§1
The law of Solon has been discussed by many; Gellius relates it: “If, because of discord and dissension, a sedition and division of the people into two parties should occur, and if on that account, their spirits being inflamed, arms should be taken up on both sides and fighting should occur, then whoever at that time and in that case of civil discord has not joined himself to either party, but, solitary and separated, has withdrawn from the common evil of the city, let him be deprived of his home, his native country, and all his fortunes; let him be an exile and an outcast.” Others believe entirely the contrary: that in civil wars and sedition one should withdraw from disturbances.
§2
In this difficult matter, which nevertheless often occurs in practice, it seems to me that a distinction must be employed: a distinction of persons and controversies, which must be discussed individually.
§3
Sometimes seditions are stirred up in such a manner that it is doubtful which party fosters the legitimate cause. The people secede and free those bound for debt, but they have been stirred up by the patricians contrary to law and covenants. There was a long controversy concerning the war of Caesar and Pompey. “The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated cause pleased Cato.” Accordingly, a man defends himself by a great judge, and even under the reign of the Caesars later generations were Pompeians:
Still Magnus goes, an exile, with peoples accompanying him; let the world adore Pompey’s adversity as much as his prosperity.
In this controversy, therefore, it was prudent to be absent from the disturbances. Pomponius Atticus acted thus, more illustrious for his friendship with Cicero than for any other thing. The reason is at hand. For when a war is of doubtful justice, it is not lawful for a free man to enroll in it unless he judges the cause of one party to be just. This is permitted much less in a sedition and civil war, for it is more atrocious to oppress citizens than foreigners. Atticus therefore acted rightly.
Justus Lipsius is almost of the same opinion, century 2, Letter 24. But he says that he does not involve himself, yet he does not define the matter. In book 6 of the Politics, chapter 7, he also employs a distinction. Therefore, although every war is sorrowful, and civil war especially, nevertheless at times it must be waged through necessity. Yet civil war must be avoided more than foreign war because it is more cruel.
I demonstrated this at the beginning. Now I am pleased to confirm it by Augustine’s testimony, so that it may appear how rightly those men judge who flee civil war while they can. Augustine, book 3 of The City of God, chapter 23:
“But now let us recall briefly, so far as we can, those evils which, the more internal they were, the more wretched they proved to be: civil—or rather uncivil—discords; and no longer seditions, but even actual urban wars, where so much blood was poured out; where the zeal of parties raged against one another, no longer through the dissensions of contentions and diverse voices, but now plainly with iron and arms. How much Roman blood did the Social Wars, the Servile Wars, and the Civil Wars pour out? How great a devastation and desolation of Italy did they produce?
“For before allied Latium moved itself against Rome, all animals subject to human uses—dogs, horses, asses, oxen, and whatever other cattle were under human dominion—suddenly became wild and, forgetting their domestic gentleness, left their shelters and wandered free. They shunned every approach not only of other men but even of their masters, not without the death or danger of the man who dared, if anyone pressed them from close at hand. Of how great an evil was this a sign? And if this was a sign, how great an evil was that of which this was the sign? If this had occurred in our times, we would have suffered these men as more rabid than those men suffered their animals.”
It is by no means the part of a good citizen to stir up or assist such great evils in a doubtful cause. So many fell in the war of Marius and Sulla, so many in peace, and yet it is still disputed whose cause was more just. The aristocrats defend Sulla, the plebs Marius; both parties detest the cruelty of each, and they mourn the deaths of their own people.
§4
It is also the part of a good man to abstain from civil controversies, although he perceives the just cause of one party, if the other party maintains an unjust cause but itself probably judges that cause to be just, and if he sees that the victory will be very bloody and the disaster greater than the offense—a thing ordinary in civil wars. Therefore, although Sulla defended a just cause—let us grant that this was so—nevertheless good men who approved the victory shuddered at the cruelty. A man is not bound to fight in Sulla’s camp, nor to promote a victory whose companion is such great cruelty and a greater evil than the war itself. For since the Marians judged that they were properly conducting the public cause, they must not be destroyed by such great slaughter that scarcely any remain over whom the Sullans may rule.
In this affair a man can indeed abstain, but he is not bound to abstain, because he can assist the legitimate cause. But if he is in a magistracy, if he will bring great weight to the victory, and if he observes that Marius will use victory cruelly, he ought not to withdraw assistance from the just cause. Therefore, if Atticus judged the Pompeian party to be the Roman and just party, he ought to have joined Pompey; if he doubted, neither party.
§5
If one party openly maintains a wicked cause, either by protecting wicked men and robbers or by oppressing good men, so that they themselves confess that they do not act without crime, it is the part of a good man to join the upright party and the just cause; and, if called by his native country, to fight, although he sees that the outcomes of victory will be most sorrowful and cruel.
When the children of Israel had decreed war against the tribe of Benjamin, Judges 20, they ordered the men of Gibeah who had perpetrated that evil to be handed over to them. After they had conquered, they killed the inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead because they had not been present at the war. For at Mizpah they had bound themselves by a great oath to kill those who were absent. The cause of the civil war was that the Benjaminites were unwilling to surrender the wicked men for punishment. All were compelled to the war under penalty of death. They killed all the citizens of Jabesh-Gilead, chapter 21:10: “They therefore sent ten thousand of their strongest men and commanded them: ‘Go and strike the inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead with the edge of the sword, both their wives and their little children.’”
Indeed, they killed all the Benjaminites, together with wives, little children, women, and beasts, chapter 20. Although, therefore, the victory was most sorrowful—and, unless God, who had determined to punish the crimes of the Benjaminites, had commanded it, most cruel—nevertheless no one could be absent from the civil war, because they punished the delayers and those who refused service in the same manner as the guilty. Moreover, those who willingly and knowingly maintain an impious cause through wickedness and injustice will deservedly impute to themselves all the cruelty of the victory.
§6
When causes for sedition exist on both sides, as in the Roman state—for example, the importunity of moneylenders and the obstinacy of the plebs demanding new account-books—although it is established on which side justice stands, it is nevertheless the part of a good man, so far as can be done, to join neither party, but to attempt peace and, as long as it is hoped for, to bring all assistance to that end. For peace is better than any war and any victory, since in civil war the victory is more miserable than the war.
If peace is despaired of, one must go over to those who maintain the right. But when the causes of seditions are exceedingly slight—such as some which we enumerated above—it is not necessary for anyone to join himself to the just cause, provided that he does not maintain the unjust cause. For to stir up sedition and begin a civil war for a slight cause is unjust. Then, however, a powerful citizen is bound to compel the parties to concord and to effect peace, and to take up arms against those who refuse to accede to equity and concord. For if honorable men, exasperated by a slight cause, should attempt a duel and eagerly seek mutual wounds, a prince can compel them to peace, and so too can their native country, so that he who obstinately resists is judged to have lost his cause. For it is unjust to ruin one’s native country on account of insignificant trifles.
§7
If there is a rebellion of one party against the prince or magistrate, or if treason is under consideration, one ought to join oneself to the magistrate and, each according to his ability, defend him by every means possible—by counsel, aid, and hand. For the man who does not come to the prince’s aid in necessity, but deserts him until he sees where the affair tends, is judged a traitor to the prince. Mettius Fufetius, prince of the Latins, did this when he deserted Tullus in the midst of the battle-line.
In this case Solon’s judgment is most true. For who would not judge worthy of every punishment the man who would not assist David against his son Absalom or against Sheba? It is plainly necessary for the members to expend their labor in defense of the head, for all have sworn to the defense of the prince. But each does this according to his ability: by zeal, contribution, fighting, and other means by which the life of the Prince may be provided for.
§8
But if subjects rise against the magistrate, many against a few, so that scarcely any hope exists that the better cause will be victorious—indeed, if the just party in the state fights against the unjust party in such a manner that it seems scarcely able to defend itself—a great difficulty arises. No one can join himself to the unjust party; adherence to the upright party carries a risk to life and fortunes. Therefore they ought not to assist the stronger, by whom they would be stained with the same crime, and they are unwilling to aid the weaker.
In this cause I judge thus. If there is someone who by his prudence, strength, and wealth can raise up the just party and obtain hope of victory, he ought to expend himself and his possessions upon liberating and establishing the state. Jehoiada acted thus: when he now hoped that he would be a match, he opposed Athaliah at immense peril and raised Joash to the kingdom. But as long as hope of victory does not yet appear, he will foster justice by counsel, admonitions, secret plans, and assistance, until there is hope that the just cause will triumph. Jehoiada did this same thing while he secretly reared the royal boy and prepared strength and men for him.
But if someone is a private man and cannot bring any weight to the relief of the state, he will not be bound to expose his fortunes and life to his enemies without any hope of public advantage. He will therefore remain quiet and foster the oppressed by prayers and secret assistance. For if he adds himself to the oppressed, he too will be oppressed; his wealth and capacity to assist will be taken away; and by this means the just party will be weaker and the unjust stronger.
This was done by many in the royal city of Aachen. Seditious men and rebels, through supreme wickedness, deprived the magistrate of authority; they were as contumacious against the Emperor’s commands as they were injurious toward the magistrate. But in domestic and foreign strength they far surpassed those who followed the just cause, and the grave oppression of all good men endured for more than twenty years. If anyone sent forth a free voice, calumnies, insults, prisons, exiles, and proscription were immediately before his eyes. At last the state was recovered by patience and the secret assistance of certain men and by the brave constancy of others. This could not have occurred if the weaker and fewer men had at the beginning opposed the stronger and more numerous with armed force; for in the first conflict they would all have been slaughtered.
§9
When matters stand thus in a state—that civil war is being waged and the justice of one party is established—it is almost always prudent to join that party. For the man who stands in the middle offends both parties. They judge themselves injured by him: they themselves defend the state at the peril of all their possessions, while those who maintain the middle neither undertake labors for the common good nor wish to make expenditures. Hence during the war they are prey to both parties, for each battle-line demands assistance from them as citizens for the defense of the city; after the victory they are victims of the victor.
Pomponius Atticus remained quiet while Caesar and Pompey fought; nevertheless, he felt the same losses of fortune as others. Had Pompey been victor, Atticus would not have been in a better condition than Cicero and the others who were in Pompey’s camp. Cicero, book 11, Letter 6 to Atticus: “I have never regretted that I departed from arms. There was such great cruelty among them and such great alliance with barbarous nations that a proscription was framed not by name but generally; so that it had already been determined by the judgment of all that the goods of all of you would be the spoil of that victory. I say ‘of you’ without qualification, for they never thought of you yourself except most cruelly. Therefore I shall never regret my intention; I regret my counsel.”
§10
When one party has been defeated in civil disaster, it is better for the remnants to defend themselves than to yield suddenly. Accordingly, Cato renewed the war in Africa—not indeed in hope of victory, but, as others judged, in hope of a settlement. Cicero, book 11, Letter 12 to Atticus: “But, as I see, we must labor much more concerning Africa, which you write is daily being strengthened more in hope of terms than of victory.” For in truth the new war in Africa and Spain mitigated Caesar’s victory, lest he render himself more hated.
For what Caesar’s disposition was, Caelius the Caesarian sufficiently indicates to Cicero, Letter 11, book 10 to Atticus: “If you judge that Caesar’s method in dismissing adversaries and offering terms will be the same, you err. He thinks and even speaks of nothing except what is atrocious and savage. He departed angry with the Senate. He has clearly been provoked by these intercessions. By Hercules, there will be no place for entreaty. Therefore remain there if your only son, if your household, if your remaining hopes are dear to you; if we are of any value with you, if your son-in-law, that excellent man, is of any value. You ought not to wish to disturb their fortune so that we may be compelled either to hate or abandon that cause in whose victory our safety lies, or to entertain an impious desire against your safety.”
If he had not feared the Spanish and African war, he would have exhibited himself in victory as the man whom Caelius depicts. And certainly he soon exhibited himself as proud and insulting toward all; nothing was lacking beyond cruelty arising from pride and suspicion.
§11
When civil wars have blazed up to such a point that barbarous nations are called to assistance with great danger, I judge that it is the part of a good man even to desert a just cause rather than assist those who summon barbarians. Cicero again did so, and gives his reason in Letter 7, book 11 to Atticus:
“But of all things nothing is nevertheless more regretted than that I did not go to Africa. I employed this judgment: that the state ought not to be defended by the barbarian auxiliaries of a most deceitful nation, especially against an army often victorious. Perhaps they do not approve. For I hear that many good men have come to Africa, and I know that they were there previously. I am greatly pressed at this point. Here too there is need of fortune, that there may be some among them—or, if possible, all—who prefer safety. For if they persevere and prevail, you see what will become of us.”
Therefore the Greek emperors who summoned the Turks to their aid against their rebels deservedly lost the empire. It is certainly better that some state should exist, even one belonging to adversaries, than that none should exist. At times fear, at times ambition, impels great men to those counsels: fear impelled Boniface; ambition impelled Rufinus, Stilicho, and others. Nor are examples among our own people lacking. Part of Hungary perished thus, and many have experienced this evil.
The Belgian rebels were indeed twice in the utmost danger of servitude: first when they summoned Alençon, then Leicester. The latter began to betray their liberty to the English, the former to the French. For this reason wiser statesmen soon turned themselves to every means of expelling both—Alençon by arms, Leicester by artifice; and if Leicester had not yielded, he would have felt their arms. But I do not speak of foreigners of every kind, but of barbarians, such as Turks, Tartars, and others, and of those equal to them in perfidy, impiety, and savagery. But now let us proceed to wars.