first, which is a prosyllogism or in the place of a prosyllogism, is probable, not of itself, but has necessity from preconfession2. For the first proves the first of the middle through
simile tertio: et illo facto secundus probat propositum per medium jam probatum.
Exemplum autem differt ab inductione in hoc, quod inductio ex omnibus individuis inductis ostendebat extremum inesse medio, et ad extremum non copulabat syllogismum: ostendit enim inductio ostendendum primum de medio per omnia medii particularia, et non concludit primum de postremo. Exemplum autem concludit primum de tertio per medium, et non per omnia particularia, sed per aliquod vel aliqua. Unde inductio ex omnibus individuis extremum ostendebat inesse medio, et ad extremum non copulabat syllogismum: hoc autem quod est exemplum, et copulat ad extremum, et non ex omnibus singularibus, sed ex quodam vel quibusdam ostendit.
Marginal label (printed page 797): Quomodo exemplum reducitur in inductionem.
Reducitur autem exemplum ad inductionem in hoc, quod multa exempla faciunt unam inductionem, per hoc quod multa exempla multa concludunt particularia, ex quibus aggregatis fit universale quod concluditur in inductione: et sic multa exempla faciunt unam inductionem.
Marginal label (printed page 797): Removet dubium.
Quamvis autem multa exempla faciant unam inductionem, et inductio una reducatur in syllogismum unum: non tamen propter hoc exemplum reducitur in syllogismum unum: quia exemplum eo modo quo in syllogismum reducitur, quatuor habet terminos, et ideo non potest reduci in syllogismum unum. Eo autem modo quo multa exempla unam faciunt inductionem, aufertur medium in eis, et remanent tres tantum termini, scilicet primum, et tertium, et simile tertio: sed multa tertia in unum tertium aggregantur, et multa similia tertio aggregantur in unum tertio simile. Et sic multa exempla eo modo quo faciunt unam inductionem, in unum reducuntur syllogismum immediate. Tamen eo modo quo exemplum quatuor habet terminos, exemplum in unum syllogismum reduci non potest. Hoc autem manifestum est, si quis conferat ad invicem unius generis multa exempla.
Notandum autem cum exemplum nullam secundum se faciat necessitatem, quod principaliter nec pertinet ad dialecticum, nec ad demonstratorem, sed ad rhetorem: secundum tamen quod non ex se, sed ex praeconfessione facit probabilitatem, potest referri ad dialecticum.
something similar to the third; and once that has been done the second proves the proposed thing through the middle already proved.
But example differs from induction in this, that induction, from all the individuals introduced, used to show that an extreme belongs to the middle, and did not join a syllogism to the extreme; for induction shows that the first is to be shown of the middle through all particulars of the middle, and it does not conclude the first of the last. But example concludes the first of the third through a middle, and not through all particulars, but through some one or some ones. Hence induction from all individuals used to show that the extreme belongs to the middle, and did not join a syllogism to the extreme; but that which is example both joins to the extreme and shows not from all singulars, but from a certain one or certain ones.
Marginal label (printed page 797): In what way example is reduced into induction.
But example is reduced to induction in this, that many examples make one induction, through this, that many examples conclude many particulars, from which, once aggregated, the universal which is concluded in induction is made; and thus many examples make one induction.
Marginal label (printed page 797): He removes a doubt.
But although many examples make one induction, and one induction is reduced into one syllogism, nevertheless on account of this example is not reduced into one syllogism, because example, in the mode in which it is reduced into syllogism, has four terms, and therefore it cannot be reduced into one syllogism. But in the mode in which many examples make one induction, the middle is taken away in them, and only three terms remain, namely the first, the third, and the similar to the third; but many thirds are aggregated into one third, and many things similar to the third are aggregated into one thing similar to the third. And thus many examples, in the mode in which they make one induction, are immediately reduced into one syllogism. Nevertheless, in the mode in which example has four terms, example cannot be reduced into one syllogism. But this is manifest if someone compares many examples of one genus with one another.
But it must be noted that, since example makes no necessity according to itself, it principally pertains neither to the dialectician nor to the demonstrator, but to the rhetorician; nevertheless, insofar as it makes probability not from itself but from preconfession, it can be referred to the dialectician.
Notes
- From this the difference between example and syllogism is gathered. P. J. (Ex hoc colligitur differentia inter exemplum et syllogismum. P. J.) ↩
- From this infer that example is reduced into two syllogisms, of which one does not have necessity except from the respondent's preconfession, but the second has necessity of itself. P. J. (Ex hoc infer quod exemplum reducitur in duos syllogismos, quorum unus non habet necessitatem nisi ex praeconfessione respondentis, secundus autem de se habet necessitatem. P. J.) ↩
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