Hence, πρὸς τοὺς ἡγουμένους μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, against those who think that what is just is not good, he writes1:
Here some2 arise who say, οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν Κύριον διὰ τὴν ῥάβδον, καὶ τὴν ἀπειλήν, καὶ τὸν φόβον, that the Lord is not good on account of the rod and the threats and the fear struck into men; and therefore they also wrongly understand the Scripture, which reads thus3: “He who fears the Lord will be converted to his heart”; and they especially forget αὐτοῦ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας, his benignity, by which he was made man for our sake. But the Prophet entreats him more familiarly4 in these words: “Remember us, for we are dust”; that is, have mercy on us, because thou thyself, having suffered it, hast experienced the weakness of the flesh. Therefore, for this reason, ἄριστος καὶ ἀνεπίληπτός ἐστιν ὁ παιδαγωγὸς ὁ Κύριος, τῇ ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων δι᾽ ὑπερβολὴν φιλανθρωπίας συμπαθήσας φύσει, the Pedagogue, who is also the Lord, is most excellent and subject to no reproach, since on account of his eminent benignity he sympathizes with the nature of each man. For there is nothing5 which the Lord hates;
for he cannot hate anything and will that what he hates should exist. Nor indeed does he at once will that something should not exist and cause that to exist which he wills should not exist. But6 neither does he will that something should not exist while it nevertheless exists. Therefore, if the Word hates anything, he wills it not to exist. But there is nothing to which God does not furnish the cause that it should exist. Therefore God hates nothing; nor does the Word: ἓν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ θεός, for both are one, namely God. But if he hates none of the things which were made by him, λείπεται φιλεῖν αὐτό, it remains that he loves it. Yet far more than the rest he loves man, τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθέντων, καὶ φιλόθεον ζῷον, the most beautiful living being among those which were made by him, and endowed with love of God. Φιλάνθρωπος ἄρα ὁ θεός· φιλάνθρωπος ἄρα ὁ λόγος. Therefore God is a lover of men, and the Word is a lover of men. But he who loves something, ὠφελεῖν αὐτὸ βούλεται, wills to benefit it. And that which benefits will certainly be more excellent than that which does not benefit. But nothing is more excellent than good. Therefore that which is good benefits; ἀγαθὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὁμολογεῖται· ὠφελεῖ ἄρα ὁ θεός. But it is agreed7 that God is good; therefore God benefits.
But good, insofar as8 it is good, does nothing other than benefit. Therefore God benefits in all things. Nor indeed does he benefit man in some respect while he does not take care of him. Nor does he take care of him while he is not solicitous for him. For that which benefits κατὰ γνώμην, of its own accord, is more excellent than that which does not benefit of its own accord. But nothing is more excellent than God; καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστι τὸ κατὰ γνώμην
ὠφελεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· κήδεται ἄρα καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ θεός. Nor is benefiting of one’s own accord anything other than being solicitous for man; therefore God takes care of man and is solicitous for him. But he shows this ἔργῳ, by the deed itself, παιδαγωγῶν αὐτὸν λόγῳ, ὅς ἐστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίας συναγωνιστὴς γνήσιος, when he instructs him by the Word, who is the genuine coadjutor of the divine benevolence toward men.
But meeting those9 who asked, πῶς οὖν εἰ φιλάνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ Κύριος, ὀργίζεται καὶ κολάζει;, “How, therefore, if the Lord loves men and is good, is he angry and punishes?” after interposing many things10, he responds: that punishments inflicted upon men while they live tend εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ αἴδιον ὑγείαν, toward salvation and eternal health; that God proceeds against us not διὰ μῖσος, from hatred, but from love, since, although he could have destroyed us because of our own crimes, ὁ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ πέπονθεν, he himself even suffered for us; in sum, that when he threatens, he openly shows that he wills to do nothing evil and does not will to execute those things which he threatens, but that by striking fear he wills to repress the impulse toward sins, to manifest his benevolence toward men, and by the very delay to demonstrate what they will suffer if they remain in sin.
Footnotes
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Pedagogue, book I, chap. VIII, pp. 135–136. ↩
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These were the disciples of Marcion who, according to the testimony of Origen, Commentary on Exodus, vol. I, p. 17, asserting another God παρὰ τὸν δημιουργόν, besides the Maker of the world, taught that the latter was δίκαιον, just, καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, but not good; foolishly indeed and impiously, since they separated justice from goodness and goodness from justice. See similar things in Tertullian, Against Marcion, book I, chap. VI. ↩
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Ecclesiasticus XXI. 6. ↩
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Ps. CII. 14. ↩
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Wis. XI. 25. ↩
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Ignatius in the Epistle to the Magnesians, chap. X, and Clement himself, Stromata VII, p. 740, have things twin to these; the latter says: “We say that God is opposed to no one and is the enemy of no one. Πάντων γὰρ κτίστης, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν ὑποστάντων, ὃ μὴ θέλει. For he is the Creator of all, and there is nothing among the things which subsist which he does not will.” ↩
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Matt. XIX. 17. ↩
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These words were expressed according to the tenets of the Stoics, who, according to Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, book X, p. 442, defined good in this manner: ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὠφέλεια, ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας, “good is utility, or something not diverse from utility.” Similar descriptions of good occur in the same author’s Outlines, book III, chap. XX, and in Diogenes Laertius, book VII, section XCIV. ↩
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Pedagogue, book I, chap. VIII, p. 136. ↩
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Ibid., pp. 137–138. ↩