SHE COULD HAVE, says Abulensis quaest. 40. Nay [in] quaest. 41 he says [that], granted she had betrayed and killed [them], or the Israelites had been killed, she would not have sinned. I am not able, however, to bring [my] mind to believe this. First, because God had shown to Rahab herself not only [that] Jericho was to be captured by the Israelites, but [that it was] to be captured also by a just war, of which he himself [was] the Leader and almost the Commander, as [is] manifest from v. 9 & 10. But when anyone knows for certain [that] a war on the other side is just, he ought with all zeal to beware lest he harm that side. For otherwise he would be repugnant to justice: knowing and prudent, he would fight for injustice; and therefore, if such a time should perhaps fall out, that not only a foreigner and a common [hireling] soldier — who gives his name [enlists] to anyone paying the stipend — but even a citizen and [one] subject to some prince should clearly and beyond all doubt understand [that] the arms of [his] city and prince are unjust, he can in no way follow them, but (as St. Augustine said of the Egyptian midwives, quaest. 12) death would rather be to be met by him, than that he inflict any violence upon clear and perspicuous justice. And this too [is] the reason and foundation [of] why to betray those spies for the advantage of the fatherland, or to deliver [them] to death, [was] by no means—
—by any means [something] Rahab ought [to do]; and therefore she was free of all fault of betrayal. Secondly, charity toward the fatherland — and so toward any other whatever — drawn from the springs of nature, prescribes this: [that] since we cannot [remove] every evil from it, we [should] at least certainly remove as much as we can, and conserve its good as much as [is] permitted. But it was established [certain] to Rahab that she could not prevent the destruction of her own city; yet she saw [that], if she did no harm to the spies sent by Joshua, but rather helped them, some remnants of her fatherland could be preserved — and indeed as regards the whole eternity of this and the future age. Right reason therefore urged, and plainly impelled to this: that she herself give what effort she could, lest the spies take any detriment. Thirdly. To her will the divine goodness applied [inward] motions which answered to those practical judgments. Just as, therefore, not to assent to judgments so certain and clear would have been a sin: so [also to yield] nothing to motions so great and so consonant to reason [would be a sin].
Abulensis strives, by a very long disputation, to break two other arguments. The one is: [that] Rahab was bound to defend those whom she had received with hospitality, [as far as lay] in her powers, as Lot [in] Genesis 19. The other: [that] she was moved by God to hide and help the spies. But these [arguments] I either do not use, or certainly not in that mode in which he objects [them] to himself and solves [them]. For thus [in fact] I would otherwise use them: Rahab was bound to protect, [as far as lay] in her powers, those whom she had received with hospitality [as] guests, even if [they were] enemies — because she nevertheless certainly knew [that] they were waging a just war. And by God she was moved to receive and protect them with hospitality, so that she certainly perceived that [inner] motion to impel toward a thing honest, good, and congruent with the true practical judgment. Without sin, therefore, Rahab could in no way indicate nor hand over the spies.