§ 1. The ancient Roman battle-line, as it seems to me, was certainly not established altogether advantageously. Livy, describing in book 8 the war between the Latins and the Romans, indicates that the younger and weaker men fought at the beginning. For the battle was especially like one in a civil war: so completely was there nothing among the Latins at variance with the Roman state except their courage.
Lipsius maintains that the hastati fought first in a stationary battle, and so it was done; for the light-armed soldiers ran forward. No account was taken of the velites. The reason why I think that the battle-line was not rightly established is that all the bravest men must be placed in the first line, so that they may overthrow or terrify the enemy at the first assault.
For there are two disadvantages in that battle-line. The first is that the war begins with the slaughter of the younger, poorly armed citizens. Once defeated, they withdrew; yet they were not defeated without slaughter, nor could they abandon their place and withdraw except under the utmost necessity, since death was the punishment for abandoning one’s place. The other disadvantage is that the enemy’s courage increased after he had routed the velites and hastati, and he pressed on all the more stoutly.
This certainly became evident in the Latin War, where the same battle-lines were on both sides: they could easily have been defeated if strong men had been opposed to the weak at the beginning. For when Manlius had ordered the accensi to run forward, the Latins suspected that they were the triarii, because the accensi were stationed behind the triarii. They therefore also roused their own men, who, while defeating and driving back the Romans in a fierce fight, became exhausted and had their spears broken or blunted. Manlius finally sent the triarii against these men and conquered.
But if he had sent the triarii out together with the accensi, he would have saved many citizens whom he allowed to be killed and defeated up to that point, until the enemy, wearied out, was exposed to fresh troops. Numisius, commander of the Latins, gives no false account of how great a slaughter occurred. He affirmed that Mars had indeed been impartial in the war; that both battle-lines had been laid low with equal slaughter; that only the name of victory was in the possession of the Romans, but that in every other respect they too bore the fortune of the vanquished; that both praetoria of the consuls were marked by death, one by the parricide of a son and the other by the slaughter of the devoted consul; that the whole army had been cut to pieces; that the hastati and principes had been slain; that slaughter had been wrought both before and behind the standards; and that at last the triarii had restored the situation.
But if they had strained against the enemy with all their strength at the beginning and preserved their youth, the Latins would by no means have thought of renewing the war. Yet, as I advised above, the leading men held the populace cheap and did not take it ill that the multitude of the poor should be exhausted through wars. The Turk now acts in the same manner in storming cities and in battles: he casts an unwarlike crowd before the enemy to be torn to pieces, until, when the enemy is weary with killing, he sends in the Janissaries.
Antiquity also approved my opinion. Homer places the weak in the middle of the battle-line and the strong in its first and last parts, with the best judgment: so that the enemy may be broken by the first assault; so that those in the middle may be incited by those before them and compelled by those behind; and so that they may be unable to flee. It must not be doubted that Homer speaks from the usage of ancient times; but he places the strong at the front:
Ἱππῆας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισι καὶ ὄχεσφιν, πεζοὺς δ’ ἐξόπιθε στῆσεν πολέας τε καὶ ἐσθλούς, ἕρκος ἔμεν πολέμοιο· κακοὺς δ’ ἐς μέσσον ἔλασσεν.
He placed the cavalry with their horses and chariots at the front. At the rear he placed many brave infantrymen as a wall of war, and he cast the weak into the middle. Certainly the cavalry and chariot-drivers were a principal part of warfare.
Next, it was anciently so among the Romans that the richest men, who were likewise the best armed, fought in the first battle-line, and the poorest in the last. Lipsius, book 4 of The Roman Military, dialogue 2. For after Dionysius had stated the property-rating and arms of the first class, he added:
χώραν δὲ κατεῖχεν αὐτοῖς πολέμοις τὴν προηγουμένην ὅλης τῆς φάλαγγος·
it occupied the first place in wars and stood before the entire remaining force. Again, concerning the second:
ἐκοσμεῖτο αὐτοῖς ἀγῶσι μετὰ τοὺς προμάχους·
it was drawn up in the battle-line after the foremost fighters. Concerning the third likewise:
χώρα καὶ τάξις τούτων ἐν ταῖς μάχαις μετὰ τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας τοῖς προμάχοις·
their place and station in battles was beside those who stood behind the principes. Finally, concerning the fourth:
τάξιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὴν ὑστάτην·
it held the last place in contests. What, then, of the fifth class, Dionysius?
τούτοις ἔξω τάξεως ἔταξε στρατεύεσθαι·
he says that he ordered them to serve outside the line of battle. Afterward, at the trial of Coriolanus, he repeats the same things in nearly the same number of words. I have adduced these passages at greater length so that the origin and order of ancient military service, and the manner in which it gradually changed, may be established once for all.
Accordingly, by the ordinance of Servius all the richest men were in the first battle-line. This is why Varro derived the name principes from the front, and asserted that they had anciently fought with swords from the beginning. The others followed in order of wealth, and at the extreme rear were finally the meaner and poorer men and those who fought with light missiles.
But who were those Quintiani outside the order? They were the accensi, according to Livy, and each was not even a regular soldier. These things were so in ancient times; but when experience and reason had shown that many features in that order deserved condemnation, they changed it over time. For what reason is there to expose all the best and richest men to dangers by placing them in the first battle-line? They were unwilling to do so and placed the principes in the second position.
Let it be permissible for me to agree with the ancients and to dissent from Lipsius—not because I approve the Servian order, but because I think that men who will fight bravely, rather than merely die, must be placed in the first battle-line. At the end, however, I would have a strong reserve placed for every contingency. Yet I would add velites, archers, and slingers to the front, but in such a manner that strong men protect them in stationary combat.
Later writers changed the places of the principes and hastati. Vegetius, book 2, chapter 20: “The combatants in the first battle-line were called principes; in the second, hastati.” And in book 1, chapter 15: “The first battle-line was of the principes, the second of the hastati.” Lipsius holds that this began under Trajan or Hadrian. Very rightly indeed, for now the battle-line was arranged according to equity and merit, not according to the caprice of the patricians. The order which history exhibits after the expulsion of the kings was the earlier one.
Now let the manner in which a battle-line must be formed when battle is imminent be explained by the example of a single legion; if need requires, it may be transferred to several. The cavalry is placed on the wings. The battle-line of the infantry begins to be arranged from the first cohort on the right wing. The second cohort is joined to it. The third cohort is placed in the middle of the battle-line. The fourth is attached to it. The fifth cohort occupies the left wing. But those fighting before the standards, around the standards, and also in the first battle-line are called principes, that is, regulars, and the rest are called principales.
This was the heavy infantry. They had helmets, cuirasses, greaves, shields, larger swords which they called spathae, and other, smaller swords which they called semispathae. They had five lead-weighted darts placed in their shields, which they cast at the first assault. They likewise had two missiles. The larger had a triangular iron head nine inches long and a shaft five and one-half feet long. They called it the pilum; it is now called the spiculum. The soldiers were especially trained to cast it, because when directed with skill and force it often pierced both shield-bearing infantrymen and armored cavalrymen. The other was smaller, with a triangular iron head five inches long and a shaft three and one-half feet long. It was then called the verriculum and is now called the verutum.
The first battle-line of the principes and the second of the hastati are taught to be equipped with such arms. After them were the ferentarii and the light infantry, whom we now call auxiliaries and light-armed troops: shield-bearing men equipped with lead-weighted darts, swords, and missiles, just as nearly all soldiers now appear to be armed. There were also archers with helmets, cuirasses, swords, arrows, and bows. There were slingers who cast stones with slings or staff-slings. There were also crossbowmen who discharged arrows from hand-ballistae or crossbows.
The second battle-line was more lightly armed; the soldiers standing in it were called hastati. In the second battle-line, however, the sixth cohort was placed on the right wing, and the seventh was joined to it. The eighth cohort held the center, with the ninth accompanying it. The tenth cohort always held the left wing in the second battle-line.
Scipio, the distinguished commander, teaches this; Lipsius also agrees with him in book 4, dialogue 6. Scipio employed it in Spain. After observing for several days that the enemy’s battle-line was arranged with the best men in the middle and the weaker on the wings, he formed his own in the opposite manner and placed the auxiliaries in the middle, but the citizens and all the strength on the wings.
Finally, two supreme commanders, Caesar and Pompey, showed how much it matters that strong men be in the first battle-line. Caesar placed his strongest legions at the front in the battle-line at Pharsalus. Caesar himself, thus preserving the arrangement stated above, had placed the Tenth Legion on the right wing and the Ninth on the left, although it had been severely reduced in the battles at Dyrrachium. He joined the Eighth to it in such a manner that he made almost one legion from the two and had ordered each to serve as a protection for the other.
He had eighty cohorts in the battle-line, the total of which was 22,000 men. He had placed Antony over the left wing, Publius Sulla over the right, and Gnaeus Domitius over the center; he himself took his position opposite Pompey. At the same time, having observed the circumstances which we have explained, and fearing that the right wing would be surrounded by the multitude of cavalry, he swiftly drew individual cohorts from the third line and formed from them a fourth line.
Pompey acted in the same manner, as Caesar relates in book 3 of The Civil War: “When Caesar had approached Pompey’s camp, he observed that Pompey’s battle-line was arranged in the following manner. On the left wing were the two legions delivered by Caesar under the decree of the Senate at the beginning of the dissension, one of which was called the First and the other the Third; Pompey himself was in that place. Scipio held the middle of the battle-line with the Syrian legions. The Cilician legion, joined with the Spanish cohorts which, as we have shown, had been brought over by Afranius, was placed on the right wing. Pompey considered these to be his strongest troops. He had interspersed the rest between the center and the wings and had filled out one hundred and ten cohorts; these amounted to fifty-five thousand men. There were about two thousand evocati, whom he had dispersed throughout the whole battle-line.”
Frontinus, book 2, says that Pompey placed the legions on the wings and in the center according to the valor of each and filled the intervening spaces with recruits. Thus he willed that the strongest should be first.
§ 2. It must be considered, first of all, that few men fight in a great battle: in a legion only one hundred fight simultaneously, except that when the first men have cast their spears, they sink down upon their knees and others cast theirs. This must be done especially when the enemy is superior in number, for he can easily be conquered by a few when the action takes place in narrow or rugged places. Those few must therefore be brave, so that they may inflict slaughter.
The Roman battle-line is accurately presented both by many writers and especially by Lipsius. According to Lipsius the battle-line among the Romans did not vary greatly, and it was generally either double or triple. It was double when the whole battle-line was divided into two wings, the right and the left. This arrangement very often prevailed in a consular army, when there were two legions and their own auxiliaries were joined to each. It is certain that this division was ancient and was employed by other nations as well. Polyainos indeed attributes its invention to Pan:
Διονύσου στρατηγὸς ἦν ὁ Πάν, ὅτι πρῶτος τάξιν εὗρεν, ὠνόμασε φάλαγγα, κέρας ἔταξε δεξιὸν καὶ λαιόν· ταύτῃ τοι ἄρα κερασφόρον τὸν Πᾶνα δημιουργοῦσι.
Pan was the commander of Dionysus, or Bacchus, in military affairs. He first discovered an order of battle, named the phalanx, and established a right and left wing. From this they commonly depict Pan with horns. To seek out and set down a few examples of this disposition among the Romans would be to take drops from a bucket: there are six hundred of them.
It is triple when, besides the wings, another division also rises up in the middle. This too is frequent, not only when there are several legions but even when there are two—these being placed in the middle, with the allies at each wing. The matter is clear in itself, and the examples readily present themselves.
But there is also another method of a double and triple battle-line: in addition to that simple division, a separation and distinction are also made in the rear. Thus, if I have four legions, I place two in front with their allies and set the same number behind them, as reserves. The same was also done with two legions: either each wing of allies—or ala, if you prefer—was placed in front with the legions attached behind, or the reverse.
See the matter in Livy, in the battle of Marcellus against Hannibal: “The fighting continued for more than two hours. Then the right wing and the extraordinarii on the Roman side began to give ground. When Marcellus saw this, he brought the Eighteenth Legion into the first battle-line. While some gave way in alarm and others came up sluggishly, the whole battle-line was thrown into disorder.” Again, concerning the same Marcellus in another battle: “The battle long remained undecided, inclining to neither side. The Third Legion took the place of the First, and the left wing that of the right.”
There are also examples of the legions themselves disposed in this way. In Livy: “The praetor’s legions were in the first battle-line; Cornelius held his own in reserve.” Elsewhere: “Sempronius led his own legions into the first battle-line; the legions of Publius Licinius were stationed in reserve.” And there are more.
These legions or forces placed in the second or third position were called reserves or reserve forces. Livy again: “When the Twelfth Legion, which was on the left wing, gave ground, he brought the Thirteenth Legion from the reserves into the first battle-line as a support.” Sallust: “There, after changing the ranks, on the right side, which was nearest the enemy, he formed the battle-line with three lines of reserves.” Entire legions were not always substituted in this manner, but sometimes a number of cohorts. Livy: “He immediately sent the reserve cohorts, which were being preserved intact for the contingencies of a longer battle, into the first line.”
The following verses of Tibullus to Messalla pertain to these dispositions:
If there is need, let the battle-line stand as a square column, so that the straight order may advance with fronts made equal; or if it please you to behold a double Mars or a joined one, so that you, a soldier, may hold the left with the right and the right with the left, and so that the victory in a twofold event may itself be twofold.
He produces what he calls a varied aspect of battle. First comes the simple square formation, with a straight front; second, the double formation with a wing on each side; third, the joined formation, which I called triple, namely, one formation joined to the other two. For in this manner what is said here occurred: the soldier on the left sees with his own right the left side of the middle body, and the soldier on the right sees with his own left the right side of that same middle body. Look at it, and you will understand.
But what follows delays this interpretation, or rather calls it back: “and so that the victory in a twofold event may itself be twofold.” For thus, in a triple battle-line, the victory and the event would be not double but triple. Does he therefore understand by “joined” the battle-line attached below and doubled, of which we spoke, so that one line is placed behind another? This is what I think. In either formation, certainly, a man sees with his right the left of the wing placed beside him, and conversely.
Nor would I object if the text were written: “to behold a double, separated Mars,” so that he names only two dispositions: the simple, undivided square, and this one separated into two wings. The sense is easy in this way.
These are the principal and accepted formations among the Romans, although they varied them slightly by advancing or withdrawing them. Examples will teach what I mean. For generally they charged equally with each wing and at the same time. Cato, in Festus, called this “with a straight front”; Tibullus, in the verses cited, “with fronts made equal.” Vegetius says on this subject: “One manner of fighting is with a long front and the army squared, just as even now battle is customarily conducted almost always.”
The second manner of fighting is oblique, when one wing is advanced before the other. The Greek tacticians write:
Λοξὴ φάλαγξ, ἣ τὸ μὲν κέρας ἕτερον, ὁπότερον ἂν προηγῆται, πλησίον τῶν πολεμίων ἔχουσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιουμένη, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἐν ἀποστάσει δι’ ὑποστολῆς ἔχουσα.
An oblique phalanx is one which brings one wing—whichever has been designated—nearer to the enemy and conducts the battle upon it, but holds the other at a distance by withdrawing it.
Vegetius writes concerning this kind: “The second manner of fighting is oblique and is far better. Its method is as follows. When the battle-lines have been formed and come to the encounter, you will then separate your left wing”—he means the wing and soon afterward calls it so—“farther from the enemy’s right, so that neither missiles nor arrows reach it. But join your right wing to his left wing, and there first begin the battle.”
But he wishes battle to be joined from the right side only, not likewise from the left. He condemns the latter because, as he says, “the assault is then as though maimed, and men whose bodies are exposed attack the enemy with difficulty.” He advises well in view of the ancient armor. For if you advance your left wing against the enemy’s right, you plainly expose your uncovered side to the enemy, who will safely attack it with missiles or arrows from his own left. This is what Vegetius means when he says that exposed men then attack the enemy, because shields are of course carried on the left. Whoever sought another cause and referred it to the weakness of the left-hand parts assuredly understood neither Vegetius nor the matter.
Caesar fought Ariovistus by this method. Although he had formed a triple battle-line, he nevertheless “joined battle from the right wing”—these are his words—because he had observed that this part of the enemy was least strong.
The third kind occurs when, in a triple battle-line, you withdraw the third and middle body from the enemy and send in only the wings. Seneca touches upon it: “Just as the same army at one time is spread out more widely, at another is contracted into a narrow space, and is either curved into wings while the middle part is recessed, or extended with a straight front.”
Scipio employed this in Spain. After observing for several days that the enemy’s battle-line was formed with the best men in the middle and the weaker on the wings, he arranged his own in the contrary manner and placed the auxiliaries in the middle, but the citizens and all the strength on the wings. “When the time for beginning the battle had now come,” Livy says, “he ordered the Spaniards”—this was the middle battle-line—“to advance at a slow pace. He himself sent a messenger from the right wing to Silanus and Marcius, ordering them to extend the wing on the left side in the same manner as they saw him extending his on the right, and with the light infantry and cavalry to join battle before the middle battle-lines could meet one another. When the wings had been drawn apart in this manner, there was a hollow in the middle, because the standards of the Spaniards advanced more slowly.”
This foresight and formation gave certain victory, because the strongest met the weakest, while the others, awaiting their own enemy, remained idle in the middle and were finally terrified by the flight and slaughter of other men.
The fourth kind is contrary to this, namely, when the middle battle-line itself projects and charges the enemy first. The Greeks call it bent, ἐπικαμπής, or also convex, κυρτόν. Aelian writes:
Ἐπικαμπὴς συμβαίνει ἡ τάξις, ἐπὰν τὰ μέσα τοῖς πολεμίοις προσπίπτῃ, τὰ δὲ κέρατα ἐκ τῶν ὀπίσω μερῶν ὄρθια ὑφ’ ἑαυτὴν ἔχῃ τεταγμένα.
A formation is called bent when its middle falls upon the enemy, while it has its wings placed straight behind it. Hannibal used this most skillfully in the battle of Cannae, but with this additional art: he made his wings exceedingly strong and preserved them intact; then, after the middle had been driven back and a hollow had been formed, he sent the wings in from both sides against the legions, thereby establishing a certain cause of his victory.
How useful it would be for our commanders to consider and employ such things! I believe that they will gradually do so, as I see the native ability and training of certain men who are now growing up.
§ 3. This battle-line, therefore, was customarily divided into wings when there were two legions and auxiliaries, which held the extreme wings.
§ 4. Sometimes two legions were in front with the allies, while two were placed in the rear. Thus Livy, book 27.
§ 5. Sometimes the battle-line is crescent-shaped, with the wings projecting on both sides, such as that of Scipio.
In this battle-line Vegetius approves an oblique movement, so that battle is fought first against the enemy’s left wing; for in this manner the attacking wing will rise up more vigorously and be less exposed.
§ 6. Contrary to this is the formation in which the wings are drawn back and the middle advances.
Hannibal defeated the Romans in this manner at Cannae, but only after he had conquered in the cavalry battle. Livy, book 22: “Toward the end of the cavalry contest the battle of the infantry began. At first the ranks of the Gauls and Spaniards held together both in strength and courage. At length the Romans, after long and repeated exertions, drove back with an oblique front and a dense line the enemy’s wedge, which was too thin and therefore insufficiently strong and which projected from the rest of the battle-line. Then, as the enemy were driven back and retreated in alarm, the Romans pressed upon them and were carried in one continuous advance through the headlong column of fugitives, first into the middle battle-line and finally, with no one resisting them, reached the African reserves.
“These had stood with their wings drawn back on both sides, while the Gauls and Spaniards stood in the middle and their line projected somewhat. When this wedge had been driven back, it first made the front level; then, by continuing to give ground, it even produced a hollow in the middle. The Africans had already made wings around it. When the Romans rushed incautiously into the middle, the Africans surrounded them with their wings; then, by extending the wings, they also closed the enemy in from the rear. From this point the Romans, having to no purpose completed one battle and lost the Gauls and Spaniards whose rear ranks they had cut down, entered into a fresh battle against the Africans—not only an unequal one because they were enclosed against enemies surrounding them, but also because, exhausted, they fought against fresh and vigorous men.”
§ 7. In ancient times great account was taken of reserves. Vegetius, book 3, chapter 17: “The best method, however, and one which contributes very greatly to victory, is for the commander to have behind the battle-line, prepared in reserve, the most select infantrymen and cavalrymen, together with deputies, companions, and tribunes who are free of other duties—some around the wings, others around the middle. Wherever the enemy presses more violently, they should suddenly rush forward, lest the battle-line be broken, and fill the places; and by adding valor, they should break the enemy’s audacity.
“The Laconians first discovered this. The Carthaginians imitated them, and afterward the Romans preserved it everywhere. No better disposition is found than this. For the straight battle-line must attempt this alone, if it can: to repel or rout the enemy. If a cuneus, or wedge, must be driven forward, or a forfex, or shears, you must have men behind the battle-line from whom you may form the wedge or shears. If a serra, or saw, must be drawn out, it will likewise be drawn from the surplus troops. For if you begin to transfer a regular soldier from his place, you will throw the whole formation into disorder.
“If a detached globus, or compact body, of the enemy begins to press either your wing or any part, unless you have surplus men whom you can oppose to the body, whether you remove infantry or cavalry from the battle-line, while you seek to protect one place you will expose another to greater danger. But if you do not abound in a multitude of fighting men, it is better to have a shorter battle-line, provided that you place a very large number in reserve. For near the middle parts of the field you ought to have the most select men from among the well-armed infantry, from whom you may form a wedge and immediately break the enemy’s battle-line. Around the wings, moreover, it is fitting for you to surround the enemy’s wings with cavalrymen armed with lances and cuirasses and reserved for this purpose, and with light infantry.”
At the beginning the Gauls had an assault more than manly; afterward, as they languished, one less than womanly, because without order and discipline they expended everything upon the first attempt. When their arms failed them, they fell. Indeed, this is true of most enemies: wars that are strong in their first assault vanish through delays.
§ 8. The greatest care must be given to forming the battle-line. For just as stones heaped together at random do not contain water and do not make a wall, so even the bravest men cannot withstand an enemy assault unless they are arranged in the best manner. Accordingly, Nestor, the wisest of the Greeks, forms the battle-line in Iliad 4. Pyrrhus excelled in this art, and Hannibal gave Scipio the first place in it. Hence kings were called λαῶν κοσμήτορες, “arrangers of peoples.”
§ 9. Writers command that the battle-line be formed first, because this appears more courageous and because one can do it more conveniently. I think otherwise when the camp is fortified or when you cannot be compelled to battle: form your line second. For you see the enemy’s order, which is a great advantage, and he is compelled to wait for you while armed. You will add courage to your own men if they think that you are arranging them prudently; this will also be so because the enemy follows your movement, if you are cheerful.
One must observe whether the adversary is swift and rash; for then such men will easily be conquered, because the man who stands first in battle-line is less able to act. Since the man who first takes his position in the battle-line cannot easily withdraw, he is compelled to await the other. When Hasdrubal had led out his army without food, Scipio commanded his own men to rest and take food. At the seventh hour, when the enemy was returning to camp because of hunger, thirst, and weariness, he led out his forces and conquered.
§ 10. It matters greatly on what side you attack in battle. When Scipio had Spaniards on his right wing and Hanno had Africans on his left, Scipio attacked the left wing; after defeating the Africans, he received into surrender the Spaniards, who were fighting for a foreign dominion. When Philip saw that the front of the Illyrians was strong and their wings weak, he attacked the wings and routed them.
Pammenes the Theban acted more dangerously. When he saw that the strongest Persians were on their right wing, he placed weak men opposite them on his own left and ordered them to flee, but with his own right wing he attacked and defeated the enemy’s left. For he had ordered the men on his left to withdraw into rugged places.
The man who forms his battle-line second chooses on what side he will attack and whom he will oppose to whom. The arrangement of a battle-line therefore cannot be determined once for all, much less can the same intervals always be used. It must be disposed according to practical need, according to what the enemy does, or according to what one can advantageously do oneself.
When Scipio saw that Hannibal had eighty elephants, he established open ranks with large intervals, so that he could receive and elude the beasts without harm. When Archelaus had an abundance of chariots, Sulla fixed stakes so that they would be caught. He made open ranks and sent cavalrymen through them, who threw the battle-line into disorder.
§ 11. Sometimes it is better to form the battle-line first in order to inspire terror, but this has no place except against the inexperienced. Thus, when the Turks were about to fight at sea against Don John of Austria, they persuaded themselves that the Christians would flee as soon as they saw the fleet. Otherwise it is best to see what the enemy is doing, so that you may place obstacles in his way.
In the same manner, when Hirtuleius had brought his soldiers up to the rampart of Metellus Pius on a sweltering day, Metellus held his own men back until the sixth hour and then defeated the enemy when they had been exhausted by the heat.