Section CLXXII

Of this doctrine I have one whom I may add as a most noble witness and defender: Theophilus of Antioch, whose illustrious praises—

—Eusebius celebrated¹. For, after recalling the transgression by which Adam bound himself and recounting the punishments² which followed from it, he immediately proceeds³:

And God bestowed this upon him in the place of a great benefit⁴, that he should not remain bound by sins for all eternity; but he cast him out of paradise as though condemned to a certain exile, so that, when by this punishment he had expiated sin within a determinate time and had been chastised, ἐξ ὑστέρου ἀνακληθῇ, he might afterwards be recalled… Moreover⁵, just as a vessel, if after it has been fashioned it has some fault, is melted down and refashioned so that it may become new and whole, death brings the same thing to man: for in a certain manner he is broken, that he may be found sound in the resurrection, that is, clean, just, and immortal. But when God calls Adam and says, “Adam, where are you?” οὐχ ὡς ἀγνοῶν τοῦτο ἐποίει ὁ Θεός, ἀλλὰ μακρόθυμος ὤν, ἀφορμὴν ἐδίδου αὐτῷ μετανοίας, καὶ ἐξομολογήσεως, he did this not because he was ignorant⁶, but, since he is exceedingly patient, he gave him a place for doing penance and confessing.

But soon, treating the question formerly agitated with the greatest contention by the heretics⁷—whether death ought or ought not to be attributed to the Creator—he writes⁸:

But someone will say to us: θνητὸς φύσει ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος; οὐδαμῶς. τί οὖν ἀθάνατος; οὐδὲ τοῦτό φαμεν. ἀλλὰ ἐρεῖ τις, οὐδὲν οὖν ἐγένετο; οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἐγώ φημι. Was Adam made mortal by nature? By no means. Then was he immortal? Neither do we say this. Therefore was he nothing? Neither do we say this.—

οὔτε οὖν φύσει θνητὸς ἐγένετο, οὔτε ἀθάνατος, therefore he was made neither mortal by nature nor immortal. For if he had made him immortal from the beginning, he would have made him God. Again, if mortal, God would seem to be the cause of his death. οὔτε οὖν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν, οὔτε μὴν θνητόν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς ἐπάνω προειρήκαμεν, δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων. Therefore he made him neither immortal nor mortal, but, as we said above, capable of both. So that, if he were borne toward those things which lead to immortality by observing the commandments of God, he would receive from him immortality as a reward and become a god; but if he turned aside toward those things which lead to death, not obeying God, he himself would be the author of death for himself. Ἐλεύθερον γὰρ καὶ αὐτεξούσιον ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς ἄνθρωπον· ὃ οὖν ἑαυτῷ περιεποιήσατο δι’ ἀμελείας καὶ παρακοῆς, τοῦτο ὁ Θεὸς αὐτῷ νυνὶ δωρεῖται διὰ ἰδίας φιλανθρωπίας, καὶ ἐλεημοσύνης ὑπακούσοντας αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. For God made man free and master of himself. What, therefore, he had procured for himself by negligence and disobedience, God now gives back to him by his singular humanity and mercy toward men obeying him. For just as man, by not obeying, drew death upon himself, οὕτως ὑπακούσας τῷ θελήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ βουλόμενος δύναται περιποιήσασθαι ἑαυτῷ τὴν αἰώνιον ζωήν, so, by obeying the will of God, whoever wills can procure eternal life for himself. ἔδωκε γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῖν νόμον καὶ ἐντολὰς ἁγίας· ὡς πᾶς ὁ ποιήσας δύναται σωθῆναι, καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τυχὼν κληρονομῆσαι τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν. For God gave us a law and holy precepts, which whoever observes can attain salvation and, having become a participant in the resurrection, inherit incorruption.

Therefore a threefold relation can, indeed ought to, be distinguished by which all men in and through their first parents are referred to God. The first a) is that by which they are compared with God creating and adorning his work with excellent gifts. But this relation is one of love and extraordinary benevolence, by which he conferred upon men not only that which was joined to their nature but beneficently added many things which surpassed every power of nature.

The second b) follows, by which the human race, fallen and lost in its first parents, is compared with God as the defender of his law and judge of the transgression committed. But this relation is one of most just severity, by which God expelled all men together with their first parents from paradise, subjected them to temporal punishments, despoiled them of preternatural gifts, and punished those already dead in soul also by the very death of the body.

This is succeeded by the third and last c), and it is proper to the divine φιλανθρωπία καὶ ἐλεημοσύνη, benignity and mercy; and it proceeds from the fact that it seemed good to God 1) to restore the work which had been lost, 2) to furnish it full opportunity and power for recovering those things which it had squandered, and 3) so to temper and soften⁹ the very order of temporal punishments that even the punishments might conduce to the benefit of men.

Who, then, weighing these things within himself, does not almost behold with his eyes the harmony of heavenly justice with benignity, the triumph of mercy, and the institution of the repaired order? And indeed that institution by which first the first parents, and then the whole of posterity, had, and continues to have, the faculty of obtaining again those things which they lost and of seeking anew the eternal felicity from which they fell?