A successor can be constituted in some principate either by God, clearly and openly; or by God indeed, but less clearly — namely, by lots (about which [see] Philo, book On the Creation of the Prince, at the beginning; Lipsius, bk. 2 Politics, ch. 4; and I myself, on ch. 1 of Acts, and on Joshua ch. 7 below); or by men — and this [happens] doubly, either by some election of these [men], or by stock and nearness of blood. That the first way is the best, no one will doubt who shall once have embraced in thought God’s wisdom and His benevolence toward the human race. For these two [things] bring it about that He can always constitute [whomever] He will, the fittest and most useful of all. By [His] wisdom He sees the best end, and the ways and means most apt to lead to it; by [His] benevolence He wills both him [the best man] and those [means]. But that is assuredly the best way of choosing princes which both has the best end, and, [directed] toward it, the best means; again, [that way] which is most consonant to the rightest and best rules; finally, [that] also which can certainly be known as such by all. Here only could someone object: Saul was divinely and plainly given and named king, and yet what [a king] did he turn out to be? And in Isaiah (ch. 3, v. 4) the Lord Himself says: “I will give boys [as] their princes, and the effeminate shall rule over them.” But if we take “boys” as St. Jerome takes it in that place, and [as] Rupert [does] on Num. ch. 32 — [namely] those who, though they be older by birth, are nonetheless [children] in [their] elders and in a childish softness — who would not see [such men] most unfit to be set over peoples to be governed? But if we take those who are “boys in age,” or at least (as the Hebrew and Greek word bears) “young men,” [then] we may [say] now what we shall be able to say from Lucan (bk. 8):
The age of the Nile’s tyrant is suspect to us: for arduous fidelity demands robust years.
And the Philosopher indicates the reason (bk. 1 Politics, last ch.): that that lesser age generally lacks those safeguards of prudence and of the virtues which are necessary for governing; but, on the contrary, [overflows] in audacity,—
(col. 186)
—pride, wantonness, and overflows in lusts and levity. Whence grave evils to the Commonwealth arise — of depraved examples, of unnecessary wars, of tribunals foully violated, of enormous expenses, and very many other like [things]. So much so that Ecclesiastes groaned (ch. 10, v. 16), and said: “Woe to thee, O land, whose King is a boy” — or, as it is cited from Isa. 3 by St. Jerome, “is a young man.” Let [men] read the annals of the magistracies to be entered upon, in Cicero (Philippic 5): the Gentile Romans, still [heathen], enacted [such laws]. He who in the preceding question was cited, the consular Nicomachus, said: “Let princes avert boys [from rule]; and let those below puberty [be reckoned] fathers of the fatherland — [those] whom the sweetness of granting consulships, and the games, and whatever childish pleasure invites. What reason, in the name of evil, is there to have an Emperor (a Prince) who knows not how to care for [his] reputation; who is ignorant of what the Commonwealth is; who makes them Consuls, Leaders, Judges, whose lives, merits, ages, families, [and] deeds he does not know?” Nay, even by feigned fables, in their [tale of] Phaëthon, the poets taught the same thing; by one of whom that [youth] is brought in, demanding the governance of the horses of the sun; but to him it is answered:
Great [things] thou seekest, Phaëthon, and [things] which suit not those [thy] strengths…
Yet, when he had wrested those reins, how great a burning of the whole world [ensued]? what destruction? Even, then, if the Lord Himself from heaven should designate Princes and set [them] over public affairs, that [supposed] best way could [still] not seem [the best]. It is to be met, however, [with the answer] that the best is indeed always to be [the outcome] — but in two ways. 1. By reason of the end, which is not the particular good of some nation in particular, but the universal [good] — namely, the good of the whole universe. For this sometimes requires that certain peoples be chastised, be overthrown in [their] fortunes, be afflicted with miseries, be despoiled of principate and of life; [and] on the contrary, that others be exalted, be increased in wealth, be amplified in glory and empire. To this end the readiest way is, if [men] boys — either in years or in manners — sit at the helm of Commonwealths destined to perish. 2. By reason of the end also, which is the particular good of some particular nation — but not the worldly, fluxile, and perishable [good], such as [are] riches, abundance of things, peace, and the tranquillity of bodies and fortunes; but another much greater and better [good] — namely, the imitation of God Himself, and penitence, the calling-away from sins, the expiation of these, the impeding of greater crimes, and other [things] of the same kind. But now, through unskilled, slothful, and impious princes, it comes to pass that there are indeed shipwrecks of temporal goods — but that planks [tables] of tears and penance are offered to all, [and] a handle of coming to their senses is given to all; or at least, that the occasion of heaping up the same or other flagitious [deeds] is taken away. For if, through the industry and virtue of Princes, wars, wants, and other calamities were averted, [men] would go on further in their pristine crimes, drunk and mad with the very prosperous course of all things. If the Prince were pious and religious, who by both example and laws would compel them to duty and religion, they would not obey — they would riot, they would snatch up arms, and so the latter [state] would become worse than the former. These [things], because the Searcher of hearts foresees [them], He has sometimes given Sauls, [and] boys, and effeminate [rulers]; and these were, at that time, place, and end, the fittest. So that always the creation of princes which is [made] by God ought deservedly to be reckoned the best. But because it is not perpetual — nay, [is] extraordinary—
(col. 187)
—[extra]ordinary, and above nature, and [above] the common order of this world — to this [way] the nearest is that which is made by the election of the men themselves; and [it is] so much the better, [in proportion] as [it is made] through better and more prudent [men]. That former part [of the point] will be clear, if we advert [that] these [men] are by nature good, and desirous of their own advantage; and again, [that they are] not ignorant that by the work of good princes they can obtain that [advantage], and will thereby lack the sloth of the bad [ones]. Now indeed, since — not like God — the mind of men cannot know who [is] certainly good, who certainly bad, it nonetheless has very many ways of investigating and exploring that goodness, and, in a human manner, sufficiently certain and least deceiving: namely, the observation of [a man’s] past life, of things once done, of [his] education and native character, of [his] propensities and studies, of [his] friendships and fellowships. And hence indeed shines out the latter part, of which I was speaking; for all these [things] they see and embrace more deeply and more skillfully, who are the better and wiser. But because in these [elections] incredible dissensions and factions often arise, and from that [cause] commonwealths — whose safety and security was sought by the first election — are cast into the utmost peril and destruction; and, as [is] written by a certain one of the Poets, “the fool often gives honors to the unworthy, and the inept [man] serves reputation” — for these two evils the long use of the ages has excogitated remedies. One, that [the electing power] should investigate various ways of choosing which have the least of fraud and of favor and of tumults, and should fortify the same by various laws and cautions. The other, that those who should be born of princes, those princes should succeed. For why should there not be good hope of these? Neither few nor small pledges have they seemed [to give] to public affairs — because these [princes] were about to educate them well, and duly to adorn them with royal arts; because they [the sons] would seem unwilling to diminish the honor received by them from [their] parents, [unwilling] to shake the empire, to desert the peoples, to obscure [their] parents’ glory, [unwilling] to leave a just cause of taking the principate away from [their] children, [unwilling] to extinguish in themselves — as [being] the last [of the line] — the family and the acquired splendor; finally, because the very blood, and a stock so illustrious and noble, seems to ingenerate some power or other. “The brave,” says he [the Poet], “are created from the brave.” Yet these [things] often all deceive; and “the sons of heroes [are] a bane,” or, as the Rabbis say, chomets ben iaiin [חמץ בן יין] — that is, “vinegar is the son of wine” — because from this [wine], as it sours and degenerates, [vinegar] comes to be. But because [there] is the remedy of that prior and better mode, God approved that way of deriving principates in the Kings of the Jews and the Aaronic priests, as here Abulensis notes (q. 39). And today it is retained in many kingdoms — yet by no means in [the case of] priests, for the reasons which Bellarmine discusses (bk. 1 On Clerics, ch. 6).