Continuation and end of Chapter I

are predicates only: they themselves indeed are predicated of other things subject to them, but concerning them other things prior to them according to understanding are not predicated, as are the most general genera. But other things are those which both are themselves predicated of certain things as of subjects, and of which other things are predicated, as are the middle things between the most general and the singular, as man, which is a species, is predicated of Callias, and animal is predicated of man; and thus man is a predicate with respect to certain things, and a subject with respect to other things. Concerning these things enough has been said in the Predicaments.

But the proof of this division is this: since, therefore, certain of the things which are are naturally apt to be said or predicated of nothing (as the first member of this division says), this is plain in this way: the nature of sensible or singular things is nearly each one of such a sort that it is predicated of nothing. But I say nearly because of the vague individual; nevertheless when that is predicated, it is predicated for the sake of the species, and not for the sake of itself insofar as it is an individual itself. On account of this, any sensible or singular thing of this kind is such that it is predicated of nothing, unless it is predicated as according to accident; for we sometimes say that that white thing demonstrated in sense is Socrates. And in this way Socrates is not predicated insofar as he is singular, but rather what is discretely picked out in sense (which is formal) is predicated of Socrates; for the sense is: Socrates is that white thing, and that demonstrated white thing is determined through Socrates. For in this way that white thing has the nature of a predicable accident, just as the vague individual has the nature of a species when it is said that Socrates is some man. But enough has been said about this both in the science of Universals and in the science of the Predicaments; and in this way we say that this thing coming is Callias.

But because in ascending in the line of predicables one sometimes stops at one thing which is a predicate only and not a subject, although this has been said in the Predicaments, nevertheless again we shall say this further in the Posterior Analytics through demonstration; and therefore let this be supposed here, because it will not be able to be proved through this science. And thus the second member of the introduced division is plain. Therefore concerning those things which are supreme in the predicamental line, it does not happen that one demonstrate another predicate which is predicated per se of them; and if something is predicated of them, it will not be predicated except according to opinion, that is, according to a community which is not of genus or species, but is a community of opinion, that is, of analogy. This community is only of opinion, because although it is in many things, nevertheless that which is predicated is only in one, and in the others there is some mode of it, which opinion contributes and refers to community¹. Yet these most general genera are predicated by true predication of other inferior things; and in this they are contrary to singulars, because singulars are not predicated of others, but other things are predicated of them.

But concerning those things which are in the middle of these, it is manifest that both happen, because these are said or predicated both of others, and other things are said or predicated of them. For nearly all syllogistic reasonings or reasonings are especially about these, namely the intermediate things. And concerning these three one must also consider reasonings in the discovery of middles. But we say nearly, because sometimes in syllogisms the extremes become middles, as in the second figure and the third; but this happens rarely. Yet especially in such things as are subjected and predicated with respect to diverse things, one looks in the discovery of the middle, because by this position they are middles, as the middle in the first figure.

Therefore for concluding the proposed thing concerning each proposed thing, that is, the proposed question, one must take propositions in such a way that first one proposes and accepts before other things the definitions of the subject, or even, as some say, of the predicate; and one must accept all other things which are proper to the subject, such as descriptions and any notifications whatever which are proper to the thing which is subjected and concerning which it is asked that something can be concluded of it, because through proper things one syllogizes more toward the proposed point. For what is convertible contributes more to the proposed point than what is not convertible. But after these one must look into all things which follow, that is, which are consequents essentially to the subject, as animal is to man; for under such things the middle must be taken in the first figure and in the third, and over such things the middle must be taken in the second figure. Then also, after these, thirdly one must look into all things which follow the thing which is the subject, and again what thing the thing follows, that is, what things the subject itself is antecedent to, as man is antecedent to animal. And also those things to which the subject follows, as man follows some man. And because of negative syllogisms one must also look into all repugnant things whatever do not happen to inhere in the same subject because of separation or opposition. But one must not accept or look at those things in which the subjected thing itself does not happen to inhere, for this would be superfluous, because once the repugnant things which are universally removed from the thing have been had, those things in which the subjected thing itself also does not follow are had, because the universal negative is converted simply and in terms. And therefore, once it is known to what some predicate is repugnant, it is also known to what things the subject is repugnant, when the universal negative proposition has been converted.

Again, in those things which follow the subject of the question, as antecedent, one must divide, and one must look at all things which follow the subject in respect of what it is, and are predicated substantially of the subject; and one must look at those consequent things which follow not in respect of what it is, but whatever also follow them and are predicated of them as proper and convertible. For through this one concludes more to the proposed point, because they are convertible, as risible is with man and sensible with animal. And one must also look at those things which follow the subject as accidents, because an accidental conclusion is concluded of something only through an accidental middle. And again, among those things which follow as accident, one must consider whether it is predicated as a probable being which is determined to opinion, namely in such a way that it seems so to all or to many or to the wise, and especially to the notable; these make a probable proposition. And again one must look at the things which are predicated of the subject or follow upon the subject according to the truth of the thing, which are of the essence of the thing, from which demonstrative and necessary propositions are made. For the more of such things someone is suitable for accepting through the faculty of intellect, so much the more discerning he is, and the more quickly he will find conclusions; and the more he is an inspector of such truer and more essential things, so much the more and more effectively he will demonstrate the proposition, because a demonstrative syllogism is from essential propositions.

But in those things which have been said, one must not choose only the things that have been said, but one must also choose which are more and which are less to be chosen. Therefore especially such consequents are to be chosen, not those which follow particularly or indefinitely, but those which follow the whole thing of the subject distributed into all its particulars. For example, one must not choose what follows a certain man or some man, but that must be chosen which follows every man; and this is more useful for this reason, because every syllogistic course is through universal propositions, and the middle which universally follows the lesser extreme infers universally more than another. Therefore when the middle is chosen according to an indefinite consequent, then it is uncertain whether the proposition which is concluded is universal, because the indefinite can be verified both for the whole and for the part; but when it is bounded in quantity by a universal sign, then it is manifest what can follow from such a middle. Similarly, however, among the antecedents to the subject of the question that is more to be chosen which the whole subject itself, that is, universally, follows, that is, the things of which the subject of the question is predicated universally, on account of the same cause which has been stated: namely because universals are more powerful in the syllogistic course.

But those things which follow upon the subject itself of the question must not be taken according to the whole, that is, as following it universally, so that a universal sign is placed at the predicate which follows upon the subject, as if I should say that man follows every animal, or if I should say that music follows every discipline, as if I should say, music is every discipline. But one must only accept the predicate which simply follows the subject without a distributive sign, in the way also that we hold forth or propose in the propositions of the syllogism. For if the predicate is predicated universally of the subject taken indefinitely, it will be useless with respect to the syllogistic course, which is not attended according to the distribution of the predicate²; and it will be impossible with respect to the truth of the proposition, because disparate or opposed things will be predicated of the same thing. For it is impossible that every man, or man, should be every animal, because thus every man, or man, would be an ass and a lion and things of this sort; and in this way it is impossible that justice should be every good. But the subject to which or upon which the predicate follows in that proposition is said as every, because the subject is distributed by a universal sign; for this is useful for the syllogistic course and does not make the proposition impossible.

But when the subject of the question is contained by some higher thing of its own, and the consequents of it, namely of the subject, must be taken for discovery of the middle, then one must not choose to take those things which are among the things that essentially contain the subject, because those things are enclosed in act and understanding in the subject and in those things which belong to the account of the subject. Similarly also one must not much take the things which do not inhere universally, because those things are essentially repugnant; and all these are at once taken once the subject itself has been taken; and therefore it is superfluous to study again for the acceptance of such things. And this is clear through this, that whatever things follow animal essentially, these also follow man, through what was said in the Predicaments: when one thing is said of another, whatever things are said of the predicate are also said of the subject. And similarly it is with repugnant things: whatever things do not universally inhere in the consequent, these also do not inhere in the antecedent, because whatever things are removed from animal are also removed from man.

Yet among extraneous repugnant things those things must be taken more which are more proper and nearer, rather than those things which are more extraneous and more remote. And this rightly happens, because certain things belong to the species which are proper and near to it besides the genus; for it is necessary that in diverse species, insofar as they are species, certain proper things inhere besides the genus; and the opposites of those things are also nearer to the species than the opposites of genera. Again, one also must not choose that universal which follows the thing that is contained, that is, the subject or antecedent, as animal, which follows that which is man; and this is because, once the subject or antecedent has been taken, all those things are taken which follow it as universal and essential, just as it is necessary that animal follow man; and similarly it is necessary that all other essential predicates follow upon that antecedent, because all these things are in the choice of man; and therefore, when the antecedent has been accepted and generally accepted, all those things have been accepted in the choice of man.

Again, those things also must be taken and chosen which for the most part and not always follow the subject, that is, as in most cases; and also such things which something follows for the most part, which are indeed predicates of the subject, but when they are taken, certain things follow them as in most cases, and these are useful in the taking of middles, because for terminating problems which are for the most part or in most cases, a syllogism is made from propositions which are as in most cases either to all or at least to some. For the conclusion of each syllogism in such matters is similar to the principles or propositions through which it is concluded.

Moreover, those things which follow all, both antecedents and consequents, or subjects and predicates, must not be chosen, because from the conjunction of such terms there cannot be a useful conjugation for syllogism. For all these will be disposed as predicates according to affirmation, which has no force in the second figure; nevertheless for what reason these things should not be chosen will be manifest in what follows.

But attention must be paid to the things which have been said here, so that they may be understood soundly. For what has been said, that some consequent follows upon an antecedent as frequently, and some as always, could have a calumny, because a consequent which follows the antecedent once always follows it, or never; but what follows frequently sometimes follows and sometimes does not, and thus it is not truly a consequent. But to this it must be said that in this whole science the antecedent is called the subject, and the consequent is called the predicate; and they are not called antecedent and consequent according to the consequence according to which that which is in another according to act and understanding follows upon it. And because a predicate sometimes inheres in a subject as now, sometimes as in most cases, and sometimes simply, for this reason the aforesaid considerations are taken in the consequent and antecedent. But these are called antecedent and consequent rather than subject and predicate, because subject and predicate do not state the order of the middle to the conclusion, but the consequent and antecedent of the middle state the order. For every affirmative relation of the middle to the conclusion is expressed through these intentions, antecedent and consequent; but every negative relation of the middle to the conclusion is sufficiently expressed through repugnant and extraneous; and therefore one must attend here to such intentions.

What also was said, that a universal sign is not to be added to the predicate of an affirmative proposition, because it is always false and makes the locution false, is sufficiently plain that with respect to the syllogistic course it is superfluous. But it is false for this reason, because the predicate according to any part whatever makes itself said of any part whatever of the subject; and thus it would happen that disparate things would be said of the same thing, which cannot be. Nevertheless in a negative proposition a universal sign added to the predicate can be said, in this way: every man is not animal, because since the affirmative with a universal sign is false, the negation coming upon it removes that falsity; and therefore it is suitably added in a negative³. And therefore it is also said in the book On Interpretation⁴ that there is no predication in which the predicate is taken universally with a universal sign.

Again, we also said that the consequent of the antecedent is to be chosen more than the consequent of the consequent, and that the nearer consequent is to be chosen more than the remote consequent; and concerning the extraneous the same was similarly said, because whatever follows upon the consequent follows upon the antecedent, and it is not converted; and whatever follows upon the remote follows upon the near, but it is not converted. And therefore more things are taken in the antecedent than in the consequent, and more things are taken in the near than in the remote; and therefore for the discovery of the middle it has more force to accept the antecedent than the consequent, and it has more force to accept the near than the remote.