§1. Flight is either stratagematic or genuine. We are treating the latter, which is twofold: that of the whole army or that of a part. I shall explain the whole class by a few propositions.
Proposition I. When danger threatens the whole army in a just war, it is better to fight with heroic courage than to flee, because there is great disgrace in flight. Judas Maccabaeus is an example, 1 Maccabees 9, from verse 6:
“And they saw the multitude of the army, that they were many, and they were greatly afraid; and many withdrew themselves from the camp, and there remained of them only eight hundred men. And Judas saw that his army had slipped away and that the battle pressed hard upon him, and he was broken in heart because he had no time to gather them, and he was disheartened. And he said to those who remained: ‘Let us arise and go against our adversaries, if we shall be able to fight against them.’ And they tried to turn him aside, saying: ‘We shall not be able. Rather, let us save our lives now and return to our brethren, and then we shall fight against them; but we are few.’ And Judas said: ‘Far be it from us to do this thing, that we should flee from them; and if our time has drawn near, let us die courageously for our brethren, and let us not bring a charge against our glory.’”
Judas acted most bravely, and Nicolaus Serarius, a learned and equally pious man, defends him excellently. But it is asked whether he acted rightly in casting himself into so great a danger when he had so few men. I answer that he acted rightly, since he performed a work of heroic courage; and he rightly undertook it because he knew that great forces of the enemy had often been routed by a few with divine aid, and he himself had experienced it. For how great were the armies which Abraham, Gideon, Jonathan, David, and others led out to encounter hostile forces? Heroic courage does not enter the common and well-worn road of courage, but rather the steep and more difficult one, trusting more in God’s strength than in its own.
And so, above, 2 Maccabees, the final chapter, verse 7: “But Maccabaeus always trusted with every hope that assistance would be present for him from the Lord.” And in the same place, verse 9, he addressed them from the Law and the Prophets, reminding them also of the contests which they had previously accomplished; or, as it is still more forceful in Greek, προσυπομνήσας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας οὓς ἦσαν ἐκτετελεκότες, bringing back to their memory also those very grievous contests which they had completed. Therefore, himself recalling all these same things to his own memory, and at the same time those magnificent promises made in the Law and the Prophets—of which Deuteronomy 28 speaks, and this book above in chapter 3, verses 18 and 19, and chapter 4, verse 8—the most valiant hero thus rushed against the enemy. Judas preferred to die in battle rather than appear to have refused battle, lest he appear to have hoped too little in God. His own glory also pertained to the glory of God.
Proposition II. Although this courage is most praiseworthy, a prudent commander can nevertheless deny the enemy an opportunity to fight and can even withdraw inferior forces, lest he engage an unequal enemy. For that caution harms the state less than a headlong battle does. Nor is danger prudently undergone when the hope of victory is slight. Therefore, one must do what Antigonus used to do, who preferred utility to empty glory; for while yielding ground he used to say that he was seeking the victory placed behind him. It is indeed more honorable to do this by declining battle, but if the army can be withdrawn without danger, it can be done even in the battle itself.
These things concern genuine flight, for feigned flight is praiseworthy, as when Paulus Aemilius pretended to be afraid until the Ligurians, after rashly attacking his camp, were cut down. Fimbria appeared so thoroughly to fear the son of Mithridates that the latter’s horsemen, after advancing within the narrow passages of the defenses, exposed six thousand of their number to slaughter. Livius asked Hasdrubal to permit him to depart unharmed; by this pretense he led the enemy into a sense of security and cut him down. When Caesar, coming with two legions to Cicero’s assistance, pretended to be afraid and held back his soldier, he caused the Gauls to approach the camp without caution and consequently killed them while they were out of formation.
The deed of Aristides of Elea was excellent. Dionysius was attacking Caulonia; Aristides displayed a reinforcement of twelve triremes. But when Dionysius opposed fifteen to him, Aristides withdrew as though afraid and at night kindled torches which the fleet of Dionysius followed. He gradually set other torches upon great pieces of cork and released them into the sea; then, withdrawing on an oblique course, he reached Caulonia while Dionysius followed the torches.
If the whole army genuinely flees, let it be collected, strengthened, and fortified as quickly as possible, and let ambushes be prepared for the enemy. If one part has been routed and the other has conquered, let the victorious part claim the victory for itself and make every provision so that it may be able to set an ambush; for then the enemy is exposed and feels secure.
Proposition III. It is never fitting for a commander to decree that the army should hurl itself away in a headlong rout after its ranks have been dissolved. For in battle a few perish; in flight almost all perish. The battle between Campson and Selim was famous. Men fell on both sides, but flight carried off more than the battle.
Proposition IV. A soldier is not permitted to flee for as long as the ranks remain, or the standard, the commander, or the centurion stands firm, even if he sees himself in the most immediate danger of death. For he promised this by oath. Therefore, if he flees, he is perjured. Next, he pledged his fidelity to the public good: by fleeing he betrays the state; by fighting and dying he preserves it.
Proposition V. If the standards have been captured, if a great part of the army flees, and if there is no hope at all in resisting, a soldier can flee. For he would die without any public utility, whereas a man who flees can fight again: ἀνὴρ ὁ φεύγων πάλιν μαχήσεται.
§2. It is commonly said as a proverb that there is greater art in fleeing than in fighting; but to flee ingeniously and to pursue victory elsewhere is praiseworthy.
Flight by stratagem is not cowardice, but industry, as I have said.
Plans for flight, therefore, are salutary when necessity causes it. Tryphon scattered gold so that the soldiers would be delayed. Sertorius and Viriathus wished their soldiers to scatter and to assemble at an appointed place. Many are saved in this manner; for if the enemy also scatters his men, he will do so at peril, and once the soldiers have assembled they will easily be able to harm him while he is dispersed. Those in pursuit, however, never scatter unless they wish to lose the victory. Callicratides pursued Conon with triremes, but when Conon saw that the fleet had been drawn apart, he raised the signal, attacked his pursuers, and defeated them.
When Afranius, fleeing Caesar, could not escape, he fortified a camp. When Caesar did the same and sent men out to forage, Afranius set out on his journey. This was great dexterity, and all the more distinguished because it deceived Caesar.
When Antony was being harassed by the Parthians in the morning, he delayed until the fifth hour. The Parthians, already tired and supposing that he would remain on that day, went back to tend their bodies; he completed a full day’s march during the remainder of the day without interruption.
Philip, defeated in Epirus, sought a truce for burying the dead and thus escaped, abusing a pretense of piety for the preservation of the living.
The Carthaginians, defeated at sea, pretended that they were stuck in shallows and did everything that men who are stuck customarily do. The Romans turned aside because they supposed the places to be shallow and gave space to the fugitives. For, to the fugitives’ very great advantage, the enemy avoided the very places through which they themselves were fleeing.
Titus Vastus placed an effigy in his bed and fled while the guards watched over the effigy. Polybius, book 8.
Nicon deceived the enemy by covering his own ship in the same manner as theirs.
Many, moreover, have employed the method of adapting the enemy’s insignia and clothing to themselves.
Demetrius of Phalerum escaped by hiding himself in a wagon filled with straw. It was a most wretched escape, but salutary in the worst circumstances.
When the enemy attacked his rear in a narrow road, the same man opposed all the wagons and set them on fire; he delayed the enemy until he escaped. Polyaenus, book 4.
Artemisia had two standards, a barbarian and a Greek one, and raised whichever of them was advantageous. Polyaenus, book 8. When she was in danger of being captured by the Greeks, she ordered the Persian standards to be taken down and made an attack upon a Persian ship; by this means she sailed away to Caria.
When Aegyptus knew that he was being sought, and that there were accordingly men lying in wait upon a ship, he told the shipmaster to go and seek Aegyptus, for it was now time to sail. On hearing this, the men lying in wait rushed into the city to seek him; he cut the cable and sailed away. Polyaenus, book 6.
When Themistocles had been carried to Ionia, he disclosed himself to the shipmaster and threatened that, unless he sailed away, he would say that the man had been hired for money to carry him off. Thus, through fear of an accusation, the shipmaster conveyed his country’s enemy to safety.
When Diotimus was fleeing with ten faster ships, he backed their sterns some distance into twenty Spartan vessels and sank them. Polyaenus, book 1.
When Eteonicus the Spartan was being besieged by the Athenians and heard that his own men had been defeated at Arginusae, he offered sacrifice as though at joyful news and ordered messengers wearing wreaths to go about. Consequently, the dismayed Athenians remained inactive. He escaped and led away his army. Of such importance is it to send messengers promptly. If Callicratides had perceived the matter before the Athenian commander, the war would have been brought to an end in both places. Eteonicus instilled error in the enemy and thus escaped.
When Brasidas and others were being enclosed by a rampart, they waited until the embankment had in fact been closed; and thus, in the narrow space, protected at the side and rear, they fought.
§3. It has been effected by various stratagems that the enemy should not pursue fugitives. Croesus delayed Cyrus from pursuing by means of flame. Polyaenus, book 7. Mithridates, while fleeing, placed the furnishings of a certain city in a public place; these delayed his pursuers so greatly that they refused to obey their commanders.
Frotho, king of the Danes, defeated by the English, delayed the victor by scattering money. The Gauls abandoned wagons laden with silk and other things and inflicted disaster upon the Caesarians while they contended over the booty. Antigonus likewise deceived the Gauls in this manner in ancient times, for avarice is exceedingly exposed to disasters.
Commius the Atrebatian is worthy of great praise. For, when defeated and fleeing Julius Caesar, he came to ships which stood upon dry ground. The wind was favorable, but the tide opposed him. He therefore ordered the sails to be spread; when Julius observed these from afar and supposed that Commius was departing with a favorable passage, he withdrew.
Iphicrates made a trench behind his soldiers so that they could not flee. But I believe it was rather so that they could not be surrounded from behind, for he was fighting with a small force against a great multitude; indeed, crossing the trench was not so very difficult.
§4. The protection of fugitives lies in concealing a defeat. Artabazus concealed his defeat while he crossed Thessaly. Some have deceived the enemy with fire.
Ammianus Marcellinus, when he could neither flee nor hide, sent a horse upon which he had placed a light across the plain to the right; while the Persians followed it, he himself escaped with his men to the left into the mountains.
It has also been a device of military cunning to give a public signal for flight, but meanwhile privately to warn the rear of the column to stand fast.
When Philip was being routed by the Thracians, he ordered the rear of the column to halt at the signal for flight, so that the others might occupy the road in advance. In slender hope, boldness is the safest course.
When Eumenes, fleeing from the Gauls, was carried in a litter, he ordered himself to be placed upon a hill. They suspected an ambush and desisted from pursuing.
§5. The flight of certain men has appeared ignoble, but nevertheless cunning.
Seleucus, fleeing from Cilicia, assumed the dress of an armor-bearer and performed that office for the commander Amyction. Niccolò Piccinino, enclosed in a sack, was carried through the midst of the enemy by his attendant Todeschino; when men asked what was being carried, the answer was “bread.” Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 3.
Lachares was fortunate in fleeing. At Thebes he hid up to his head in a sewer; at Sestos he went out with women mourning a dead man; at Athens he went out in a servant’s dress, with his face blackened, carrying a basket covered with dung. He then mounted a horse and delayed his pursuers by casting down darics. Bohemond, passing through the dominions of his enemy Alexius, caused himself to be carried in a coffin as though dead.
§6. When one must withdraw from the enemy because he is stronger, the first thing to be done is that it not be thought to occur through fear but through prudence; otherwise the soldiers flee. Next, everything must be done so that the enemy does not perceive the departure. Hence they are accustomed to place the cavalry at the opening, kindle fires at night, and feign battle. But one who has withdrawn far enough to cross a forest, mountains, or a river easily completes the rest of the journey; for, after stationing a garrison, he can delay the enemy until he has reached the appointed place. When the Greeks who had marched into Persia with Cyrus the Younger were being followed by the enemy, and consequently withdrew by night and pitched their camp farther away lest they be attacked in the darkness, the Greeks themselves set out by night and went so far ahead that the Persians first overtook them on the fourth day.
§7. The end of flight, however, is that they recover victory; of this Antigonus is a notable example. No one is easily found who recovered victory as nobly as that Antigonus of whom I have spoken. Polyaenus describes the matter in book 4.
Antigonus had one hundred and thirty ships, over which Nicanor presided. With these he engaged in a naval battle against Polyperchon’s fleet, which Cleitus commanded. The battle was joined in the Hellespont. Nicanor, after his men had been forced by inexperience into the opposing waves, lost seventy ships. Although the enemy plainly held victory in their hands, Antigonus arrived toward evening and did not fear the defeat he had suffered. Instead, he ordered those who remained in the other sixty ships to be ready and equipped for naval battle again during the night. He stationed the bravest of his attendants at the vessels and gave them instructions to threaten that they would bring death upon all who did not go forth into the battle.
And since the nearby city of Byzantium was joined to him by alliance and friendship, he ordered shield-bearing and light-armed soldiers and one thousand archers to be sent from there at once to handle the oars and to cast javelins and arrows into the enemy’s ships. These things were arranged in the course of one night. But when dawn began, while they were casting spears and darts upon the ships, and the enemy, not yet released from sleep but only then awakened, received wounds without precaution, some began breaking the cables, others drawing back the boarding-bridges, others raising the anchors—in brief, all began to raise shouting and tumult. Antigonus also gave the signal to the sixty ships to approach and make an assault with fury and force. Thus it immediately happened that, while some cast missiles from the shore and others brought hostile ships forward, the victors were overcome by the vanquished.
Parallel to this is the following deed of Sertorius. When Quintus Sertorius, military tribune under the praetor Didius, had his winter quarters in the city of Castulo, the people of Castulo received the enemy Gyrisaeni into the city by night, and together they began to attack and kill Sertorius’s men. On hearing the clamor, Sertorius secretly went out from the city with a few men, halted not far from the gate, and began to collect his fleeing men and arrange them in battle-line. When he now saw that he had collected a sufficiently large body, he reentered the city by the same gate through which the enemy had gone. He found them scattered into different places and intent upon plunder alone; and thus he routed them within a short time and put on their arms. Having drawn up his battle-line in this manner, under the appearance of the Gyrisaeni he hastened toward Gyrissa. There, since no one suspected anything and they supposed that their own men were returning, the gate-leaves were opened. Thus he took the city and plundered it completely, so that he abundantly repaid the enemy for the evil they had inflicted at Castulo. Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 4.
§8. Those who are sailing sometimes direct lights one way while they themselves keep a different course without a lamp. When Frederick Marabotto the Guelf was fleeing Auria and had already despaired of being able to escape, he advised his triremes by night where he intended to sail; then he placed a lamp upon a shield which was cast toward the shore. The enemy followed it and gave him the opportunity to escape. Fulgosius, book 7, chapter 4.