Chapter XX. The Defense of the Nobility Makes a Prince Powerful

§ 1. A question much debated both formerly and now is whether it is advantageous for a powerful prince to have no powerful prince beneath him, and to leave nobles and commoners undistinguished, so that the sole nobility is to have been honored by the king; or whether account is indeed to be taken of nobility by birth. Nor is the matter debated only in words, but is conducted in deed, as the disagreement of rulers shows. To leave other things unmentioned, in Europe most affairs are conducted through the nobility, and especially in Germany a strict distinction of marriages is observed. On the contrary, however, the emperor of the Turks holds even all the highest pashas as slaves, nor is any nobility acknowledged except being pleasing to the master—which is properly the good fortune of a slave. For since he belongs wholly to his master, both in use and in ownership, he can rely on nothing other than his master’s goodwill. This administration, therefore, has pleased many, and it has seemed safe that after the prince all should be slaves or equals, that no one should be accounted noble—a practice which obtains also among the Chinese. If there are no nobles, let none be made; if there are, let them gradually be reduced to the ordinary rank. I shall therefore also set forth my own opinion concerning this matter, so that it may be made clear what is to be followed amid these varieties of ruling.

A prince is not of great spirit if only ignoble and servile men attend him, nor is he of proven judgment if boorishness and stupidity win men a place among his ministers.

§ 2. I am not unaware that no Appian or Lentulan lineage is to be preferred to virtue, and that virtue is the sole and only nobility. We are all born with an equal lot; we are distinguished by virtue alone, as Minucius admonishes: “He who boasts of his lineage praises what belongs to others.” What is best is also noblest. Indeed Euripides rightly says:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες εὐγενεῖς, εἰσὶν κακοί.

Many nobles are wicked. Hence Nazianzen also says most excellently:

Κακὸς δ᾽ ἀκούων, αἰσχύνου, μηδὲ δυσγενής,

γένος γὰρ εἰσὶν οἱ πάλαι σεσηπότες.

If you hear yourself called wicked, blush; do not blush if you are called ignoble. For the lineage which is esteemed consists of those who rotted long ago—perhaps men who were thieves, adulterers, and robbers.

οὐδὲ ἵππον ταχὺν ποιεῖ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ταχυτάτων φῦναι.

Nor does descent from the swiftest make a horse swift.

Agapetus therefore gives a golden precept:

Ἐπὶ προγόνων εὐγενείᾳ μηδεὶς ἐναβρυνέσθω· πηλὸν γὰρ ἔχουσι πάντες τοῦ γένους προπάτορα· καὶ οἱ ἐν πορφύρᾳ καὶ βύσσῳ τρυφώμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἐν πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ τρυχώμενοι, καὶ οἱ διαδήματα περικείμενοι, καὶ οἱ διὰ δώματα προκείμενοι. μὴ τοίνυν εἰς πηλὸν καυχώμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ χρηστότητι σεμνυνώμεθα τρόπων.

Let no one insolently exalt himself on account of the nobility of his ancestors. For all have clay as the founder of their lineage: both those magnificently and gloriously clothed in purple and fine linen, and those worn down by poverty and diseases; both those upon whom diadems have been imposed, and those who are stationed before houses for the sake of guarding them. Let us therefore not boast of our clay-born lineage, but let us render ourselves venerable and commendable by innocence and uprightness of conduct.

And indeed Charlemagne preferred the nobility of virtue to smoke-blackened ancestral images; from this comes the nearly most ancient nobility of Germany—he preferred the former.

Henry Mutius, book 8 On German Affairs, and Aventinus, book 4 of the Annals of the Bavarians, report that the emperor entered the schools of Paris and, having learned that the poor were making great advances in their studies while the nobles languished in idleness, placed the former on his right, promised them bishoprics and civil dignities, and neglected the nobles—an action truly worthy of a king. For to what purpose is a boorish and idle nobility? There is need of prudence, labor, and vigor.

I therefore do not dispute how highly nobility is to be valued, but rather this point which pertains to the matter: whether it is advantageous for the nobility to be fostered and advanced to dignities while commoners are neglected, or whether the nobility ought instead to be pressed down, commoners raised on high, and all things made equal.

§ 3. In the Turkish state there are only distinctions of offices; all other conditions are servile, so much so that even the emperor’s concubines are not accounted free, and the principal strength rests with men of the lowest condition. In the Roman Empire, besides offices, there are hereditary or elective dignities.

The order of nobility is duke, count, baron, noble. I say of nobility, not of dignity or of offices. For the nobility of emperors can rank below that of a duke; furthermore, the dignity of electors and archdukes is not defined by nobility alone. The dignity of counts also varies: some are called counts simply, others margraves, others landgraves. From men noble by birth, and also from others, knights of the golden spur are made when they have conducted themselves bravely in battle; for then they attain that dignity. From these barons are made, in consideration of their virtues and power. One who conducted himself heroically in a first battle is created a noble; in a second, a military tribune; after a third, a baron. Then follow count, margrave, landgrave, duke, and king.

But what they say—that a noble must be wealthy and a knight still wealthier; that a military tribune ought to be able to lead forth at his own expense a troop of fifty nobles; that a baron must possess lower, middle, and basal jurisdiction, together with four castles of nobles; that a count-margrave must possess three baronies; that a landgrave must possess four baronies in one duchy; that a viscount, or princely count, must possess five counties; that a duke must possess four principal counties, and a county or barony annexed to each—this assuredly is not observed. A king is crowned if he has four contiguous duchies, and in each one four cities in which no one else possesses any right; in these cities one archbishop, and under four archbishops forty episcopal provinces. But—

—these things have been received neither by firm law nor by custom. Among these men there is no equality of nobility, for the emperor is the fountain of nobility, chapter De decurionibus, law Imperatores, and the lineage of dukes is greater than that of counts. Nobility is therefore, as it were, recognizability, too narrowly called by the Greeks εὐγένεια, because men are well-born; for a man can be noble who by virtue gave a beginning to his own stock, who has borne offices, or who without administration attained nobility through honorary codicils. Nor is nobility solely in descendants; rather, it is often better in its first root. For descendants sometimes possess nothing from their ancestors except their images, empty of virtues and deeds; their nobility is cheaper than seaweed to the ancient poet.

§ 4. Kings and princes must act so that they have lesser princes, petty rulers, counts, and nobles whose continual service they may employ at home and in war; for this is a firm defense of the state. When between the royal summit and the son of the maidservant who sits at the mill there is no one in the middle, there is a great gap advantageous to the enemy. My reasons, insofar as reasons can be given in these matters, are strong.

The first reason. This was the form of all rightly constituted states: that the nobility possessed its own dignity. For one who is engaged in the state and debates concerning it, this consideration ought to be of great weight. I am not establishing a Platonic or ideal city, but one such as can and customarily does exist.

Certainly, in Numbers 1:16 I read that men newly emerged from servitude were called most noble princes, קריאים, “called men”; and in Deuteronomy 1:15, nobles, וידעים, “known men.” Nobility therefore arose at once within the same nation and house. In 1 Samuel 9:6 a man is called ἔνδοξος, נכבד, honorable and weighty. So too Psalm 149:8; Job 14:21; Proverbs 31:23; Isaiah 3:5, 5:13, and 34:12; and Jeremiah 39:6. Indeed, Joseph too is praised as a noble councilor in Mark 15:43:

εὐσχήμων βουλευτής.

But let us not labor over the name. Whenever we hear of the princes of Israel, we ought to understand noblemen and leading men. There were also princes of Egypt of great dignity, and likewise those of the Persians, and before them of the Medes. The matter is clearer concerning the Roman state, which only late gave way to monarchy. Nebuchadnezzar, after living the life of a beast for seven years, was at last restored to his kingdom. “My leading men,” he says, “and magistrates sought me,” Daniel 4. Those who governed everything for seven years after their king had been lost were not of a servile disposition. The matter is established most clearly concerning the monarchy of the Medes from Daniel 6:12 and 15, and especially verse 7.

The kingdom of the Macedonians had many great princes and nobles. Nor was it generally otherwise in Greece, a region most fond of liberty. At Athens, as Plutarch relates in his Theseus, this distinction existed: for he named the nobles εὐπατρίδας and entrusted to them the care of discharging the magistracies. The nobility of Germany is the emperor’s one support; and, if there were concord, he could quickly obtain from it several thousand of the most select cavalrymen. Matters have reached such a point that even princes can accomplish nothing without the nobility. In Gaul they wage wars and administer the state; in Spain the principal roles in so vast an empire are also theirs. The nobility has grown to a remarkable degree, increased by the offices of so many dukes, counts, prefects, and admirals, so that, unless newly ennobled men had come to its aid, the ancient nobility would have been unequal to so many affairs.

The kingdom of Britain also stood through the labor and care of the nobility, but especially Poland, where the nobility is very numerous and possesses great eminence in the state. It is not surprising that the Venetians foster nobility, for they have an aristocracy. No voyage is permitted without a company of nobles. By an ancient law of the Venetians, says Gregory of Toulouse, book 4, chapter 2, §13, it has been observed even from antiquity down to the present that the captain of every galley or trireme, wherever he journeys, should take with him eight sons of poor nobles, with a stipend of seventy gold coins. Necessary provisions of the kind nobles ought to have are to be furnished to them; and at the same time he is to permit each of them to import four thousand pounds of spices without payment of any naval duty and free of charge. Nevertheless, by votes of the senate these nobles are chosen from among many poor petitioners.

This is a great privilege of the nobility; for that reason it seems all the more remarkable to me that there should be poor nobles among them when there is so great an opportunity to become rich.

Since these things are so, the nobility must be defended and increased in every way. Nor are those political writers to be tolerated who suggest otherwise, for it belongs to a good man to preserve the condition of the state which exists and, if it did not exist, to recommend it.

The second reason. If, on the contrary, we examine the customs of disordered or perishing states, we shall observe that nobility is hateful to those who contrive to introduce either the tyranny of one man or the confusion of the multitude. To cut down the ears of grain that rise above the rest is an ancient maxim of tyranny. Nor is any concern greater for the Turk than to extirpate the nobility in conquered regions. At Rome also, those who stirred up seditions under the free state made it their policy to oppress the nobility. But after affairs had fallen under the decision of one man through the royal law, no men were more cruel toward the senate than those who proved to be the most oppressive tyrants—so much so that some began attempts to destroy the entire senate.

There are two reasons, arising from the different purpose of each, why a tyrant hates the nobility while a legitimate prince loves it. A tyrant wishes to be feared and considers it equitable that all others should be slaves, in accordance with the maxim: “Remember that everything is permitted to you, and against everyone.” The nobility especially obstructs him in this, and therefore he fears and reveres it. For generous and martial spirits do not suffer themselves to be subjected slavishly; nor can a tyrant be so shameless that he does not blush for his crimes before weighty, prudent magnates. Since he does not wish there to be any whom he either fears or before whom he blushes, he desires the nobility to be removed from his midst.

A prince, however, because he has resolved to be an observer of law and equity, loves noblemen as the most faithful advocates of justice. He places his government before the eyes of men such as Paetus, Thrasea, Corbulo, and Seneca. Moreover, he judges it more honorable for the principate itself that his administration should be confirmed by the testimony and approval of such great men. Hence that magnificent and royal preface to edicts: “By the judgment of the kinsmen of princes, of the nobility, and of our counselors, we establish,” and so forth. Nero killed Seneca lest shame before his teacher burden his disgraceful life. Great is the authority of a good and great man over a ruined spirit. Nero could despise the present and posthumous reputation of the human race; he had learned to suppress his conscience and to hear flatteries of all his vices; before Seneca alone he blushed.

The third reason. Nobility is necessary in war; without it neither fidelity, courage, nor military prudence is furnished. I do not deny that there are some who have obtained nobility for themselves through war, but I deny that this is lasting. A state must be established so that it stands amid the great and moderate vices of the great, the middling, and the lowest, and does not perish through the fall of one man, as happened at Thebes when Epaminondas died.

Above all nations the Romans exhibited fidelity to their fatherland, and this through the defense of tribunes, chief centurions, and knights—that is, nobles. Servile hands do not readily fight for their master through every danger. First, they acquire nothing for themselves except perhaps a more tolerable servitude. Second, they often experience an even harsher master when, exulting in victory, he treats more bitterly and insultingly those by whose wounds he conquered. Third, those raised in servitude esteem neither the good of a name nor that of a lineage; they are therefore easily conquered by fear or price. In this matter, then, the Turks err most of all: everyone encounters dangers through fear; no one does so through hope or love of his lord.

But where the honor of nobility is held in esteem, men rush into death through the desire to receive, preserve, and increase the distinction of their lineage. The daily pugnacity of the nobility supplies proof of this—vicious indeed, but suitable for demonstrating what I have proposed. If you call a nobleman a liar, faithless to his lord, a scoundrel, unwarlike, timid, or a fugitive, he immediately challenges you to a duel; men decide the dispute by the sword and regard it as disgraceful for the challenged man to evade it. Whence comes so great a desire for reputation and honor? From ancestral training and the discipline of military life, in which faithlessness and timidity are the greatest disgrace. Hence they regard it as contrary to their honor not to stand in battle, to desert the ranks, or not to aid the wounded; and their concern for honor and fidelity is greater than their concern for life.

Nobility therefore preserves fidelity and is consequently courageous, for those two qualities always cling together in war. No one preserves fidelity in difficult circumstances, amid flying javelins, unless he is courageous; and no one fights courageously and rises above dangers unless he has resolved not to violate his fidelity and oath even when death is set before him.

Trained by these rudiments, the nobility also cultivates military prudence above others, for this is, as it were, its craft, by which it renders service to the state. Those who in our age are judged to conduct wars most cautiously, the States of Holland, think no differently: for they place nobles, barons, and counts in command during war, although their domestic and civil council consists of commoners.

The fourth reason. Those who suddenly attain dignities without any hope of permanent nobility are readily carried away by insolence and conduct themselves without restraint in all things. They collect wealth most greedily, as though an opportunity had been granted only once. No men were richer than freedmen. Crassus was regarded as rich. “From the same nation,” says Pliny, book 33, chapter 10, “Marcus Crassus declared that no one was wealthy unless he could maintain a legion from his annual income. He possessed two hundred million sesterces in his estates and was the richest Roman citizen after Sulla. Nor was this enough unless he should hunger for all the gold of the Parthians.” And although he may have secured for himself the very record of wealth—for it is pleasing to assail this insatiable desire for possession—we afterward knew many men released from slavery who were wealthier, including at the same time three under the principate of Claudius: Pallas, Callistus, and Narcissus. Behold, the richest of the Romans were slaves. Whence did their riches come except from robberies? There were many such men, but it was peculiar that three existed under the one Claudius, and while Claudius behaved as he did. There is no need to say anything about Rufinus, Eutropius, and others.

The present times show us the fortunes of ignoble men increased through administration of the state. In order that the matter may be understood, I shall set forth the words of the most famous political figure of our time, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, advocate of the States. In his Apology he writes as follows:

From these five royal embassies and negotiations it happened that the aforesaid kings supplied the States collectively with more than twenty-five million pounds. By payment of these, the confederated provinces—chiefly through my foresight—were freed, and the obligations were restored together with the pledged cities and citadels.

And:

When I entered my office, with the greatest labors and difficulties the lords States of Holland and West Friesland could scarcely raise annually one million eight hundred thousand florins for the generality, to sustain the burdens of war. But at present they pay approximately four million two hundred thousand pounds. Here, however, it must be noted that the burdens of war during these thirty-two years in which I have held office have been so great and enormous that at present it is necessary for you to provide more for the burdens of Holland and West Friesland alone than could be collected in 1586 both for the burdens of the generality and for Holland and West Friesland in particular: namely, more than two million florins each year. These nevertheless are deducted and paid from the revenues of the fatherland in addition to the aforesaid four million two hundred thousand pounds. And although it is more expedient to burden the fatherland than to lose it, one must nevertheless observe wisely and providently—as the colleges of the Supreme and Provincial Councils and the prefects of accounts taught in writing in 1604—that, while burdens grow beyond revenues, provinces must necessarily fall at last into utter ruin. And if during the last ten years expenses had been made equal to those made during the preceding ten years, at this time the burdens of Holland and West Friesland alone would easily have consumed about four million florins annually. The conclusion of the truce applied a remedy to this evil, after many other dangers and troubles, foreseen as well as unknown, had passed.

In these difficulties of the fatherland and amid so great a public debt, do you suppose the wealth of its rulers to have been diminished? See what he recounts:

1. He had received so much property from his wife that he could easily support himself.

2. At the beginning he received four thousand annually from his practice.

3. By inheritances he received four hundred Holland acres and two thousand florins annually.

4. He made a profit of four hundred acres by draining marshes.

5. He contributed a little more than five hundred thousand to the Indian Company.

6. He purchased estates.

Observe the swift increase of riches while the burdens of the fatherland grow. But in his case these things were tolerable; consider what follows:

But if it should now please you to inquire into and assess the property of your subjects, I shall readily suffer it. For I have learned that those who in the general assessment of 1599 valued all their goods at no more than fifty or sixty thousand florins now dare to boast that they are twice as wealthy as I. Yet in that same year those same men, being more hostile, counted me among those upon whom the highest contribution was to be imposed and valued me at two hundred thousand florins.

Behold what ignoble men do in the extreme necessity of their fatherland, and how great the wealth they amass, so that it is not surprising that those for whom war is so fortunate hate peace.

First, Oldenbarnevelt’s goods in 1599 were valued at two hundred thousand; those of certain others at fifty or sixty thousand. But those men now possess twice as much as he, namely four hundred thousand. Oldenbarnevelt’s goods in 1599 were—

§ 4, continued. —two hundred thousand, valued unjustly, as he himself complains. Meanwhile he acquired many things for himself, so that in 1618 he possessed five hundred thousand besides his lands. But others who in 1599 possessed fifty or sixty thousand made so much profit in the space of seventeen years that they were twice as rich as Oldenbarnevelt. That is, each possessed sixteen hundred acres, a million in gold, and so forth; for Oldenbarnevelt possessed more than lands and Indian gold. Behold: the fatherland bestowed so great wealth not upon one but upon several such men; this is what they obtain by governing it. And this is that splendid liberty of the fatherland which exhausts the citizens and fills those conducting affairs and acting on behalf of affairs. For because the merchants obtained an opportunity from the fatherland, they conducted commerce, afterward intending to live cautiously elsewhere.

The fifth reason. Just as there ought to be a profession for the other arts in a city, so too there ought to be a profession of defending the fatherland from the enemy, governing it at home, and regulating it, and a definite class of men occupied in so distinguished an exercise: namely, nobles educated for wars and for the discipline of ruling. All historical records teach us that this was the perpetual occupation of the nobility.

From this comes the German name by which nobles are called vom Adel, from the eagle, because they follow victorious eagles and the Roman standards; and they take the name Knaben von Schild from the shield. Indeed, in preceding centuries they were called simply soldiers. Military service, moreover, is twofold: armed service, and the more peaceful service of those who possessed immunities and privileges. Lest they discontinue military exercises in time of peace, they produced imitations of war in various games and called them lance-games or tournaments. These were often forbidden because of their dangers; but if they provide exercise without bloodshed, they can be beneficial and arouse manly spirits.

It can neither be said nor believed how greatly that institution assisted the nobility, especially since most honorable laws were laid down for the contestants. For wicked nobles were excluded by a single word:

1. Enemies of the Christian religion, or transgressors and apostates.

2. One who had been guilty of treason.

3. One who had violated a virgin or widow, and adulterers.

4. Perjurers, deniers of written obligations and agreements, traitors, deserters from military service, and authors of flight in battle.

5. Men injurious to subjects, oppressors, and murderers.

6. The sacrilegious.

7. Despoilers of widows and wards.

8. Robbers, pirates, and assassins.

9. Authors of new taxes.

10. Those who had harmed the state.

11. Moneylenders, merchants, and artisans.

12. Those who were not nobles from their great-grandfather onward.

Those marked by any of these vices were not admitted to the mock battles. This was a great restraint upon audacity, ostentation, and desires; and among the nobles they were in some fashion infamous. Hence those marked with disgrace were called Schelmen, and they lost their order. How much it contributes to the defense of the fatherland that there should be many rich and prudent men in whom a great natural capacity for war is advanced toward justice and courage by domestic precepts, exhortations, examples, and the pursuits of their equals becomes apparent only when a soldier is ready at hand against sudden assaults.

The sixth reason. In war there is need of the highest authority. The first cause is that the most difficult things are commanded: to hold the assigned place in battle although certain death presses upon it, to climb the rampart against the enemy’s weapons, and to go into death. The second is that great authority is needed in order to command armed men. Noble tribunes and centurions possess greater authority, both because they are of illustrious blood and because their whole family is occupied at home in dignities and command. More is also expected from them as fortunate men. But men who are fellow slaves and who all came forth from the same chamber or workhouse obey their equals—or even those subject to them in peace—more stubbornly. For this reason men generally seek nobles as commanders and centurions.

The incident in the time of Claudius is well known. Narcissus, Claudius’s freedman, whom Rome revered and the Senate feared, was sent to mutinous soldiers. As he was already ascending the platform, they shouted: “Io Saturnalia!” So much greater was the liberty in the camp than in the senate-house.

The whole German nobility arose from command, specifically military command, and takes its name from the eagle: der Adel, von Adel, Adelingi. They were formerly soldiers, but noble soldiers, distinguished by the shield. There are two kinds of them: some are subject to the emperor alone; others to the princes in whose territory they dwell. The Swabian, Franconian, and Rhenish nobility possesses the highest liberty; in other places there are very few such men. Swabia came to the empire in 1269 when its heirs died, and thereafter there were no dukes of Swabia; therefore its nobility was not subject to one. In a manner not dissimilar, in eastern Franconia and along the Rhine that liberty was acquired through changes of lords and because many provinces were under the emperors. The Franks once had a secular duke. When the duchy was transferred to the bishopric of Würzburg, they say that the nobility remained subject to the emperor alone—although the immunity of many rests upon the individual grant and privilege of emperors, and prelates possess their own rights.

The seventh reason. When after the prince there is no one of dignity or esteem in the state, the whole state is endangered in one little body; but this is contrary to right reason. The Persian Empire in its old age had a corrupted nobility: all were slaves and all flatterers. Accordingly, when Darius was killed—and indeed by his own men—no one resisted. The Macedonian Empire, however, because it possessed many Alexanders, stood for a long time and had many kings, each of whom was powerful; and unless, having been set against one another, they had worn away their strength, each could have equaled Alexander.

Machiavelli himself, an enemy of nobility, admits that when the emperor of the Turks has been killed, no one remains who must be feared. Experience itself taught this. When Bayezid was captured by Tamerlane, none of the Turks conceived any hope of restoring the empire. For when Çelebi, Bayezid’s son, had fled to Adrianople, it was not the Turks but the Greek nobles—hostile in arms to their own emperor Palaeologus—who equipped him with money and troops and, to the destruction and disgrace of their fatherland, gave him the empire when he was despairing. At that time there nevertheless remained some care for nobility; now, since all serve equally, there is none.

But because ancient histories possess great authority, let the political writer weigh the deeds of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. Philip cultivated and adorned the nobility. Hence they accompanied his son into Asia and nevertheless preferred Philip. For when Alexander had rejected his own nobility and attached himself to the Persians and conquered nations, he was tossed amid many dangers; the princes and the whole nobility rejoiced at his death. Nor is there any doubt that, if he had lived longer with those customs, he would have been deserted or killed. Although the stronger authority of the histories relates that he died from Babylonian poison, it is established that his mother, son, and entire family were killed by his princes because he had already provoked them while alive.

The eighth reason. Machiavelli says that a kingdom in which everyone serves is more easily held, but that a kingdom in which there is a multitude of princes is more easily occupied. Yet his discussion must be set forth and examined, for he mingles true things with false and finally deceives altogether. Chapter 4 of The Prince:

Someone could be led to wonder, after considering the difficulties which seem to attend the retention of a newly acquired empire, whence it arose that Alexander possessed Asia within a few years and died almost as soon as he had occupied it—so that it could deservedly have seemed that the whole empire would fall into revolt—although his successors preserved it for themselves and labored under no difficulty in defending it except that which arose among themselves from their own particular ambition.

I answer that the principalities whose memory still remains are found to be administered in two different ways: either at the decision of one prince, by whose favor and permission all the rest, who are slaves by condition, are employed like ministers in the administration of the kingdom; or by the counsel of a prince and nobles who obtain that rank not by favor but by the antiquity of their blood. Nobles of this kind possess dominions and peoples subject to them, who acknowledge them as lords and are affected toward them by a certain natural love.

In principalities governed by the direction of one prince and the ministry of slaves, the prince presides with greater authority. For there is no one in the entire province who acknowledges any other superior besides him; and if anyone obeys another, he does so as a minister and appointed official, and those men are not affected by any particular love.

Examples of these two kinds of governing a kingdom occur in our own times: the Turk and the king of the French. The whole supreme power of the Turkish Empire is governed at the will of one prince; the rest are slaves. Having divided his kingdom into prefectures, he sends different administrators and removes and substitutes them according to the will of his mind. But the king of the French is placed amid an ancient multitude of lords whom the peoples subject to them acknowledge and embrace with goodwill. They retain their authority, which the king cannot take from them without danger.

Therefore, whoever considers the constitution of each kind will encounter difficulties in occupying the empire of the Turk; but once it has been conquered, there is no difficulty in retaining it. The reasons for the difficulty that prevents the Turkish Empire from being occupied consist in this: one who attempts to occupy it cannot be called there by the princes of that kingdom, nor be led to hope that he can more easily bring his undertaking to effect through the defection of those who surround the ruler. This appears to proceed from the reasons I touched upon above. For since they are all his slaves and bound to him, they can be corrupted with much greater difficulty; and even if they were corrupted, little benefit could nevertheless be hoped from it, since for the reasons given above they cannot draw the peoples with them.

Accordingly, one who is to wage war against the emperor of the Turks must consider that he will find him united and that he must be conquered more by his own strength than by the efforts and seditions of others. But when he has been defeated and his battle-line routed so that he cannot restore his army, there is nothing besides the prince’s stock which must afterward be feared. When that has been extinguished, no one remains whom anyone need fear, since the rest lack fidelity and authority among the peoples. And just as before victory the victor could place no hope in winning them over to himself, so after victory there is no reason for him to fear them further.

The contrary occurs in the administrator of kingdoms constituted like that of France. For access into it will readily lie open to you if you win over one of the king’s leading men. Among them there are always some who, offended in spirit, strive to cause revolutions. For the reasons stated above, these can open the way into that kingdom for you and render victory more expeditious. But afterward almost infinite difficulties arise in preserving it, not only with those who assisted you but also with those whom you oppressed. It is not enough for you to have extinguished the prince’s blood; those leading men also survive who make themselves authors of new changes of state. Since you can neither satisfy nor extinguish them, you lose the kingdom whenever an opportunity offers itself.

Now, if you consider to which kind of administration the kingdom of Darius belonged, you will find it very similar to that of the Turk. For this reason Alexander had to make an attack upon the whole of it and strip Darius of his camp. After that victory, when Darius was dead, that empire passed securely to Alexander for the reasons collected above. If his successors had been concordant, they could plainly have enjoyed it altogether at leisure; for no disturbance arose within it except what they themselves excited against one another.

But dominions constituted in the likeness of the kingdom of France cannot possibly be possessed so peacefully. Hence came the frequent revolts of Spain, Gaul, and Greece from the Romans, because the dominions of princes were more numerous in them. As long as the memory of those dominions remained vigorous, the Romans were always uncertain of their possession. But when their remembrance had been erased by the power and duration of the empire, the Romans possessed a secure right of possession. Afterward, according as each of the Romans had acquired authority for himself in parts of the provinces, even when waging war among themselves, they could draw a part of those provinces with them; and this was because, after the line of the former prince had been removed, the peoples acknowledged no one except the Romans.

A kingdom, therefore, in which all besides the king are slaves cannot, once oppressed by an enemy, reclaim liberty for itself. Machiavelli admits this. But a state must be established in such a way that fortune possesses a means of return. In saying that such a kingdom is more difficult to occupy, however, he is mistaken.

Experience refuted this long ago. For regions in which there were many princes not only retain the yoke of a foreign empire with greater difficulty but also receive it with greater difficulty. The Romans attacked Gaul for many years and, after taking it piecemeal—now this part, now that—waged wars with the remainder. But when Antiochus was defeated, they very quickly occupied the principal part of his kingdom and ordered him to reign beyond the Taurus. The same thing also occurred in Greece: now the Aetolians, now the Macedonians resisted; at another time Lacedaemon under its Nabis resisted. In Asia, when Antiochus was defeated, his slaves went forth as degenerate slaves, while their master followed behind their backs. They think it matters little whom they serve; indeed, they desire a change of masters and hope for an alleviation of servitude.

The Turkish forces also, although their emperor was often defeated, did not occupy Greece except over a long period, because its princes, although not sufficiently, nevertheless resisted much. Do we not see the same in Hungary? Its greater part was long ago betrayed to and subjugated by the Turks, yet the remaining portion still resists through the courage of its princes and nobles and even preserves its liberty. Remove these men, and the rest, performing no deed of great praise, after bargaining for their little fields and cottages, will become an accession to that great empire.

Although the tyrant has attempted them in every way, he has nevertheless never conquered them.

But it is easy to entice some one prince to one’s party, which is not practicable in a monarchy. Machiavelli therefore means that where there are nobles and princes, betrayals and rebellions are easier.

It seems otherwise to me, unless the king is changed into a tyrant—

§ 4, continued. —for reason and examples have taught that a man of servile disposition, avaricious and joined to his prince by no bond, can be driven to those crimes. Who betrayed Pyrrhus for money? Who wounded Darius? Who destroyed so many emperors? Were they not for the most part petty slaves? I pass over those men who, while the servitude of the state was still fresh, were killed by the lowest of the Romans. The betrayers of empires are men such as Eutropius, Rufinus, Stilicho, and Andragathius: all slaves, and sprung from slaves or from the most sordid barbarians.

Alas! Alas! By what slight causes great things perish!

An empire sought with so much blood, preserved with so much,

Which the labors of a thousand commanders produced,

Which the Roman hand constructed through so many years,

One idle traitor overturns in a brief time.

Priam was betrayed, and Agamemnon was betrayed—but by a vile adulterer; Pompey the Great by a eunuch; Rome by Curio, and the same city earlier by a girl; Ahasuerus by eunuchs. Phrynus and Philocrates the pimps were traitors. Eurybatus betrayed the king of the Persians, for he took money from him and handed it over to Cyrus. To put on the fox’s skin belongs to sordid spirits, not to princes; for slaves possess many causes for infidelity, but princes few. If we weigh the examples, we shall understand that princes, cities, and kingdoms have generally been betrayed by sordid and indebted men.

Those who are entirely subject to masters cannot easily rebel and riot where the government is despotic, because they lack strength and possess no authority. On this account alone, therefore, danger can be created for a king who possesses many powerful princes. But if one is pleased to compare dangers with dangers and defenses with defenses, we shall understand that a multitude of princes and nobles is to be preferred. An emperor or king is one man; his safety, security, and power consist in the spirit and strength of others, and he is always in the power of others. If he does not possess princes chosen from distinguished stock, he is in the power of the lowest men, by whose arms he is surrounded. These are easily moved and watch for revolutions, judging that right is wherever the greatest reward is. If he possesses princes, the lowest men dare nothing. Moreover, the plots of princes are more easily guarded against than those of the lowest. Hence we see that, although there have been various disturbances in Gaul, the murderers of the kings were nevertheless vile men and were not suborned by princes. Finally, plots can be guarded against if men are governed moderately and equably and if everything is not entrusted to one man—a matter treated elsewhere.

The ninth reason. Finally, I judge that not every nobility but an energetic, upright, and uncorrupted nobility is to be admitted into partnership in government. I also judge that this is the support of empire and that it is especially effective against the ancient evil of nobility: pride and injuries. For just as trees fail with age, so do certain families over a long period. They retain neither vigor nor purity and possess nothing except their insignia. Frivolous, languid, and stupid men are often born from courageous and great men. Such was the appearance of the Roman nobility when Marius delivered his speech. Sallust, Jugurtha:

You have ordered me to wage war against Jugurtha, a decision which the nobility has borne most grievously. I ask you to consider in your minds whether it would be better to alter this decision and send on this or some other similar enterprise someone from that crowd of nobles, a man of ancient lineage and many ancestral images but no military service—so that, being ignorant of everything in so great a matter, he may tremble, hurry about, and take some man from the people as the instructor of his duty. Thus it generally happens that the man whom you ordered to command seeks another commander for himself.

But I know, Romans, men who, after they had been made consuls, began to read the deeds of their ancestors and the military precepts of the Greeks—men acting in reverse order. For discharging an office is later in time than being appointed to it, but in reality and practice preparation comes first.

Now compare me, Romans, a new man, with their pride. What they are accustomed to hear and read, I have in part seen and have in part performed myself. What they learned from books, I learned by military service. Now judge whether deeds or words are worth more. They despise my newness; I despise their idleness. My fortune is cast as a reproach against me; their disgraces are cast against them. I indeed judge that nature is one and common to all, but that every most courageous man is also the most nobly born.

And if it could now be asked of the fathers of Albinus or Bestia whether they would rather have had me or those men born from them, what do you believe they would answer except that they wished their children to be the best possible? But if those men rightly despise me, let them do the same to their own ancestors, whose nobility, like mine, began from virtue. They envy my honor; let them therefore envy my labor, innocence, and dangers also, since through these I obtained it.

Yet men corrupted by pride pass their lives as though they despised your honors, while they seek those honors as though they had lived honorably. Truly those men are deceived who expect contrary things at once: the pleasure of idleness and the rewards of virtue. Moreover, when they speak before you or in the senate, most of them extol their ancestors in their speech. By recounting their courageous deeds, they think themselves more illustrious; but the contrary is true. For the more distinguished the life of those ancestors, the more disgraceful is the sloth of these descendants. And assuredly the matter stands thus: the glory of ancestors is a light for their posterity and permits neither their good nor their evil deeds to lie hidden.

I suffer poverty in this respect, Romans. But what is far more distinguished, I am permitted to speak of my own deeds. Now see how unjust they are. What they arrogate to themselves from another’s virtue, they do not concede to me from my own—evidently because I possess no ancestral images and because my nobility is new. Assuredly it is better to have produced nobility than to have received and corrupted it.

I am indeed not unaware that, if they now wished to reply to me, they would possess an abundantly eloquent and polished speech. But amid your very great favor, when they lacerate both me and you with reproaches in every place, I resolved not to remain silent, lest anyone interpret modesty as a guilty conscience. Indeed, in accordance with my conviction, no speech can injure me: a true one must necessarily speak well of me; my life and conduct overcome a false one. But because your counsels are accused—you who imposed upon me the highest honor and the greatest undertaking—consider again and again whether you ought to regret it.

To inspire confidence, I cannot display ancestral images, triumphs, or consulships of my forefathers; but, if the matter demands, I can display spears, a standard, horse-trappings, other military gifts, and, besides these, scars on the front of my body. These are my ancestral images; this is my nobility—not left to me by inheritance, as theirs was to them, but what I acquired through very many labors and dangers of my own.

My words are not polished. I make little of that. Virtue sufficiently manifests itself; they have need of artifice in order to cover their disgraceful deeds with speech. Nor did I learn Greek literature. It pleased me little to learn it, since it profited its teachers nothing toward virtue. But I am learned in those things far better for the state: to strike the enemy, to keep watch over defenses, to fear nothing except a disgraceful reputation, to endure winter and summer alike, to rest upon the ground, and to tolerate want and labor at the same time.

By these precepts I shall exhort the soldiers. I shall neither maintain them harshly while maintaining myself lavishly, nor make their labor my glory. This is useful; this is command suitable to citizens. For when you yourself live in softness, to compel the army by punishment is to be a master, not a commander. By doing these and similar things your ancestors brought glory to themselves and to the state. The nobility, relying upon them but itself unlike them in conduct, despises us who emulate them and demands all honors from you, not from merit but as though they were debts. Yet those most arrogant men are far mistaken. Their ancestors left to them everything that it was possible to leave: riches, ancestral images, and a distinguished memory of themselves. They did not leave virtue, nor could they; that alone is neither given nor received as a gift.

They call me sordid and uncultivated in conduct because I adorn a banquet with little skill and possess neither any actor nor a cook of greater price than my farm steward. I am pleased to confess these things, Romans. For I received this teaching from my father and from other virtuous men: that elegance befits women, labor men, and that all good men ought to possess more glory than riches; that arms, not household furnishings, are an ornament.

Why then do they not always do what pleases them and what they esteem dear? Let them love and drink. Let them pass their old age where they passed their youth: at banquets, devoted to their belly and the most disgraceful part of the body. Let them leave sweat, dust, and other such things to us, to whom they are more pleasant than feasts. But it is not so. For when the most disgraceful men have dishonored themselves by crimes, they go to seize the rewards of good men. Thus, most unjustly, luxury and idleness—the worst arts—do no harm to those who cultivated them, but are the ruin of the innocent state.

Now, since I have answered them as far as my conduct, not their crimes, required, I shall speak briefly concerning the state.

§ 5. I do not approve this nobility, for it is wicked; but I judge that the counsel of our Mariana must be followed. “Indeed,” he says, book 4, chapter 4:

In my judgment the nobility must be protected by the prince, and something must be granted to descendants because of the distinguished merits of their ancestors—but only if they themselves add conduct not unlike the splendor of their birth, together with industry and virtue. Nothing is more disgraceful than an idle nobility: men who, swollen with the glory of their ancestors, consume the wealth received by inheritance in wickedness and frivolity; and who, trusting in the praise of their forefathers, themselves languish in idleness and sloth, striving to obtain the rewards of virtues by vices and, through the disguise of nobility, to occupy in sloth and inactivity the place of courageous men.

They are therefore to be repelled by the prince on two grounds and are foul with a twofold disgrace: because they both contaminate themselves with baseness and stain the distinction of their lineage with baseness. For the more illustrious their forefathers were, the more deserving of hatred are those who obscure the splendor of nobility by lust and impurity. And most especially, many from their number possess such rashness and madness that, proud of the emptiest names, they so despise in comparison with themselves men born in an obscure station, however industrious, courageous, and energetic, that they do not consider them human beings. Having been honored with many honors, they seek greater ones; and, ambitious and senseless through evil arts, they contend that all rewards owed to virtue are owed also to their nobility.

Moreover, not a few concessions must be made to the rich, since men of wealth constitute a great defense for the prince in every part of the state, and they can set many things in motion unless they are bound by the prince’s beneficence. But they are finally to be held in esteem only if they devote themselves to good arts and direct their money and wealth toward the pursuit of honor. If the rich, although empty of every virtue, are increased by rewards and honors, avarice, insolence, and idleness will be sanctioned among the people; and they will believe that only those whose fortune is immense and whose possessions are extensive are blessed. The needy will lie perpetually in squalor without any hope of rising. Having therefore conceived despair, they will be incited to make an assault upon the rich. Quarrels, insults, and robberies will arise. The state, torn into opposing parties, will utterly perish.

Therefore, if the prince desires service to be rendered to his dignity and the public safety, he will not regard immense wealth if it is stripped of virtue, nor will he foster nobility of lineage if it is destitute of the light of honor. Rather, he will embrace virtue and industry wherever they are found; and, retaining liberty to establish what he judges, he will fear the empty murmuring of no man. He will not be moved by anyone’s displeasure. No one will be supported by such great wealth or illustrious through such great nobility that he may impose laws upon the ruler and assume so much for himself that he dares to draw the prince away from the pursuit of ordering virtue.

The prince will nevertheless not cast aside illustrious families even when they are idle, but will arouse them to virtue by every means; and, just as he cares for the preservation and increase of ancient cities, so will he care for families.

He will especially employ the method which Plato valued most highly: namely, that he graft warlike men into peaceful families. There is a noble family in towns or citadels, a follower of pleasures but nevertheless rich and peaceful; from it let him seek a wife for a noble admiral, tribune, or courageous and fierce man. He will add spirit to his relations by marriage and draw them with him into labors and the sweet honor of victories. Let him entrust to a military father-in-law a noble youth who hides at home or is occupied with courtly pageants; for thus the virtue of one man will arouse both sons-in-law and grandsons.

Next, let the prince have no nobles around him, and let him indicate that he esteems none, except those who delight in prudence, temperance, and labor. Most importantly, after a careful selection for virtue, prudence, and wealth, every year he will ennoble men who have deserved well and employ them in the state. From this he will obtain two things: first, that he possess nobles; then, that he possess suitable magistrates.

Many of the ancients often ridicule new men, or recently created nobles. Against them Cicero argues in book 3 of his Letters and shows that there can be εὐγένειαν—nobility of character—without hereditary nobility, and hereditary nobility without εὐγενεία. Euripides also expressed this excellently:

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸς εὐγενὴς ἐμοί γ᾽ ἀνήρ·

ὁ δ᾽ οὐ δίκαιος, κἂν ἀμείνονος πατρὸς

Ζηνὸς πεφύκῃ, δυσγενὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

A good man seems noble to me; but one who is not just, even if he was born from a father nobler than Jupiter himself, I account ignoble.

Let men acknowledge that these nobles are new, since their own ancestors were also new, while the descendants of these men will be called members of an ancient lineage. Seneca speaks prudently in Letter 44:

If there is anything else good in philosophy, it is this: that it does not inspect a pedigree. All men, if recalled to their first origin, are from the gods. You are a Roman knight, and your industry brought you to this order; but, by Hercules, the fourteen rows are closed to many. The senate-house does not admit all; the camp also disdainfully chooses those whom it receives for labor and danger. A good mind lies open to all; we are all noble for this purpose. Philosophy rejects no one and chooses no one; it shines for all.

Socrates was not a patrician. Cleanthes drew water and hired out his hands to irrigate a little garden. Philosophy did not receive Plato as a nobleman but made him one. Why is there reason for you to despair of being able to become equal to these men? They are all your ancestors if you conduct yourself worthily of them. You will do so if you immediately persuade yourself that no one surpasses you in nobility.

All of us have the same number of generations before us. The origin of every man lies beyond memory. Plato says: “No king is not descended from slaves; no slave is not descended from kings.” A long succession of changes has mixed all these things, and fortune has turned them up and down. Who, then, is nobly born? One well fashioned by nature for virtue. This alone is to be regarded. Otherwise, if you recall matters to antiquity, every man comes from a point before which there is nothing. From the first origin of the world down to the present time, an alternating succession of illustrious and sordid ancestors has brought us forth.

An atrium full of smoke-blackened ancestral images does not make a man noble. No one lived for our glory, nor is what existed before us ours. The spirit makes a man noble; from any condition it is permitted to rise above fortune. Consider yourself, therefore, not a Roman knight but a freedman.

You can attain this: that you alone should be free among freeborn men. “How?” you ask. If you distinguish good and evil without taking the people as your authority.

If we examine the whole nobility, few extend their insignia beyond two hundred years, fewer beyond three hundred, and very few beyond four hundred. For how small a proportion of nobles is found celebrated in records and histories before those years? The little moons of the Arcadians are therefore laughable if they wore them upon their shoes as a boast of antiquity, as though they were older than the moon; they are praiseworthy if worn as a symbol of changes.

The promotion of new men brings a notable advantage to the state. For since the old nobility in part despises them and in part envies their advancement, the new men must necessarily look to two things: that they be beyond contempt and then beyond envy. They will be beyond contempt if in great, honorable, laborious, and costly matters they render faithful and energetic service to the prince and are accepted by him, as were Daniel and his companions in the court of the Chaldeans. These things, however, kindle the torches of envy. So it happened in Darius’s court, Daniel 6:1:

It pleased Darius, and he appointed over the kingdom one hundred and twenty satraps, that they might be throughout his entire kingdom; and over them three princes, of whom Daniel was one, so that the satraps might render an account to them and the king might not sustain trouble. Daniel therefore surpassed all the princes and satraps because a greater spirit was in him. Moreover, the king was considering appointing him over the whole kingdom. Hence the princes and satraps sought an occasion by which they might find fault with Daniel on the king’s side; but they could find no cause or suspicion, because he was faithful and no fault or suspicion was found in him.

Envy clings to upright successes, but more strongly when others perceive that they are being obscured by their brilliance. They will escape or diminish envy by living modestly and courteously; accordingly, they will make no display either of pomp or expense. Their virtue will spur on the old nobles, as Miltiades’ trophy spurred Themistocles, so that by the same path they may strive through good deeds for the prince’s favor. Next, they will arouse others from the same family and from other families to dare likewise to raise themselves from the ground.

Nor will the estimation of nobility be cheaper, for men will be chosen who are an ornament to the state—not men whose nobility consists in cicadas or bordered togas, but men who bring learning, prudence, dexterity in action, and magnanimity to government. For them nobility is not a covering for vices and idleness but a whetstone and spur of industry. Thus a new nobility will grow up as a rival of the old and itself will soon become old. The old nobility will diminish; and, just as the most excellent medicines become the most harmful poisons when they have putrefied, so generosity of stock, when corrupted into degenerate conduct, gravely infects the state.

The prince will correct those vices seriously, especially if nobles inflict injuries, for the vices increase through toleration. Otherwise either the nobility, through fear of judgments, will disturb the state, as happened at Rhodes, or the people will rise up, as happened in Switzerland and a hundred years ago in many places of Germany. The same occurred in Hungary in 1514. In 1505 the Genoese expelled the nobility. King Casimir opportunely corrected the tyranny of the Polish nobles when the people were already disposed toward conspiracy. Cromer, book 6, On the Deeds of the Poles.

§ 6. Furthermore, for someone to be accounted noble means that he is distinguished from the condition of the common people, of which there are many degrees. Every supreme majesty possesses the right to ennoble. For the ordering of the ranks of citizens, the granting of rewards to virtue, and the exempting of worthy men from the common lot are in its power. This power has been given to certain others either by privilege or by usage.

Men of many pedigrees but degenerate and without virtue, prudence, or knowledge are nevertheless accounted nobles, both by opinion and by common law, which does not examine every particular circumstance.

If, however, a prince ennobles a man possessing no virtue, but solely by grace and favor or because of riches, Arumaeus judges that he does not become noble. Yet since experience teaches that many nobles are inferior in virtue and prudence to commoners, and since nobility is a dignity established by civil law, I judge it valid even when conferred upon an unworthy man. The prince indeed abuses his power when he lavishes the rewards of courageous men upon the unworthy; nevertheless, it does not belong to a private person to accuse the prince’s judgment or render it void. Accordingly, just as an office, gift, praetorship, and other things conferred by the prince upon unworthy men are not to be revoked, so neither is nobility. For if the people must acknowledge an unworthy governor because the prince appointed him, why should they not also regard as exempt the man whom the prince exempted? If an unworthy man receives a fief and transmits it to his descendants, why not nobility also—and its effects, privileges, honor, and immunity from the various burdens to which the common people are subject?

The reasoning is the same if nobility is granted for a crime: because a man devised new taxes, calumniated the innocent, committed slaughter by the prince’s command, or pandered to his pleasures. For although the prince sins most gravely when he rewards vices of which he was appointed the avenger by God, and although all detest Tiberius, who willed the prefecture of the city to be the reward of drunkenness, the benefice of even an imprudent prince nevertheless remains unaltered. For if the merits of the recipients are weighed, perhaps few are worthy, and generally the worthier are passed over, since they flatter less. That man will therefore enjoy his nobility to his own and his lineage’s everlasting disgrace. He will be exempt from the common people, but foul, infamous, and a reproach to the prince.

Nor ought this to seem surprising: prostitutes securely retain the payments given them for crimes. Many princes have also ennobled their concubines; noble families remain today whose nobility began from fornication. Nor is it surprising that the royal stock of the Israelites arose from incest.

They say that nobility is lost by practicing vile arts. They deny that bakers, smiths, carpenters, cooks, innkeepers, money-changers, pipers, harpists, and merchants remain noble. The laws indeed forbid servile and theatrical crafts, but most have now fallen out of use. Others do not so much deprive a man who practices them of nobility as demonstrate that they are unbecoming to nobles. If necessity drives someone to them, I do not see why he should cease to be noble, if lineage and virtue remain. I do not wish the man struggling with that difficulty to boast meanwhile of his nobility; if he emerges from it, let him defend and display his right and dignity. David assuredly was noble: at home a keeper of sheep, at court Saul’s harpist. I have seen serious men of senatorial rank who were innkeepers and were themselves ennobled; elsewhere I have shown that many nobles engage in commerce. Would that idle, drunken, blasphemous nobles—oppressors of farmers, fornicators, adulterers, and unjust men—lost their nobility! Would that they preserved it by sedentary handicrafts rather than by robberies!