Little Question Five of Principal Question Three
That not all things are necessitated by fate
It is asked how theologians demonstrate that not all things are subjected to fate, nor are individual things necessitated by it.
To this it is answered that theologians prove this by reasons, authorities, and examples, speaking and understanding this concerning human and voluntary acts.
The first reason is as follows. Divine providence disposes the universe in such an order that inferior things are governed through superior things and less noble things through more noble things, as Augustine says in Book III On the Trinity.
In a human being, however, there are two things, soul and body. The body, which is now passible and mortal, is inferior to a celestial body. Therefore, it is subjected to a celestial body per se and directly, and the celestial body makes an impression upon it, just as the body was formed and complexioned by its power. Hence the Philosopher says in Book II of the Physics: “The Sun and a human being generate a human being,” that is, the influence of the stars and planets together with a human being.
And Augustine says in Book V of The City of God: “It cannot be said to be altogether absurd that certain influences of the stars have force with respect only to differences of bodies.”
And Dionysius says in chapter 4 of The Divine Names: “The light of the Sun contributes to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them toward life itself, and nourishes, augments, and perfects them.”
But the soul, since it is assimilated to God because each is a spirit—and an effect is nobler to the degree that it is more assimilated to its cause, according to Books II and IV of the Metaphysics—is not subjected per se and directly to the heavens, planets, and bodies, as has been said, since the soul itself is nobler than all of them. Therefore, the soul is not subjected to fate, nor will it be good or evil from fate and the celestial bodies, but from itself and its free will. See Thomas, Book III Against the Gentiles.
The second reason is as follows. If two movers make impressions upon the same moved thing, and one is more powerful, more noble, and more immediate, it will also be more efficacious in making an impression. But our body is subject to two movers, namely, the celestial bodies and the rational soul. The rational soul is nobler than the celestial body itself, more powerful, and more immediate; therefore, it will be more efficacious in making an impression.
The soul, therefore, will be more capable of affecting and making an impression upon its own body than the celestial bodies are with respect to works expressed in the body. Hence, however greatly Mars might move the body toward disturbance and anger by moving the blood, a well-ordered soul will nevertheless be more capable of producing temperance of the blood and quiet, so that joy and meekness may belong to it.
The third reason is as follows. If fate and the celestial bodies were directly the causes of human choices and acts, it would follow that a human being would be driven toward his passions by natural instinct, just as the other animals are, in which there are only powers of the soul bound to bodily organs. For that which occurs in these inferior things from the impression of celestial bodies is carried out naturally. And thus it would follow that a human being would not possess free choice but would have determined actions, just as other natural things do.
All these things are manifestly false and contrary to human conduct. Therefore, it is evident from these things that human and voluntary acts are not subjected to fate and the celestial bodies.
Authorities must now be set forth. First is Damascene, who says in Book II of the Sentences: “The celestial bodies are in no way the cause of our acts, for we, having been made by the Creator with free choice, are also lords of our acts…”
And Gregory of Nyssa says: “The Egyptians say that fate can be changed by certain sacrifices.”
And Moses says in Deuteronomy 4: “Lest you see the Sun and the Moon and all the stars of heaven and, deceived by error, adore and worship them, which the Lord God created for service to all the peoples which are under heaven.” Note: for service, and not for dominion.
And Ambrose says in the Hexameron: “Some have attempted to express the qualities of nativities—what sort each person who has been born will be in the future—although this is not only vain and useless for those seeking it, but impossible for those promising it.”
And the same author, in Book II of the Hexameron, demonstrates by an argument from the greater that the heaven and celestial bodies concur in the generation of animals and plants as a universal agent which excites and invigorates the generative powers of seeds and animals in the elemental region. He speaks thus: “Let the inept discourse of the astronomers fall silent. Let all know that the Sun is not the author of things which are born, but that God’s clemency loosens the earth and God’s indulgence causes fruits to break forth.”
And in Book IV he introduces nature speaking about the Sun: “The Sun is indeed good in service, not in rule; a good helper of my fecundity, but not its creator; a good fashioner of my effects and nourisher of my fruits, but not their author.”
And Gregory says in the homily for Epiphany: “Far be it from the hearts of the faithful that they should say fate is anything, for the Creator alone, who created the life of human beings, administers it.”
And Ptolemy says in the Almagest: “A wise human being will rule the stars.” And at the beginning of the Centiloquium he says: “The wise soul of a physician will rule the stars.” For a physician endeavors to dry bodies when a celestial body moves them toward moisture.
And Bugufarus the Wise, in his commentary upon Ptolemy’s Centiloquium, says: “A wise human being both assists and impedes a celestial effect through the power of the wisdom which is in him.”
And Abraham Avenezra, the Chaldaean astrologer, says:
For if anyone raises prayers and cries to heaven, he will be able to conquer his fate.
And Virgil says in Book I of the Georgics:
Intelligence and prudence in affairs are greater than fate.
And Quintilian says in Declamation IV: “Fate is conquered if you resist; it conquers if you despise it.”
Hear how gloriously Chrysippus the Stoic concludes on this side, as Aulus Gellius adduces him in the Attic Nights. He says:
By fate, he says, according to a certain principal reason, all generated things come about. Nevertheless, innate dispositions themselves possess something of their own. An example: If you throw a cylindrical stone, its beginning is from us, but that stone nevertheless rolls headlong, not because you bring this about, but because its own manner and the rollability of its form so possess it. Thus the order, reason, and mobility of fate move the kinds themselves and the principles of causes. The impulses of our counsels and minds, however, are from us.
Therefore, in Homer Jupiter rightly complained about mortals, saying:
Alas, how mortals condemn the divinities of heaven! They say that evils come through us, although they themselves, through a senseless mind, have sufferings beyond fate.
These are his words.
Now the same thing will be proved by examples.
Plato, judged by a physiognomist to be a corrupter of young men, answered that the inclination of the stars is conquered by wisdom. For the stars signify a thief or adulterer, but they do not make a thief or adulterer.
Two twins were born, namely Jacob and Esau, Genesis 25, the one after the other in such a way that the later held the heel of the former. And yet in life they were diverse in customs, unlike in acts, and dissimilar in the love of their parents.
Within one expanse of heaven the son of a king and the son of a countryman are born, yet they are diverse in all things. A male and a female are born under Mars: she plies the distaff; he triumphs with the sword.
If Posidonius the astronomer should say to these things that the cause of the diversity of these persons at birth was the tiny interval of time which the twins possessed while they were being born Augustine answers this in Book V of The City of God, saying: “It is remarkable that so small a portion of the heaven, which passed by, should have had so much force in producing the diversity of the wills, acts, customs, and fortunes of twins—or of those who are not twins—being born.”
To this Nigidius the astronomer answers in turn that the rapidity of the heaven is so great that, even if one of the twins were born quickly after the other, it would nevertheless cause a very great interval in heaven. He gives the example of a wheel running with the greatest speed and marked twice with ink as though it were standing still in one place: after the motion ceases, those two points of ink will be found to be very far apart.
From this caused distance and the rapidity of the heaven, Nigidius says, arises the diversity of customs and outcomes in twins and in persons who are not twins but were born at the same time.
Augustine also answers this by saying that this fabrication is more fragile than the vessels which are fashioned by that same method. For if, with respect to those born at the same time, so much difference occurs in heaven from so small a portion of the same constellation that it cannot be comprehended, why did the inheritance fall to one of the twins, namely Jacob, but not to the other, namely Esau? How, therefore, were astronomers able to judge concerning persons who are not twins and who have different constellations, when sometimes the greatest portion of the heaven has passed by with respect to them? All these things are from Blessed Augustine in the place cited above.
From these things the foolishness is evident of those who choose an hour for marrying, who await a particular time for lying with their wives, and who restrain women, if they can, lest they give birth before a particular time. Thus Nectanebus the astronomer, when lying with Olympias, the mother of Alexander, forbade her when she was near childbirth to give birth to the boy before an hour which he had observed, as is read in the history of Alexander the Great.
I myself knew a certain most learned prelate who awaited with an astrolabe the hour of his departure for his bishopric. When at last, because he trusted the stars, he had taken lodging on the first evening in a stable, he was killed by a stone from above while visiting the horses…
Another man, having chosen from the stars the hour for taking a wife, found her with an adulterer after a year had passed.
Hence Saint Ambrose writes in the book Hexameron:
How many persons do we see who, rescued from crimes and sins, have been converted to a better state? The holy Apostles were redeemed and gathered from among sinners not, indeed, by the hour of their nativity, but the advent of Christ sanctified them and the hour of the Lord’s Passion redeemed them from death. That robber, condemned to capital punishment and crucified with the Lord, passed to the joys of Paradise not by benefit of his nativity, but by confession of faith. It was not the power of his nativity which cast Jonah into the sea, but the offense of disregarding a divine command. An angel of Christ, not a series of stars, freed Peter from prison. Paul, struck by a viper and troubled by shipwreck, was preserved not by the remedies of nativity, but by the merit of devotion. But what do we say concerning those who, after they had died, rose again through the prayers of the Apostles? Was it their own necessity or apostolic grace which raised them again? And what need was there for them to commit themselves to fasts, prayers, and dangers, if they could obtain what they wished by the benefit of necessity?
These are his words.
Do the stars determine and revoke a determination? Do they possess a will?
Therefore, it is better that in all things we honor God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit—to whom is honor and glory, as Peter the Apostle said—by whose providence and our free will we do whatever good or evil things we do, than that, by following the sacrilegious foolishness of the astronomers, we deny the will by which we sin, invent a necessity in which we defend our transgressions, and falsely claim that we have from the stars, without cause, those ruined customs through which we are detested on earth by human beings.