Volume 1 · pp. 661–662

Chapter VI. On the error which comes from this, that terms are taken according to the obliquity of some case.

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Latin (Borgnet)English

p. 661

CAPUT VI. De errore qui provenit ex hoc quod termini sumuntur secundum obliquitatem alicujus casus.

In reductione propositionum in terminos etiam oportet tales terminos sumere sicut ea quae semper praedicantur de se invicem secundum rectum secundum unam et eamdem similitudinem, ita quod in recto praedicetur primum de medio, et medium de postremo secundum eumdem casum praedicetur: et hoc similiter observandum est in non esse quod significatur in negativa. Sed toties variare oportet hoc, quoties secundum casus aliquid esse dicitur sive praedicatur, et quoties sive quot modis verum est unum de alio dici vel significari. Cujus exemplum quod obliquus subjicitur et rectus praedicatur, sicut quando dicimus quoniam contrariorum una est disciplina: tunc enim cum obliquo subjecto syllogizatur. Sit enim A major extremitas unam esse disciplinam, B autem medium sit contraria sibi invicem, A ergo (facta tali positione) inest B non tali praedicatione facta in recto: sicut dici posset, quod contraria sunt una disciplina: sed ideo dicimus A inesse B, quoniam verum unam esse disciplinam de ipsis genitive subjectis.

Accidit enim quandoque in propositionibus syllogismi primum de medio dici sive praedicari secundum rectum, medium autem de tertio, minori scilicet extremo non dici secundum rectum, sed secundum aliquem obliquum: sicut cum dicimus, sophia sive sapientia est disciplina: boni autem sophia: conclusio ex his est, quoniam boni est disciplina: et praedicatur hic primum de medio secundum rectum, medium autem de postremo secundum obliquum, et concluditur primum de postremo secundum obliquitatem postremi: et patet ulterius quod bonum non est disciplina secundum rectum: sophia autem est disciplina, ita quod utrumque refertur ad alterum secundum rectum.

Quandoque autem medium de tertio sive minori extremo dicitur secundum rectum: primum autem de medio non praedicatur secundum rectum, ut si sic proponatur, quod qualis alicujus sit omnis disciplina, aut quod omnis disciplina est alicujus contrarii: bonum autem dicitur secundum rectum et contrarium, et quale secundum rectum: omne enim bonum est alicujus contrarium, et omne bonum est quale: conclusio ex his, quoniam boni est disciplina: et sic praedicatur primum de medio in prima propositione oblique: et similiter in conclusione praedicatur primum de tertio sive postremo secundum obliquitatem, non est bonum disciplina nec quale, sed qualis: nec contrarium, sed contrarii, in praedicta acceptione terminorum: sed omnium talium dicitur esse disciplina secundum obliquitatem genitivi: et non dicitur hoc, quod bonum sit disciplina in conclusione: quia nec conclusio est secundum praedicationem recti, sed secundum obliquitatem genitivi.

CHAPTER VI. On the error which comes from this, that terms are taken according to the obliquity of some case.

In the reduction of propositions into terms, one must also take such terms as those which are always predicated of one another according to the straight case according to one and the same likeness, so that the first is predicated of the middle in the straight case, and the middle is predicated of the last according to the same case; and this must similarly be observed in non-being, which is signified in a negative. But this must be varied as many times as something is said or predicated according to cases, and as many times or in as many ways as it is true that one thing is said or signified of another. An example of this, that an oblique term is subjected and a straight term is predicated, is when we say that of contraries there is one discipline; for then one syllogizes with an oblique subject. For let A, the major extremity, be there being one discipline, and let B, the middle, be contraries to one another. Therefore A, when such a position has been made, inheres in B not with such predication made in the straight case, as it could be said that contraries are one discipline, but we say for this reason that A inheres in B, because it is true that there is one discipline of them when they are subjected genitively.

For sometimes in the propositions of a syllogism it happens that the first is said or predicated of the middle according to the straight case, but the middle is not said of the third, namely the minor extreme, according to the straight case, but according to some oblique case; as when we say, sophia or wisdom is a discipline; but wisdom is of the good; the conclusion from these is that there is a discipline of the good. And here the first is predicated of the middle according to the straight case, but the middle of the last according to the oblique, and the first is concluded of the last according to the obliquity of the last. And further it is plain that the good is not discipline according to the straight case; but sophia is discipline, so that each is referred to the other according to the straight case.

But sometimes the middle is said of the third or minor extreme according to the straight case, while the first is not predicated of the middle according to the straight case, as if it is proposed that every discipline is of some quality, or that every discipline is of some contrary. But good is said according to the straight case, and contrary and quality according to the straight case; for every good is of some contrary, and every good is a quality. The conclusion from these is that there is discipline of the good. And thus the first is predicated of the middle obliquely in the first proposition; and similarly in the conclusion the first is predicated of the third or last according to obliquity: the conclusion is not that good is discipline or quality, but of what quality; nor contrary, but of a contrary, in the aforesaid acceptance of the terms. But discipline is said to belong to all such things according to the obliquity of the genitive; and this is not said, that good is discipline in the conclusion, because the conclusion also is not according to predication of the straight case, but according to the obliquity of the genitive.

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Est autem aliquando neque primum de medio praedicatum secundum rectum, neque medium de tertio, ita quod primum de tertio in conclusione quandoque quidem secundum rectum dicitur, quandoque autem non dicitur de ipso secundum rectum: ut si taliter proponamus, quod cujus est disciplina, hujus est genus: boni autem est disciplina: conclusio, quoniam boni est genus: et facile est videre, quod primum de medio in prima propositione, neque medium de tertio in minori propositione secundum obliquitatem praedicatur, ita quod nullum trium de nullo trium in praemissis et in conclusione secundum rectum praedicatur. Si autem sic proponatur, quoniam id cujus est disciplina, hoc est genus secundum rectum sive recti praedicationem: et assumatur, quod boni est disciplina: erit secundum recti praedicationem, quoniam bonum est genus quoddam. Patet ergo quod sic proponendo de extremo quidem secundum rectum praedicatum primum in conclusione, de se autem invicem in praemissis non praedicantur termini secundum rectum.

Eodem autem modo fit variatio terminorum secundum casus in non esse quod significatur in negativa: non enim semper negative significant hoc non inesse huic secundum obliquitatem dativi casus, vel non esse hoc secundum accusativum: sed significant aliquando hoc non esse hujus secundum obliquitatem genitivi, aut hoc huic secundum obliquitatem dativi, sicut si sic proponamus, non est motionis motio, vel non est motus motus genitive, aut generationis generatio: voluptatis autem sive delectationis est motus sive motio sive generatio: et concludimus, non ergo voluptas est generatio vel motus, sicut dixit Plato, quod omnis voluptas est generatio. Aut rursus quando sic proponimus, quoniam omnis risus est signum secundum recti praedicationem: signi autem non est signum secundum genitivi obliquitatem: et concludimus, ergo risus non est signum secundum praedicationem recti. Similiter autem in aliis negativis, in quibus interimitur propositio sive negatur non secundum rectum: sed ideo quia genus sive aliud praedicatum aliquo modo secundum obliquitatem alicujus casus dicitur ad ipsum subjectum.

Rursum si sic proponimus in obliquitate dativi dicentes, quod Deo non est tempus opportunum: eo quod nihil Deo potest esse proficiens in tempore vel simpliciter: sed Deo est aestas: concludentes quod aestas non est tempus opportunum: sic enim proponendo terminos, ponendum est aestatem pro minori, tempus opportunum pro majori, et Deum pro medio: propositio autem utraque est sumenda secundum nominis casus. Simpliciter enim hoc et universaliter.

But sometimes neither is the first predicated of the middle according to the straight case, nor the middle of the third, so that the first is sometimes said of the third in the conclusion according to the straight case, and sometimes is not said of it according to the straight case; as if we propose thus, that of whatever there is a discipline, of that there is a genus; but there is a discipline of the good; the conclusion is that there is a genus of the good. And it is easy to see that the first of the middle in the first proposition, and the middle of the third in the minor proposition, are not predicated according to obliquity in such a way that none of the three is predicated of any of the three in the premises and conclusion according to the straight case. But if it is proposed thus, that that of which there is a discipline is a genus according to the straight case or predication of the straight case, and it is assumed that there is discipline of the good, it will be according to predication of the straight case that the good is a certain genus. Therefore it is plain that by proposing in this way the first predicate is indeed predicated of the extreme according to the straight case in the conclusion, but the terms are not predicated of one another in the premises according to the straight case.

In the same way variation of terms according to cases occurs in non-being, which is signified in a negative. For negatives do not always signify this, that this does not inhere in this according to the obliquity of the dative case, or that this is not this according to the accusative; but sometimes they signify this, that this is not of this according to the obliquity of the genitive, or this is not to this according to the obliquity of the dative. For example, if we propose thus: there is no motion of motion, or there is no movement of movement genitively, or no generation of generation; but of pleasure or delight there is movement or motion or generation; and we conclude, therefore pleasure is not generation or movement, as Plato said, that every pleasure is generation. Or again, when we propose thus, that every laughter is a sign according to predication of the straight case; but of a sign there is not a sign according to the obliquity of the genitive; and we conclude, therefore laughter is not a sign according to predication of the straight case. Similarly also in other negatives, in which the proposed proposition is destroyed or denied not according to the straight case, but because the genus or some other predicate is said of that subject in some way according to the obliquity of some case.

Again, if we propose in the obliquity of the dative by saying that for God there is not an opportune time, because nothing can be advantageous to God in time or simply; but summer is for God; concluding that summer is not an opportune time. For in proposing terms in this way, summer must be posited as the minor, opportune time as the major, and God as the middle; but each proposition must be taken according to the cases of the noun. For simply this is so also universally.