Some Nations, or rather certain Tyrants, seized by too much anger and cruelty, have done this: but [it] must be thus determined. First: On account of the atrocity of a crime, that punishment can sometimes be transferred from the guilty to the innocent which takes away faculties [wealth], honors, [and] the celebrity of [one’s] fame and name. This all the Jurisconsults teach, and the daily experience in [cases] of injured majesty [treason], in poisoners, and similar [cases]. Second: The punishment of death can, outside war, be inflicted on no innocent [person] on account of any other’s fault, however enormous. And in that [matter] many cautions [are] still to be applied, concerning which [see] elsewhere — Deut. 24:16, where a precept is given to Judges: “The fathers shall not be slain for the sons, nor the sons for the fathers: but,” etc. St. Augustine (q. 8 on Joshua) clearly established this of the difference between the judgment of God and of man: that God can embrace the guilty and the innocent in the same punishment, [but] not man. For when he had first said, “Is that a precept to men [as] judging, that they punish no one for another? But the judgments of God are not of such a kind, [God] who by his high and invisible counsel knows to what extent he may extend even a temporal punishment of men, and a salutary terror,” afterward he subjoins: “If Achan had been found by someone, and apprehended, and, guilty of that crime, had been brought to the judgment of Jesus [Joshua], it is by no means to be thought that the man, [as] judge, would have punished, either for him or with him, anyone else, who was in no way held to the fellowship of his deed. For it was not lawful for him to exceed the mandate of the law, which was given to men, that by his judgment — which is commanded or permitted to a man against a man — he should not reckon one to be punished for another’s sin. But by a far more secret justice does God judge, [God] who is powerful even after death, [in a matter] which a man cannot either free or destroy. Therefore the visible afflictions of men, or [their] deaths — since to those on whom they are inflicted they can both harm and profit — the Lord, in his hidden providence, knows how justly to dispense to each, even when the sins of some seem to be avenged in others.” And again: “With a man [as] Judge, no one ought [to pay] visible punishments, unless for his own fault.” The reason seems [to be] because [a man] has not any right whatever over the life of a man, but [a right] modified, so that it cannot rightly be taken away from him by anyone, unless a fault be found in him. For, among human goods, since life [is] the greatest of all, it is just that no one be despoiled of it who has not rendered himself unworthy of it by his own fault. St. Thomas (in the place cited): because man, as to [his] soul, is altogether free, [belonging to] no other. There is added [the point] that in a matter of so great moment it is better to put a bridle upon the Judges, than that a too free faculty of pronouncing concerning the life of unblamed men be made. See St. Thomas (2a2ae, q. 108, a. 4, ad 2); Alphonsus de Castro (bk. 2 On the Punishment of Heretics,
(col. 903)
of Heretics*, ch. 10 and following); and the Interpreters of Law, on the chapter. So [have] we [treated it], q. 25, sect. 2.