§ 1. Those who govern any single kingdom, however large, if a war should arise with an equal or a more powerful enemy, ought themselves, as kings, to preside over it and administer everything. For the presence of a good king carries very great weight; and deservedly did Antigonus say to a helmsman who warned him about the multitude of the enemy: “ἐμὲ δὲ αὐτὸν παρόντα πρὸς πόσους ἀντιτάττεις;”—“But I myself, present here—before how many do you place me?” Augustus discharged not only the office of commander but also that of soldier; and in the midst of an engagement, when the eagle-bearer of his legion had been gravely wounded, he took the eagle upon his shoulders and carried it for a long time. The first signal advantage of the royal presence is that it carries with it the supreme right of fighting and of changing everything according to the occasion. For where the supreme commander is, there the present opportunity can be met; where he is not, many things must be sought from elsewhere.
§ 2. Otherwise a king will make his commanders more powerful than himself; since they have the army in their hands and are experienced, they can easily bring an unwarlike prince into subjection. Examples of many commanders who cast kings down from the throne show this. For when victory is attributed not to kings but to their ministers, it is dangerous for kings to have powerful, spirited, and popular commanders of war.
§ 3. Let him be present at a battle in which the whole issue is decided; in lesser engagements let war be waged through his commanders. Sarbaras admired Heraclius: “How boldly,” he said, “he stands for battle, and alone contends against a multitude, and like an anvil beats back the missiles.” This can be done under necessity; otherwise one must never allow the army to be placed in peril in the person of one man. Augustus, as seemed good, either took part in wars or conducted them through his commanders. Suetonius, The Deified Augustus: “Of foreign wars he personally conducted only two in all: the Dalmatian, while still a young man; and, after Antony had been defeated, the Cantabrian. In the Dalmatian war too he received wounds: in one battle he was struck on the right knee by a stone, and in another both his leg and both arms were injured by the fall of a bridge. The remaining wars he administered through his legates, yet in such a manner that in certain Pannonian and German wars he either intervened or was not far away, advancing from the city as far as Ravenna, Milan, or Aquileia.” Since, therefore, he ought to take part in battles rarely and without danger, much less does it befit him to put himself upon the road with a few men and reconnoiter the enemy. Theodosius did this when, accompanied by cavalry, he found the enemy—with the greatest boldness, indeed, but also with the greatest danger.
§ 4. If ever the king descends into the battle line, he must be subject to the doubtful chances of battles. Let him therefore either be protected by a guard in some place, or be in a neighboring city. Thus it was done in 2 Kings 18:2: “And the king said to the people, ‘I too will go out with you.’ And the people answered, ‘You shall not go out; for if we flee, it will not greatly concern them about us; or if half of us should fall, they will not care enough, because you alone are reckoned as ten thousand. It is therefore better that you be a protection to us in the city.’”
Writers also blame, not without reason, the rashness of Alexander, because he was accustomed to take part in every battle and to fight with his own hand in the front line. Now, because of the uncertain missiles of engines, much greater care must be taken that he not be wounded in whom lies the danger of all. The saying was more glorious than prudent:
First to enter the battle with his hand, last to cease from the fight.
And:
βασιλεὺς τ’ ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ’ αἰχμητής.
A good king and a mighty warrior.
This is to be desired when necessity requires it; otherwise dangers ought not to be summoned against the king, who is the heart of the battle, any more than against the heart itself. In other matters let him maintain equality. Let it be unknown whether a commander or a soldier is marching; let him show that he endures labors, not merely command them. In this matter be cautious. Antoninus Caracalla furnished an example of a good prince, although he lacked constancy in the same conduct. Nevertheless, I judge that the things Herodian writes about him ought to be adopted by a good commander: “He himself,” Herodian says, “readily performed every duty of military service whatsoever. If anything had to be dug, he was the first to dig; if a bridge had to be laid over a river, an embankment built, any work of the hands performed, or any labor undergone, he was the first to undertake everything. He was content with a meager table, little wooden cups, and vessels for food; he even ate bread made without care. For he was accustomed to take as much wheat as sufficed for one man, grind it with his own hand, make a lump from it, bake it upon the coals, and eat it. In short, he disdained everything more elegant and used only the cheapest things, such as were most readily available even to the poorest common soldier. Then he preferred to be called fellow soldier rather than prince; he generally made the journey as though himself traveling on foot, and only rarely mounted a vehicle or horse. He carried his own arms himself. Sometimes he even took upon his shoulders the longest military standards, very heavy with many golden ornaments and difficult to carry even for the strongest soldiers.”
Trajan too always made the journey on foot with the soldiers and by that affability brought it about that a soldier never mutinied against him, as Dio attests. For the soldier is wonderfully kindled to labor when he sees his labors honored by the emperor’s sharing in them.
§ 5. Finally, he avoids the disadvantages which arise from the command of others in wars. Machiavelli correctly enumerates them, but reaches a wholly wicked and impious conclusion. I shall transcribe his words, book 1, chapter 30: “If any prince wishes to avoid occasions for suspicions of this kind, lest he be compelled to be ungrateful toward his own men for their benefits, he must himself take part in conducting affairs, as the first Roman emperors formerly did, and as in our own age the Turk and other princes of distinguished virtue are accustomed to do. For if they are present and conduct the affair splendidly and prosperously, all praise and glory belongs to them. If, while absent, they conduct the affair well through others, then, because the chief praise seems to rest with the man who took part in the business, they think that they cannot enjoy the victory gained according to the judgment of their own mind unless they extinguish the glory of the man through whom the affair was so well conducted; and in this way they become unjust and ungrateful. And although they themselves seem to gain glory from those whom they offend in this manner, nevertheless, if anyone weighs the matter diligently, he will find that they lose more than they gain.
“Although this is so, nevertheless it cannot happen otherwise than that all who through imprudence or negligence remain idle at home, but entrust the administration of affairs to other commanders of theirs, fall into errors of this kind. Nor is there any method of helping them so that they are not borne in the direction in which nature leads them. But the military commander who, after an affair has been splendidly conducted, wishes to avoid his prince’s ingratitude must do one of two things. For after he has obtained the victory, he must either immediately hand the army over to another and commit himself as a suppliant to the protection of his prince, and restrain all pride and ambition in himself. By this method alone will he be able to soothe the prince’s mind, so that the prince can suspect nothing concerning him but has manifest cause for rewarding rather than injuring him.
“Or, if he does not wish to do this, let him know that he will have an ungrateful prince. He has a single defense by which to protect himself against ingratitude: he must reserve to himself with a courageous spirit the victory he has gained and show that it does not belong to the prince; he must either win over to himself the affections of the soldiers and the chief commanders of the army, or, if there are some whom he cannot win over by kindness, remove them from his path for the sake of protecting himself; contract friendships with neighboring peoples; successively occupy the more fortified places; and strengthen them with garrisons. By this method he will be able to repay an ungrateful disposition in kind. These alone are the methods by which a deserving citizen can take care that he is not oppressed by an ungrateful lord. But because it is so arranged that men do not know how to be either altogether good or outstandingly evil, they know neither how to return the army immediately after the victory has been gained, nor how to conduct themselves modestly and humbly, nor how to employ a certain outstanding and magnificent wickedness. And so, wavering between two extremes, they are crushed.”
The first counsel certainly appears safe and is in truth just: that he who has gained the victory should return the army to the man under whose auspices he served. Hundreds of commanders do this today and have done it; but I do not advise them to cast themselves down and become wretched lest they provoke envy. For by that counterfeit modesty of theirs they reproach the prince for his faintheartedness and envy, and offend him more grievously. The second counsel is not only wicked and seditious but also rash. For that outstanding and magnificent wickedness scarcely ever attains a good end. Since the army is well disposed toward the prince, and since noble and military men do not at once change the religious obligation of their oath, he will not be able in a single moment to make them all deserters. And from where will provisions and money be supplied? Consequently, defections of commanders of that kind are rare today; for they can scarcely occur in a well-constituted state if the measures I advised above are observed.
§ 6. No one would readily believe how greatly the presence of the emperor wins men’s affections. Tacitus, on Galba: “It was resolved that he should go into the camp; this would be honorable to the soldiers, whose favor, just as it is badly acquired by largess and canvassing, ought not to be disdained when gained through good arts.” In this manner there is, most especially, one emperor; for the others depend upon the supreme king and upon others, and are compelled to have their counsels approved by others.
But there is one emperor. Three tribunes with consular power, when each formerly strove toward his own counsels, opened an opportunity to the enemy.
One emperor, moreover, treats matters with few men, and therefore more secret affairs are kept secret, and silence, the foundation of all good counsels, is preserved.
Discuss with many what ought to be done; with the very fewest—or rather with yourself alone—what you are going to do. When Metellus was asked what he was going to do on the following day, he answered that he would burn his tunic if it could disclose the matter.
§ 7. They esteemed the presence of a commander so highly that at times they led not only the unwarlike but even infants into battle.
The Macedonians placed their infant king in his cradle in the front line and conquered the Illyrians. Pity for King Clothar likewise made the Franks brave when they saw the infant, hanging from his mother’s breasts, going before them.
The kings of the Persians were not accustomed to take part in battle, although Darius stood against Alexander. It is excessive if a commander is now exposed to blows when the safety of the army is placed in peril in him, or if, should he be captured, the kingdom is burdened by the expense. This happened to France under Francis.
In the year 1381 the Muscovite besieged Neuhusium, a fortress of Livonia, with three hundred thousand men; the prefect of the fortress pierced the commander’s heart with an arrow, and the whole army was put to flight. Through commanders Justinian, Charles VI, king of France, the kings of Spain, and formerly Augustus brought very many wars to completion. A king has more duties than that he ought to be occupied with the labors of a commander, unless the danger is great.