It is an old axiom and decree of the Peripatetics, that all these lower [things] depend on the motion of the heavens, [and] that, [the heaven’s motion] ceasing, [the motion] of these…
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…[the motion] of these — all motions and changes [would cease]. But by this one example all that is clearly refuted, since, the heavens being unmoved, the motions on earth were then so great — of some fleeing, of others pursuing and striking the turned backs [of the foe]. For at such a time and in [such] a war, that I may speak Plautinely:
Each man, for himself, [does] that which each can and avails [to do]; he gives forth [blows], he strikes; the weapons break; it resounds — the heaven [resounds] with the roar of men; from [their] breathing and panting a cloud forms; they fall by the force of [the] wound, and of [men’s] strength.
There is added also the authority of the good Philosophers, who deny that an agent — otherwise well disposed, and endowed with its own force — would act, if it were applied to a patient [thing] similarly disposed, while the heaven was at rest. If some matter, dry and easy to catch fire, were rightly and closely brought to fire, and the heaven suddenly ceased to turn, [they say] it would not burn. Among these Philosophers are Scotus (book 2, distinction 14, question 3); Richard [of Middleton] (in the same place, book 2, [distinction] 2, question 6); Durandus (book 2, part [of] distinction 5, question 3); Henry [of Ghent] (Quodlibet 11, question 15, and Quodlibet 14, question 1) — if it be rightly weighed; Toletus (book 2 On Generation, chapter 10, question 12, [reply] to 7).
Yet I would gladly employ some distinctions. The first: the substances which are below the Moon are either bodies, or bodily forms, or the souls of men. The second: the motion of the heavens is the cause of the motions which are in this sublunary orb either universal only, or also particular.
I say, therefore, first: the motion of the heavens ceasing, all those [things] naturally cease of which it [the heaven’s motion] is the particular cause — for example, the particular motion of the Moon is reckoned the cause of the tides of the sea, as is explained in book 2 of the Meteorologica. If, therefore, the Moon be not moved, there will be no reciprocation [ebb and flow] of those tides — which the Author On the Marvels teaches, in the place often cited, thus: “Since we have shown in all [respects] that the course of the sea agrees with the lunar [motion], and that [the Moon] then rested, although it is passed over in silence by the words of Scripture, does not the observable passage [tide] of those things itself proclaim it?” Secondly: the motion of the heavens ceasing, it is not necessary that all those [things] naturally cease of which [the heaven’s motion] is the universal cause; because there is not, between its universal influx and the effect in lower [things], an essential connection — as Suárez copiously and subtly does [show] (volume 1 of the Metaphysics, disputation 22, On the concurrence of the first cause, section 5). Thirdly: the souls of men, if at any time they have no need of the motion of phantasms [mental images], can understand and reason while the heavens are entirely at rest. But when they do need the motion of phantasms, [these acts] for the most part pertain to those [things] of which the heaven is only the universal cause. But the actions of human men are “motions” only in a very broad [sense]; and therefore their ceasing too is “rest” only in a broad [sense]. On the occasion of this question, Abulensis throws in thirty-four questions about the number of the elements, [their] motions, qualities, and the like — namely from question 36 to 69. But I relegate all these general [matters] to their own place, to Physics.