VIII. The names, origin, and attributes of the second will, and the relation of the latter to the first

The inherent attributes and properties of the first and principal will are therefore these: I. that in scope and amplitude it is universal; and II. that in character and nature it is interior, sincere, fruitful, and efficacious, just as the love from which it spontaneously flows is efficacious¹, and as the divine φιλανθρωπία, which Paul² extols and by which God, best and greatest, pursues the whole human race, is efficacious.

When these things have been perceived, both the distinction of the first will from the second and the attributes and properties of the latter are deduced without difficulty. For the relation which exists between the two wills clearly demonstrates: I. that τὸ θέλημα δεύτερον, the second will, whether it be that by which God bestows a reward or that by which he inflicts punishments, is particular in extension and amplitude, and is circumscribed either to those who have satisfied the conditions of the divine covenant or to those who have violated them even unto impenitence; and II. that in character and nature it is not inherent in God and arisen spontaneously from him, but is, as it were, adventitious and provoked either by the crimes and wickedness of men or by their merits and good works. Wherefore we understand that this difference exists between the two wills:

a) θέλημα πρῶτον, the first will, is and is called ἀπὸ ἀγαθότητος μόνης, “a will proceeding from goodness alone,” and requires from men no condition of merit and worthiness; but the second will, θέλημα δεύτερον, is and is called the will of justice and is referred separately to those who either³, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ, “holding the truth in injustice,” render themselves ἀναπολογήτους, “inexcusable,” or, the faith having been holily kept⁴, are worthy of having the crown of glory repaid to them;

b) θέλημα πρῶτον, the first will, since it is the germ and fruit of goodness alone, is universal and extends to all men whatsoever; but θέλημα δεύτερον, the second will, since it is commanded by justice, is particular and regards each according to his own merit, namely, those who have either despised the gifts of the first will or complied with them;

c) θέλημα πρῶτον, the first will, is self-consistent, of one color, and solely intent upon doing good; but θέλημα δεύτερον, the second will, is various, lies open in two directions, and no less distributes rewards than inflicts punishments;

d) finally, θέλημα πρῶτον, the first will, tends to this: that it may nourish the hope of men and restore their spirits; but θέλημα δεύτερον, the second will, pertains to this⁵: that each one, with God going before, may work out his salvation μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου, “with fear and trembling.”