Little Question Four of Principal Question Three
That there are three execrable dogmas concerning fate
It is asked how many sacrilegious dogmas of the philosophers there are concerning fate, and how they are condemned by Catholic doctors.
To this it is answered that there are three execrable dogmas of the philosophers who speak about fate.
The first is that they say fate is the celestial aspect and disposition of the stars which, simply and of itself, necessitates all effects below the Moon, with all providence of God entirely excluded. They defend themselves by a saying of Augustine in Book V of The City of God, where he says that fate is a certain order and disposition of secondary causes for producing effects among these corruptible and generable things, apart from the wills of God and human beings.
This dogma is proved false by reason and authority.
By reason, thus, according to Thomas in Book III Against the Gentiles, chapter 63: It is impossible for things which do not know an end to operate for the sake of an end and to arrive at it in an orderly manner unless they are moved and regulated by something which possesses knowledge of the end, as is evident in the case of an arrow. But all natural bodies, planets, and stars operate for the sake of an end, and move and attain the end, although they do not recognize it. Therefore, it is necessary that their entire operation be directed by something which orders and regulates it. This is what we call divine providence.
For this reason Wisdom 14 says: “But your providence, O Father, governs all things from the beginning”; and Wisdom 8: “It reaches mightily from end to end and disposes all things sweetly”; and Wisdom 11: “There is no other God than you, who have care for all”; and in Hebrews: “Upholding all things by the word of his power.”
In support of this is what Augustine says in Book III On the Trinity, chapter 4:
Nothing occurs visibly in this world which is not commanded or permitted from the inner, invisible, and intelligible court of the Supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces and retributions, in this exceedingly vast and immeasurable commonwealth of the whole creation.
And Lactantius says in Book III, chapter 21:
For who does not perceive that this world, composed according to such marvelous reason, is governed by some providence, since there is nothing which can subsist without any regulation? A house without an inhabitant falls apart. A ship without a pilot goes to the bottom. A body abandoned by the soul dissolves. Still less should we think that this entire mass could either have been constructed without an artisan or have stood so long without a ruler.
And he says in Book I:
For no one is so coarse and so savage in his customs that, when raising his eyes to heaven, even though he does not know by whose providence all this which is seen is governed, he nevertheless does not understand in some manner, from the motion, magnitude, beauty, usefulness, and tempering of the things themselves, that some providence exists; nor can it occur that what consists by marvelous reason was not established by some greater counsel.
Therefore, from these things the falsity of the philosophers and astronomers is evident with respect to the first dogma. To the saying of Augustine which they adduced, however, it is said that Augustine adduces it in the person of the Stoics.
The second perverse dogma of the astronomers is that they say that all things which are subjected to fate occur necessarily and immovably. They prove this thus: when any sufficient cause has been posited, it is necessary that the effect follow immovably. But the celestial bodies, with their motions and dispositions, are the sufficient cause of their effects. Therefore, it is necessary that the effects follow immovably and of necessity.
Hence Boethius also says that fate is an immovable disposition inhering in movable things.
But this too is proved false.
First, with respect to human affairs. For human acts are not subjected to the action of celestial bodies, as will be proved below. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent a voluntary action from impeding an effect of the celestial bodies not only in a human being, but also in other things to which human operation extends.
Second, their position is false with respect to all things which occur per accidens, because that which is per accidens is not properly a being, nor is it one. But every natural action is terminated at some one thing. Therefore, it is impossible for something which is per accidens to be the per se effect of any natural principle. For no nature would bring it about that one who intends to dig a grave finds a treasure.
And thus, since a celestial body acts after the manner of a natural principle, because it follows a natural motion, it follows that it is impossible for any active power of a celestial body to be the active cause of those things which occur here per accidens.
Hence the Philosopher says in Book VII of the Metaphysics that it is not necessary for an effect to be posited whenever any cause whatsoever has been posited. For there are certain causes which are ordered toward their effects not of necessity, but as occurs in most cases; these sometimes fail in the lesser number of cases because of the corruption or impediment of some principle, as when nature produces a monster or a human being with seven fingers. According to the Philosopher in Book II of the Physics, these things occur by chance and fortune.
The Philosopher also says in the book On Sleep and Waking that celestial bodies do not always produce their effects in these inferior inanimate things because of contrary dispositions which impede them. For signs of rains and winds frequently arise, he says, although the rains and winds do not occur because of stronger contrary dispositions.
It follows, therefore, that neither voluntary effects nor all the natural effects which are directly subjected to fate occur necessarily and immovably.
To their argument, however, it is said that celestial bodies, or fate, are the cause of inferior effects by means of particular movable causes which can fail in the lesser number of cases and are therefore movable per accidens. For each thing is received in another according to the manner of the recipient. Just as the celestial powers are found to be necessary in themselves, so in inferior movable effects they are received movably and contingently.
And because everything multiform, varied, fortuitous, per accidens, and movable must be reduced to some uniform and per se principle, chance events of this kind, which are movable in relation to the celestial bodies and secondary causes, nevertheless acquire a certain immovability and necessity through their relation to the first principle by which they are ordered—that is, to the divine intellect and its providence. This is not, indeed, an absolute necessity, but a conditional one, according as we say that this conditional proposition is true or necessary: “If God foreknew it, it will occur.”
Hence, after Boethius had said that the series of fate is movable, a little later he adds: “Since it proceeds from the immovable beginnings of divine providence, it too must be immutable.” See Thomas, Part I, questions 115 and 116, throughout.
To the saying of Boethius that fate is an immovable disposition inhering in movable things, however, it is answered that the disposition of secondary causes which Boethius calls fate can be considered in two ways.
In one way, it can be considered according to itself and in the secondary causes themselves; and thus fate is movable, just as the movable or voluntary things subjected to fate are also movable.
But if fate, or the disposition of secondary causes, is understood through its relation to the first divine principle by which they are ordered, then fate is indeed immovable. Boethius understands fate in this manner, namely, insofar as it is referred to the will and power of God. For although all creatures are in themselves mutable in some manner, nevertheless, insofar as they are referred to God’s providence, they acquire a certain immutability.
This second dogma is also proved perverse from the inadmissible consequences which would follow from it. For if we concede that fate introduces necessity among human beings, it follows, first, that Moses speaks falsely in the work of the fourth day when, after enumerating the two great lights and the stars, he added: “And God saw that it was good”—supply: the governance of the stars.
For if it came about from fate and the stars that this person is a robber, that one avaricious, another lustful, and another a drunkard, this would not be good, but exceedingly evil. If the courses of the heavens and stars produced these things, they would not direct human beings toward their proper end by illuminating the earth, but would turn them away from their proper end.
It follows that the Lord God, who gave such power and influence to the stars, would have given human beings a great occasion for departing from those things which the Christian faith proposes for belief.
It follows, second, that it is not necessary for anyone to pray to or worship God.
It follows that there is no sin, for fate removes the freedom of the will by which every sin is committed, cause 15, question 1, at the beginning.
It follows that God is the cause of all sins, because whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused, as Proclus says.
It follows that God contradicts himself, for he commands good things and compels human beings toward evil things.
It follows also that human beings are punished unjustly. For no one sins in that which he cannot avoid.
It follows that rewards are given to the good without justice, for the will is the cause of merit.
It follows that no judgment concerning the deeds of human beings is left to God.
It follows that theology, the arts, moral philosophy, and medicine would be in vain. For what need is there to teach, write, counsel, heal, and so forth, if all things occur from the necessity of fate?
And if temptations are excited in human beings by astral influences at different times of the year according to the diversity of their births, then temptations to sin do not arise from demons and the tinder of sin, as the Christian faith professes.
And, to state the matter in summary, if we concede that all things occur by fate and that all things proceed from it necessarily and immovably, all human life would be overturned. For rebukes, praises, censures, and exhortations would be offered superfluously.
Considering these things, Blessed Augustine says in Book V of The City of God, chapter 1:
Those who think that the stars possess such power delivered to them by God do a great injury to heaven, in whose most illustrious senate, as it were, and most splendid court they suppose that the commission of crimes is decreed—crimes such that, if some earthly city had decreed them, it ought to have been overthrown by decree of the human race.
And the same author says in Book II of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: “With impious perversity, in evil deeds which are most rightly to be censured, they thrust forward the author of the stars as the one to be accused, rather than the human being who committed the crimes,” etc.
And Ambrose, in the book Hexameron, says in condemnation of this unspeakable error concerning fatal necessity:
How has the Lord either proposed rewards to the good or punishments to the wicked, if the necessity of fate—the course of the stars—shapes the discipline and conduct of human beings? If our acts and deeds are referred to natal necessity and not to instruction in morals, why have laws been established and why also have statutes been promulgated, by which either punishments are decreed for the wicked or security is conferred upon the innocent? Why is pardon not granted to the guilty, since, as they themselves say, they transgressed not by their own will but from necessity? Why does the farmer labor and not wait to carry unlabored fruits into the receptacles of his granaries by the privilege of his necessity, if he was so born that riches or resources should flow to him? In vain does the merchant trouble the perilous sea, when a treasure of riches can, as they say, fall to him while idle through his natal lot. Why all the solicitude of human beings concerning gain, every application to business, every labor, and every occupation, if human affairs proceed not from the will but by fatal necessity? For where there is fixed necessity, there industry is without honor and solicitude is indeed foolish.
These are his words.
Therefore, in order that we may avoid all the inadmissible consequences adduced and all these pernicious errors, let us confess neither that all things are subjected to fate nor that all things are immovably necessitated by it.
The third perverse dogma of the philosophers and astronomers concerning fate is that they say that all things come about and are subjected to fate. They proved this by the reasons, authorities, and examples adduced above in the present third little question. But the sixth little question below will resolve and make manifest the falsity of the philosophers’ aforesaid dogma. Boethius likewise confounds them in Book IV of the Consolation, saying: “Certain things which are placed under God’s providence transcend the series of fate.” What things there are which transcend fate and are not subjected to it will appear from the following seventh question.