When someone had killed another [while] unknowing, imprudent, and involuntary, [it] was necessary for this [killer], if he wished to preserve his [own] life, to betake himself to [his] feet [flee], and straightway to flee to one of those cities; because, by divine permission, [it] was lawful for the kinsmen of him who had been slain to kill [the one] who had committed the slaughter — wherever they might find him, whether in cities, or in fields, roads, and mountains, outside these asylum-cities. So Num. 35:26: “If the slayer (the involuntary [one], of whom [there] is discourse there) be found outside the bounds of the cities which are assigned to the exiles, and be killed by him who is the avenger of blood, he who kills him shall be without blame.” But in those words [it] can be asked: “Is he to be reckoned outside the bounds of those cities, who shall have been outside their walls [moenia]?” or [is it] rather the pomoerium [precinct], and the whole domain of the city — or, as we commonly say, the whole territory enclosed within the city’s boundary? And from the context [it] is clear [that] the “bounds and limit” are called the “walls.” And so also [in] Deut. 19:5 & 6. Now then. Secondly: when the slayer had approached one of those cities, he had to stop at the more frequented gate of the city, where, among the ancient Israelites, was the tribunal and session of the Judges; and there [he had] to narrate the circumstance of the slaughter committed, and to show his innocence; and so he was received into that city. And there he was free and exempt [safe] for the time, until his case should be more carefully examined — his accusers [being] heard, and his own defense [being] weighed. For this one [thing] had to be clearly ascertained: whether in that homicide he had truly been unknowing, imprudent, involuntary, and innocent; or whether he said this falsely, [and] brought [it] forward for his own defense. But Oleaster seems to have hallucinated [erred] (ch. 35), when he says (p. 85b): “I would think [that] the case [was] stated before this [man] went to the city of refuge.” For how could he quickly take [to] flight, and escape the anger of the avenger? — to which [view] the text, too, clearly enough protests. But [there] is a question: where did this more careful examination take place? Whether in the same city of refuge, or in another? Two opinions. The former, of Masius and Montanus, [holds] that it took place in the same city of refuge. First: because [in] Deut. 19:11 & 12, if anyone were a guilty and deliberate striker, he was demanded back, from the Asylum-city, by the senate [council] of that city in which the slaughter was committed. Therefore he must have been judged in the asylum-city, and found [to be] such [guilty]. Secondly: the cities of refuge were the same [as the cities] of the Levites, as will be clear [in] the following chapter. And this seems to have been done for this reason — that capital judgments might be made with greater scrupulousness and justice. The latter opinion is [that] of the Rabbis, in the Talmudic tractate “On Striking” [Makkoth] ch. 2, and of the Christians agreeing with these — Lyra and Abulensis, before [at] q. 15 — [namely] that the more careful examination took place in that city where the lethal blow [was] inflicted; because [in] Num. 35:25 [it] is said: “After the examination of the whole case, the innocent [one] shall be freed from the hand of the avenger, and [he] is led back, by sentence, into the city into which he had fled.” He seems, therefore, to have been led to the tribunal of another city, and there accused [and] excused; and at last, his innocence [being] ascertained, [to have been] wholly absolved, and led back into the safe station of refuge. Each opinion is probable, but in the former [there is] greater probability. First: because [it] would have been very troublesome to lead a man, whose innocence [was] to be examined, out from one city into another, and from this [one] back into that same [first one]. Secondly: [it] would also have been dangerous for the innocent [man], since — although he [were] hedged about and guarded by attendants — ambushes could have been laid for him by the relatives of the slain [man], and so the wretched [man] be killed. Thirdly: because this would have been to distrust the wisdom, justice, and virtue of those who presided over the judgments in the city of refuge — which [would be] both grievous to them, and little consonant with the Jewish institutions, especially since those [judges] were all from the Levites, as [was] indicated above. Fourthly: because that [passage] about the leading-back into the city of refuge (Num. 35) is very conveniently explained [as being] about a leading-back not from any other city, but from the place of judgment — from the city gate, where (as I said) the judgments were exercised. For so also, in everyday speech, we say [that] “the accused are led back into custody,” when [from]
(col. 1211)
[…continued from col. 1210.] when, from the tribunal and the benches of the Judges — which are otherwise in the same city — [they] are led back again into prison. Fifthly: because the passage [in] Deut. 19, to prove [that] the one who is condemned of voluntary slaughter was condemned in the city of refuge, is much clearer than that [passage in] Num. 35, [which serves] to prove [the examination to be] in another city. For this [latter] has the single word “of returning” or “of coming back,” and that, moreover, has [been] already expounded. But that [former passage, Deut. 19] says [that the guilty man] is sent into the city of refuge, [to be fetched] by the elders of the other city, who demand back the source [the fugitive]; and [that] he is received by these [elders], and given into the hands of the accusers and avengers, that he may be punished. Nor can this passage be otherwise expounded. Sixthly: because here (v. 9) [they] are called in Hebrew the cities “hammohedah” — that is, as the old Latins speak, “cities of assembly, cities of judgment.” And in reference to this, [they] are called by our interpreter “appointed cities”; by the 70, “αἱ πόλεις αἱ ἐπίκλητοι [hai poleis hai epiklētoi]” [“the convoked cities”]. Seventhly: finally, because [in] Num. 35, in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin text, [it] is sufficiently signified [that] he who had fled to some urban asylum ought to be judged there, as quickly as possible, and indeed by that careful judgment, so that [he] be either condemned of the guilt or absolved. For since [the discourse] there is about the cities of refuge, and [since they] are closed to every voluntary striker, [the case] about the involuntary [one] is immediately subjoined (v. 23 & 24): “But if by chance, without hatred and enmities, he shall have done any of these [things], and this shall have been proved in the hearing of the people, and the question [shall have been] ventilated [debated] between the striker and the kinsman of the blood, the innocent [one] shall be freed from the hand of the avenger, and [he] shall be led back (from the place of judgment), by the sentence of the judge, into the city into which he had fled.” And hence [it] is clear [that] refugees of this kind were safe in those cities — first, indeed, against the kinsmen of the slain man, and the angry avengers; then, against the judges of the other cities also.