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Articulus Quartus
Utrum Angeli cognoscant futura - et secreta cordium
Utrum Angeli cognoscant futura - et secreta cordium
Fourth Article
792. Ex iis quae de objecto cognitionis angelicae in specie disputari solent, ea tantummodo, ut ab initio proposuimus, attingemus, quae futura libera - et secreta cordium respiciunt.
792. Of those things which are customarily disputed in particular concerning the object of angelic cognition, we shall touch upon only those, as we proposed from the beginning, which concern future free things and the secrets of hearts.
§ I. Status quaestionis
§ I. State of the Question
793. Pro quaestionis intelligentia, aliqua imprimis notanda sunt quoad cognitionem futurorum. Atque a) distinguendus est duplex modus cognoscendi futurum. Unus est, cognoscendo illud in alio, scilicet, in causa, vel in signo causae, quomodo cognoscitur eclipsis futura in motibus caelorum, et pluvia futura in signis caeli, ut in colore nubium, vel vento, etc. Alius modus cognoscendi futura, est in seipsis immediate et directe ipsam veritatem futuram in se intuendo, sicut videtur res praesens et actu existens: quomodo intelligimus Deum cognoscere, et videre res futuras.
b) Distinguere oportet futura: nam quaedam sunt quae naturali necessitate eveniunt, ut, ex. gr., temporum mutationes; alia quae contingenter.
c) Contingentia autem in quibusdam provenit ex solo concursu, seu occursu plurium causarum naturalium sese impedientium, sine interventu alicujus causae libere agentis; in aliis vero contingentia provenit ex aliqua causa libera, quae effectum promovere, vel impedire pro suo arbitrio potest. - Si de primis sermo sit, ea contingentia dici possunt respectu causae proximae, vel aliquarum causarum; non vero respectu complexus omnium causarum; respectu hujus complexus necessaria dicenda sunt. Vid. D. Th. de Verit. q. 8. a. 12.
d) Cognitio futurorum potest esse naturalis, vel supernaturalis. Item certa, vel solum conjecturalis.
b) Distinguere oportet futura: nam quaedam sunt quae naturali necessitate eveniunt, ut, ex. gr., temporum mutationes; alia quae contingenter.
c) Contingentia autem in quibusdam provenit ex solo concursu, seu occursu plurium causarum naturalium sese impedientium, sine interventu alicujus causae libere agentis; in aliis vero contingentia provenit ex aliqua causa libera, quae effectum promovere, vel impedire pro suo arbitrio potest. - Si de primis sermo sit, ea contingentia dici possunt respectu causae proximae, vel aliquarum causarum; non vero respectu complexus omnium causarum; respectu hujus complexus necessaria dicenda sunt. Vid. D. Th. de Verit. q. 8. a. 12.
d) Cognitio futurorum potest esse naturalis, vel supernaturalis. Item certa, vel solum conjecturalis.
793. For understanding the question, certain things must first be noted concerning the cognition of future things. And a) a twofold mode of knowing a future thing must be distinguished. One is by knowing it in another, namely in its cause, or in a sign of the cause, in the way a future eclipse is known in the motions of the heavens, and future rain in signs of the sky, as in the color of clouds, or the wind, etc. The other mode of knowing future things is in themselves, immediately and directly, by intuiting in itself the very future truth, just as a present and actually existing thing is seen. In this way we understand God to know and see future things.
b) Future things must be distinguished: for some are those which happen by natural necessity, as, for example, changes of seasons; others are those which happen contingently.
c) Contingency in some things comes from the concurrence or encounter of several natural causes impeding one another, without the intervention of any cause acting freely; but in others contingency comes from some free cause, which can promote or impede the effect according to its own choice. - If the discussion concerns the first kind, they can be called contingent with respect to the proximate cause, or with respect to some causes; but not with respect to the whole complex of all causes. With respect to this complex they must be called necessary. See St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 8, a. 12.
d) Cognition of future things can be natural or supernatural. Likewise it can be certain, or only conjectural.
b) Future things must be distinguished: for some are those which happen by natural necessity, as, for example, changes of seasons; others are those which happen contingently.
c) Contingency in some things comes from the concurrence or encounter of several natural causes impeding one another, without the intervention of any cause acting freely; but in others contingency comes from some free cause, which can promote or impede the effect according to its own choice. - If the discussion concerns the first kind, they can be called contingent with respect to the proximate cause, or with respect to some causes; but not with respect to the whole complex of all causes. With respect to this complex they must be called necessary. See St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 8, a. 12.
d) Cognition of future things can be natural or supernatural. Likewise it can be certain, or only conjectural.
794. Quibus positis, concedunt omnes posse Angelos naturaliter certo cognoscere futura necessaria in causa vel causis eorum - posse etiam aliquam conjecturam de futuris liberis naturaliter habere - posse haec eadem cum certitudine supernaturaliter cognoscere. Quaestio solum est de cognitione certa naturali futurorum liberorum.
794. These things being posited, all concede that angels can naturally and certainly know necessary future things in their cause or causes; that they can also naturally have some conjecture about future free things; and that they can know these same things supernaturally with certainty. The question is only about certain natural cognition of future free things.
795. Quoad secreta cordium, notamus a) cum D. Thoma 1. p. q. 57. a. 4.: "Cogitatio cordis dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo in suo effectu; et sic non solum ab Angelo, sed etiam ab homine cognosci potest, et tanto subtilius, quanto effectus hujusmodi fuerit magis occultus. Cognoscitur enim cogitatio interdum non solum per actum exteriorem, sed etiam per immutationem; et etiam medici aliquas affectiones animi per pulsum cognoscere possunt, et multo magis Angeli, vel etiam daemones, quanto subtilius hujusmodi immutationes occultas corporales perpendunt ... Alio modo possunt cognosci cogitationes, prout sunt in intellectu, et affectiones, prout sunt in voluntate."
b) Non omnes autem cordis cogitationes producunt tales immutationes externas, ut ex iis possint cum certitudine determinate cognosci: tunc ergo non poterunt certo et determinate cognosci, nisi in seipsis; et haec dicimus secreta cordium.
c) Actus hujusmodi sunt tum voluntatis, tum intellectus. Quamvis autem quaestio fieri possit de actibus omnibus, sive necessariis, sive liberis; eam tamen restringimus praesertim ad actus liberos voluntatis internos, et ad internas cogitationes mentis, quae pendent a libera applicatione voluntatis. Agitur denique de cognitione certa et naturali.
b) Non omnes autem cordis cogitationes producunt tales immutationes externas, ut ex iis possint cum certitudine determinate cognosci: tunc ergo non poterunt certo et determinate cognosci, nisi in seipsis; et haec dicimus secreta cordium.
c) Actus hujusmodi sunt tum voluntatis, tum intellectus. Quamvis autem quaestio fieri possit de actibus omnibus, sive necessariis, sive liberis; eam tamen restringimus praesertim ad actus liberos voluntatis internos, et ad internas cogitationes mentis, quae pendent a libera applicatione voluntatis. Agitur denique de cognitione certa et naturali.
795. As regards the secrets of hearts, we note a) with St. Thomas, I, q. 57, a. 4: "The thought of the heart can be known in two ways. In one way, in its effect; and thus it can be known not only by an angel, but even by a man, and so much the more subtly as an effect of this kind has been more hidden. For thought is sometimes known not only through an exterior act, but also through an alteration; and even physicians can know some affections of the soul through the pulse, and much more angels, or even demons, insofar as they consider such hidden bodily alterations more subtly ... In another way thoughts can be known insofar as they are in the intellect, and affections insofar as they are in the will."
b) But not all thoughts of the heart produce such external alterations that from them they can be known with certainty and determinately. Therefore then they cannot be known certainly and determinately, except in themselves; and these we call the secrets of hearts.
c) Acts of this kind are acts both of the will and of the intellect. Although the question can be raised concerning all acts, whether necessary or free, nevertheless we restrict it especially to internal free acts of the will, and to internal thoughts of the mind which depend on the free application of the will. Finally, the matter concerns certain and natural cognition.
b) But not all thoughts of the heart produce such external alterations that from them they can be known with certainty and determinately. Therefore then they cannot be known certainly and determinately, except in themselves; and these we call the secrets of hearts.
c) Acts of this kind are acts both of the will and of the intellect. Although the question can be raised concerning all acts, whether necessary or free, nevertheless we restrict it especially to internal free acts of the will, and to internal thoughts of the mind which depend on the free application of the will. Finally, the matter concerns certain and natural cognition.
796. His igitur declaratis,
PROP. LIV. Etsi Angeli sicut natura, ita intelligendi facultate hominibus antecellant; non possunt tamen sive 1. futura libera - sive 2. secreta cordium naturaliter cognoscere.
Prob. 1ma pars. I. Ex Scriptura. Is. 41. 23. legitur: "Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos." - 46. 9. seq.: "Ego sum Deus, et non est ultra Deus, nec est similis mei. Annuntians ab exordio novissima, et ab initio, quae necdum facta sunt." - Et hinc prophetia, per quam haec futura praedicuntur, est signum certissimum, imo et evidens divinae veritatis et revelationis, ut ex 1. Corinth. 14. sumitur: non esset autem sufficiens signum divinae veritatis, nisi solus Deus posset illa futura cognoscere, ut recte docuit Origen. lib. 6. cont. Celsum, Chrysostom. homil. 32. in 1. ad Corinth. et D. Thom. 3. cont. gent. capit. 154. et sumitur ex illo 2. Petr. 1. "Habemus firmiorem propheticum sermonem."
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Tertullianus (Apolog. c. 23.): "Idoneum opinor testimonium divinitatis veritas divinationis." - S. Hilarius (de Trin. l. 9.): "Quid est tam proprium Dei, quam futurorum cognitio." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 18. in Jo.): "Certa praedictio futurorum immortalis Dei duntaxat opus est." S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 5. c. 9.): "Qui non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus." - S. Cyrillus (l. 4. in Jo.): "Nulli alii, quam uni ac soli naturali Deo futura nosse convenit."
Prob. III. Ex ratione. Futura non possunt cognosci nisi vel in suis causis, vel in seipsis; atqui neutro modo possunt ab ulla creatura cum certitudine naturaliter cognosci futura libera. Ergo.
Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Futura libera non sunt certo et immutabiliter determinata in suis causis; ergo nequeunt in ipsis cum certitudine cognosci.
Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Ille modus attingendi futura in seipsis, et per modum existentium pro suis temporibus antequam in reipsa sint, est proprius divinae intellectionis propter immutabilitatem, et aeternitatem suam, ratione cujus semper, ac simul habet omnia praesentia, non per realem coexistentiam aeternam rerum cognitarum, sed propter praesentiam objectivam respectu divini intuitus simplicissimi, et infinitae comprehensionis. Nam ad cognoscendi modum adeo sublimem, et perfectum requiritur vis intelligendi infinita: sed Angeli non habent vim intelligendi infinitam, nec simplicem, et immutabilem intuitum, quo omnes differentias temporis attingant, ergo non possunt futura illo modo cognoscere. - Hinc videtur in animis hominum etiam infidelium insedisse, ut cognoscere futura infallibiliter, sit divinitatis proprium: nam inde illorum praedictio divinatio dicta est tamquam divina actio. Potestque aliter hoc explicari ex magna difficultate, quam e converso habent Theologi in explicando, quomodo Deus veritates talium futurorum certissime videat.
Quare merito concludit Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 10. n. 10.): "Si alterum ex his duobus, scilicet, cur Deus haec futura cognoscat, vel cur Angelus illa naturaliter non cognoscat, supra humanam rationem esse dicendum sit, potius certe de priori, quam de posteriori affirmari hoc posset. Aut si primum ita esse sufficienter probatur ex ipsa excellentia Dei, etiamsi modus cognoscendi ratione comparari, aut explicari non possit: profecto etiam ex eo, quod Angelus infinitam illam eminentiam Dei non habet, satis concluditur, non habere hanc scientiam naturalem."
Prob. 2da pars I. Ex Scriptura. 2. Paralip. 6. 30. legitur: "Tu solus nosti corda filiorum hominum." - Jerem. 17. seqq.: "Pravum est cor hominum et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? ... Ego Dominus scrutans cor, et probans renes." - 3. Reg. 8. 39.: "Tu nosti solus cor omnium filiorum hominum:" - Hebr. 4. 12.: Apostolus Verbo Dei tanquam singularem characterem tribuit, quod sit pertingens usque ad divisionem animae, ac spiritus, compagum quoque ac medullarum, et discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis.
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Origenes (Hom. 7. in Gen.): "Propositum habeo martyrium, non ex hoc dicere ad me Angelus poterit, quia nunc cognovi, quod tu times Deum. Deo enim soli cognitum est propositum mentis. Si vero accessero ad agones, protulero bonam confessionem, quae inferuntur cunctanter suscepero: tunc potest dicere Angelus velut confirmans me et corroborans: nunc cognovi, quod tu times Deum." - S. Hilarius (in Ps. 59.): "Cogitationes nosse non nostrum est, sed ejus, de quo dictum est: 'scrutans corda, et renes Deus;' ejus quoque qui dixit: 'Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?'" - S. Ambrosius (in Luc. l. 5. c. 3.): "Dominus volens salvos facere peccatores, occultorum cognitione Deum se esse demonstrat." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 4. in Matth.) ad illa verba: "Haec eo cogitante Angelus in somno apparuit Joseph," sic loquitur: "Hoc signum fuit certissimum, illum a Deo missum fuisse Angelum, quippe cum solius Dei sit, arcana cordium nosse." S. Augustinus (Serm. 234. de temp.) haec de S. Job habet: "Colebat Deum, faciebat eleemosynas, et quo corde fiebat, nemo sciebat, nec ipse diabolus, sed Deus noverat."
Prob. III. Ex ratione. Fatetur Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 23. n. 1.) difficile esse hoc assumptum ex ratione ostendere: "In hoc puncto," inquit, "valde laborant theologi, quia revera difficile est. Attamen 1. D. Thomas, dat hanc rationem: Praestantia mentis ejusmodi est, ut soli Deo subdatur naturaliter tam quam causae efficienti et finali ultimae. Unde est consentaneum, ut cogitationes et affectiones, quae pendent solum ex ipsius libero arbitrio, non nisi soli Deo pateant; aliis autem creaturis rationalibus eatenus, quatenus ipsa mens humana velit ab illis eas cognosci: ita scilicet, ut haec voluntas sit velut conditio quaedam, sine qua non possit cogitatio vel affectio interna mentis humanae repraesentari intellectui Angelico, vel humano per intelligibilem speciem.
2. Suarez addit aliud argumentum. Angeli ex natura sua non sunt sufficienter constituti in actu primo ad cognoscendum secreta cordium; ergo non possunt ea naturaliter cognoscere. - Prob. antec. Actus primus duo requirit, nempe lumen seu potentiam, et species: ex parte luminis, seu potentiae activae fatemur nihil deesse, ut patet manifeste in cognitione horum actuum post consensum habentium illos: nam per illum consensum non crescit lumen, vel virtus activa potentiae angelicae, ergo ex illa parte Angeli erant antea sufficienter constituti in actu primo ad illam cognitionem. At vero alterum requisitum ad completum actum primum, scilicet species, in Angelis deest. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) "Angelus in his actibus voluntatis non solum se gerit ut agens naturale, seu physicum, sed maxime ut agens morale, et ideo non debentur illi species talium actuum nisi ut accommodatae ordini morali: ad rectum autem moralem ordinem non fuisset conveniens, ut omnis creatura intellectualis haberet concreatas species omnium actuum liberorum aliarum voluntatum. Sic enim omnes liberi actus singulorum caeteris omnibus noti essent, quod est contra bonum ordinem multitudinis, et societatis personarum rationalium, quam naturaliter postulant, quia inde orirentur odia, et contentiones, ac similia: et specialiter daemones acrius possent in homines saevire, si eorum affectus intime cognoscerent, ut revera possent, si eorum species haberent, ergo talis natura non postulat tales species."
b) Rationalis creatura naturaliter appetit occultare actus suos intimos, qui maxime sunt sua decreta libera, ergo non potest connaturaliter postulare id, quod talium actuum occultationi repugnat: sed hujusmodi est, habere species concreatas talium actuum, ut ostensum est, ergo non postulat concreationem illarum ut sibi connaturalem.
c) Quando natura habet proprium, et intrinsecum modum obtinendi aliquam perfectionem, non postulat illam immediate ab auctore naturae per infusionem, seu concreationem; sed natura rationalis aliter postulat communicationem propriarum cogitationum, et affectionum per mutuam locutionem; ergo non postulat specierum concreationem, per quam talis locutio vel impossibilis, vel inutilis fieret.
NOTA I. Iis, quae diximus de cognitione futurorum non obstat, quod Angelus habet species infusas singularium ab initio, ut articulo praecedenti diximus. Nam ut illis Angelus in cognoscendo certo singularia possit actu uti, praeterea requiritur tamquam conditio sine qua non, ut ejusmodi singularia vel coexistant Angelo jam praesentia, vel certe prius ei aliquando coextiterint. Qua conditione non opus habet Deus, cum non habeat facultatem finitam et limitatam ad cognoscendum, qui proinde futura certo cognoscit aeque ac praesentia et praeterita. - Hanc difficultatem fuse pertractat Suarez (l. 2. c. 11.)
NOTA II. Neque obstat, quod interdum daemones quaedam futura contingentia vera praenunciant. Id enim non faciunt, quia naturaliter certo illa cognoscant; sed quia vel, Deo ita disponente, ea discunt ab Angelis bonis, (qui ea norunt in divino Verbo, aut per peculiarem revelationem) ut Augustinus notavit lib. 2. ad Simplic. q. 3. et lib. 2. super Genes. ad lit. cap. 17. - Vel quia ea cognoscunt ex revelationibus factis aliquibus Sanctis, quas vel audiunt, vel scriptas animadvertunt cum sciant omnia quae usquam geruntur, ut notat Tertullianus in Apolog. cap. 22. - Vel quia ea praedicunt quae ipsi facere constituerunt, ut notat idem Augustinus libro de divinatione daemonum, cap. 5. et lib. 2. super Genes. ad literam, cap. 17. - Vel denique quia illa per probabilem conjecturam assequuntur multo melius quam solent homines, ut notat Augustinus eodem libro, capite sexto, et explicat fuse D. Thomas 3. c. g. cap. 154.
De his omnibus vid. D. Thomam 1. p. q. 57. aa. 3. 4. - Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. cc. 9. 10. 11. - 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.)
PROP. LIV. Etsi Angeli sicut natura, ita intelligendi facultate hominibus antecellant; non possunt tamen sive 1. futura libera - sive 2. secreta cordium naturaliter cognoscere.
Prob. 1ma pars. I. Ex Scriptura. Is. 41. 23. legitur: "Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos." - 46. 9. seq.: "Ego sum Deus, et non est ultra Deus, nec est similis mei. Annuntians ab exordio novissima, et ab initio, quae necdum facta sunt." - Et hinc prophetia, per quam haec futura praedicuntur, est signum certissimum, imo et evidens divinae veritatis et revelationis, ut ex 1. Corinth. 14. sumitur: non esset autem sufficiens signum divinae veritatis, nisi solus Deus posset illa futura cognoscere, ut recte docuit Origen. lib. 6. cont. Celsum, Chrysostom. homil. 32. in 1. ad Corinth. et D. Thom. 3. cont. gent. capit. 154. et sumitur ex illo 2. Petr. 1. "Habemus firmiorem propheticum sermonem."
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Tertullianus (Apolog. c. 23.): "Idoneum opinor testimonium divinitatis veritas divinationis." - S. Hilarius (de Trin. l. 9.): "Quid est tam proprium Dei, quam futurorum cognitio." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 18. in Jo.): "Certa praedictio futurorum immortalis Dei duntaxat opus est." S. Augustinus (de civ. Dei l. 5. c. 9.): "Qui non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique Deus." - S. Cyrillus (l. 4. in Jo.): "Nulli alii, quam uni ac soli naturali Deo futura nosse convenit."
Prob. III. Ex ratione. Futura non possunt cognosci nisi vel in suis causis, vel in seipsis; atqui neutro modo possunt ab ulla creatura cum certitudine naturaliter cognosci futura libera. Ergo.
Prob. min. quoad 1am partem. Futura libera non sunt certo et immutabiliter determinata in suis causis; ergo nequeunt in ipsis cum certitudine cognosci.
Prob. min. quoad 2am partem. Ille modus attingendi futura in seipsis, et per modum existentium pro suis temporibus antequam in reipsa sint, est proprius divinae intellectionis propter immutabilitatem, et aeternitatem suam, ratione cujus semper, ac simul habet omnia praesentia, non per realem coexistentiam aeternam rerum cognitarum, sed propter praesentiam objectivam respectu divini intuitus simplicissimi, et infinitae comprehensionis. Nam ad cognoscendi modum adeo sublimem, et perfectum requiritur vis intelligendi infinita: sed Angeli non habent vim intelligendi infinitam, nec simplicem, et immutabilem intuitum, quo omnes differentias temporis attingant, ergo non possunt futura illo modo cognoscere. - Hinc videtur in animis hominum etiam infidelium insedisse, ut cognoscere futura infallibiliter, sit divinitatis proprium: nam inde illorum praedictio divinatio dicta est tamquam divina actio. Potestque aliter hoc explicari ex magna difficultate, quam e converso habent Theologi in explicando, quomodo Deus veritates talium futurorum certissime videat.
Quare merito concludit Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 10. n. 10.): "Si alterum ex his duobus, scilicet, cur Deus haec futura cognoscat, vel cur Angelus illa naturaliter non cognoscat, supra humanam rationem esse dicendum sit, potius certe de priori, quam de posteriori affirmari hoc posset. Aut si primum ita esse sufficienter probatur ex ipsa excellentia Dei, etiamsi modus cognoscendi ratione comparari, aut explicari non possit: profecto etiam ex eo, quod Angelus infinitam illam eminentiam Dei non habet, satis concluditur, non habere hanc scientiam naturalem."
Prob. 2da pars I. Ex Scriptura. 2. Paralip. 6. 30. legitur: "Tu solus nosti corda filiorum hominum." - Jerem. 17. seqq.: "Pravum est cor hominum et inscrutabile, quis cognoscet illud? ... Ego Dominus scrutans cor, et probans renes." - 3. Reg. 8. 39.: "Tu nosti solus cor omnium filiorum hominum:" - Hebr. 4. 12.: Apostolus Verbo Dei tanquam singularem characterem tribuit, quod sit pertingens usque ad divisionem animae, ac spiritus, compagum quoque ac medullarum, et discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis.
Prob. II. Ex Patribus. Origenes (Hom. 7. in Gen.): "Propositum habeo martyrium, non ex hoc dicere ad me Angelus poterit, quia nunc cognovi, quod tu times Deum. Deo enim soli cognitum est propositum mentis. Si vero accessero ad agones, protulero bonam confessionem, quae inferuntur cunctanter suscepero: tunc potest dicere Angelus velut confirmans me et corroborans: nunc cognovi, quod tu times Deum." - S. Hilarius (in Ps. 59.): "Cogitationes nosse non nostrum est, sed ejus, de quo dictum est: 'scrutans corda, et renes Deus;' ejus quoque qui dixit: 'Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?'" - S. Ambrosius (in Luc. l. 5. c. 3.): "Dominus volens salvos facere peccatores, occultorum cognitione Deum se esse demonstrat." - S. Jo. Chrys. (Hom. 4. in Matth.) ad illa verba: "Haec eo cogitante Angelus in somno apparuit Joseph," sic loquitur: "Hoc signum fuit certissimum, illum a Deo missum fuisse Angelum, quippe cum solius Dei sit, arcana cordium nosse." S. Augustinus (Serm. 234. de temp.) haec de S. Job habet: "Colebat Deum, faciebat eleemosynas, et quo corde fiebat, nemo sciebat, nec ipse diabolus, sed Deus noverat."
Prob. III. Ex ratione. Fatetur Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. c. 23. n. 1.) difficile esse hoc assumptum ex ratione ostendere: "In hoc puncto," inquit, "valde laborant theologi, quia revera difficile est. Attamen 1. D. Thomas, dat hanc rationem: Praestantia mentis ejusmodi est, ut soli Deo subdatur naturaliter tam quam causae efficienti et finali ultimae. Unde est consentaneum, ut cogitationes et affectiones, quae pendent solum ex ipsius libero arbitrio, non nisi soli Deo pateant; aliis autem creaturis rationalibus eatenus, quatenus ipsa mens humana velit ab illis eas cognosci: ita scilicet, ut haec voluntas sit velut conditio quaedam, sine qua non possit cogitatio vel affectio interna mentis humanae repraesentari intellectui Angelico, vel humano per intelligibilem speciem.
2. Suarez addit aliud argumentum. Angeli ex natura sua non sunt sufficienter constituti in actu primo ad cognoscendum secreta cordium; ergo non possunt ea naturaliter cognoscere. - Prob. antec. Actus primus duo requirit, nempe lumen seu potentiam, et species: ex parte luminis, seu potentiae activae fatemur nihil deesse, ut patet manifeste in cognitione horum actuum post consensum habentium illos: nam per illum consensum non crescit lumen, vel virtus activa potentiae angelicae, ergo ex illa parte Angeli erant antea sufficienter constituti in actu primo ad illam cognitionem. At vero alterum requisitum ad completum actum primum, scilicet species, in Angelis deest. Ergo.
Prob. min. a) "Angelus in his actibus voluntatis non solum se gerit ut agens naturale, seu physicum, sed maxime ut agens morale, et ideo non debentur illi species talium actuum nisi ut accommodatae ordini morali: ad rectum autem moralem ordinem non fuisset conveniens, ut omnis creatura intellectualis haberet concreatas species omnium actuum liberorum aliarum voluntatum. Sic enim omnes liberi actus singulorum caeteris omnibus noti essent, quod est contra bonum ordinem multitudinis, et societatis personarum rationalium, quam naturaliter postulant, quia inde orirentur odia, et contentiones, ac similia: et specialiter daemones acrius possent in homines saevire, si eorum affectus intime cognoscerent, ut revera possent, si eorum species haberent, ergo talis natura non postulat tales species."
b) Rationalis creatura naturaliter appetit occultare actus suos intimos, qui maxime sunt sua decreta libera, ergo non potest connaturaliter postulare id, quod talium actuum occultationi repugnat: sed hujusmodi est, habere species concreatas talium actuum, ut ostensum est, ergo non postulat concreationem illarum ut sibi connaturalem.
c) Quando natura habet proprium, et intrinsecum modum obtinendi aliquam perfectionem, non postulat illam immediate ab auctore naturae per infusionem, seu concreationem; sed natura rationalis aliter postulat communicationem propriarum cogitationum, et affectionum per mutuam locutionem; ergo non postulat specierum concreationem, per quam talis locutio vel impossibilis, vel inutilis fieret.
NOTA I. Iis, quae diximus de cognitione futurorum non obstat, quod Angelus habet species infusas singularium ab initio, ut articulo praecedenti diximus. Nam ut illis Angelus in cognoscendo certo singularia possit actu uti, praeterea requiritur tamquam conditio sine qua non, ut ejusmodi singularia vel coexistant Angelo jam praesentia, vel certe prius ei aliquando coextiterint. Qua conditione non opus habet Deus, cum non habeat facultatem finitam et limitatam ad cognoscendum, qui proinde futura certo cognoscit aeque ac praesentia et praeterita. - Hanc difficultatem fuse pertractat Suarez (l. 2. c. 11.)
NOTA II. Neque obstat, quod interdum daemones quaedam futura contingentia vera praenunciant. Id enim non faciunt, quia naturaliter certo illa cognoscant; sed quia vel, Deo ita disponente, ea discunt ab Angelis bonis, (qui ea norunt in divino Verbo, aut per peculiarem revelationem) ut Augustinus notavit lib. 2. ad Simplic. q. 3. et lib. 2. super Genes. ad lit. cap. 17. - Vel quia ea cognoscunt ex revelationibus factis aliquibus Sanctis, quas vel audiunt, vel scriptas animadvertunt cum sciant omnia quae usquam geruntur, ut notat Tertullianus in Apolog. cap. 22. - Vel quia ea praedicunt quae ipsi facere constituerunt, ut notat idem Augustinus libro de divinatione daemonum, cap. 5. et lib. 2. super Genes. ad literam, cap. 17. - Vel denique quia illa per probabilem conjecturam assequuntur multo melius quam solent homines, ut notat Augustinus eodem libro, capite sexto, et explicat fuse D. Thomas 3. c. g. cap. 154.
De his omnibus vid. D. Thomam 1. p. q. 57. aa. 3. 4. - Suarez (de Angelis l. 2. cc. 9. 10. 11. - 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.)
796. These things, therefore, having been declared:
PROP. LIV. Although angels surpass men in the faculty of understanding, just as they surpass them in nature, nevertheless they cannot naturally know either, first, future free things, or, secondly, the secrets of hearts.
The first part is proved. I. From Scripture. Isaiah 41:23 says: "Announce the things which are to come in the future, and we shall know that you are gods." - 46:9 ff.: "I am God, and there is no God beyond me, nor is there any like me, announcing from the beginning the last things, and from the start the things which have not yet been done." - And hence prophecy, through which these future things are foretold, is a most certain and indeed evident sign of divine truth and revelation, as is taken from 1 Corinthians 14. But it would not be a sufficient sign of divine truth unless God alone could know those future things, as Origen rightly taught in book 6 against Celsus, Chrysostom, homily 32 on First Corinthians, and St. Thomas, book 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 154; and as is taken from 2 Peter 1: "We have the more firm prophetic word."
Proof II. From the Fathers. Tertullian (Apology, c. 23): "The truth of divination is, I think, a suitable testimony of divinity." - St. Hilary (On the Trinity, book 9): "What is so proper to God as cognition of future things?" - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 18 on John): "Certain prediction of future things is the work only of the immortal God." St. Augustine (City of God, book 5, chapter 9): "He who is not foreknowing of all future things is certainly not God." - St. Cyril (book 4 on John): "To know future things belongs to no other than to the one and only natural God."
Proof III. From reason. Future things cannot be known except either in their causes or in themselves; but in neither way can future free things be naturally known with certainty by any creature. Therefore.
The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Future free things are not certainly and immutably determined in their causes; therefore they cannot be known in those causes with certainty.
The minor is proved with respect to the second part. That mode of reaching future things in themselves, and after the manner of things existing for their own times before they are in reality, is proper to divine intellection because of its immutability and eternity, by reason of which it always and simultaneously has all things present, not through a real eternal coexistence of the things known, but because of their objective presence with respect to the most simple divine intuition and infinite comprehension. For for a mode of knowing so sublime and perfect an infinite power of understanding is required; but angels do not have an infinite power of understanding, nor a simple and immutable intuition by which they reach all differences of time. Therefore they cannot know future things in that mode. - Hence it seems to have settled even in the minds of unbelieving men that to know future things infallibly is proper to divinity; for from this their prediction was called divination, as though a divine action. And this can be explained in another way from the great difficulty which, conversely, theologians have in explaining how God most certainly sees the truths of such future things.
Therefore Suarez rightly concludes (On Angels, book 2, chapter 10, n. 10): "If one of these two things must be said to be above human reason, namely why God knows these future things or why an angel does not know them naturally, certainly this could be affirmed rather of the former than of the latter. Or if the first is sufficiently proved to be so from the excellence of God himself, even if the mode of knowing cannot be compared or explained by reason, then indeed from the fact that an angel does not have that infinite eminence of God, it is sufficiently concluded that he does not have this natural knowledge."
The second part is proved. I. From Scripture. 2 Chronicles 6:30 says: "You alone know the hearts of the sons of men." - Jeremiah 17 ff.: "The heart of men is depraved and inscrutable; who will know it? ... I the Lord, searching the heart and proving the reins." - 3 Kings 8:39: "You alone know the heart of all the sons of men." - Hebrews 4:12: the Apostle attributes to the Word of God as a singular characteristic that it reaches even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart.
Proof II. From the Fathers. Origen (Homily 7 on Genesis): "I have the purpose of martyrdom; not from this will an angel be able to say to me, 'Now I know that you fear God.' For to God alone is the purpose of the mind known. But if I come to the contests, if I bring forth a good confession, if I accept hesitatingly the things which are brought upon me, then an angel can say, as though confirming and strengthening me: 'Now I know that you fear God.'" - St. Hilary (on Psalm 59): "To know thoughts is not ours, but his of whom it was said: 'God searching hearts and reins'; and also his who said: 'Why do you think evil things in your hearts?'" - St. Ambrose (on Luke, book 5, chapter 3): "The Lord, wishing to make sinners saved, shows himself to be God by knowledge of hidden things." - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 4 on Matthew), on those words, "While he was thinking these things, an angel appeared to Joseph in sleep," speaks thus: "This was a most certain sign that the angel had been sent by God, since it belongs to God alone to know the secrets of hearts." St. Augustine (Sermon 234 On Time) has these things about St. Job: "He worshiped God, he gave alms, and with what heart it was done no one knew, not even the devil himself, but God knew."
Proof III. From reason. Suarez admits (On Angels, book 2, chapter 23, n. 1) that it is difficult to show this assumption from reason: "On this point," he says, "the theologians labor greatly, because it is truly difficult. Nevertheless, 1. St. Thomas gives this reason: the excellence of a mind of this kind is such that it is naturally subject to God alone as to the efficient and ultimate final cause. Hence it is fitting that thoughts and affections which depend only on its own free choice are open only to God; but to other rational creatures only insofar as the human mind itself wishes them to be known by them: that is, so that this will is, as it were, a certain condition without which the thought or internal affection of the human mind cannot be represented to an angelic or human intellect through an intelligible species.
2. Suarez adds another argument. Angels by their nature are not sufficiently constituted in first act for knowing the secrets of hearts; therefore they cannot know them naturally. - The antecedent is proved. First act requires two things, namely light or potency, and species. On the part of light, or active potency, we admit that nothing is lacking, as is manifestly clear in the cognition of these acts after the consent of those having them; for by that consent the light or active power of the angelic potency does not increase. Therefore on that side angels were already sufficiently constituted in first act for that cognition. But the other requisite for complete first act, namely species, is lacking in angels. Therefore.
The minor is proved a) "In these acts of the will an angel acts not only as a natural or physical agent, but especially as a moral agent; and therefore species of such acts are not due to him except as accommodated to the moral order. But it would not have been fitting to the right moral order that every intellectual creature should have concreated species of all free acts of other wills. For thus all the free acts of each would be known to all the rest, which is contrary to the good order of the multitude and society of rational persons, which they naturally demand, because from that hatreds, contentions, and similar things would arise. And especially demons could rage more fiercely against men if they knew their affections intimately, as indeed they could if they had species of them. Therefore such a nature does not demand such species."
b) A rational creature naturally desires to hide its intimate acts, which are especially its free decrees; therefore it cannot connaturally demand that which is opposed to the concealment of such acts. But such a thing is to have concreated species of such acts, as has been shown; therefore it does not demand their concreation as connatural to itself.
c) When a nature has a proper and intrinsic mode of obtaining some perfection, it does not demand that perfection immediately from the author of nature through infusion or concreation. But rational nature otherwise demands the communication of its own thoughts and affections through mutual speech. Therefore it does not demand the concreation of species, through which such speech would become either impossible or useless.
NOTE I. What we have said concerning the cognition of future things is not opposed by the fact that an angel has infused species of singulars from the beginning, as we said in the preceding article. For in order that the angel be able actually to use them in certainly knowing singular things, it is further required, as a condition without which not, that singulars of this kind either coexist with the angel as already present, or at least at some earlier time once coexisted with him. God does not need this condition, since he does not have a finite and limited faculty for knowing; and therefore he certainly knows future things equally as present and past things. - Suarez treats this difficulty at length (book 2, chapter 11).
NOTE II. Nor is it an objection that demons sometimes announce certain true contingent future things beforehand. For they do not do this because they naturally know those things certainly, but either because, God so disposing, they learn them from good angels, who know them in the divine Word or through a special revelation, as Augustine noted in book 2 To Simplicianus, q. 3, and book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17; or because they know them from revelations made to some saints, which they either hear or notice in writing, since they know all things that are being done anywhere, as Tertullian notes in the Apology, chapter 22; or because they predict those things which they themselves have determined to do, as the same Augustine notes in the book On the Divination of Demons, chapter 5, and book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17; or finally because they attain them by probable conjecture much better than men usually do, as Augustine notes in the same book, chapter 6, and St. Thomas explains at length in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 154.
On all these matters, see St. Thomas I, q. 57, aa. 3-4; Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapters 9, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25).
PROP. LIV. Although angels surpass men in the faculty of understanding, just as they surpass them in nature, nevertheless they cannot naturally know either, first, future free things, or, secondly, the secrets of hearts.
The first part is proved. I. From Scripture. Isaiah 41:23 says: "Announce the things which are to come in the future, and we shall know that you are gods." - 46:9 ff.: "I am God, and there is no God beyond me, nor is there any like me, announcing from the beginning the last things, and from the start the things which have not yet been done." - And hence prophecy, through which these future things are foretold, is a most certain and indeed evident sign of divine truth and revelation, as is taken from 1 Corinthians 14. But it would not be a sufficient sign of divine truth unless God alone could know those future things, as Origen rightly taught in book 6 against Celsus, Chrysostom, homily 32 on First Corinthians, and St. Thomas, book 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 154; and as is taken from 2 Peter 1: "We have the more firm prophetic word."
Proof II. From the Fathers. Tertullian (Apology, c. 23): "The truth of divination is, I think, a suitable testimony of divinity." - St. Hilary (On the Trinity, book 9): "What is so proper to God as cognition of future things?" - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 18 on John): "Certain prediction of future things is the work only of the immortal God." St. Augustine (City of God, book 5, chapter 9): "He who is not foreknowing of all future things is certainly not God." - St. Cyril (book 4 on John): "To know future things belongs to no other than to the one and only natural God."
Proof III. From reason. Future things cannot be known except either in their causes or in themselves; but in neither way can future free things be naturally known with certainty by any creature. Therefore.
The minor is proved with respect to the first part. Future free things are not certainly and immutably determined in their causes; therefore they cannot be known in those causes with certainty.
The minor is proved with respect to the second part. That mode of reaching future things in themselves, and after the manner of things existing for their own times before they are in reality, is proper to divine intellection because of its immutability and eternity, by reason of which it always and simultaneously has all things present, not through a real eternal coexistence of the things known, but because of their objective presence with respect to the most simple divine intuition and infinite comprehension. For for a mode of knowing so sublime and perfect an infinite power of understanding is required; but angels do not have an infinite power of understanding, nor a simple and immutable intuition by which they reach all differences of time. Therefore they cannot know future things in that mode. - Hence it seems to have settled even in the minds of unbelieving men that to know future things infallibly is proper to divinity; for from this their prediction was called divination, as though a divine action. And this can be explained in another way from the great difficulty which, conversely, theologians have in explaining how God most certainly sees the truths of such future things.
Therefore Suarez rightly concludes (On Angels, book 2, chapter 10, n. 10): "If one of these two things must be said to be above human reason, namely why God knows these future things or why an angel does not know them naturally, certainly this could be affirmed rather of the former than of the latter. Or if the first is sufficiently proved to be so from the excellence of God himself, even if the mode of knowing cannot be compared or explained by reason, then indeed from the fact that an angel does not have that infinite eminence of God, it is sufficiently concluded that he does not have this natural knowledge."
The second part is proved. I. From Scripture. 2 Chronicles 6:30 says: "You alone know the hearts of the sons of men." - Jeremiah 17 ff.: "The heart of men is depraved and inscrutable; who will know it? ... I the Lord, searching the heart and proving the reins." - 3 Kings 8:39: "You alone know the heart of all the sons of men." - Hebrews 4:12: the Apostle attributes to the Word of God as a singular characteristic that it reaches even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints also and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intentions of the heart.
Proof II. From the Fathers. Origen (Homily 7 on Genesis): "I have the purpose of martyrdom; not from this will an angel be able to say to me, 'Now I know that you fear God.' For to God alone is the purpose of the mind known. But if I come to the contests, if I bring forth a good confession, if I accept hesitatingly the things which are brought upon me, then an angel can say, as though confirming and strengthening me: 'Now I know that you fear God.'" - St. Hilary (on Psalm 59): "To know thoughts is not ours, but his of whom it was said: 'God searching hearts and reins'; and also his who said: 'Why do you think evil things in your hearts?'" - St. Ambrose (on Luke, book 5, chapter 3): "The Lord, wishing to make sinners saved, shows himself to be God by knowledge of hidden things." - St. John Chrysostom (Homily 4 on Matthew), on those words, "While he was thinking these things, an angel appeared to Joseph in sleep," speaks thus: "This was a most certain sign that the angel had been sent by God, since it belongs to God alone to know the secrets of hearts." St. Augustine (Sermon 234 On Time) has these things about St. Job: "He worshiped God, he gave alms, and with what heart it was done no one knew, not even the devil himself, but God knew."
Proof III. From reason. Suarez admits (On Angels, book 2, chapter 23, n. 1) that it is difficult to show this assumption from reason: "On this point," he says, "the theologians labor greatly, because it is truly difficult. Nevertheless, 1. St. Thomas gives this reason: the excellence of a mind of this kind is such that it is naturally subject to God alone as to the efficient and ultimate final cause. Hence it is fitting that thoughts and affections which depend only on its own free choice are open only to God; but to other rational creatures only insofar as the human mind itself wishes them to be known by them: that is, so that this will is, as it were, a certain condition without which the thought or internal affection of the human mind cannot be represented to an angelic or human intellect through an intelligible species.
2. Suarez adds another argument. Angels by their nature are not sufficiently constituted in first act for knowing the secrets of hearts; therefore they cannot know them naturally. - The antecedent is proved. First act requires two things, namely light or potency, and species. On the part of light, or active potency, we admit that nothing is lacking, as is manifestly clear in the cognition of these acts after the consent of those having them; for by that consent the light or active power of the angelic potency does not increase. Therefore on that side angels were already sufficiently constituted in first act for that cognition. But the other requisite for complete first act, namely species, is lacking in angels. Therefore.
The minor is proved a) "In these acts of the will an angel acts not only as a natural or physical agent, but especially as a moral agent; and therefore species of such acts are not due to him except as accommodated to the moral order. But it would not have been fitting to the right moral order that every intellectual creature should have concreated species of all free acts of other wills. For thus all the free acts of each would be known to all the rest, which is contrary to the good order of the multitude and society of rational persons, which they naturally demand, because from that hatreds, contentions, and similar things would arise. And especially demons could rage more fiercely against men if they knew their affections intimately, as indeed they could if they had species of them. Therefore such a nature does not demand such species."
b) A rational creature naturally desires to hide its intimate acts, which are especially its free decrees; therefore it cannot connaturally demand that which is opposed to the concealment of such acts. But such a thing is to have concreated species of such acts, as has been shown; therefore it does not demand their concreation as connatural to itself.
c) When a nature has a proper and intrinsic mode of obtaining some perfection, it does not demand that perfection immediately from the author of nature through infusion or concreation. But rational nature otherwise demands the communication of its own thoughts and affections through mutual speech. Therefore it does not demand the concreation of species, through which such speech would become either impossible or useless.
NOTE I. What we have said concerning the cognition of future things is not opposed by the fact that an angel has infused species of singulars from the beginning, as we said in the preceding article. For in order that the angel be able actually to use them in certainly knowing singular things, it is further required, as a condition without which not, that singulars of this kind either coexist with the angel as already present, or at least at some earlier time once coexisted with him. God does not need this condition, since he does not have a finite and limited faculty for knowing; and therefore he certainly knows future things equally as present and past things. - Suarez treats this difficulty at length (book 2, chapter 11).
NOTE II. Nor is it an objection that demons sometimes announce certain true contingent future things beforehand. For they do not do this because they naturally know those things certainly, but either because, God so disposing, they learn them from good angels, who know them in the divine Word or through a special revelation, as Augustine noted in book 2 To Simplicianus, q. 3, and book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17; or because they know them from revelations made to some saints, which they either hear or notice in writing, since they know all things that are being done anywhere, as Tertullian notes in the Apology, chapter 22; or because they predict those things which they themselves have determined to do, as the same Augustine notes in the book On the Divination of Demons, chapter 5, and book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 17; or finally because they attain them by probable conjecture much better than men usually do, as Augustine notes in the same book, chapter 6, and St. Thomas explains at length in Contra Gentiles III, chapter 154.
On all these matters, see St. Thomas I, q. 57, aa. 3-4; Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapters 9, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25).