Article 7. On the Obstinacy of the Damned, and the Mitigation of Punishment

664. For a fuller knowledge of the state of the damned, we add here a few things concerning their obstination in evil and concerning the mitigation of punishment.

§ I.

On the obstination of the damned in evil.

665. The obstination of the will of the damned in evil imports two things. 1. That they can never exercise salutary repentance, and always remain in the sin on account of which they incurred damnation. - 2. That they never have an act morally good, nor can they ever be without every evil act.

666. And indeed the first effect of obstination is openly handed down a) in the Scriptures. Thus Psalm 87:12 and following reads: "Will anyone recount your mercy in the sepulcher, and your truth in perdition? Will your wonders be known in darkness, and your justice in the land of forgetfulness?" - Psalm 113:26: "The dead shall not praise you, O Lord, nor all who descend into hell." - Isaiah 38:18: "For hell shall not confess you, nor death praise you: those who descend into the pit shall not expect your truth." Luke 13:24-25: "Strive to enter through the narrow gate, because many, I say to you, will seek to enter and will not be able. But when the master of the house has entered and has shut the door, you will begin to stand outside and to knock at the door, saying: Lord, open to us; and answering he will say to you: I do not know whence you are, etc."

b) It is also handed down by the Fathers. St. Clement of Rome, 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians, no. 8, says: "Let us do repentance while we are in this world and have the time for repenting; for if we shall have departed from this life, neither confession nor repentance has a place." St. Pacian, in Paraenesis and Penance: "Remember, brethren, that among those below there is no exomologesis, nor will repentance then be able to be granted, when the time for repenting has been consumed." - St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 18: "Only in this life do we have the prescribed time of repentance and remission of sins." - St. Jerome, against Helvidius, no. 3: "If we shall have said that Helvidius, before he did repentance, was overtaken by death, it does not follow that he did repentance after death, since there is not there a place for repentance." - St. Augustine, book on heresies, no. 43: "For what Catholic Christian, learned or unlearned, would not vehemently shudder at that which Origen calls the purgation of the wicked, that is, that even those who finished this life in vices and crimes and sacrileges and impieties however great, even finally the devil himself and his angels, although after very long times, are purged and liberated and restored to the kingdom of God and the light? ... Concerning this most vain impiety against the philosophers, from whom Origen learned these things, I disputed most diligently in the books of The City of God, book 21, chapter 24."

c) Moreover, it is plainly evident from those things which we have said concerning the eternity of punishments.

667. But the second effect of obstination is evident from the unanimous consensus of Theologians. "In the damned," says St. Thomas, Supplement, question 98, article 1, corpus, "a twofold will can be considered, namely deliberative will and natural will. The natural will indeed is not in them from themselves, but from the author of nature, who placed in nature this inclination which is called natural will. Hence, since nature remains in them, according to this there will be able to be in them a good natural will. But the deliberative will is in them from themselves, according as it is in their power to be inclined by affection to this or that; and such a will is in them only evil: and this is so because they are perfectly turned away from the last end of right will, nor can any will be good except through order to the aforesaid end. Hence even if they will some good, nevertheless they do not will it well, so that from this their will could be called good."

668. But what, then, is the cause of the obstination of the damned in evil? a) All agree that the first effect of obstination is from God himself. "From God indeed," says St. Thomas, De veritate, question 24, article 10, "not as making or conserving malice, but as not bestowing grace. For it is just that those who refused to will well while they were able should be led down to this misery, that they cannot will well at all."

b) Likewise all agree that God not bestowing grace is not the only cause of obstination.

c) But they do not equally agree with regard to assigning another cause of obstination. For St. Thomas, De veritate, question 24, article 10, teaches 1. concerning the angels: "In an angel sin cannot be from passion, because passion exists only in the sensible part of the soul, which angels do not have. Hence in the sin of an angel only two things concur: namely a habitual inclination into sin, and a false estimation of the cognitive power concerning the particular object of choice. But since in angels there is not a multitude of appetitive powers, as there is in men, when their appetite tends toward something, it is totally inclined into it, so that there is not in it any inclination inducing toward the contrary. But because they do not have reason, but intellect, whatever they judge, they receive by an intelligible mode. But what is received intelligibly is received irreversibly, as when someone receives that every whole is greater than its part. Hence angels cannot lay aside the estimation which they once receive, whether it is true or false."

2. He thinks that the condition of the separated soul will be similar to the condition of the Angels. Hence in the same place, article 11, he says: "That some man," he says, "in the state of the way cannot be so obstinate in evil that he cannot cooperate toward his liberation, the reason is clear: because passion is both dissolved and repressed, and habit does not totally corrupt the soul, and reason does not cling to the false so pertinaciously that it cannot be led away by contrary reason. But after the state of the way the separated soul does not understand by receiving from the senses, nor will it be in the act of sensible appetitive powers, and thus the separated soul is conformed to an angel both as to the mode of understanding and as to the indivisibility of appetite, which were the causes of obstination in the sinning angel; hence by the same reason there will be obstination in the separated soul. But in the resurrection the body will follow the condition of the soul; and therefore the soul will not return to the state in which it now is, in which it necessarily receives from the body, although it uses bodily instruments; and so then the same cause of obstination will remain." See also Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 95.

Suarez, on the contrary, in On Angels, book 8, chapter 11, judges that the obstination of demons and of all the damned arises from the miserable condition of the state, joined with the natural condition and fragility of the created will, left only to its own powers, without any gratuitous or moral help, as I may say, of God, with only the general, quasi-physical influence of God for operating.

In order to explain and confirm this, he notes 1. that the damned always have in the intellect some acts concerning objects very disagreeable to them, and of themselves exciting vehement sadness and pain.

2. That they always have memory of past evils for which they are punished, or of past goods of which because of sins they are perpetually deprived.

3. That the same condition is discerned in the perpetual cognition and, as it were, sensation of that penal action of the fire to which they are perpetually subjected, as we shall see later. And so they are compelled always actually to consider and, as I may say, vitally to feel and perceive that punishment, and at the same time by the same necessity they see their own baseness, both of fault, because of which they are thus punished, and of punishment and deformity, which they suffer from the fire.

4. That the damned always and necessarily have some acts of will by which they are especially afflicted: one is sadness concerning goods lost, and especially concerning lost beatitude; and besides this, that quasi-sensible pain resulting from the perception of that evil which they suffer from the fire.

5. That another act by which the damned spirit is especially afflicted is despair of escaping those punishments or obtaining a diminution of them. Because, as Bernard said, "The damned man for eternity will not obtain what he wills, and what he does not will, he will nevertheless endure for eternity."

6. That from the bitterness of pain and sadness together with desperation, impatience with great disturbance of mind arises.

7. That just as from the vision of God there follows in the blessed a most confirmed love of him, so in the damned from the consideration of their misery there follows a most obstinate hatred of God, by which they pursue him perpetually as an enemy; because the damned apprehend God only in the effects of his justice which they experience in themselves, namely because, exiled from the kingdom, they are tormented in exile by perpetual tortures. Hence it happens that they think of him under the aspect of one who torments and inflicts the highest evil, and therefore they hold him in most obstinate hatred.

8. Hence he concludes: "Therefore from this perpetual depraved disposition of the intellect and will of the demon, by a certain natural necessity it happens that in all his other acts he operates perversely." Compare the whole cited chapter.

669. You will say I: Not every will of the damned seems to be evil; for it is said of the rich man in Luke 16 that he prayed for his brothers, lest they come into the place of torments; but this will seems to be good. Therefore.

I answer with St. Thomas, Supplement, question 98, article 4, reply to 1: "There will be so much envy in the damned that they will envy even the glory of relatives, since they themselves are in the greatest misery, as this also happens in this life when envy increases. Yet nevertheless they will envy relatives less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their relatives were damned and others were saved. And from this it was that the rich man asked that his brothers be snatched from damnation. For he knew that some would be snatched away; nevertheless he would have preferred his brothers to be damned with all the others."

670. You will say II: At least the damned do not seem to sin through their constantly evil will; for from what has been said they seem to be in an inability of doing good. But no one sins in that which he can in no way avoid.

I answer with St. Thomas, who, after he had stated that the will of the damned is immovably turned away from the last end, adds in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 95: "On the last end depends the whole goodness or malice of the will; because whatever goods someone wills in order to a good end, he wills well; but whatever evils he wills in order to an evil end, he wills evilly. Therefore the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from one thing willed to another thing willed, with the order to the same last end nevertheless preserved. From this it appears that such immobility of the will is not repugnant to free choice, whose act is to choose. For choice concerns those things which are toward the end, not the last end. Therefore, just as it is not repugnant to free choice that by an immovable will we desire beatitude and flee misery in common, so it will not be contrary to free choice that the will is immovably borne toward something determinate as toward the last end; because just as now the common nature, through which we desire beatitude in common, immovably inheres in us, so also that special disposition through which this or that is desired as the last end will remain immovably."

671. Although, however, the damned constantly sin, nevertheless they do not demerit, according to the very common opinion of the Doctors; for they are not in the state of the way. See St. Thomas, Supplement, question 88, article 6.

§ II.

On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.

672. The question can be raised concerning essential punishment and concerning accidental punishment. - The mitigation of essential punishment can be understood in two ways: either insofar as there are established certain times, like holidays, in which the damned have rest, and thus there is intermission and interruption in their punishment; or insofar as, although the punishments are never interrupted, they are at some time lessened in bitterness and intensity.

673. Now it is the common doctrine of Theologians, which some even call proximate to faith, that among the damned there is no intermission or diminution of essential punishment. This is evident

a) From Scripture. Apocalypse 14:11 says: "And the smoke of their torments shall ascend forever and ever: nor do those who have adored the beast have rest day and night." Luke 16:25 and following: "Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, that he may cool my tongue, because I am tormented in this flame. And Abraham said to him: Son, remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus likewise evil things; but now he is consoled here, while you are tormented." - Mark 9 says that the damned "do not have rest day and night."

b) From the Fathers. St. Cyprian, in the Epistle to Demetrianus, says concerning the punishments of the damned: "Nor will there be anything by which the torments can ever have either rest or end." - St. Bernard, book 1, On the Soul to Hugh: "Exiled far from the blessed homeland of Paradise, they will be tormented in perpetual gehenna, never to see light, never to obtain refreshment ... where neither he who torments grows weary, nor he who is tormented ever dies." - Hence they commonly teach that one must not pray for the damned.

c) From reason. In the damned nothing will ever be diminished of fault; therefore nothing will ever be remitted of punishment: for God leaves nothing disordered. See St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 45, question 2, article 2.

674. But with regard to accidental punishment, all agree that some accidental punishment can be mitigated, increased, or removed until the day of judgment. But the difficulty is 1. with regard to the punishment owed to venial sins; 2. with regard to the punishment owed to sins already remitted.

675. With regard to the first. It can certainly happen that the damned, together with lethal sin, have venial sin; but the punishment owed to this is not eternal. Therefore is the punishment of the damned diminished, insofar as after an interval of time they will no longer suffer the punishment owed to venial sins?

Scotus affirms this; but St. Thomas denies it, in question 7 On Evil, and teaches that the punishment of venial sin in the damned will be eternal by accident. For although the punishment owed in itself to venial sin is temporal, nevertheless by reason of the state in the damned it will be eternal. He proves this as follows: punishment will last as long as fault lasts; but venial fault will always last in the damned. Therefore. - Proof of the minor. The remission of fault in the present providence cannot take place except through the application of the merits of Christ; but to the damned, who are not members of Christ, his merits cannot be applied. Therefore.

676. With regard to the second. St. Thomas, on book 4, distinction 22, question 1, article 4, reply to 5, says: "The venial is punished eternally in hell for this reason, that it always remains, since there is nothing there which can wipe away fault; but punishment is expiated from the very fact that it is paid. And therefore others say that the punishment of which someone is a debtor after fault has been remitted will be punished temporally in hell. Nor does it follow on account of this that there is redemption in hell, because punishment which is paid is not redeemed. It is not unfitting that as to something accidental, the punishment of hell is diminished until the day of judgment, just as it is also increased."

677. Here lastly it can be asked whether one must pray for the damned.

Petavius, On Angels, book 3, chapter 8, observes that some Fathers went into the affirmative opinion, but only perhaps St. John Chrysostom and Prudentius seem to have favored it; for St. Augustine does not assert it, but permits it. Hence the cited Author concludes that the aforesaid opinion should not be rejected as absurd, although he grants that it is foreign to the common sense of Catholics.

Nevertheless, according to the common authority of the Fathers and Theologians, it must altogether be held that suffrages for the dead do not profit the damned. For

a) The suffrages of the living can profit the dead to the extent that they are members of the same mystical body of Christ, and therefore capable of receiving mercy through the merits of Christ. But the damned in no way belong to the mystical body of Christ. Therefore.

b) Hence St. Augustine, The City of God, book 21, chapter 24: "This therefore is the cause by which it happens that now the Church does not pray for the evil angels, whom she knows to be her enemies; the very same cause is that by which it will happen that in that judgment then, even for men to be tormented with eternal fire, although she is perfected in sanctity, she will not pray." - St. Gregory, Moralia, as cited by St. Thomas: "The saints in this life intercede for enemies for this reason, that they may be converted to God, while they still can be converted. For if it were known to us that they were foreknown unto death, we would not pray for them any more than for demons. And because after this life, for those departing without grace, there will be no time of conversion, no prayer will be made for them, either by the Church militant or by the Church triumphant."

c) And St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 45, question 2, article 2: "The aforesaid opinion, nevertheless, that suffrages profit the damned, is presumptuous, as contrary to the sayings of the Saints, supported by no authority, and nevertheless irrational: both because the damned in hell are outside the bond of charity, according to which the works of the living are continued to the dead, and because they have totally arrived at the terminus of the way, receiving their final retribution according to merits, just like the Saints who are in the fatherland." - But see Gotti, tractate 16, on universal judgment, doubt 3.