The divisions of lots are various. First: the lot is either “ludic” [playful], like dice and things similar to games, or “serious.” Second: and the most usual [division] is handed down by St. Thomas in the place cited, at the end — that, of serious lots, some are “divisory” [dividing], some “consultory” [consulting], some “divinatory” [divining]. Namely, either mere knowledge is sought through the lot, or also some action. And [as for] mere knowledge — though it can be of things past and present as well as future, yet because it is chiefly exercised in future things, therefore, says the same St. Thomas, if it be asked what is future, it is called a “divinatory” lot. But when, besides knowledge, an action is regarded, that [action] is considered specifically — namely, the giving and applying of some thing to be assigned to someone: whether that thing be some good — such as honor and dignity, some wealth placed in estates, fields, or other portions of land, in moneys, cattle, townships [municipia], or other similar [things], [or] finally some prerogative in the order of some pleasing and sought-after action; or whether that thing be an evil — such as death or other penalty and trouble; and so it is called a “divisory” lot. Or [the] action is considered generally — namely, whatever can fall under counsel and deliberation — and [then] the lot is “consultory,” under which the “divisory” could be contained. For in this [consultory lot], either it is established about a good or an evil to be brought [on someone], and it is sought by lot only whether someone is worthy of it; or it is established that someone is worthy of that good or evil, but it is sought by lot what kind of good or evil is to be imposed on him; or, finally, neither is established, and both are sought by lot. For example, it is established here that on him who committed the sacrilege the penalty of fire is to be brought; but it is not known who [is] the sacrilegious one. But it could happen that the sacrilegious one were known, yet his punishment unknown; or that both he himself and the punishment [were] unknown; and the lot could be used for the inquiry of all [these]. But indeed all these same [things] can be inquired by human counsel, care, and industry, and not rarely found. Therefore the divisory [lot], taken generally, can be reduced to the consultory. Yet because in the business of dividing things of this kind the lot is wont to be more frequently employed, [the divisory] can not badly be distinguished from [other] actions and other lots. I am not unaware that these lots are expounded otherwise by Cajetan too (in the Summula), and again otherwise by Abulensis (q. 35); but either that division is little or not at all accurate, or [is to be] explained in the way already said.
Again, from [their] end, this other division can be [made]: The lot either seeks a knowledge proper to God alone — of which kind is [that] which is occupied about the thoughts of hearts, which is most certain about inconstant and fortuitous things, which finally [is] most perfect and greatest — or [it seeks] an inferior knowledge, which falls under the created intellect, which is conjectural and imperfect. Secondly: [a division may be made] from the efficient cause, which [is] twofold — principal and instrumental. And that [principal] is here again twofold. For either it is the man who openly effects those very [things] by which that lot-knowledge is sought; or it is he who secretly directs what he openly effected by that hook [instrument], and brings out, through it, the knowledge that was sought. The name “caster” [sortitor] is given to both causes — to the former often, to the latter more rarely, yet sometimes: as when, in the Troades (Act 4), in Seneca, it is said: “Who [is] so powerful and fierce [a one], and a fierce caster of the unjust urn?” But the former [the human diviner] is properly called sortilegus and sortiarius [lot-reader]; and he is either he himself who seeks the lot, or another chosen by him — such as a priest, or some little boy — lest, namely, any fraud intervene, while this holy priest, ignorant of it and a stranger to it, is [so] held; but those who cast look at all things with attentive eyes. Masius, on verse 16: “In sacred history it is [found] where the lots are handled by those upon whom the casting falls, as 1 Chron. ch. 24. It is also [found] where [they are handled] by others, and, as I think, by priests. For ‘cast [lots],’ says Saul, ‘between me and my son Jonathan.’ Sometimes [one] himself is the presiding minister of the divine casting, as [in] ch. 18 of Joshua.” Cicero (2, On Divination): “The lots are mixed by a boy’s hand, and drawn.” The Poet:
“The boy thrice took up the sacred lots for him; / from the cross-roads the boy brought back to him all things sure.”
Yet these names, bent to the worst sense, began to signify only the superstitious; and among the Gauls, [they signify] those little women who deal with a demon — [women] who in Germany are called Heren and Buholdt [hags, witches]. And so the lot is either from the casters themselves, or from some priest, or from a little boy. The latter cause [i.e. the presiding, principal one] is reckoned to be God, or a false-god [Deaster] — such as fortune, a demon, [or] heaven. For the good Angels, who can also temper the lot, are attributed to God as, [it were,] ministers. And so the lot is reckoned either divine or superstitious. But from the instruments by which the lot is made, there can be as many kinds of lots as [there are] of those instruments. I have indicated the instruments in Esther ch. 3, q. 4, in which lots are sometimes placed; and there could be added water (as in Plautus, and Pausanias in the Messenica); likewise altars and sacred tables (from Nicephorus, bk. 16, ch. 11 and 18; the Frisian Laws, tit. 74; Caelius Rhodiginus, bk. 20, ch. 27; Suetonius, in [the life of] Tiberius). There are other instruments which are used for the lot, as in St. Thomas (2a-2ae,
(col. 859)
quaest. 96, a. 3): points [marks], molten lead, slips [of paper], reeds [straws], dice, and a book. And this [book-lot] is either divinatory — as in [Gregory] of Tours (History bk. 4, chs. 16 and 20; bk. 5, chs. 14 and 47), Metaphrastes (on St. Theodore, September 11), St. Augustine (Confessions bk. 9, last ch., and Epistle 119, ch. 20), Ranulph (Polychronicon bk. 7, ch. 6), Cedrenus (on Heraclius), Gregoras (bk. 8, on Andronicus), [and] Cardano (On the Variety of Things, bk. 14, ch. 68) — or profane; and so, of old, [there were] lots from Musaeus the Poet, and likewise Homeric and Virgilian [lots], of which Spartianus [treats] in [the life of] Hadrian. For poets are reckoned as though “inspired” [entheoi, ἔνθεοι, “god-filled”], and a care of the gods, and divine. And they themselves used to say:
“There is a god in us; when he stirs, we glow. / From the aethereal seats that spirit comes.” [Ovid, Fasti 6.5–6]
Again, letters — ancient and unknown ones — [as] in Cicero (On Divination 2), [serve] as marks: as in Plutarch (in the Apophthegms), with Dionysius, who [was] a Syracusan, afterward a Tyrant, when by lot he had drawn the letter μ, and another, mocking, said [it meant] μωρολογήσεις [mōrologēseis, “you will speak folly”] — nay, said he, μοναρχήσω [monarchēsō, “I shall rule alone”]. Hence [come] characters variously formed in various ways — in earth, in ash, [with] fingernails, and the like — of which Saxo Grammaticus [treats] (bk. 14, on Denmark), [and] Bodin (On Demons bk. 1, ch. 6).
Rings [are used], as in Plutarch (in [the life of] Timoleon); a bean, as in the same [author] (bk. On the Education of Children), [and] Herodotus (bk. 6), and among the Gauls at this time, when on Epiphany day they choose Kings by lot. An arrow, as in Ezek. 21. Rods, as in Tacitus (bk. On the Customs of the Germans) and Gonzalez Mendoza (bk. 2 of the Chinese History, ch. 4), [and] Hosea 4:12. Little sticks [taleoli], as in Saxo (in the place cited) and title 14 of the Frisian Laws, where they are called “tennij,” as it were fir-branches — since the fir-tree is [called] Tennenbaum in German. Leaves — whence the lot of Mercury among the ancients. Knives thrown up and fallen back — today commonly [used] even among children at play. Six hundred [countless] other [ways], according as it comes into anyone’s mind.
Thirdly: [a division] from the matter about which [the lot] is concerned. And it is either “near” [propinqua] — namely, the knowledge of a hidden thing, as above — or “remote” [remota] — namely, the very thing about which the casting is [made], such as kingdoms [or] estates. For so, as is understood from Seneca (Hercules Furens, Act 1), the blind Gentiles used to say:
“Jupiter holds the stars, Neptune the sea, Pluto the nether realms: / three [gods] hold their three ancestral kingdoms, each his own.”
And so the land of promise was divided [by lot], as will appear below (ch. 13); so also Holstein was divided, as Chytraeus says (in ch. 1 of [his commentary on] Judges). So too other goods, or inheritances (the law Meminimus, in the Code, bk. 10, tit. 34). Secondly: spoils [are] frequently [divided] among soldiers; and so [were] the garments of Christ the Lord (Matt. 27). Thirdly: captives, as in Seneca (Troades, Act 1): “Behold, choosing a master for the daughters-in-law and daughters of Priam, the urn casts [the lot]”; and Act 4: “The turned urn gave masters to the captives.” Fourthly: provinces among the Romans, as appears from Cicero (On the Consular Provinces) and elsewhere. Fifthly: those to be handed over to death — as Achan, and the decimated soldiers, as in Livy (decade 1, bk. 2), Dio (bk. 41), [and] Socrates (bk. 11 of the Tripartite [History], ch. 8) — or those to be afflicted with any penalty, as in Delrio (bk. 4 of the Disquisitions, [sect.] 4, q. 1), [and] Caesar (in the Gallic War). Sixthly: judges, among the same Romans, as Sigonius attests (On Judgments bk. 2, ch. 12), [and] Alexander ab Alexandro (bk. 5, ch. 2); legates, and others, as in Tacitus (Histories bk. 4); senators, as in Dio (q. 54). Seventhly: the order in the Senate, or [the right of] pronouncing judgment, as in the same Alexander (bk. 4, ch. 11) and law 14, ff. [Digest] On Judgments. Eighthly: place in the battle-line, and the order of watches, [and] the assault, and of many other affairs, as in Livy (bk. 2, decade 3) [and] William of Tyre (bk. 12, ch. 24). Ninthly: place at the banquet, [as in] Athenaeus (bk. 8). Tenthly: the matching and combat of athletes, [which] Lucian shows in the Hermotimus; the going-forth of chariots in the circus, as in Bulenger (bk. On the Circus, ch. 13). Eleventhly: certain Saints [chosen] for imitation and invocation — as today, [for] as many months as there are, [it is done] in the sodality of the Blessed Virgin and in the Society of JESUS; formerly publicly in churches, as is plain from the turning wreath made for that purpose at Würzburg [Herbipolis] in the civic church of the Blessed Virgin, and from Bonfini (on St. Elizabeth), [and] Cardano (bk. 16, On the Variety of Things, ch. 92), Francisco López (History of Mexico 21, on Ferdinand Cortés), [and] finally from Caesarius (bk. 8, ch. 62). Twelfthly: sacred ministries (Luke 1:8) and dignities (Acts 1).
Fourthly: [a division] from the form. And it [the lot] is as manifold as [is] the composition and use of the instruments for the seeking of the lot — which even today is very well known in many [cases]. Other divisions can be made — for example, from the place, like the Praenestine [lots], of which Cicero (On Divination 2); the Geryonean [lots], near Padua, [as in] Suetonius (in [the life of] Tiberius, ch. 14); the Delphic [lots], as in Horace (in the Art [of Poetry]):
”…And the prophetic verdict of the lot-diviner / did not differ from Delphi about the divine future.” [Horace, Ars Poetica 218–219]
From the time — [lots] ancient [and] modern; from other circumstances, of which below — such as [lots] religious, profane, permitted, [and] forbidden.