Volume 1 · p. 651

Continuation and end of Chapter IX

Latin (Borgnet)English

p. 651

negatione illius inferatur affirmativa alterius: tunc non est syllogismus dialecticus, nec procedit ex notioribus, nec concludit minus commune, sed aeque: quia non concludit nisi quod homo est animal vel mortale vel immortale, sicut dictum est: et ideo non valet talis processus: quia ex sub disjunctione conclusio sine remotione alterius dividendium petit, quod homo sit animal mortale sine disjunctione et determinate: hoc enim est intentum in diffinitione.

Adhuc autem notandum est quod, cum dicitur quod in omni ratione concludentem universalem affirmativam oportet medium esse sub majori extremitate, et non communius ipsa, accipiendum quod medium est quidem ut pars, et ut minus commune majori extremitate: quia se habet ut subjectum ad majorem extremitatem, et sic est in ratione inferioris ad ipsam: non tamen semper est inferius et minus secundum rem: et hoc patet ex hoc, quod potissimae demonstrationes et potissimae ratiocinationes dialecticae fiunt in terminis convertibilibus, in quibus medium secundum rem non est minus majori extremitate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem.

Adhuc autem notandum quod, sicut diximus, cum volumus partes diffinitionis de subjecto diffinito concludere, conclusio intenta est, quod illa sola differentia (quae essentialis est subjecto) concludatur de ipso ut major extremitas de minori: unde non est major extremitas totum disjunctum in ambabus partibus disjunctionis acceptum: quod tamen concluditur in syllogismo in quo major extremitas ponitur totum disjunctum: et ideo in tali syllogismo divisivo semper concluditur id quod communius est principali intento, et conclusio principaliter intenta petitur sine syllogistica probatione, Et his intellectis planum erit cuilibet quod in ante habitis dictum est.

from the negation of that one the affirmative of the other is inferred; then it is not a dialectical syllogism, nor does it proceed from better-known things, nor does it conclude what is less common, but what is equal, because it concludes only that man is animal or mortal or immortal, as has been said. And therefore such a process has no force, because from a conclusion under disjunction without removal of one of the dividing members it begs that man is a mortal animal without disjunction and determinately; for this is what is intended in the definition.

Again it must be noted that, when it is said that in every reasoning concluding a universal affirmative the middle must be under the major extremity and not more common than it, one must understand that the middle is indeed as a part and as less common than the major extremity, because it has itself as a subject toward the major extremity, and thus is in the account of something inferior to it. Yet it is not always inferior and less according to reality; and this is plain from this, that the strongest demonstrations and strongest dialectical reasonings are made in convertible terms, in which the middle according to reality is not less than the major extremity according to reality, but only according to account.

Again it must be noted that, as we said, when we wish to conclude the parts of the definition concerning the defined subject, the intended conclusion is that that difference alone, which is essential to the subject, is concluded of it as the major extremity of the minor. Hence the major extremity is not the whole disjunct accepted in both parts of the disjunction, which nevertheless is concluded in the syllogism in which the major extremity is posited as the whole disjunct. And therefore in such a divisive syllogism there is always concluded what is more common than the principal intended thing, and the principally intended conclusion is begged without syllogistic proof. And with these things understood, what has been said in the preceding matters will be plain to anyone.