COROLLARY XLVII.
Nevertheless, it does not escape me that for a fuller and more intimate knowledge of the whole matter it will be very opportune if several further heads pertaining to either will are examined a little more diligently. I shall therefore enter upon this examination and complete it as briefly as can be done. As regards the first will, then, it can come into controversy whether it ought to be believed and called absolute, or rather conditioned and hypothetical. But every controversy will cease, wholly removed from its foundation, provided the necessary and opportune distinctions are not neglected. For the antecedent will can and ought to be compared severally: a) with its proper and native origin; b) with the men whom it regards; c) with the order of which it is the cause and principle; d) with the means which it employs; and finally, e) with the salvation which it has proposed. Now if it is joined with its origin, it ought no more to be called absolute than hypothetical: absolute indeed, because it proceeds from the innate love of God; but hypothetical, because it flows at the same time from mercy, which supposes the ruin and transgression of humanity. But if it is referred to the men whom it regards, it is rightly named both absolute and—
—hypothetical. It is rightly named absolute because it prerequires no merits of men by which it may be incited to do good; for it does good precisely that men may be able to have merits. But it is named hypothetical because it is concerned with men who are not guiltless and whole, but wounded and infected by the contagion of guilt. Similar things must be repeated if it is compared with the order of which it is the cause and principle. For a twofold and diverse account inheres in an order of this kind: the account of a supernatural order and the account of a restored order. Therefore, just as by reason of the supernatural order it is referred to the antecedent and absolute will, so by reason of the restored order it pertains to the antecedent and hypothetical will. Nor must it be judged otherwise if it is considered in relation to the means which spring forth from it no otherwise than from a most abundant vein. For these can be regarded either as supernatural aids by which human nature is raised and elevated from a servile condition to the dignity of adoptive filiation, or as heavenly medicines by which contracted diseases are healed and broken powers are restored. But considered in the former manner, they are recalled to the antecedent will, and that absolute; in the latter, to the same will indeed, but hypothetical. Eternal salvation remains, with which the first will may be compared. It can be compared with this either insofar as it is the ultimate and supernatural eudaimonic good proposed to humanity, or insofar as it is indeed such a good, but one which is divinely presented for attainment to corrupted and unworthy humanity. But no one fails to know that, according to this diversity in the manner of considering salvation, it ought to be reduced to the first will, whether absolute or hypothetical. Wherefore the question whether the antecedent salvific will must be called and held absolute or hypothetical cannot be answered accurately otherwise than by naming it both absolute and hypothetical according to the manifold manner in which it is considered.