Theorem I. The eternity of punishments is asserted by those testimonies which expressly call the punishments of hell eternal.

6. Demonstration. Not in one place or once, but in several places and frequently, the punishments of hell are called eternal.

An eternal fire is spoken of in Isaiah¹ and Matthew;² an eternal ignominy is spoken of in Daniel;³ an eternal destruction is spoken of by Paul the Apostle;⁴ finally, eternal darkness and eternal bonds are commemorated in the Epistle of Jude.⁵

Now, I. neither syllable nor apex is contained in the Scriptures from which it may lawfully be conjectured that the appended word eternal can or ought to be taken broadly in the testimonies adduced. Moreover, II. neither the subject matter of the discourse, nor the nature of the thing, nor the analogy of faith requires that, with the proper and obvious sense neglected, improper, more remotely sought, and metaphorical senses be preferred. Therefore, III. the proper sense of the words must be retained. But the punishments of hell are expressly and explicitly called eternal. Therefore they are eternal and are bounded by no end.

Scholion I

7. In order to detract from the force of this argument, those who have declared war upon the eternity of punishments note that the words עוֹלָם, αἰών, and eternal do not have a certain and determinate notion underlying them, but that they frequently express not what is eternal, but what is long and lasting. They endeavor to confirm this by examples collected from every quarter.⁶

8. We reply that nothing is established by the examples collected, and that nothing is elicited from the fact that the words עוֹלָם, αἰών, and eternal do not always have the value of that which is eternal.

We prove that nothing is elicited from this latter point chiefly by a twofold reason, the one indirect and the other direct.

And I. the indirect reason is this: one would act absurdly who denied that the words father, son, bread, body, fire, and so forth, of themselves and absolutely signify that which we call father, son, bread, body, fire, and so forth. In order that the proper sense be maintained, established usage of speech suffices, nor is there need of arguments; but arguments, and indeed most weighty ones, are needed in order that a metaphorical signification may be substituted for the proper signification. Therefore those act equally absurdly who deny that the words עוֹלָם, αἰών, and eternal, of themselves and absolutely, express that which has no end and endures perpetually.

If the words עוֹלָם, αἰών, and eternal are sometimes employed improperly, the names father, son, bread, body, fire, and so forth are also sometimes employed improperly. Therefore, if it is unlawful to infer from the sometimes improper use of these names that they do not of themselves and absolutely express what we ordinarily understand upon hearing the names father, son, and so forth, in the same manner it is unlawful to infer from the sometimes improper use of the words עוֹלָם, αἰών, and eternal that they are not of themselves and absolutely to be taken in their proper and obvious sense.

In one word, those who pursue improper and far-sought senses must persuade themselves of this: such senses cannot be admitted and proved unless they are confirmed by certain weighty reasons. As long as these are lacking or are not adduced, so long do the canons of legitimate interpretation require that we not depart from the proper and common force of signification.

II. The direct reason follows. I therefore ask whether the words עוֹלָם, αἰών, and eternal sometimes, or frequently, denote in the Scriptures that which is perpetual and lacks an end. He would be most unskilled who called this most frequent signification into doubt. What rule, therefore, shall we employ in order to establish with certainty when this most frequent signification, and when the other and improper one, ought to be taken? The rule will be this: the most frequent signification is to be taken whenever no trace of limitation occurs in the context, and neither the nature of the thing nor the analogy of the Scriptures and of faith demands a limited sense. But neither the nature of the thing nor the analogy of the Scriptures and of faith requires that the punishments inflicted upon the wicked be believed to cease; and the contexts from which we have taken the testimonies⁷ contain not even a shadow of limitation. Therefore it is not the improper and limited, but the proper and absolute signification that ought to be taken.

9. Now, as regards the examples, I observe that each and all of them are beside the point, and indeed for a twofold cause. For either a limited sense is attributed to them through error, or, if deservedly, it is because indications of the limitation are present which are neither obscure nor doubtful.

A limited sense is wrongly affixed to those testimonies which more than once ascribe eternity to legal enactments. For eternity is not asserted of them considered in themselves, but in comparison with the antitype which was to be eternal, and of which they were shadows and images. Hence in passages of this kind there obtains that figure of speech by which those things which are proper to the thing signified are attributed to the sign.

Again, a limited sense is wrongly affixed to those testimonies in which it is foretold that the punitive visitation of God, although temporal, will endure eternally upon the wicked. For eternal duration is attributed to the temporal visitation because this visitation⁸ is regarded as a certain beginning of the visitation which awaits the wicked in the other life.

Likewise, a limited sense is undeservedly affixed to those testimonies in which the eternity of the earth⁹ and of the heavenly bodies¹⁰ is proclaimed. For nowhere in the Scriptures is the complete destruction of the earth and of the heavenly bodies found to be signified.

Finally, what we read in the Book of Genesis is wrongly restricted to a limited sense: “My covenant shall be in your flesh, לִבְרִית עוֹלָם, for an eternal covenant.”¹¹ For the legitimate sense of these words is: “The sign of my covenant shall be in your flesh, for the sign of an eternal covenant,” namely, of that covenant by which he had promised him¹² that he would be a God to him. To the same point likewise conduce the words contained in the Book of Numbers: “All the firstfruits of the sanctuary … I have given to thee and to thy sons and daughters by a perpetual right; it is an everlasting covenant of salt before the Lord, for thee and thy sons.”¹³

10. Nor do we therefore contend that in absolutely every individual text the word עוֹלָם has underlying it the notion of a duration circumscribed by no limits. Indeed, we freely grant that some texts can be adduced in which עוֹלָם has the same value as lasting; but we also add that among these texts there is none in which there is not a wholly undoubted indication of that limitation.

Such an indication is present when עוֹלָם is constructed with דֹּרוֹת, as in the ninth chapter of Genesis,¹⁴ where the rainbow is established as a sign לְדֹרֹת עוֹלָם, “for generations of the age”; and in several places of Exodus,¹⁵ where the priesthood is promised to the sons of Aaron לִכְהֻנַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתָם, “for a priesthood of the age throughout their generations.” For since human generations are designated by the word דֹּרוֹת, the limitation according to which the phrase ought to be understood immediately discloses itself.

Such an indication is present when עוֹלָם is constructed with the word חֹק in the certainly not uncommon phrase חֻקַּת עוֹלָם, “an everlasting statute,”¹⁶ by which ceremonial laws are designated. For all Scripture, as widely as it extends, proclaims that these were to be temporary and to cease as soon as the new covenant should be instituted.

11. Moreover, I do not sufficiently grasp what Daniel Huet intended when he wrote in his Origeniana:¹⁷ “That αἰών designates not infinite but indefinite time is clear from the words of Luke:¹⁸ ‘And he shall reign in the house of Jacob forever, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας.’ For if it expressed an interminable span of time, to what purpose would there be added: ‘And of his kingdom there shall be no end’? Therefore Luke, or rather Gabriel, intends this: he shall indeed possess in the house of Jacob a lasting kingdom, but one which will not lack an end.” But this interpretation is neither fitting nor necessary.

It is not fitting, since it can scarcely be cleared of the fault of tautology.

It is not necessary, since in the words which immediately follow, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται τέλος [and of his kingdom there shall be no end], the particle καί can be regarded as exegetical or causal, so that the reason is given why the kingdom of Christ will endure εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας [forever].

In addition, it may reasonably be supposed that one and the same thing, namely, the perpetual duration of the kingdom of Christ, is expressed by two distinct modes of speech, the one affirming, “He shall reign in the house of Jacob forever,” and the other denying, “His kingdom shall be bounded by no end.”

Finally, it is manifest that the words of the angel refer to several oracles of the prophets which now were to be fulfilled in Christ. It is therefore no wonder if he used a twofold phrase, the one affirming and the other denying, in order to recall more clearly to memory what those oracles had been: that he used the affirmative phrase in order to express the eternal kingdom of the Messiah, which had been foretold in the Psalms¹⁹ and by Daniel;²⁰ and that he used the negative phrase in order likewise to express his kingdom without end, foretold by Isaiah.²¹ In brief, he therefore employed the twofold negative and affirmative form because the perpetual duration of the kingdom of the Messiah had likewise been announced beforehand in the twofold negative and affirmative form.

Wherefore there is no reason why the notion of the word αἰών should be restricted, especially since this limited acceptation is not sufficiently well composed with its etymology: for αἰών is from ἀεὶ ὤν, “that which always is.”

Scholion II

12. Those who belong to the Socinian faction make use, moreover, of another exception, and note with Wolzogen: “That is not called eternal fire in which the thing cast into it is burned forever and is never consumed, but rather that which so burns up and consumes a thing that it is never restored to its integrity, or which burns so long as until that thing is burned plainly and entirely.”²²

But this exception is truly Socinian, and nothing is more suited than it to overturn all the rules of speech. In the phrase πῦρ αἰώνιον [eternal fire], eternity is an attribute of the fire; but in the Socinian exposition, eternity is an attribute of the effect produced through a fire which is not eternal. What of the fact that πῦρ, or fire, which elsewhere is called αἰώνιον [eternal], is termed ἄσβεστον [inextinguishable] in the same Matthew?²³ But concerning this denomination and the argument drawn from it, a little below.