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678. Duo docet catholica fides de purgatorio, videlicet "purgatorium esse - animasque ibi detentas fidelium suffragiis, potissimum vero acceptabili altaris sacrificio juvari." - De suffragiis agi solet in tractatu de poenitentia: quaestionem solum de purgatorii existentia expediemus.
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Proponitur status quaestionis.
§ I.
Proponitur status quaestionis.
678. The Catholic faith teaches two things concerning purgatory, namely that "purgatory exists, and that the souls detained there are helped by the suffrages of the faithful, but especially by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar." - The subject of suffrages is usually treated in the treatise on penance; we shall dispatch only the question concerning the existence of purgatory.
§ I.
The state of the question is proposed.
§ I.
The state of the question is proposed.
679. Purgatorii nomine intelligitur locus quidam, in quo post mortem, eorum fidelium animae, quae vel obstrictae adhuc reatu alicujus temporalis poenae, vel etiam aliquibus peccatis venialibus, ex corpore migraverunt, secundum divinae justitiae rationem cruciantur, quoad penitus ab ejusmodi peccatis expiatae beatitudinem coelestem consequi valeant.
679. By the name purgatory there is understood a certain place in which, after death, the souls of those faithful who have departed from the body either still bound by the debt of some temporal punishment, or even by some venial sins, are tormented according to the rule of divine justice, until, being entirely expiated from sins of this sort, they are able to attain heavenly beatitude.
680. Jam a saeculo IV Aerius dogma de purgatorio impugnasse perhibetur, quamvis non certo constet, utrum purgatorii existentiam, an solummodo suffragiorum utilitatem negaverit. - Medio aevo doctrinam de purgatorio Petrobrusiani, Albigenses, Waldenses, atque Hussitae rejecerunt. - Novatores saeculi XVI idem dogma impugnarunt. Lutherus enim, qui ab initio solum asseruit doctrinam de purgatorio ad fidem non pertinere, sed posse pro libito admitti vel negari; mox eamdem cum magna vehementia rejecit. Admisso enim principio, quod justificatio non tollit peccatum, sed solum facit ut per merita Christi non imputetur ad poenam; consequenter negabat haeresiarcha ille post remissionem peccati remanere ullam poenam, sive in hac vita sive in purgatorio solvendam: quemadmodum admisso principio, quod bona opera nostra sunt inania, consequenter negabat suffragiorum utilitatem. Unde (in Articulis Smalcaldicis P. 2. c. 2. § 9.) ait: "Quapropter purgatorium et quidquid ei solemnitatis, cultus, et quaestus adhaeret, mera diaboli larva est. Pugnat enim cum primo articulo, qui docet, Christum solum, et non hominum opera, animas liberare." - Pariter Calvinus: "Ubi," inquit, "peccatorum expiatio alibi quam in Christi sanguine quaeritur, ubi satisfactio alio transfertur, periculosissimum silentium. Clamandum ergo non modo vocis, sed gutturis ac laterum contentione, purgatorium exitiale satanae esse commentum, quod Christi crucem evacuat, quod contumeliam Dei misericordiae non ferendum irrogat, quod fidem nostram labefacit et evertit." Vid. Bellarm. (de Purg. l. 1. c. 2.)
680. Already from the fourth century Aerius is said to have attacked the dogma concerning purgatory, although it is not certainly established whether he denied the existence of purgatory or only the usefulness of suffrages. - In the Middle Ages the Petrobrusians, Albigensians, Waldensians, and Hussites rejected the doctrine concerning purgatory. - The Innovators of the sixteenth century attacked the same dogma. For Luther, who at the beginning only asserted that the doctrine concerning purgatory did not pertain to faith, but could be admitted or denied at will, soon rejected it with great vehemence. For once the principle had been admitted that justification does not take away sin, but only causes it not to be imputed unto punishment through the merits of Christ, that heresiarch consequently denied that after the remission of sin any punishment remains to be paid, whether in this life or in purgatory. Likewise, once the principle had been admitted that our good works are empty, he consequently denied the usefulness of suffrages. Hence, in the Smalcald Articles, part 2, chapter 2, § 9, he says: "Therefore purgatory and whatever solemnity, worship, and gain adheres to it is a mere mask of the devil. For it fights against the first article, which teaches that Christ alone, and not the works of men, liberates souls." - Likewise Calvin says: "Where the expiation of sins is sought elsewhere than in the blood of Christ, where satisfaction is transferred elsewhere, silence is most dangerous. Therefore it must be shouted not only with the effort of the voice, but of the throat and lungs, that purgatory is a deadly invention of Satan, which empties the cross of Christ, which inflicts an intolerable insult upon the mercy of God, which shakes and overturns our faith." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 2.
681. Non pauci vero inter recentiores Protestantes doctrinam patrum suorum mitigari conati sunt. Ita admittunt quemdam purgationis statum post hanc vitam, atque orationes etiam pro defunctis fieri posse; sed monent aliqui tales orationes privatim, non publice esse faciendas; alii etiam publicas preces concedunt, sed non plus quam semel aut bis, ne videantur more catholicorum, aiunt, vim Deo inferre; alii publicas pluries repetitas preces admittunt, sed non quia illis defunctorum animae juvantur, sed quia solatio sunt ipsis fidelibus orantibus etc.
681. But not a few among more recent Protestants have tried to soften the doctrine of their fathers. Thus they admit a certain state of purgation after this life, and even that prayers can be made for the dead; but some warn that such prayers are to be made privately, not publicly; others also concede public prayers, but not more than once or twice, lest, as they say, they seem after the manner of Catholics to use force upon God; others admit public prayers repeated more than once, but not because the souls of the dead are helped by them, but because they are a consolation to the faithful themselves who are praying, etc.
682. Catholica de hac re doctrina pluries ab Ecclesia definita est: praesertim in Conc. Florent., in decreto unionis Graecorum, ubi legitur: "Definimus, si vere poenitentes in Dei caritate decesserint, antequam dignis poenitentiae fructibus de commissis satisfecerint et omissis, eorum animas poenis purgatoriis post mortem purgari, et ut a poenis hujusmodi releventur, prodesse eis fidelium vivorum suffragia, Missarum scilicet sacrificia, orationes, et eleemosynas, et alia pietatis officia, quae a fidelibus pro aliis fidelibus fieri consueverunt secundum Ecclesiae instituta." Et Conc. Trid. sess. 6. can. 30.: "Si quis dixerit post acceptam justificationis gratiam cuilibet peccatori poenitenti ita culpam remitti et reatum poenae aeternae delere dixerit, ut nullus remaneat reatus poenae temporalis exsolvendus, vel in hoc saeculo, vel in futuro in purgatorio, antequam ad regna coelorum aditus patere possit; anathema sit." Vid. Bellarminum (de Purgator. l. 1. c. 9.)
682. Catholic doctrine on this matter has several times been defined by the Church, especially in the Council of Florence, in the decree of union with the Greeks, where it is read: "We define that, if those truly penitent have departed in the charity of God before they have made satisfaction by worthy fruits of repentance for things committed and omitted, their souls are purged after death by purgatorial punishments, and that, in order that they may be relieved from punishments of this sort, the suffrages of the living faithful profit them, namely the sacrifices of Masses, prayers, alms, and other offices of piety, which are accustomed to be done by the faithful for other faithful according to the institutes of the Church." And the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 30: "If anyone shall say that after the grace of justification has been received, guilt is so remitted to any penitent sinner and the debt of eternal punishment so blotted out, that there remains no debt of temporal punishment to be discharged, either in this age or in the future in purgatory, before the entrance to the kingdoms of heaven can lie open, let him be anathema." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 9.
683. Ad has Ecclesiae definitiones intelligendas, pauca adnotabimus. Atque imprimis, anima, dum a corpore separatur per mortem, potest in triplici conditione inveniri. Vel est in statu gratiae et perfecte purgata; et coelum statim ingreditur - vel est in statu peccati lethalis; et in inferno detruditur - vel est quidem in statu gratiae, sed nondum plene purgata; et detinetur in purgatorio, donec perfecte purgata recipiatur in coelo, quo nihil coinquinatum ingreditur. Jamvero purgatio potest esse 1. a peccatis venialibus - 2. a poena debita his, vel peccatis lethalibus remissis quoad reatum culpae et poenae aeternae - vel 3. a pravis habitibus.
683. In order to understand these definitions of the Church, we shall note a few things. And first of all, when the soul is separated from the body through death, it can be found in a threefold condition. Either it is in the state of grace and perfectly purged, and immediately enters heaven; or it is in the state of lethal sin, and is thrust down into hell; or it is indeed in the state of grace, but not yet fully purged, and is detained in purgatory until, perfectly purged, it is received into heaven, which nothing defiled enters. Now purgation can be 1. from venial sins; 2. from the punishment owed to these, or to lethal sins remitted as to the debt of guilt and eternal punishment; or 3. from depraved habits.
684. Quoad 1um notamus a) Certum est aliquem posse mortis momento esse in statu gratiae, et simul habere peccatum veniale, cum quo nequit ingredi coelum.
b) Certum est etiam peccatum veniale non semper quoad culpam remitti in ipsa morte. Etenim peccatum veniale remitti nequit sine poenitentia saltem virtuali (Vid. D. Thomam 3. p. q. 87. a. 1. et Sylv. h. l.) Atqui non semper homo in veniali existens poenitentiam de eo habet ante mortem. Ergo. - Prob. min. Non pauci etiam pii et justi rapiuntur ex hac vita vel somno oppressi, vel vi morbi in delirium lapsi, qui prius habebant affectum ad aliquod peccatum veniale, quem certe in morte nequeunt poenitentia retractare. Unde Ecclesia non solum orat pro defunctis, ut a cunctis reatibus absolvantur; quod de peccato quoad poenam est accipiendum; sed etiam, ut sacrificiis purgati, et a peccatis expediti, indulgentiam pariter et requiem capiant sempiternam. Item, ut quae per fragilitatem carnis humana conversatione commiserunt, Deus venia misericordissimae pietatis abstergat. Ista vero de peccatorum maculis esse intelligenda, certum videtur; cum illae solae purgari possint et abstergi." Vid. Sylvium (in l. c. quaer. 1.)
c) Si quis autem quaerat, quomodo peccatum veniale post mortem remittitur; respondet D. Thomas (de malo articulus 11. ad 9.): "culpam non remitti per poenam neque secundum quod actu sustinetur, quia non est meritoria: neque secundum quod recogitatur, non enim esset motus charitatis quod aliquid detestaretur peccatum veniale propter poenam, sed magis esset motus timoris servilis, vel naturalis. Remittitur ergo in purgatorio veniale, quantum ad culpam, virtute gratiae, non solum secundum quod est in habitu, quia sic compatitur veniale peccatum; sed prout exit in actum charitatis, detestantis veniale peccatum."
d) Si quis deinde quaerat, quando peccatum veniale remittitur; respondetur, quod quamvis disputetur de tempore; probabile tamen est culpas veniales deleri, non diu postquam anima est e corpore egressa: quia cum statim ab egressu perfecte cognoscat suum statum, ac omnes culpas quibus adhuc est maculata; probabile est quod statim concipiat amorem Dei, et detestationem omnium eorum quae Deum offendunt ipsamque retardant ab ejus fruitione: quia nihil eam impedit a tali actu; nec habebit postea plus gratiae quam tum habeat. Deinde, quando est aliquod magnum bonum quod differtur, et magnum malum quod imminet, tunc excitatur intensum desiderium ad consequendum illud bonum, et evadendum istud malum: sed ei animae separatae, quae purgatorio est obnoxia, imminet magnum malum, imo potius jam est in magno malo, scilicet in acerba purgatorii poena, et differtur a maximo bono, scilicet a vita aeterna: ergo statim excitatur in ea fervens desiderium. Quae ratio, ait B. Th. ad 16. dicti art. 11. "non concludit quod peccatum veniale in purgatorio non remittatur, sed quod statim ibi remittatur: (haec est enim vera lectio quam habent veteres codices) et hoc satis videtur probabile." Addit vero: "Quia tamen post hanc vitam non est status merendi, ille dilectionis motus in eis tollit quidem impedimentum venialis culpae, non tamen meretur absolutionem vel diminutionem poenae, sicut in hac vita." Vid. Bellarminum (de Purgat. l. 1. c. 14. sexta ratio); Suarez (in 3. p. q. 87. a. 7. disp. 11. sect. 1. n. 4.)
b) Certum est etiam peccatum veniale non semper quoad culpam remitti in ipsa morte. Etenim peccatum veniale remitti nequit sine poenitentia saltem virtuali (Vid. D. Thomam 3. p. q. 87. a. 1. et Sylv. h. l.) Atqui non semper homo in veniali existens poenitentiam de eo habet ante mortem. Ergo. - Prob. min. Non pauci etiam pii et justi rapiuntur ex hac vita vel somno oppressi, vel vi morbi in delirium lapsi, qui prius habebant affectum ad aliquod peccatum veniale, quem certe in morte nequeunt poenitentia retractare. Unde Ecclesia non solum orat pro defunctis, ut a cunctis reatibus absolvantur; quod de peccato quoad poenam est accipiendum; sed etiam, ut sacrificiis purgati, et a peccatis expediti, indulgentiam pariter et requiem capiant sempiternam. Item, ut quae per fragilitatem carnis humana conversatione commiserunt, Deus venia misericordissimae pietatis abstergat. Ista vero de peccatorum maculis esse intelligenda, certum videtur; cum illae solae purgari possint et abstergi." Vid. Sylvium (in l. c. quaer. 1.)
c) Si quis autem quaerat, quomodo peccatum veniale post mortem remittitur; respondet D. Thomas (de malo articulus 11. ad 9.): "culpam non remitti per poenam neque secundum quod actu sustinetur, quia non est meritoria: neque secundum quod recogitatur, non enim esset motus charitatis quod aliquid detestaretur peccatum veniale propter poenam, sed magis esset motus timoris servilis, vel naturalis. Remittitur ergo in purgatorio veniale, quantum ad culpam, virtute gratiae, non solum secundum quod est in habitu, quia sic compatitur veniale peccatum; sed prout exit in actum charitatis, detestantis veniale peccatum."
d) Si quis deinde quaerat, quando peccatum veniale remittitur; respondetur, quod quamvis disputetur de tempore; probabile tamen est culpas veniales deleri, non diu postquam anima est e corpore egressa: quia cum statim ab egressu perfecte cognoscat suum statum, ac omnes culpas quibus adhuc est maculata; probabile est quod statim concipiat amorem Dei, et detestationem omnium eorum quae Deum offendunt ipsamque retardant ab ejus fruitione: quia nihil eam impedit a tali actu; nec habebit postea plus gratiae quam tum habeat. Deinde, quando est aliquod magnum bonum quod differtur, et magnum malum quod imminet, tunc excitatur intensum desiderium ad consequendum illud bonum, et evadendum istud malum: sed ei animae separatae, quae purgatorio est obnoxia, imminet magnum malum, imo potius jam est in magno malo, scilicet in acerba purgatorii poena, et differtur a maximo bono, scilicet a vita aeterna: ergo statim excitatur in ea fervens desiderium. Quae ratio, ait B. Th. ad 16. dicti art. 11. "non concludit quod peccatum veniale in purgatorio non remittatur, sed quod statim ibi remittatur: (haec est enim vera lectio quam habent veteres codices) et hoc satis videtur probabile." Addit vero: "Quia tamen post hanc vitam non est status merendi, ille dilectionis motus in eis tollit quidem impedimentum venialis culpae, non tamen meretur absolutionem vel diminutionem poenae, sicut in hac vita." Vid. Bellarminum (de Purgat. l. 1. c. 14. sexta ratio); Suarez (in 3. p. q. 87. a. 7. disp. 11. sect. 1. n. 4.)
684. With regard to the first we note a) It is certain that someone can at the moment of death be in the state of grace and at the same time have venial sin, with which he cannot enter heaven.
b) It is also certain that venial sin is not always remitted as to guilt in death itself. For venial sin cannot be remitted without at least virtual repentance. See St. Thomas, III, question 87, article 1, and Sylvius on this place. But not always does a man existing in venial sin have repentance concerning it before death. Therefore. - Proof of the minor. Not a few even pious and just persons are snatched from this life either oppressed by sleep, or fallen through the force of illness into delirium, who previously had affection toward some venial sin, which certainly in death they cannot retract by repentance. Hence the Church not only prays for the dead, that they may be absolved from all debts, which must be understood concerning sin as to punishment; but also that, being purged by sacrifices and freed from sins, they may receive at once pardon and eternal rest. Likewise, that whatever they committed through the frailty of the flesh in human conversation, God may wipe away by the pardon of his most merciful piety. These things seem certainly to have to be understood concerning the stains of sins, since those alone can be purged and wiped away. See Sylvius, on the cited place, question 1.
c) But if someone asks how venial sin is remitted after death, St. Thomas answers, On Evil, article 11, reply to 9: "Guilt is not remitted by punishment either according as it is actually endured, because it is not meritorious, or according as it is reflected upon; for it would not be a movement of charity that someone should detest venial sin because of punishment, but rather a movement of servile or natural fear. Therefore the venial is remitted in purgatory, as to guilt, by the power of grace, not only according as it is in habit, because in this way it coexists with venial sin, but as it goes forth into an act of charity detesting venial sin."
d) If someone then asks when venial sin is remitted, the answer is that although there is dispute concerning the time, nevertheless it is probable that venial faults are blotted out not long after the soul has gone out from the body. For since immediately after departure it perfectly knows its state and all the faults by which it is still stained, it is probable that it immediately conceives love of God and detestation of all those things which offend God and delay it from the fruition of him, because nothing impedes it from such an act, nor will it afterward have more grace than it then has. Next, when there is some great good which is delayed, and a great evil which threatens, then an intense desire is stirred up for obtaining that good and escaping that evil. But for that separated soul which is liable to purgatory, a great evil threatens, or rather it is already in a great evil, namely in the bitter punishment of purgatory, and it is kept back from the greatest good, namely from eternal life. Therefore a fervent desire is immediately stirred up in it. This reasoning, says Blessed Thomas in reply to 16 of the said article 11, "does not conclude that venial sin is not remitted in purgatory, but that it is remitted there immediately; for this is the true reading which the ancient codices have, and this seems probable enough." But he adds: "Because, however, after this life there is not a state of meriting, that movement of love in them indeed removes the impediment of venial fault, yet it does not merit absolution or diminution of punishment, as in this life." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 14, sixth reason; Suarez, on III, question 87, article 7, disputation 11, section 1, no. 4.
b) It is also certain that venial sin is not always remitted as to guilt in death itself. For venial sin cannot be remitted without at least virtual repentance. See St. Thomas, III, question 87, article 1, and Sylvius on this place. But not always does a man existing in venial sin have repentance concerning it before death. Therefore. - Proof of the minor. Not a few even pious and just persons are snatched from this life either oppressed by sleep, or fallen through the force of illness into delirium, who previously had affection toward some venial sin, which certainly in death they cannot retract by repentance. Hence the Church not only prays for the dead, that they may be absolved from all debts, which must be understood concerning sin as to punishment; but also that, being purged by sacrifices and freed from sins, they may receive at once pardon and eternal rest. Likewise, that whatever they committed through the frailty of the flesh in human conversation, God may wipe away by the pardon of his most merciful piety. These things seem certainly to have to be understood concerning the stains of sins, since those alone can be purged and wiped away. See Sylvius, on the cited place, question 1.
c) But if someone asks how venial sin is remitted after death, St. Thomas answers, On Evil, article 11, reply to 9: "Guilt is not remitted by punishment either according as it is actually endured, because it is not meritorious, or according as it is reflected upon; for it would not be a movement of charity that someone should detest venial sin because of punishment, but rather a movement of servile or natural fear. Therefore the venial is remitted in purgatory, as to guilt, by the power of grace, not only according as it is in habit, because in this way it coexists with venial sin, but as it goes forth into an act of charity detesting venial sin."
d) If someone then asks when venial sin is remitted, the answer is that although there is dispute concerning the time, nevertheless it is probable that venial faults are blotted out not long after the soul has gone out from the body. For since immediately after departure it perfectly knows its state and all the faults by which it is still stained, it is probable that it immediately conceives love of God and detestation of all those things which offend God and delay it from the fruition of him, because nothing impedes it from such an act, nor will it afterward have more grace than it then has. Next, when there is some great good which is delayed, and a great evil which threatens, then an intense desire is stirred up for obtaining that good and escaping that evil. But for that separated soul which is liable to purgatory, a great evil threatens, or rather it is already in a great evil, namely in the bitter punishment of purgatory, and it is kept back from the greatest good, namely from eternal life. Therefore a fervent desire is immediately stirred up in it. This reasoning, says Blessed Thomas in reply to 16 of the said article 11, "does not conclude that venial sin is not remitted in purgatory, but that it is remitted there immediately; for this is the true reading which the ancient codices have, and this seems probable enough." But he adds: "Because, however, after this life there is not a state of meriting, that movement of love in them indeed removes the impediment of venial fault, yet it does not merit absolution or diminution of punishment, as in this life." See Bellarmine, On Purgatory, book 1, chapter 14, sixth reason; Suarez, on III, question 87, article 7, disputation 11, section 1, no. 4.
685. Quoad 2um, notamus a) Quod, uti ostenditur in tractatu de poenitentia, remissa culpa non semper remittitur totus reatus poenae; et divina justitia exigit, ut exsolvatur antequam quis admittatur in regnum Dei.
b) Falso asseruerunt Novatores ipsa mortis amaritudine exsolvi quemcumque poenae reatum. Nam mors non habet hanc vim ex opere operato nec homini datur semper in eo articulo vis ad satisfaciendum perfecte pro omnibus debitis hujusmodi: ubi enim est de hac re facta promissio? Praecipue cum repentinae mortes saepe veniant, in quibus nullius bonae operationis, nedum tantae satisfactionis locus datur. "Mors per se non est poena actualium peccatorum, sed secundum se est quaedam conditio naturae: secundum autem praesentem providentiam est poenalitas originalis peccati. Item nulla ratio patitur, ut secundum ordinariam et communem legem eadem poena purgentur, qui parum, et qui multum debent, praesertim cum acerbiores mortes saepe sustineant, qui justiores sunt. Deinde ubi est privilegium martyrii, si hoc omni morti commune est? ad quid etiam sunt necessaria suffragia pro defunctis, si mors omnia purgat? Denique eadem ratio persuadet, non omni homini morienti dari in ipsa morte auxilium efficax, ut possit per suum actum plene satisfacere pro omni praeterita negligentia, cur enim Deus hac universali lege faveret hominum negligentiae satisfaciendi dum viverent, securi de plena remissione in morte, si saltem absque culpa mortali invenirentur? Eademque ratio probat non esse admittendam talem satisfactionem post mortem, alioqui timor futurae vindictae non cohiberet homines in hac vita, sed in futuram satisfactionem reservaret." Vide Suarez (de Poenit. disp. 45. de purgator. sect. 1. nn. 35. 37.)
c) Temporalis autem poena post mortem non exsolvitur merendo (nullus enim, juxta catholicam doctrinam, est merendi locus post mortem) - nec proprie satisfaciendo, sed satispatiendo. "Hoc erit manifestum," inquit Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 2. n. 7.), "si termini propositi explicentur, quod erit facile supposita doctrina supra tradita de satisfactione. Ex peccato enim remisso primo et per se relinquitur reatus poenae ignis et afflictionis Purgatorii, et hanc sustinere possunt animae Purgatorii, et quia illa poena temporalis est, per sufficientem durationem illius dicuntur posse satispati juxta qualitatem, seu quantitatem reatus ad quod illis sufficit esse in statu gratiae. Rursus vero concessum est hominibus justis, et viatoribus, ut possint quodammodo mereri remissionem illius poenae per alias poenas voluntarias hujus vitae moraliter aequivalentes, juxta divinam legem, et justam institutionem: et haec vocatur propria satisfactio. Hanc ergo dicimus exhibere non posse animas Purgatorii, quia sicut tempus merendi fuit tantum in hac vita, ita etiam status satisfaciendi per voluntarias poenas, vel afflictiones." Vid. etiam Bellarminum (l. c. c. 14.)
b) Falso asseruerunt Novatores ipsa mortis amaritudine exsolvi quemcumque poenae reatum. Nam mors non habet hanc vim ex opere operato nec homini datur semper in eo articulo vis ad satisfaciendum perfecte pro omnibus debitis hujusmodi: ubi enim est de hac re facta promissio? Praecipue cum repentinae mortes saepe veniant, in quibus nullius bonae operationis, nedum tantae satisfactionis locus datur. "Mors per se non est poena actualium peccatorum, sed secundum se est quaedam conditio naturae: secundum autem praesentem providentiam est poenalitas originalis peccati. Item nulla ratio patitur, ut secundum ordinariam et communem legem eadem poena purgentur, qui parum, et qui multum debent, praesertim cum acerbiores mortes saepe sustineant, qui justiores sunt. Deinde ubi est privilegium martyrii, si hoc omni morti commune est? ad quid etiam sunt necessaria suffragia pro defunctis, si mors omnia purgat? Denique eadem ratio persuadet, non omni homini morienti dari in ipsa morte auxilium efficax, ut possit per suum actum plene satisfacere pro omni praeterita negligentia, cur enim Deus hac universali lege faveret hominum negligentiae satisfaciendi dum viverent, securi de plena remissione in morte, si saltem absque culpa mortali invenirentur? Eademque ratio probat non esse admittendam talem satisfactionem post mortem, alioqui timor futurae vindictae non cohiberet homines in hac vita, sed in futuram satisfactionem reservaret." Vide Suarez (de Poenit. disp. 45. de purgator. sect. 1. nn. 35. 37.)
c) Temporalis autem poena post mortem non exsolvitur merendo (nullus enim, juxta catholicam doctrinam, est merendi locus post mortem) - nec proprie satisfaciendo, sed satispatiendo. "Hoc erit manifestum," inquit Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 2. n. 7.), "si termini propositi explicentur, quod erit facile supposita doctrina supra tradita de satisfactione. Ex peccato enim remisso primo et per se relinquitur reatus poenae ignis et afflictionis Purgatorii, et hanc sustinere possunt animae Purgatorii, et quia illa poena temporalis est, per sufficientem durationem illius dicuntur posse satispati juxta qualitatem, seu quantitatem reatus ad quod illis sufficit esse in statu gratiae. Rursus vero concessum est hominibus justis, et viatoribus, ut possint quodammodo mereri remissionem illius poenae per alias poenas voluntarias hujus vitae moraliter aequivalentes, juxta divinam legem, et justam institutionem: et haec vocatur propria satisfactio. Hanc ergo dicimus exhibere non posse animas Purgatorii, quia sicut tempus merendi fuit tantum in hac vita, ita etiam status satisfaciendi per voluntarias poenas, vel afflictiones." Vid. etiam Bellarminum (l. c. c. 14.)
685. With regard to the second, we note a) That, as is shown in the treatise on penance, when guilt has been remitted, the whole debt of punishment is not always remitted; and divine justice requires that it be paid before one is admitted into the kingdom of God.
b) The Innovators falsely asserted that by the bitterness of death itself any debt whatsoever of punishment is paid. For death does not have this force ex opere operato, nor is there always given to a man in that article the power to make satisfaction perfectly for all debts of this sort. For where has a promise been made concerning this matter? Especially since sudden deaths often come, in which no place is given for any good operation, much less for so great a satisfaction. "Death in itself is not a punishment of actual sins, but according to itself is a certain condition of nature; but according to the present providence it is the penality of original sin. Likewise, no reason allows that according to the ordinary and common law, those who owe little and those who owe much should be purged by the same punishment, especially since those who are more just often endure more bitter deaths. Next, where is the privilege of martyrdom, if this is common to every death? For what purpose also are suffrages for the dead necessary, if death purges all things? Finally, the same reason persuades that effective help is not given in death itself to every man dying, so that by his act he could fully satisfy for all past negligence. For why would God by this universal law favor the negligence of men in making satisfaction while they lived, secure about full remission in death, if only they were found without mortal guilt? And the same reason proves that such satisfaction after death is not to be admitted; otherwise fear of future vengeance would not restrain men in this life, but would reserve them for future satisfaction." See Suarez, On Penance, disputation 45, on purgatory, section 1, nos. 35 and 37.
c) But temporal punishment after death is not paid by meriting, for according to Catholic doctrine there is no place for meriting after death, nor properly by making satisfaction, but by suffering satisfaction. "This will be manifest," says Suarez, same place, disputation 47, section 2, no. 7, "if the terms proposed are explained, which will be easy once the doctrine handed down above concerning satisfaction has been supposed. For from sin remitted there remains first and in itself the debt of the punishment of the fire and affliction of purgatory, and the souls of purgatory can endure this; and because that punishment is temporal, through a sufficient duration of it they are said to be able to suffer sufficiently according to the quality or quantity of the debt, for which it is enough for them to be in the state of grace. Again, however, it has been granted to just men and wayfarers that they can in some manner merit the remission of that punishment through other voluntary punishments of this life morally equivalent, according to divine law and just institution; and this is called proper satisfaction. Therefore we say that the souls of purgatory cannot exhibit this, because just as the time for meriting was only in this life, so also was the state of satisfying through voluntary punishments or afflictions." See also Bellarmine, same place, chapter 14.
b) The Innovators falsely asserted that by the bitterness of death itself any debt whatsoever of punishment is paid. For death does not have this force ex opere operato, nor is there always given to a man in that article the power to make satisfaction perfectly for all debts of this sort. For where has a promise been made concerning this matter? Especially since sudden deaths often come, in which no place is given for any good operation, much less for so great a satisfaction. "Death in itself is not a punishment of actual sins, but according to itself is a certain condition of nature; but according to the present providence it is the penality of original sin. Likewise, no reason allows that according to the ordinary and common law, those who owe little and those who owe much should be purged by the same punishment, especially since those who are more just often endure more bitter deaths. Next, where is the privilege of martyrdom, if this is common to every death? For what purpose also are suffrages for the dead necessary, if death purges all things? Finally, the same reason persuades that effective help is not given in death itself to every man dying, so that by his act he could fully satisfy for all past negligence. For why would God by this universal law favor the negligence of men in making satisfaction while they lived, secure about full remission in death, if only they were found without mortal guilt? And the same reason proves that such satisfaction after death is not to be admitted; otherwise fear of future vengeance would not restrain men in this life, but would reserve them for future satisfaction." See Suarez, On Penance, disputation 45, on purgatory, section 1, nos. 35 and 37.
c) But temporal punishment after death is not paid by meriting, for according to Catholic doctrine there is no place for meriting after death, nor properly by making satisfaction, but by suffering satisfaction. "This will be manifest," says Suarez, same place, disputation 47, section 2, no. 7, "if the terms proposed are explained, which will be easy once the doctrine handed down above concerning satisfaction has been supposed. For from sin remitted there remains first and in itself the debt of the punishment of the fire and affliction of purgatory, and the souls of purgatory can endure this; and because that punishment is temporal, through a sufficient duration of it they are said to be able to suffer sufficiently according to the quality or quantity of the debt, for which it is enough for them to be in the state of grace. Again, however, it has been granted to just men and wayfarers that they can in some manner merit the remission of that punishment through other voluntary punishments of this life morally equivalent, according to divine law and just institution; and this is called proper satisfaction. Therefore we say that the souls of purgatory cannot exhibit this, because just as the time for meriting was only in this life, so also was the state of satisfying through voluntary punishments or afflictions." See also Bellarmine, same place, chapter 14.
686. Quoad 3um, breviter notamus cum Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 1. n. 5.): "Dicet vero aliquis: Ad beatitudinem obtinendam non satis est carere omni culpa, et reatu poenae, sed etiam pravis habitibus, et inclinationibus. Respondeo, propter hanc causam non oportere fingere detentionem aliquam: nam quidquid hujusmodi est in appetitu sentiente, in ipsa morte deponitur, simul cum corpore, in quo est appetitus: habitus vero existentes in voluntate, vel in ipso instanti mortis auferuntur, aut per actus contrarios divina virtute factos, aut per abstractionem divini influxus conservantis; aut certe in primo ingressu gloriae ratione status infunduntur per accidens omnes virtutes etiam naturales, quae habitus repugnantes expellunt, sicut infunduntur etiam scientiae generales, quae omnem expellunt ignorantiam."
686. With regard to the third, we note briefly with Suarez, same place, disputation 47, section 1, no. 5: "But someone will say: for obtaining beatitude it is not enough to be without every fault and debt of punishment, but also without depraved habits and inclinations. I answer that on account of this cause it is not necessary to invent some detention. For whatever of this sort is in the sentient appetite is laid aside in death itself, together with the body in which the appetite is; but habits existing in the will are either taken away in the very instant of death, either through contrary acts made by divine power, or through the withdrawal of the conserving divine influx; or certainly in the first entrance into glory, by reason of the state, all virtues, even natural ones, are infused by accident, which expel repugnant habits, just as general sciences are also infused, which expel all ignorance."
687. Ex his intelligitur a) quo sensu animae in Purgatorio habent gratiam consummatam. Dupliciter, "docet Suarez (l. c. disp. 47. sect. 2. n. 4. 5.) "dici posse gratiam consummatam: primo, quia jam est actualiter conjuncta suo fini, quod est esse consummatam per operationem, et hoc modo animae illae non habent gratiam consummatam, quia non conjunguntur Deo per visionem claram, nec illum possident, ut supponimus ex supra dictis de loco Purgatorii, unde adhuc per solam fidem illum cognoscunt. Alio vero modo potest dici gratia consummata quoad intensionem, quam in tali subjecto habere potest, aut debet: sicut dicitur calor in summo, quando habet omnes gradus suae intensionis, et in hoc sensu dicendum est habere animas illas gratiam consummatam. Quia in intensione numquam crescere potest in tali subjecto: nam in instanti mortis habuit omnes gradus, quos in hac vita aliquo titulo homo promeruit, postea vero nec mereri potest, nec intensius operari, quam ipsi habitus connaturali modo operari valeant."
Intelligitur b) quo sensu charitas animarum in Purgatorio sit perfecta, vel imperfecta. "Potest enim charitas dici imperfecta essentialiter: et hoc modo nulla charitas est imperfecta, si est vera, juxta illud 1. Joan. 2. 'Qui servat verbum ejus, vere in hoc charitas Dei perfecta est.' Omnis enim charitas unit Deo animam, ut ultimo fini supernaturali, estque essentialiter virtus et forma virtutum, et hoc modo imperfectio essentialis ei repugnat. Potest autem esse imperfecta accidentaliter, idque, dupliciter. Primo quoad statum, et hoc modo dicitur charitas imperfecta eo ipso, quod non est conjuncta actualiter et immobiliter suo ultimo fini: et hoc modo verum est charitatem animarum Purgatorii esse imperfectam, id est, non consummatam, sicut de gratia dictum est. De qua imperfectione videtur loquutus Paulus ad Philippenses 3. dicens, 'Non quod jam perfectus sim:' nam subdit: 'Sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam.' Non tamen inde fit posse augeri, quia est in supposito, quod jam est extra statum merendi. Unde alio modo potest charitas esse imperfecta, quia non habet totam intensionem, quam in tali subjecto habere potest, et debet: et sic charitas illarum animarum imperfecta non est, sed perfecta, sicut de gratia dictum est: eadem enim est utriusque ratio."
Intelligitur c) an animae illae dicendae sint esse in termino vel in via. "Simpliciter enim non sunt in termino, quem nondum possident, et quoad hanc negationem sunt in via, et quoad aptitudinem solvendi debitum alicujus poenae per satispassionem, item quoad statum fidei: absolute tamen non sunt in via, sicut nos sumus, scilicet, quoad omnes conditiones, et effectus viatorum: sunt ergo veluti in statu medio. Dicique possunt esse in termino gratiae, nondum vero in termino gloriae."
Intelligitur d) quo sensu sit accipiendum illud Eccle. 11. 3.: "Si ceciderit lignum ad austrum aut ad aquilonem, in quocumque loco ceciderit, ibi erit," et alia similia ex Sacra Scriptura. Haec vera sunt de sorte definitiva; quoad hanc enim non datur medium inter paradisum et infernum, nec ullus est locus augendi post mortem gratiam, siquidem nullus amplius est locus merito; sed inde non excluditur status poenalis purgationis temporariae. Sane textus citatus desumitur ex V. T.; at in V. T., uti ipsi Protestantes agnoscunt, tertius locus extitit, videlicet limbus Patrum, in quo justi ad tempus detinebantur.
Intelligitur e) quomodo sint accipienda quaedam effata Patrum. Cum enim aliqui asserunt nullam dari in altera vita remissionem peccatorum, nullumque esse poenitentiae locum; agunt de peccatis mortalibus, et de remissione poenae aeternae. (Vid. S. Joan. Chrys. hom. 2. de Lazaro.) - Cum dicunt peccata remissa non obesse post mortem, significant non obesse ad beatitudinem ultimo consequendam, quin tamen excludant eam posse differri. Quod si aliqui, ut S. Augustinus (Enchirid. cap. 79.) videntur ancipites esse de futuris purgatorii poenis, loquuntur potius de earum natura et indole; ipsam enim existentiam alicujus poenae temporalis pro aliquibus post mortem, apertissime iidem Patres, uti S. Augustinus (de Civitate Dei lib. 21. c. 13.) docent.
Intelligitur b) quo sensu charitas animarum in Purgatorio sit perfecta, vel imperfecta. "Potest enim charitas dici imperfecta essentialiter: et hoc modo nulla charitas est imperfecta, si est vera, juxta illud 1. Joan. 2. 'Qui servat verbum ejus, vere in hoc charitas Dei perfecta est.' Omnis enim charitas unit Deo animam, ut ultimo fini supernaturali, estque essentialiter virtus et forma virtutum, et hoc modo imperfectio essentialis ei repugnat. Potest autem esse imperfecta accidentaliter, idque, dupliciter. Primo quoad statum, et hoc modo dicitur charitas imperfecta eo ipso, quod non est conjuncta actualiter et immobiliter suo ultimo fini: et hoc modo verum est charitatem animarum Purgatorii esse imperfectam, id est, non consummatam, sicut de gratia dictum est. De qua imperfectione videtur loquutus Paulus ad Philippenses 3. dicens, 'Non quod jam perfectus sim:' nam subdit: 'Sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam.' Non tamen inde fit posse augeri, quia est in supposito, quod jam est extra statum merendi. Unde alio modo potest charitas esse imperfecta, quia non habet totam intensionem, quam in tali subjecto habere potest, et debet: et sic charitas illarum animarum imperfecta non est, sed perfecta, sicut de gratia dictum est: eadem enim est utriusque ratio."
Intelligitur c) an animae illae dicendae sint esse in termino vel in via. "Simpliciter enim non sunt in termino, quem nondum possident, et quoad hanc negationem sunt in via, et quoad aptitudinem solvendi debitum alicujus poenae per satispassionem, item quoad statum fidei: absolute tamen non sunt in via, sicut nos sumus, scilicet, quoad omnes conditiones, et effectus viatorum: sunt ergo veluti in statu medio. Dicique possunt esse in termino gratiae, nondum vero in termino gloriae."
Intelligitur d) quo sensu sit accipiendum illud Eccle. 11. 3.: "Si ceciderit lignum ad austrum aut ad aquilonem, in quocumque loco ceciderit, ibi erit," et alia similia ex Sacra Scriptura. Haec vera sunt de sorte definitiva; quoad hanc enim non datur medium inter paradisum et infernum, nec ullus est locus augendi post mortem gratiam, siquidem nullus amplius est locus merito; sed inde non excluditur status poenalis purgationis temporariae. Sane textus citatus desumitur ex V. T.; at in V. T., uti ipsi Protestantes agnoscunt, tertius locus extitit, videlicet limbus Patrum, in quo justi ad tempus detinebantur.
Intelligitur e) quomodo sint accipienda quaedam effata Patrum. Cum enim aliqui asserunt nullam dari in altera vita remissionem peccatorum, nullumque esse poenitentiae locum; agunt de peccatis mortalibus, et de remissione poenae aeternae. (Vid. S. Joan. Chrys. hom. 2. de Lazaro.) - Cum dicunt peccata remissa non obesse post mortem, significant non obesse ad beatitudinem ultimo consequendam, quin tamen excludant eam posse differri. Quod si aliqui, ut S. Augustinus (Enchirid. cap. 79.) videntur ancipites esse de futuris purgatorii poenis, loquuntur potius de earum natura et indole; ipsam enim existentiam alicujus poenae temporalis pro aliquibus post mortem, apertissime iidem Patres, uti S. Augustinus (de Civitate Dei lib. 21. c. 13.) docent.
687. From these things it is understood a) in what sense souls in purgatory have consummated grace. "Grace can be called consummated in two ways," Suarez teaches, same place, disputation 47, section 2, nos. 4 and 5: "first, because it is now actually joined to its end, which is to be consummated through operation; and in this way those souls do not have consummated grace, because they are not joined to God through clear vision, nor do they possess him, as we suppose from what has been said above concerning the place of purgatory; hence they still know him through faith alone. But in another way grace can be called consummated as to the intensity which it can or ought to have in such a subject; as heat is said to be at its highest when it has all the degrees of its intensity, and in this sense it must be said that those souls have consummated grace. For it can never grow in intensity in such a subject; for in the instant of death it had all the degrees which a man in this life merited by some title, but afterward he can neither merit nor operate more intensely than the habits themselves are able to operate in a connatural mode."
It is understood b) in what sense the charity of souls in purgatory is perfect or imperfect. "For charity can be called imperfect essentially, and in this way no charity is imperfect if it is true, according to that saying of 1 John 2, 'He who keeps his word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected.' For all charity unites the soul to God as to the supernatural last end, and is essentially virtue and the form of the virtues, and in this way essential imperfection is repugnant to it. But it can be imperfect accidentally, and that in two ways. First as to state; and in this way charity is called imperfect by the very fact that it is not actually and immovably joined to its last end; and in this way it is true that the charity of the souls of purgatory is imperfect, that is, not consummated, as was said concerning grace. Paul seems to speak of this imperfection to the Philippians, chapter 3, saying, 'Not that I am already perfect,' for he adds, 'But I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend.' Yet from this it does not follow that it can be increased, because it is in a subject which is already outside the state of meriting. Hence in another way charity can be imperfect because it does not have the whole intensity which it can and ought to have in such a subject; and thus the charity of those souls is not imperfect, but perfect, as was said concerning grace, for the same account belongs to both."
It is understood c) whether those souls are to be said to be in the terminus or on the way. "For simply they are not in the terminus, which they do not yet possess; and as to this negation they are on the way, and as to aptitude for paying the debt of some punishment through satisfaction-suffering, likewise as to the state of faith. Yet absolutely they are not on the way, as we are, namely as to all the conditions and effects of wayfarers. Therefore they are, as it were, in a middle state. And they can be said to be in the terminus of grace, but not yet in the terminus of glory."
It is understood d) in what sense that saying of Ecclesiastes 11:3 must be taken: "If the tree falls to the south or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there it will be," and other similar sayings from Sacred Scripture. These are true concerning definitive lot; for as to this there is no middle between paradise and hell, nor is there any place for increasing grace after death, since there is no further place for merit. But from this a penal state of temporary purgation is not excluded. Certainly the cited text is taken from the Old Testament; but in the Old Testament, as the Protestants themselves acknowledge, a third place existed, namely the limbo of the Fathers, in which the just were detained for a time.
It is understood e) how certain sayings of the Fathers are to be taken. For when some assert that no remission of sins is given in the other life and that there is no place for repentance, they are treating of mortal sins and of the remission of eternal punishment. See St. John Chrysostom, homily 2 on Lazarus. - When they say that remitted sins do not harm after death, they mean that they do not harm with respect to finally attaining beatitude, without thereby excluding that it can be delayed. But if some, such as St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 79, seem uncertain about future punishments of purgatory, they are speaking rather about their nature and character; for the same Fathers, such as St. Augustine in The City of God, book 21, chapter 13, most openly teach the very existence of some temporal punishment after death for some persons.
It is understood b) in what sense the charity of souls in purgatory is perfect or imperfect. "For charity can be called imperfect essentially, and in this way no charity is imperfect if it is true, according to that saying of 1 John 2, 'He who keeps his word, truly in him the charity of God is perfected.' For all charity unites the soul to God as to the supernatural last end, and is essentially virtue and the form of the virtues, and in this way essential imperfection is repugnant to it. But it can be imperfect accidentally, and that in two ways. First as to state; and in this way charity is called imperfect by the very fact that it is not actually and immovably joined to its last end; and in this way it is true that the charity of the souls of purgatory is imperfect, that is, not consummated, as was said concerning grace. Paul seems to speak of this imperfection to the Philippians, chapter 3, saying, 'Not that I am already perfect,' for he adds, 'But I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend.' Yet from this it does not follow that it can be increased, because it is in a subject which is already outside the state of meriting. Hence in another way charity can be imperfect because it does not have the whole intensity which it can and ought to have in such a subject; and thus the charity of those souls is not imperfect, but perfect, as was said concerning grace, for the same account belongs to both."
It is understood c) whether those souls are to be said to be in the terminus or on the way. "For simply they are not in the terminus, which they do not yet possess; and as to this negation they are on the way, and as to aptitude for paying the debt of some punishment through satisfaction-suffering, likewise as to the state of faith. Yet absolutely they are not on the way, as we are, namely as to all the conditions and effects of wayfarers. Therefore they are, as it were, in a middle state. And they can be said to be in the terminus of grace, but not yet in the terminus of glory."
It is understood d) in what sense that saying of Ecclesiastes 11:3 must be taken: "If the tree falls to the south or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there it will be," and other similar sayings from Sacred Scripture. These are true concerning definitive lot; for as to this there is no middle between paradise and hell, nor is there any place for increasing grace after death, since there is no further place for merit. But from this a penal state of temporary purgation is not excluded. Certainly the cited text is taken from the Old Testament; but in the Old Testament, as the Protestants themselves acknowledge, a third place existed, namely the limbo of the Fathers, in which the just were detained for a time.
It is understood e) how certain sayings of the Fathers are to be taken. For when some assert that no remission of sins is given in the other life and that there is no place for repentance, they are treating of mortal sins and of the remission of eternal punishment. See St. John Chrysostom, homily 2 on Lazarus. - When they say that remitted sins do not harm after death, they mean that they do not harm with respect to finally attaining beatitude, without thereby excluding that it can be delayed. But if some, such as St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 79, seem uncertain about future punishments of purgatory, they are speaking rather about their nature and character; for the same Fathers, such as St. Augustine in The City of God, book 21, chapter 13, most openly teach the very existence of some temporal punishment after death for some persons.
688. His ergo positis.
688. Therefore, these things having been posited.