COROLLARY LVI.
The stricter Calvinists, who are also the supralapsarians, in order to delineate the form and account of the decree predestining and reprobating, and to subject it article by article to the eyes, use this scheme1 and proceed in this order, as it were.
I. The most wise God decreed first concerning the ultimate end, and then concerning the means for the sake of the end.
II. The ultimate end of God was and is the manifestation of his glory.
III. The most excellent manifestation of the divine—
—glory cannot be obtained from any other source than from the manifestation of all the divine properties, but especially of mercy and justice: of mercy indeed, which shines forth in pardoning sins, and of justice, which is resplendent in imputing and punishing them.
IV. Just as God willed to exhibit an example of his mercy concerning some, those selected from the multitude of the rest, so he willed to disclose his justice concerning all the rest neglected and reprobated by him.
V. Therefore, both election and reprobation, decreed for this end and unto this end, must be judged absolute, subjective, and free and unencumbered by human conditions2.
VI. In order that the manifestation of mercy and vindictive justice could have place, a miserable object and subject worthy of misery was required. It was therefore necessary that a miserable creature should exist.
VII. A miserable creature could not exist unless: a) its creation preceded; but creation was followed by b) legislation, and after legislation by sin; because c) without sin the creature could not be miserable; for misery d) is a punishment which cannot be separated from antecedent guilt.
VIII. In order that sin could be contracted, there was need of a creature endowed with intellect and liberty: with intellect by which it would know the law; with liberty by which it would violate the law or keep it.
IX. When the law had been given and liberty placed in the creature, and especially a liberty which was restrained by the golden bridle of original justice and reduced to order, it was doubtful whether sin would or would not occur; indeed, it ought to have seemed far more probable that it would not occur. Therefore, lest God either fall short of the end established for himself or appear subject to the free choice of creatures, it was altogether necessary that by some decree he should determine the liberty of the creature toward one side, namely, that of sin—
—X. In order that the decreed determination might be committed to execution, the bridle of original justice had to be removed, and the grace necessary for not sinning withdrawn or denied, while man himself was permitted to himself and to his weakness. This was within the right of God, that man, taught by experience, might understand what he could do from himself and when destitute of aid determining liberty toward good.
XI. When an order of providence of this kind had been chosen, which the supralapsarians call one of efficacious permission, it was necessary by a wholly unavoidable necessity that sin should exist, and together with sin liability to punishment and eternal damnation.
XII. Human nature having fallen into sin and misery, in order that mercy could come to the aid of the elect, it was necessary to decree a Mediator who: a) would make satisfaction for them and reconcile them to God; b) would lead them to faith and repentance; c) would implant faith itself and repentance in their souls by interior and insuperable grace; d) would protect the faith once implanted by a power which cannot be resisted; e) would either preserve repentance continually or restore it at least in the final struggle; and f) through death would advance the elect to immortal life.
XIII. But for fulfilling the decree of reprobation, by which all the rest not elect are comprehended, this one thing was necessary: that God should deny them the salvific aids of grace. For when these were denied, they could neither be reconciled to God, nor obey the external calling, nor abstain from all sins, nor complete the present mortality dear to God, nor finally escape the punishments threatened and the torments of hell.
These are their assertions, in which nothing occurs which is not most alien to the universal doctrine of Christian tradition3. For most alien from it is: 1) the very series of divine acts, which—
—are distinguished virtually; most alien, 2) is what is said concerning a will determined toward one part, namely, that of sin; most alien, 3) is what is taught concerning grace withdrawn from many; and, lest I commemorate each item by reviewing it, most alien, 4) is what is affirmed concerning the manifestation of punishing justice before benignity and mercy have been expended.
Footnotes
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Concerning this Friedrich Seiler has things worthy of being known in Theologia Dogmatica Polemica, P. II, cap. II, pp. 380 ff., Erlangen ed., 1820. ↩
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Wyttenbach, Tentam., T. I, § 416: “The decree,” he writes, “of election is absolute; for God chose man not only to salvation but also to faith and holiness, which are means to salvation; and therefore he chose both to the end and to the means, which is absolute.” And § 438: “Moreover, since a decree in general is concerned both with all means and with ends, hence it must be absolute; and predestination, which differs from it only as regards its object, must be absolute.” With these agree the words of Friedrich Stapfer, Institutt. Theolog. Polemic., T. I, cap. III, sect. XVII, p. 335: “Whatever depends upon no condition is absolute. But since the divine decree can depend upon no condition, hence it is called absolute.” ↩
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For from the universal doctrine of Christian tradition which we have expounded, the τάξις, order, of decrees must be constituted thus: 1) God decreed to create men that they might be blessed eternally and might illustrate the divine glory by their beatitude; 2) for this reason he decreed to furnish the first men with all those gifts by which they could attain the end fixed for them; 3) since from all eternity he had seen that man would not rightly use the natural and supernatural gifts received, he decreed to permit the abuse of liberty and the sin cohering with it; 4) nevertheless, at the same time he decreed to bring aid to fallen—
—and afflicted humanity and to stretch forth his right hand to it as it lay prostrate; 5) hence he decreed to reconcile all to himself through Christ; 6) he established for all and offered to all aids by which they might enjoy the benefits of universal restoration; 7) finally, he decreed to crown those whom he foresaw would join their own work with the aids offered even unto the end, but to condemn those whom he foreknew would be rebellious against his mercy even unto the last day. Such is the order of decrees which is gathered from Christian tradition, and from which there proceeds the following syllogism representing the form of divine predestination.
πρόθεσις, proposition: Whoever rightly uses the benefits of universal restoration is to be saved.
πρόγνωσις, foreknowledge: I foreknow that Clement will rightly use the benefits of universal restoration.
προορισμός, predestination: Therefore Clement is to be saved.
↩In this syllogism the proposition refers to the antecedent will of God, but the inference to the consequent will and predestination itself.