Article 3. On Angelic Cognition in General

771. Many things are customarily disputed by theologians concerning the cognition of the angels, things indeed useful and pleasant to know; but those things which are altogether necessary are reduced especially to two questions, namely whether the angels know the secrets of hearts, and whether they know future free things. But in order that these things may be understood, certain matters concerning angelic cognition in general are presupposed; these, because of the narrowness of time, we touch upon briefly, not so much by disputing as by setting them forth.

772. That angels are spiritual and intellective substances is abundantly clear from what we said in the two preceding articles; and consequently that in them there is both the principal and the proximate faculty of understanding needs no further demonstration. Therefore, concerning the nature of this faculty:

773. It is asked, first, whether the intellect of an angel is the same as his substance. In this matter we note a) that this question can be raised with respect to possibility and with respect to fact: namely, it can be asked whether in some creature, and hence in an angel, the intellect can be the same as his substance, and whether in fact it is the same. - We note b) that, since it belongs to the nature of an intellective potency, and of any other operative faculty, to be the immediate principle of operation, it is the same thing to ask whether the substance of an angel, or of some creature, is, or can be really the same as an intellective or operative potency, and to ask whether it is, or can be, the immediate principle of intellection or of another operation.

774. Hence, with respect to the question of fact, we say: besides substance there is in angels an intellect, which is a potency distinct from substance. This is the very common opinion of the Doctors. - It is also more consonant with the opinion of the Fathers, who everywhere indicate that they understand powers of this kind to be distinguished from the substance of the creature. Thus Dionysius, chapter 11 of the Celestial Hierarchy, when he distinguishes in the angels essence and operation and power. And St. Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 7, who says that "the mind is not the soul, but that which excels in it." And St. Anselm, in the book On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Will, in the last chapter, where he speaks thus: "There is reason in the soul, which it uses as its instrument for reasoning; and the will, which it uses for willing."

775. But with respect to the question of possibility, a distinction must be made between the absolute and the ordinary power of God. Theologians and philosophers dispute whether, by the absolute power of God, there could be some creature in which potency is its substance. But very commonly they deny this with respect to the ordinary power of God. Here it is sufficient to prove this by the argument of Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapter 1, n. 2), who, after citing the authorities of the Fathers and theologians for the question of fact, says: "Hence I have always been persuaded that the necessity of this potency distinct from substance arises from the limitation of created substance, and therefore in every created spirit, however perfect, we posit that distinction. And hence Cajetan rightly extends this even to every creatable spirit, because if an angel were creatable who, in a connatural mode, could understand without an intellect distinct from his substance, we could by no probable reason divine that such an angel was not made; indeed, it would be more credible that either all angels, or many created angels, are of this kind."

785. Question 2. Whether intellection, or the act of understanding, in an angel is the same as his substance. - The negative is the common opinion of the theologians. For the operations of an angel are partly natural, partly supernatural. But neither the supernatural nor the natural operations are the same as the substance of the angel. Therefore none at all are.

The minor is proved concerning supernatural operations; for if they were the substance of the angel, by that very fact they would be natural to the angel with respect to their entity, and not supernatural. And the same thing is clear from the Council of Vienne (n. 374), where it is defined that the beatific operation is natural to no creature.

The minor is proved concerning natural operations. For first, as regards the evil operations of evil angels, it is certain that they are not the same as their substance. For then their substance, as regards its entity, precisely insofar as it was an operation, would be evil, which is contrary to Sacred Scripture. Genesis 1: "God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good." But concerning other natural operations the same reason holds, since the angel has himself in the same way in operating, whether he operates well or badly, as regards the entity of the operation itself.

St. Augustine also pursues these matters at length (City of God, book 11, chapter 10), where among other things he writes: "as a vessel has some liquid, or a body color, or air light or heat, or a soul wisdom. For none of these things is that which it has; for neither is the vessel the liquid, nor the body color, nor the air light or heat, nor is the soul wisdom." From this he infers that all the aforesaid things can be deprived of that which they have, and be turned and changed into other habits and qualities; "as a vessel is emptied of the liquid with which it is full, and a body is discolored, and the air is darkened, and the soul becomes foolish." See I, q. 54; and Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapter 1).

776. It is asked, first, whether angels need an intelligible species in order actually to understand. - We suppose a) that some intelligible species, whatever at last it may be, is certainly required in an angel. For an angel, from what has been said, is not his own act of understanding, and therefore is in potency to understanding; therefore he must be determined to this; but this determination is made through an intelligible species; therefore. See n. 349. - b) Hence the true sense of the proposed question is whether an angel needs an intelligible species properly so called, or whether he understands through his own essence, which performs the office of an intelligible species. c) If the matter concerns the cognition by which an angel knows himself, St. Thomas, and many with him, concede that an angel knows himself through his own essence (Valentia, tome 1, disputation 4, question 6, point 1). Thus it is asked whether angels need superadded intelligible species for understanding objects distinct from their substance.

777. The most common response is affirmative. For no form can complete the potency of some subject unless it contains those things to which such a subject extends itself; but the essence of an angel does not contain all things to which the intellect of an angel extends itself; therefore through it he cannot understand all things, and consequently an angel needs superadded species. The minor is proved. The intellect of an angel is in potency to understanding all being, and all beings distinctly; and his essence, since it is of a determinate species and genus, does not contain every entity. Therefore.

That argument can be explained and confirmed in this way from Valentia (tome 1, disputation 4, question 6, point 1): the reason why the divine essence is in place of intelligible species for God himself and for the blessed has no place in the essence of an angel; nor from another source does a suitable reason present itself why we should think that an angel's own essence is for him in place of all species. Therefore this is by no means to be thought. The antecedent is proved, since we attribute this to the divine essence on account of its infinite perfection, which therefore, far better than any species, can itself intelligibly represent things and concur in the cognition of them. Nor indeed from the perfection of an angel, however great, is it permitted from another source to understand that he does not need added species. For not just any great perfection suffices for any effect whatever, unless it is infinite; but if it is finite, of which kind is the perfection of an angel, it can happen that, although it is great and sufficient for some eminent effect, nevertheless it is not such that it suffices also for some other effect, even though less perfect. Thus the perfection, for example, of a lion suffices for producing a lion; yet on that account it does not suffice for producing a mouse, which is a more imperfect effect.

778. It is asked, secondly, whether angels understand through universal species. - We note a) Since it belongs to an intelligible species in some way to represent the object, a species is called universal because it represents many things. But this can occur in two ways. Either because it represents only under a common aspect, which is only a confused representation of the singulars contained under it; or because it so represents the common aspect that it also clearly and distinctly represents the inferiors contained under it. Therefore the title of the question is to be understood in this latter way. - b) It must be held, with the very common opinion of the Doctors, that species of this kind can exist. This can be argued thus. Since the divine essence is most simple, it distinctly and expressly represents all creatable things; therefore nothing prevents some created species, insofar as it is a participation of the divine essence, from participating in this eminence, namely that, though it is one, it represents several and diverse entities. Intelligible species in angels are infused immediately by God, as we shall presently say; and therefore they are certain participations of the exemplars, or divine ideas. Hence we say:

779. Angels understand through universal species. The proof is that universal species of this kind are possible, and can be connatural, as is clear, to some creature. Therefore in fact they are connatural to angels.

The consequence is proved a) Angels are in the highest grade of intellectual substances, and in that grade they have great efficacy and power of understanding; therefore it is likely that they have a superior power of understanding, one which through a single principle can understand many things, because the more perfect a power is, the simpler and more united it is.

b) That men know individual things through individual species arises from imperfection and from the mode of acquiring species through the senses; therefore, since angels are of a higher order, and have a higher mode of obtaining species, and can easily receive universal species, this is more consonant with their natural perfection and with the excellence of their light: for the things which in lower beings are divided are found united in higher beings.

780. From this it plainly follows that higher angels understand through more universal species. For the more perfect angels are in intellectual nature, the more similar they are to God in understanding; but God excels most in understanding in this, that through his single knowledge he knows all things; therefore the more perfect the angels are, the more unitedly they will understand, and consequently through more universal and fewer species.

781. It is asked, thirdly, whether species were infused by God into angels together with their nature.

The more common and truer opinion of the theologians is that angels understand things through species naturally implanted in them from the beginning of their condition, not species acquired by themselves. The assertion is proved a) From Ezekiel 28, where, in the person of the King of Tyre, it is said to the angel who fell: "You were the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and beauty." And below: "You were perfect in your ways from the day of your condition." But he would not have been perfect and full of wisdom from the day of his condition if at the beginning he had lacked intelligible species and had needed to acquire them.

b) From St. Dionysius, who in chapter 7 of The Divine Names affirms that angels know things "by the proper power and nature," as he says, "of a mind fashioned after the image of God," that is, by species naturally implanted in them, and that they do not "draw" cognition "from the things themselves." Likewise from Augustine, who in book 2 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 8, says for this reason that things were so created by God "that they were first created in the very cognition of the angels," namely according to their likenesses; and afterward the intelligible species were in their own genus.

c) "Lower spiritual substances," says St. Thomas (I, q. 55, a. 2), "namely souls, have being akin to a body, insofar as they are forms of bodies; and therefore from their very mode of being it belongs to them to obtain their intelligible perfection from bodies and through bodies; otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. But higher substances, that is, angels, are totally free from bodies, subsisting immaterially and in intelligible being; and therefore they obtain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outflow, by which they received from God the species of known things together with their intellectual nature." - See this whole question; and Suarez (book 2, chapters 3, 7, 8, 14, 15).

782. As regards the mode of angelic cognition, it is asked whether an angel knows by discursive reasoning. - We note a) that in cognition a twofold discourse can occur: one according to succession only; the other also according to causality. The former means only a succession of acts without inference, as when we understand this and then this; or, as St. Thomas says, "when, after we understand something in act, we turn ourselves to understanding something else." The latter implies not only succession, but also causality between acts, so that the prior act causes and infers the posterior: "as when through known principles we arrive at the cognition of conclusions." It is well established that the former discourse is in fact found in angels. For since they do not understand all things by one single act, as God does, it follows that for cognition of things they need a succession of acts. Therefore the question concerns the latter discourse, which properly comes under the name of discourse.

b) But for true and proper discourse two conditions are necessarily required: one, a distinction of acts, and indeed a real distinction, if the discourse is formal. The other, that there be inference and true causality between the acts, so that the prior act really infers and causes the posterior; or that one thing previously known, by priority either of duration or of nature, produce and infer the cognition of the posterior. Hence for true and formal discourse it is not sufficient that one thing, on the part of the object, be the reason for knowing another: for the divine essence is the reason for knowing all things both for God and for the blessed, and nevertheless in God there is no discourse, nor do the blessed reason discursively in the blessed vision. Therefore discourse requires two acts on the part of the subject, by one of which the cause is known, and by another, inferred from the prior act, one proceeds from the known cause to cognition of the effect.

c) Therefore these three differ greatly: "to see something in another," "to see after another," and "to see from another." For God sees all things in himself, but not after something else seen, nor from something else seen. Angels see one thing after another, but not one thing from another, as we shall say. Men, however, see one thing after another and, further, see one thing from another.

783. These things being posited, with St. Thomas we say: angels understand without discourse. For that we know the subject by one cognition and conclusions from principles by another, namely by reasoning discursively, happens to us because of the imperfection of our intellect. But angels are endowed with a far more perfect intellectual light, since they are, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of The Divine Names, "a certain most pure and most clear mirror." Therefore we can rightly judge that they understand without discourse the things which they understand, since neither from another source is there supplied to us a suitable reason why we should deny this excellence to their intellect. See Toletus; and Valentia (tome 1, disputation 4, question 9, point 2); St. Thomas, I, q. 58, a. 3.

784. From these things it is easily deduced that angels do not know by composing and dividing, that is, they know by a certain simple intuition both the subject and the things which belong to the subject. See St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

785. But as regards the object of the angelic intellect, first it must be observed that here we are not asking about the object in species or in particular, but about the proper and adequate object, which contains under itself the individual objects to which the intellect of angels can extend itself. Suarez (On Angels, book 2, chapter 2, n. 1).

786. Now this object can either be assigned as one and the same with respect to all angels, or as proper to each one and different from the others. And both seem necessary according to different reasons. For since all angels agree in one common account of intellectual substance, it is necessary that they have some one adequate intelligible object in common; and since they differ in their particular and proper intellects, consequently it also seems necessary that they have some diversity in their proper adequate objects. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 5).

787. To explain these things, it must be observed that an adequate object of a potency can be assigned in two ways: namely, either in the being of the thing, or according to real agreement; or in the being of an object, that is, in some formal account under which that whole object is attained. In other words, this object is usually distinguished into material and formal: that is, into the material object which the potency attains, and the formal account under which it attains that object.

788. These things being posited, no one doubts that the adequate material object of the angelic intellect is being, simply and taken in its whole breadth, insofar as it is true. This assertion has place in every intellect, even the human intellect. See n. 370.

789. But besides the material object, a formal object of the angelic intellect must also be assigned, which is also usually called the aspect under which the material object is attained, the motive, and so forth. For we suppose that not all angels are of the same species. Hence, in angels differing in species, the intellects too must differ specifically; for there is as much distinction among properties consequent upon nature as there is in the nature itself. But the difference of potencies must also be taken from the formal object. Therefore. - The minor is supposed to have been proved from metaphysics, and here it is sufficient to explain it by an example. Will and intellect are distinguished from their objects, not because in reality there is a distinct object which is attained by them, for the same being is known and loved, but because it is attained by those potencies under diverse aspects. These aspects are not denominations from the potencies, but objective aptitudes, so that the object may be attained in this or that way. Thus, therefore, in the same intelligible being there can be distinguished diverse aptitudes, so that it may be represented in this or that way, and according to these several intellects can be distinguished. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 24; see also nn. 20 ff.).

790. Once the necessity of assigning a diverse formal object for angels of diverse species has been understood, if it is asked what that object is, we respond: operations follow being; intellectual operations differ in species from a more universal and more immaterial mode of knowing; the mode of knowing is also determined from the object, or from the aspect under which the object is attained; therefore this objective aspect ought to be proportioned to the immateriality of being of angels of diverse species.

For just as the human intellect, because by its nature it belongs to a soul seeking conjunction with a body, therefore understands all things with some proportion to material things and supposes in objects some aptitude that they be known in this way; so the angelic intellect knows things with proportion to its own mode of being, and consequently supposes in things an aptitude that they be represented to it in this way. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 25).

791. Suarez (loc. cit., n. 23) excellently illustrates this doctrine from St. Thomas, I, q. 12, a. 4, saying: "He posits three grades of intellects, the highest, the lowest, and the middle, that is, the divine, the human, and the angelic, and distinguishes them from the objects most proportioned and motive to each. For the divine intellect is moved, as though connaturally, to understanding by its essence alone, which is its subsistent being, and through that alone knows all things. But it is connatural to the human intellect to be moved to knowing by existing things, although it knows them in a more abstract and immaterial mode than they are in themselves, and through them ascends to immaterial things. But the angelic intellect first of itself understands created immaterial natures, which are middle between God and material things, and through them ascends to God; but material objects it knows as if from an abundance of its power, in a higher mode than man knows. And this mode of distinction can be applied to the various species of intellects contained in that middle grade. For in the highest grade, because of its supreme perfection, there is no multiplication; but in the third grade, because of its lowest condition, there is no specific multiplication, although there is numerical multiplication; but in the middle grade specific distinction is found, which can be declared proportionately through direct, intrinsic, and most connatural motives. For each angelic intellect connaturally demands to behold intimately its own proper substance, from which it flows, and to be joined to it immediately, and consequently to be moved and stirred by it, first of itself, to understanding itself; and therefore each angelic intellect, in its specific and essential perfection, is commensurate with the essence from which it flows, and in its mode of understanding it is, as it were, made adequate to its own substance as to its first intelligible object, and therefore from that object it receives its specific difference."