§ 1. This matter must be considered generally; for in certain wars cavalry is scarcely of any use, while in others cavalry accomplishes everything. When cities in mountainous places, or beside rivers and seas, are besieged, and when the contest is conducted by siegeworks, cavalry is not of great use. We are speaking, therefore, of war and battle, in which I affirm that the man who abounds in cavalry will easily become superior.
There are many reasons. First, the man who is preeminent in cavalry holds both his own territory and that of the enemy in his power. He conveys supplies freely, prevents all excursions and foraging expeditions by the enemy, and keeps him, as it were, in loose confinement. The Ottomans place the whole hope of their kingdom in the timariots, who constitute their cavalry and are able to harm the enemy especially when, in a great number which no one can resist, they rush into hostile land and in one assault produce the devastation of a full-scale war. The Tartars, and formerly the Huns, were very powerful through the same means.
It makes no difference to the argument that, as men say, heavy expenses must be incurred for cavalry; for a smaller number of infantrymen ought rather to be selected, and the expenses are compensated by the speed of the war. The expense can also be diminished if the cavalry become accustomed to live from enemy territory, which is easy for those who are superior.
In assaults upon cities and other stationary engagements, cavalrymen were also accustomed to dismount and fight as infantry. With the present license of soldiers, however, a commander will hardly accomplish this. But when a storm of cavalry was hurled forward in battle, the enemy quickly sought flight. In battles themselves, when cavalrymen are compelled to give ground, the infantrymen, as though abandoned, look only to flight.