When there are several causes of the same effect, that effect is rightly attributed to each of them, but in different [ways]. But here “the causes of the same hardening” are said [to be] “man and God.” Therefore [they must be distinguished]. The manner, then, in which each is a cause of the hardening, is such that “man” is a direct, per se, and proper cause — because of his own accord, and quite freely, he is unwilling to acquiesce in the divine impressions, or, as the text often says, he “does not hear” them; but “God” is only an indirect, improper, and per-accidens cause, because, namely, he permits that hardening. And that in two ways. First: by not doing something. Then, by doing something. “By not doing” [something], again in two ways. First: because he does not at once inflict the penalty, but defers [it]. Then: because he does not give the extraordinary and spiritual helps of grace. And so [teach] St. Jerome (Epistle to Hedibia, q. 10); Augustine (Epistle 101; bk. 1 to Simplicianus; Sermon 88 On the Season; bk. 1 Against the Adversary of the Law, ch. 16); St. Chrysostom (homily 3 on Romans); St. Gregory (Moralia 11, ch. 3). “By doing something” also in two ways. First: because God does something which is otherwise good, and is referred by him to good, from which, however, he foresees [that] that man will seize the occasion of hardening — as was said above from Psalm 104[103]. Secondly: because he declares [makes manifest] someone’s obstinacy. For sometimes one is said to do [that] which he shows to have been done. So Philastrius (part 3, heresy 76), where he enumerates the heresy of those who attributed the hardening of Pharaoh to God — so that Calvin can glory in those Fathers, as also in those who were called the “Predestinarian” heretics, whom Archbishop Rabanus condemned here at Mainz in a synod, as I narrate (bk. 3 On Mainz).
But it is pleasing here to hear the Nicene Anastasius (q. 29) explaining that [text], “I will harden Pharaoh”: “It was easy for God,” he says, “after [his] disobedience, to bring utter destruction upon him; but, using unspeakable gentleness, he inflicted [only] a moderate chastisement — and that made his heart hard and resisting. For just as the Sun, by the operation of [its] heat, softens wax indeed, but hardens clay: so also, by the gentleness of God, some men indeed are softened, but others are hardened. But because not all believe in the life to come, God here chastises certain evil [men], but honors the pious. For that cause the Apostle named some ‘vessels of wrath,’ but some ‘vessels of mercy’ — because, through the former, it is manifest [that] God justly punishes; but through the latter, [that he] takes care of the virtue of the Athletes [of God], and provides for them. For just as physicians cut those who labor under an incurable disease — many being present — teaching [their] disciples the manner of medicine: so also God subjected Pharaoh, on account of [his] disobedience and hardness of heart, to every kind of torments, for the chastisement of the rest. For the Proverbialist [Paroemiastes] says: ‘While the wicked man is scourged, the fool becomes wiser [more shrewd].’ And the shrewd [man], when he shall have seen the evil [man] severely punished, is himself instructed; but the foolish, passing by, are afflicted with loss; and, the impious falling, the just are struck with dread. But let no one reckon [that] Pharaoh was led [away] by God, so that he might not feel what was being done. But the deferring of the scourges is sometimes a cause that the mind contracts a callus. For when [God] inflicted blows upon him, he [Pharaoh] promised to let the people go; but when [God] remitted the torments to him, he was hardened. For [Scripture] says: ‘But Pharaoh, seeing that there was respite, made his heart heavy, and did not hear what God had spoken.’”
And when St. Bridget had asked God, the supreme Judge (bk. 5, interrogation 13, question 5), “why some are hardened,” “I answer,” says he [God], “that Pharaoh was hardened: it was his own fault, not mine, because he was unwilling to conform himself to my divine will. For hardening is nothing else but my subtraction of divine grace — which is subtracted for this [reason], that [man] does not attribute to me, God, that good thing which he has [as] free — [namely] his own proper will. As thou wilt be able to understand by an example. Note the example of the fruitful field. There was a man possessing two fields, of which the one remained uncultivated, [while] the other bore fruit at certain seasons. To whom his friend said: ‘I wonder,’ he said, ‘[that,] since thou art wise and rich, [thou] cultivatest not thy fields more diligently — or why dost thou not hand [them] over to others to be cultivated?’ He answered: ‘The one of the fields, however great diligence I show, produces nothing but the worst weeds, which noxious beasts occupy, and [they] defile the place; to which, if I apply fertilizer, it only grows rank by luxuriating; and even if it produces a little grain, more tares [zizania] come up, which I disdain to gather, because I desire no grain but the pure. Therefore it is more advisable to leave such a field uncultivated — because then the beasts do not occupy the place, nor do the beasts hide themselves in the weeds; and although some bitter herb sprouts, it is useful for the sheep, because, having tasted those, they learn not to disdain the sweet. But the other field is disposed according to the temper of the seasons; of which a certain part is stony, and needs fertilizer; another [is] moist, needing heat; another [is] dry, needing moisture. Therefore, according to the quality of the field, I wish to temper my work.’ I, therefore, God, am like that man. Now the first field is the free motion of the will, given to man — which moves more against me than for me; and if it does some [things] pleasing to me, yet in more [things] it provokes me, because the will of man and mine do not agree. So also Pharaoh did, who, although from certain signs he knew my power, nonetheless firmed his mind against me, to stand in his malice; therefore he experienced my justice — because [of him] who does not use the least [things] well, it is just that he should not glory in the greatest. But the other field is the obedience of a good mind, and the casting-away of one’s own will. Such a mind, if it is dry in devotion, ought to await the rain of my divine grace; if it is stony through impatience and obduration, let it equanimously endure purgation and correction; if it is moist through the wantonness of the flesh, let it embrace abstinence, and be as an animal ready for the will of its possessor — because of such a mind I, God, greatly glory. Therefore, [as to] the fact that some are hardened: this the will of man, contrary to me, does — because, although I will all to be saved, yet it is not accomplished, unless man personally cooperates, conforming his whole will to my will. But why an equal progress and grace is not given to all — this is my hidden judgment: I who know, and dispense to each what is expedient and due to him; who also restrain the endeavor of man, lest he fall more deeply. For many have the talent of grace, who would suffice to work, but refuse. Others abstain from sin from fear of punishment, and because they have not the faculty of sinning, or because sin does not delight them; therefore to some greater gifts are not given — because I, who alone know the minds of men, know [how] to distribute my gifts.”
(col. 1079)
But Calvin, in ch. 4 and 7, objects certain [things], and answers some. He objects, first: “To act is not to be acted upon [to suffer]; but to harden is to act.” I answer, [that] a double “acting” can here be considered: one, to which the passion [being-acted-upon] directly corresponds — and thus a man hardens himself, and is hardened by himself. The second: [it] is “to be willing not to hinder.” And this is a certain willing to permit; and so God is said to harden. He objects, secondly: “God wishes to show power, not patience.” I answer, both — but patience first, then power, as it is said [in] Rom. 2. He objects, thirdly: “Hardening is a certain penalty, which God wishes to inflict.” I answer, the penalty is [that] a man is permitted freely to abuse his own will for evil.
But when it is objected to that same Calvin [that], “according to his opinion, God [will] be the author of sin,” he really concedes it, even though he denies [it] in word; [and] then immediately betakes himself to showing [that] “God does not sin” — which, although it would rightly be inferred from the prior [premise], yet is not inferred first, but only [this]: that he [God] will be the cause of sin. Whence also, overcome by the evidence of the thing, in ch. 7 he says: “sometimes God permits license to the wicked, that they may pass off the divine works as [if] their own; sometimes he relaxes the reins to the wicked, and no one is thus cast headlong, except [one] who has willed to resist.” Finally, “a spirit,” he says, “of dizziness [vertigo] seizes those who have been obstinate in their malice.”