There follows πραγματολογία, the matter itself which is contained in this distinction and variety of formulas. And at the outset it is contained therein that each will, the first and the second, is ἀληθῶς, truly, in God, and embraces not the name and appearance alone but the very force and rationale of an intimate will. Since all profess this concerning the second will, they will profess it no less concerning the first will, provided that they consider within themselves the phrases and circumlocutions which Chrysostom employs for declaring and explaining it.
It is contained, secondly, that the fountain of the second will is other than and altogether diverse from that from which the first will flows. For the first proceeds ἀπὸ ἀγαθότητος μόνης, from the goodness of God alone, and is and is called a will χωρὶς αἰτίας, without a cause derived from men; but the second is and is called the will of justice, θέλημα κατὰ συγκατάβασιν, the will to which
God descends when provoked, and therefore θέλημα μετὰ αἰτίας, a will not separated from a cause which men have furnished.
It is contained, thirdly, that the first will differs from the second in nature and character: for the former is native to God, spontaneously occupies God himself, and is not separated from his φιλανθρωπίᾳ, extraordinary benignity toward men, whence it is called ἁπλῶς, simply, θέλημα αὐτοῦ, his will; but the latter comes, as it were, to God, is a will μετὰ αἰτίας, cohering with a cause, of which men themselves are the authors, and therefore is θέλημα οὐκ αὐτοῦ, a will which can be called and judged his only in a certain respect.
It is contained, fourthly, that the first will is occupied about men in one way and the second will in another. For the parts of the latter, as its very name also demonstrates, are second; the former, by its own right, claims for itself the first and principal parts. For justice does not go before and love follow after, but love anticipates and justice succeeds; nor does God first demonstrate his justice and afterward his goodness, but he does not show himself just μετὰ αἰτίας, on account of an external cause, before he has disclosed his love χωρὶς αἰτίας, without an external cause, and ἀπὸ ἀγαθότητος μόνης, stirred by goodness alone; nor does God act first by that will which is called his will only in a certain respect before he has manifested himself by that will which is called simply his will, his desire, καὶ πεῖσμα, and his most firm determination of mind; nor does he first undertake those things which are proper to the will κατὰ συγκατάβασιν, which lowers itself, before he has accomplished those things which τὸ θέλημα σφοδρόν, his intense will, τὸ μετ᾽ ἐπιθυμίας θέλημα, his desirous will, and his implanted desire demand and require; nor does he pursue his own glory through works of justice before he has sought it through the poured-out gifts of his goodness.
It is contained, fifthly, that the antecedent will is both perpetual in time and universal in amplitude; and it is indeed perpetual in time because it began ἐξ ἀρχῆς, from the very beginnings of the human race, has always accompanied the human race, and still accompanies it; but it is universal in amplitude because it has never excluded anyone, and has enriched by the gifts of its benevolence even those who are called vessels of wrath κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν, prepared for destruction.
It is contained, sixthly, that the same antecedent will is not sluggish and sterile but active, efficacious, intent upon and solicitous for procuring the salvation of men.
It is contained, seventhly, that God omits nothing, τό γε εἰς αὐτὸν ἧκον, as much as lies in him, and ὡς τό γε αὐτοῦ μέρος, as far as concerns him, of those things which can be useful and salutary for men; and therefore it comes to pass only παρὰ τὴν κακουργίαν, from their own wickedness, and παρὰ τὴν οἰκείαν πονηρίαν, from voluntary iniquity and an ungrateful disposition, that all do not obtain salvation and everlasting felicity.
For rightly understanding these things, it will conduce not a little to distinguish the salvific will, and the manifold providence cohering with it, from the very conferral of salvation and beatitude. For the latter is not a gift of God to such a degree that it is not at the same time a recompense, a reward, and a crown of justice. For just as it is written1, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα τοῦ Θεοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, “but the grace of God is life everlasting in Christ Jesus our Lord”; so in like manner we read it written2, ἀπόκειταί μοι ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης στέφανος, ὃν ἀποδώσει μοι ὁ Κύριος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὁ δίκαιος κριτής, “there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day.” Wherefore, for obtaining and attaining everlasting felicity, just as God must be present, who as the principal cause may go before and prepare men by the gifts of his mercy, so men must be present who, as subordinate causes, freely cooperate with God going before and preparing. But if this were not necessary according to the pre-established order of divine providence, and the attainment of beatitude were to be expected from God alone, οὐδὲν ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας σώζεσθαι, “nothing would prevent all from being saved,” Chrysostom says3; indeed, if so great a good depended upon divine charity alone, ἐχρῆν ἅπαντας σωθῆναι, “all would have to be saved.”
But the salvific will and the manifold providence toward men, of which that will is the fountain and principle, since they depend upon the benignity of God alone and are fruits of that benevolence by which God strives most earnestly for the salvation of men, are not only universal and except no one at all, but also demand no incitement from men themselves and no condition of deserving well. This can be expressed much more briefly in this manner by formulas received in the usage of the School: that God is not only the principal but also the sole and adequate cause of the salvific will and of the manifold providence flowing from it; but that God is indeed the principal cause of salvation itself, yet not likewise its sole and adequate cause: οὐ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ πᾶν, “for,” Chrysostom writes, “the whole is not God’s.”
Whence, finally, it is manifest that Chrysostom’s doctrine also contains that which contributes especially to illustrating the present question: that those err grievously who either estimate and define the amplitude of the salvific will from the amplitude of those who obtain salvation, or teach that no true and sincere will of God concerning the salvation of men can be admitted and approved except one which is conjoined with the effect of salvation itself having been obtained. For the salvific will is much broader than the number of those who are saved, since the former extends as far as God’s love, benignity, and extraordinary benevolence toward men extend themselves, while the latter extends only to those who obey God and do not spurn the divine gifts. And therefore a sincere will fruitful in those things which are required for procuring salvation is also much broader than the will by which salvation itself is conferred: for the former is a will of mercy and goodness; but the latter pertains not only to the goodness by which God crowns his own gifts, but also to the justice by which he crowns our merits.