Section CXXIII

This summary of doctrine, which Irenaeus—ὁ ἐγγὺς τῶν ἀποστόλων γενόμενος, “who lived near the time of the apostles”¹, and a disciple of Polycarp²—handed down with such care—

—and inculcated with such zeal upon the churches of Gaul, the bishops and doctors of those same churches who followed retained with a certain marvelous consent of minds and words. For, not to commemorate Prosper again³, its most abundant witnesses and defenders are Phoebadius of Agen, Hilary of Poitiers, Sedulius, Salvian, Sidonius, Valerian, Avitus, and Caesarius. Of these, Hilary speaks thus⁴ on the words of the Psalm⁵, “They shall pour forth the memory of the abundance of thy sweetness”:

This is chief in God; this is to be praised in the powerful one: not that he made heaven, because he is powerful; not that he founded the earth, because he is might; not that he regulated the year by the stars, because he is wise; not that he animated man, because he is life; but that he is merciful, who is just; that he has compassion, who is king; that he passes over, who is God. For upon that which was said⁶, “They shall exult in thy justice,” there follows, as necessary⁷: “The Lord is compassionate and merciful, patient and of much mercy. The Lord is sweet to all, and his compassions are over all his works.” For that he is powerful is the might of his nature; but that he is merciful is the advancement of our salvation. And it is more not to use the things which are one’s own, but to furnish to others the things which are one’s own. And therefore mercy excels the other works of God, because his magnificent operation is a thing of his power, but the use of his mercy is for another.

He proceeds to narrate this preeminence of mercy, both when he denies⁸ that God forgets to be sweet or ceases to be so, and when⁹, comparing human and divine justice, he says:

The justice of God is not equated with human justice. For it is not subject to the law of nature, by which law nature was established, so that it has no necessity of not being good—

—since it is just. The justice of God possesses the will to have mercy; yet through the will to have mercy it will not be so changed from itself that it ceases to be justice. But human justice is accustomed to come to this, that it is not merciful, and mercy so to present itself that it is not just. For mercy will not be just¹⁰ if, for the sake of a pitiably needy slanderer, you begrudge the richer man his right; if you prefer a woman’s tears to the injury of her husband; if you do not think the abuse of a blind man ought to be reproved. But, on the contrary, justice will not retain mercy if you punish the thief of one coin as the thief of a vast treasure, although he who lost it may have had a treasure in that one coin; if you torment with an inquiry of punishments an adolescent entangled in only one and the same infamous adultery, by an equal death¹¹, as an artificer of many adulteries, although the crime is one of death in both¹². These and things of this kind make both human mercy and justice imperfect; but patience granted before the punishments of criminals makes the justice of God merciful. Since he does not hasten to punish according to the custom of human impatience, he has had mercy: retaining justice in the punishment, after patience with its mercy did not profit; having mercy in the punishment, by displaying justice after patience. For God does not seize the occasions of human crimes, nor, as though ignorant of our weakness and nature, does he seize upon that very moment of our error and sin for punishment¹³; but he passes it over and defers, and, by delaying vengeance, awaits the consolation of penance, presenting himself sweet to all, while through the measure of mercy—

—and justice reserves indulgence to himself for tempering severity.