§ 1. Aristotle judges it worthwhile to know how the ancients raised money. I have determined to pursue his narrative in the order in which it is presented by him. Some methods must be condemned; some, but few, are worthy of praise; necessity renders several just.
When Cypselus of Corinth had made a vow to Jupiter that, if he gained possession of that city, he would dedicate all the resources of the Corinthians, he ordered a census to be recorded. When they had declared their property, he took away from each a tenth part of his goods, and ordered them to trade and acquire property with the remainder. When the year had turned, he did the same. It therefore happened that in ten years he himself possessed all the goods of the Corinthians and dedicated them, while the Corinthians in the meantime sought and acquired others.
A wicked man’s vow ought not to have been fulfilled; yet it was fitting that it should be carried out humanely. Julius acted similarly when, after swearing that he would crucify the pirates, he first killed them.
§ 2. Lygdamis of Naxos, after driving certain men into exile, when no one wished to buy their property except at a very low price, sold it to the exiles themselves. He also sold, both to the exiles and to others, those things which lay in workshops, not entirely finished, so that they might be consecrated as gifts to the gods, permitting the purchaser’s name to be inscribed upon each.
The reason why men wished to buy at a low price was that possession assigned by a tyranny appeared uncertain and hateful to the common people. The exiles preferred to redeem it at a moderate price rather than lose everything. If he expelled them justly, he was not unjust in the sale; the sale also brought it about that the exiles were set against one another, while one bought another’s goods.
§ 3. The Byzantines, in want of money, sold public groves and sacred places: productive ones for a fixed time, but unproductive ones as perpetual property. Likewise they sold both the things which associations possessed and those which belonged to ancestral rites, including those situated in private fields. For these were bought at a high price by the men who possessed the remainder. They gave the associations other public properties which were around the gymnasium, forum, or harbor, and also market places where something was sold. In addition, they sold the sea saltworks and the trade in salt. Likewise they ordered sleight-of-hand performers, diviners, sellers of drugs, and others of this kind, wherever they made profit, to pay a third part of their profit. They then leased out only one counter for exchanging money. It was not lawful to buy anything from one person or sell anything to another with any other coin. If anyone did so, he was fined that money. Since there was a law among them that one who had not been born of two citizen parents was not to be regarded as a citizen, when they needed money they enacted that one born of only one citizen parent should be regarded as a citizen if he paid twelve thousand coins. During a scarcity of grain, when they suffered from want of money, they brought ships down from the Pontus. When the merchants bore this with resentment, they paid them interest of a tenth. Those who then bought from them exacted that tenth from them beyond the price itself. When certain inhabitants had placed money at interest upon security of goods, and there was no source from which those loans could be repaid, they enacted that whoever contributed a third part of the debt or loan as tribute should retain those goods as his own.
Many things in these χρηματιστείαις of the Byzantines are worthy of note, and some perhaps of imitation in necessity. First, they sold τὰ τεμένη, that is, all places consecrated to the gods, such as groves, open areas, temples, and chapels. Second, they sold productive places, such as groves and fields, for a fixed time; unproductive ones, such as open areas and chapels, in perpetuity. Otherwise they would not have found a purchaser; for who would buy unproductive properties, only to render them productive and surrender them again? Third, they sold τὰ θιασωτικὰ, that is, places which belonged to sacred assemblies or associations; for those who entered an association for the sake of religion, such as Bacchic and Eleusinian initiates, are called θιασῶται, and θιασωτικά are the things which belong to them, especially houses and banqueting places. The rites were either πατριωτικὰ, ancestral, or, as some read, φρατριωτικά, rites of a brotherhood; and then τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἰδιωτικοῖς, those situated in private fields. Pollux in Book Six calls the houses themselves φωλητήρια, caves and dens in which they drank deeply. There were many things of this kind in private gardens and fields which nevertheless belonged to the associations, not to the men in whose possessions they were found. Therefore the owners bought them at a high price so that they might have their fields free. Fourth, they gave the associations other things which were not productive publicly. Fifth, they sold the saltworks. Sixth, when there was need of exchanging money, they appointed only one man to do so at a fixed price, namely to pay out coin at a high price and receive it at a low price. This was manifestly unjust, especially since they could not use another coin. It was therefore easy to exchange gold pieces for a single denarius. The law concerning interest was no less unjust. All these measures took their beginning from the bad administration of the state.
§ 4. Hippias of Athens sold upper projections of houses extending into the public roads, likewise stair-steps, fortified vestibules, and doors which turned outward when opened. The owners of the properties therefore bought these things, and thus a plentiful sum of money was collected.
These things could have been done lawfully if the projections and steps were contrary to law; for since they occupied public space, and it was contrary to law for private buildings to make roads more obstructed, the state could lawfully have claimed them for itself. The cunning of Hippias was conspicuous in this: that he punished a concealed transgression of law under the supreme pretext of justice; for the owners of the houses were compelled to redeem these things at a high price unless they wished, by alteration and deformation of the whole building, to incur greater expenses. What Aristotle calls καὶ θύρας τὰς ἀνοιγομένας ἔξω—doors which open outward—was also forbidden formerly among the Romans. This was not readily granted to anyone, not even to triumphal houses, except those whose triumph had been attended by exceptional glory. Pliny, Book Thirty-six, chapter 35:
The thought arises, however, what portion of these were those sites upon which they decreed that houses should be built publicly for unconquered commanders. Their highest honor, as in the case of Lucius Valerius Publicola, who was the first consul with Lucius Brutus after so many merits, and his brother, who twice defeated the Sabines in the same magistracy, was that it was added to the decree that the doors of their houses should open outward and the doorway should be thrown back into public space. This was the most illustrious distinction even among triumphal houses.
Hippias acted dangerously and hatefully, however, for this appeared to belong to a malicious and crafty tyranny. He sold προφράγματα, or, as another reading has it, περιφράγματα—although I prefer προτεράσματα, for these are places before a stage or an enclosure, and in this place defenses of houses and enclosures extending into public space—which, unless they were redeemed, as I said, would have required the houses to be entirely destroyed.
§ 5. He ordered the coin then in use at Athens to be declared invalid, and commanded that all money be brought to him at an established price. When those who wished to mint with another device had assembled, he leased the same silver back to them.
Here there was pure fraud and deception by the tyrant, so that he might gather money by fraud and then approve anew what he had previously rejected. Even now many frauds are practiced in minting and reminting money, but generally under some pretext of justice.
§ 6. Furthermore, from those who were obliged to furnish the expenses of a trireme or a tribe, or the games, or to make expenditure upon another public service of this kind, he ordered that, upon establishment of a moderate sum, whoever wished to pay it should be enrolled among those who had discharged their office.
This was badly established concerning triremes and necessary things, but orderly and rightly concerning games, banquets, and other things. For if a thousand drachmas were to be spent upon games, it was better that six hundred should be given to the public and the games omitted. Here is a great opportunity for imitation, so that our princes may turn all expenditures made upon empty displays toward true and useful things. Nor did the man act foolishly, although avariciously, who, when crowns, statues, and empty honors were being considered, showed his hollow hand and wished them to be placed in it.
§ 7. He also commanded that two sextarii of barley, the same amount of wheat, and one obol—that is, two asses—be brought to the priestess, ἱερείᾳ, of Minerva who was consecrated on the citadel, for each dead person, and the same amount from those who had been increased by offspring.
The translator renders χοίνικας as two sextarii; more correctly, our Villalpandus, in his apparatus on Ezekiel, shows from Fannius that χοίνικα contains four sextarii:
This measure, taken four times, is called a choenix in Greek.
He judges, however, that five pounds of bread are contained in it.
In a populous city this produces a great contribution, but one that is tyrannical and sordid: to assess the dead and those being born. Yet it is not unlike the Roman poll tax, which brought it about that many did not rejoice that sons were born to them, as certain cities have also done.
§ 8. When the Athenians at Potidaea needed money for war, they ordered everyone to declare the valuation of his property, not all together in his tribe, but so that each possession should be declared in whatever place it was situated, so that the poor might submit an assessment. If anyone possessed absolutely nothing, the valuation of his person was two minae. From this, therefore, the tribute exacted from each was contributed in full. Nothing unjust was done in this matter; precaution was taken against the fraud of those who did not make a true declaration.
§ 9. A citizen of Antissa, when his city was oppressed by want of money and they had a custom of celebrating the Dionysia or Bacchanalia splendidly—upon which they made great expenditures from the provision of the entire year, on other things and on costly victims—and that feast day was then at hand, persuaded them to make a vow that they would render double things to Liber in the following year and to sell all the things which they had prepared together. Thus no small amount of money was collected for their present use. He acted rightly; and what was promised to an idol can also be done in the cause of God, for in a public necessity the ornaments of temples can be torn away and sold; those of idols ought to be. Saint Maternus admonishes the emperors to convert the ornaments of all temples consecrated to demons to the use of the state.
§ 10. When the arrival of many triremes was expected, and six modii of barley-meal sold for four denarii, the Lampsacenes ordered the men trading in the market to sell those six modii for six denarii. To a congius of oil which sold for four denarii, they ordered three obols, or six asses, to be added. They ordered the same to be done with wine and other things. Private persons therefore received the former price; the city, retaining what exceeded it, thus obtained an abundance of money.
This was an immense and inimitable tax, for they received a third part of all things offered for sale. Although they did not bring ruin upon the sellers, they nevertheless increased the losses of the citizens and of those who were in the triremes.
§ 11. When the Heracleots sent forty ships against the tyrants in the Bosporus and did not abound in money, they bought up from the merchants all the grain, oil, wine, and other goods offered for sale. A time was appointed at which the price would be paid; and since it was advantageous for the merchants not to have their wares distributed by the hemina, but to have them sold all together, the Heracleots themselves, since they would pay when opportunity permitted, carried not pay but merchandise in cargo ships, and placed one quaestor in charge of each ship. When they had now arrived in the enemy’s land, the soldiers bought everything from them. Money was collected, and the commanders gave the pay. Thus it happened that the same money was given repeatedly until they returned home.
That commerce was just if they paid the merchants at the appointed time. From the trade they maintained the army until they could dissolve it altogether. For the state did what was difficult for the merchants, namely κολλυβίζειν, that is, to sell by retail.
§ 12. When the Samians asked the Lacedaemonians to contribute money to them for the recovery of their country, they decreed that on one day both masters and household, and the beasts of burden, should fast, and that each should contribute to the Samians as much as he would have spent if they had not fasted.
This was a small but just subsidy, by which they showed that the state can easily be defended if each person is prepared to assist. Nor do I doubt that, if a thousandth part of the things which perish through luxury were expended upon the Turkish war, the Pannonias, together with Greece and Thrace, could be recovered in two years.
§ 13. When the number of foreign soldiers among the Carthaginians increased and they had no source from which to pay the wages owed them, a proclamation was made that, if any citizen or inhabitant had a right to seize either the city or any private person, and wished to make a seizure, he should declare it. Since very many made declarations, they thus seized ships sailing into the Pontus, putting forward some plausible cause and appointing a fixed time at which they affirmed that they would plead the cases. When a great abundance of money had then arisen, they dismissed those soldiers and adjudicated concerning the seizure. The city made satisfaction from its revenues to those upon whom injury had been inflicted by the seizure.
It was a Libyan deed and Punic fraud, which can nevertheless be excused by necessity. First, the foreign mercenary soldiers were numerous and, unless they received their pay, would have plundered the city and even the harbor. Second, they seized the ships and ἐσύλων, plundered them, as the Greek has it, not in the manner of brigands, but with witnesses brought in and a written record of how much each man had taken—indeed, with it deposited with the state. Third, judges or recoverers were then appointed; and to those from whom property had been unjustly taken it was restored gradually from the revenues of the treasury, namely by giving a loan for the present.
§ 14. When sedition arose among the Cyzicenes and the plebs was victorious, and the rich had been oppressed and captured, because money was owed to the soldiers they decreed that the captives should not be killed, but that after money had been exacted they should go into exile.
Here also mercy intervened, if the city could justly have killed the rich.
§ 15. Since there was a law among the Chians that debts should be registered publicly, when they needed money they enacted that the debtors themselves should pay their loans to the city, while the city should pay the creditors interest from the revenues until the amount paid equaled the principal. Injury was inflicted upon the debtors because they were compelled to pay at their own loss. The moneylenders were deservedly punished in this way, for it would have been lawful to take away the principal itself.
§ 16. Mausolus, tyrant of Caria, when the king of Persia requested through ambassadors that he pay tribute, summoned the wealthiest men in that land and showed them that the king was requesting tribute, but that he himself by no means abounded in money. Certain men who had been suborned then immediately promised that they would contribute and stated the sum. When this had been done, the wealthier men, partly from shame and partly from fear, both promised and contributed more.
There was nothing unjust here, if tribute was truly being exacted, if the matter was not conducted by armed entreaties, and, finally, if Mausolus was not able to pay.
§ 17. Again needing money, he summoned the Mylassans and showed them in a speech that their city, the chief city of the kingdom and the one from which he himself had arisen, was not enclosed by walls, while the king of Persia was bringing an army against it. He therefore ordered the Mylassans to contribute as much money as each could, affirming strongly that by means of the things which they contributed then, they would preserve the rest of their resources. When great resources had been contributed, he himself retained the money, but declared that the god did not wish the walls to be constructed at that time. Now he openly plays the impostor and brings it about that no one will thereafter believe anything from him, even when he is placed in true dangers.
§ 18. Condalus, the prefect of Mausolus, if anyone brought him a gift of a pig or calf when he was making a journey through his province, ordered that the name of the giver and the day be recorded and that the animal be led to his house and fed until he returned. When a sufficiently long time seemed to have passed, he demanded back what the other man had fed, with an account of its produce also calculated. A slave like his master. Τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν λογιζόμενος: that is, calculating the produce—if a sheep had given birth, if it had been shorn, he exacted all these things. But the man played the impostor and stage-player, as is clear from what follows.
§ 19. Likewise he sold the fruit of trees overhanging or falling into the royal roads. If any soldiers had died, he also sold for a denarius the opportunity to carry the body outside the gate. From this he at once received silver and was not deceived by the commanders’ report of the time at which any soldier had died. That man would gather coins from the lower regions themselves and from Pluto.
§ 20. What he judged concerning the Lycians is witty: that they could be milked of their coins by a jest. Aristotle relates the matter thus. Seeing that the Lycians delighted in wearing long hair, he said that royal letters had been brought in which it was commanded that their hair be brought to the locks. He therefore said that he had commands from Mausolus that they be shorn. He promised that, if they wished to contribute a fixed sum per head, he would take care that hair was brought from Greece. They gladly furnished what he demanded, and a plentiful sum of money was collected from a great multitude.
The translator renders τριχοκομίαν or τριχοτροφίαν, “locks,” which has either no meaning or an obscure one. Aristotle says in Greek that they wore Τρίχωμα, that is, that they were long-haired; then that Condalus said that it was necessary ὑποστείλαι εἰς ἀκροκόμια, or προκόμια. What κόμας ὑποστείλαι εἰς τὰ προκόμια means—whether it is to let the hair down to the forelocks, or where it was to be sent—is not very difficult to conjecture, since he says that they ought τὸ κείρασθαι, to be shorn. The cut hair was therefore sent to προκόμια, or perhaps προκομεῖα, places where it was dedicated; for no one is ignorant that there was enormous superstition in this matter. In place of their hair he promises to bring from Greece artificial locks in exchange for the Lycians’ hair. Their hair, therefore, was to be sent somewhere; but where would it be sent except to certain places where it was customarily consecrated to the gods?
§ 21. Aristotle of Rhodes also acted wickedly. Aristotle relates the following about him. Aristotle of Rhodes, holding authority at Phocaea, when in want of money and seeing that there were two factions of the Phocaeans, secretly spoke to one of them, indicating that the others were offering him money so that he would incline affairs toward them, but that he preferred to receive it from themselves and to deliver the administration of the city to them. Upon hearing these things, they immediately gave him as much money as he had ordered. But he in turn showed the other faction what he had received from the first. These men gave no less. Having thus received money from both parties, he reconciled favor between them.
Not a few imitate this, and a Roman arbiter also did it formerly.
§ 22. When the same Rhodian observed that there were many controversies among the citizens, and great injuries in them because of the war, he established a court and proclaimed that, if any had not proceeded at law within the prescribed time, judgments concerning their earlier charges would no longer be granted them. Then, drawing to himself the collection and appeals in a great many causes and disputes, after many terms had been proposed, and receiving something from both parties through different persons, he amassed no small amount of money. Another fraud, and one also too customary. For why is the matter conducted with such vehemence that cases are drawn to specified tribunals, unless because advantages also are drawn there?
§ 23. When the Clazomenians lacked money during a scarcity of grain, they decreed that those who possessed oil should lend it to the state at interest. This produce was plentiful in their region. When the oil had thus been lent, they hired ships and arranged that it be carried to places where markets were held, from which grain came to them, the price of the oil having been given as security. That commerce—the exchange of oil for grain—was lawful; but it was unjust that they commanded those who possessed oil to make a loan to the state.
§ 24. Their other device was much more ingenious. When, Aristotle says, they owed the soldiers forty and eighty sesterces in the name of pay and could not discharge it, each year they paid the commanders ninety-six sesterces in interest. But because by this agreement nothing was deducted from the principal and they themselves continued to make expenditure in vain, they struck iron coin to the value of silver, in the amount of 480 sesterces. They then gave this money to the wealthiest men in the city, in the proportion suitable to each, and received the same amount of silver from them. Private persons therefore had what they might spend upon daily uses, and the city was freed from debt. Then from the revenues they both paid them interest and, always dividing it, distributed it to each according to his share, and received the iron coins back. Aristotle says that they owed twenty talents but paid φόρον τέτταρα τάλαντα, four talents as interest. The citizens could trade with the iron money no less than with silver, since it had force by command of the magistrate, while the Senate exchanged the coins themselves for silver until it received all of them within the fifth year.
Many in necessity have followed this method. Enicus Lupides did so, as Tolosanus relates from Nebrissensis, Book Three, chapter 6, number 26. Thus Enicus Lupides, count of Tendilla, a distinguished commander placed in charge of the city of Alhama in the war of Granada, in extreme desperation concerning money, while awaiting money from King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, made little notes from cardboard with his own hand and marked them with his signature, calling some gold pieces, others silver coins, bronze asses, halves, thirds, and quarters. Purchases and commerce were conducted among them with these, after he had promised that he would give true money for those fictitious pieces after its receipt.
At number 27, Sabellus relates that Domenico Michiel, doge of the Venetians, did the same when he was far from home, besieging Tyre with a fleet in the Asiatic expedition. Since because of a lack of money pay could not be rendered to the rowers and naval allies, he marked leather money with the public stamp; distinguishing it by fixed symbols as gold and silver, he paid it as wages to the naval companies, promising that soon at home gold and silver coins would be presented in equal number to the possessors in exchange for the leather ones. This also was done.
Since this form of money is held valid not by the value of the metal but by valuation alone, which arises from the faith placed in the one establishing it, it must not be used if everything is in doubt; for in that case it introduces despair, much less if no faith is placed in him, for men think themselves mocked. Accordingly, if Mausolus or Condalus should strike coins from leather or lead, no one would accept them. For that money is not properly money but rather a token that true money is to be given, or a promissory note, which we value at nothing if it is given either by an impostor or by a needy man.
§ 25. When the Selymbrians were in want of money, and there was a law that grain should not be exported in time of famine, while old grain remained to them, they decreed that private persons should deliver their grain to the state at an established price, so that each retained sustenance for himself for one year. Afterward they granted to anyone who wished the power of exporting at an established price, which appeared equitable.
There was already famine. Therefore, since it was not lawful to export it, they appeared with a certain right to be able to demand that what remained beyond necessity be sold to the state. The state itself then exported it and sold it at a higher price, which was unjust, for it received the property of private persons, traded with it, and took from them the opportunity of making profit.
§ 26. Because the land of the Abydenes was uncultivated through sedition, and the inhabitants spent nothing further upon it because other debts were still owed, they decreed that whoever lent money to farmers so that they might perform work in the country should receive the fruits produced first, and the others only those which remained.
The zeal for agriculture is praiseworthy, in which those who furnish expenditure to the cultivators are preferred to the owners.
§ 27. When the Ephesians needed money, they enacted a law that women should not be permitted to wear gold, and that whatever gold they had at that time they should entrust to the city. After also establishing a sum of silver which was to be paid, they permitted the name of the man who had paid that silver to be inscribed upon the columns of the temple as though he had consecrated the column.
This was equitable, for they ought to lend to their country rather than, by loving their ornaments excessively, lose both their country and the ornaments themselves. The provision concerning inscription of the name upon the columns was certainly prudent, for by it defense of the country was obtained without injury to anyone—unless perhaps the names of others had already been inscribed.
§ 28. Dionysius possessed various arts of defrauding and gathering money; Aristotle recounts them. Dionysius of Syracuse, wishing to heap up money, summoned an assembly and said that Ceres had appeared to him and commanded that women’s ornaments be brought to her shrine, and that he himself had done this with the ornaments of his own women. He therefore demanded that the same be done by others also, lest the goddess be angered. He pronounced that whoever did not do it would be guilty of sacrilege. When all had brought the things they possessed, both out of regard for the goddess and for him, after the sacred rite had been performed he took away the ornaments as though they had been lent by the goddess herself.
This was a foul deception unworthy of a king, abusing the superstition of wretched women for profit.
§ 29. But the device that follows for chastising female φιλοκαλίαν, love of adornment, was not incapable of imitation, provided superstition were absent. “When some time had passed,” says Aristotle, “and the women again wore ornaments, he proclaimed that the woman who wished to wear gold should dedicate in the temple something of equal value.”
§ 30. When he was about to build triremes, he knew that he would need money. He therefore summoned an assembly and said that a certain city was being betrayed and that he needed money for that affair. He demanded that the individual citizens contribute two gold pieces. They contributed this money. After an interval of two or three days, as though the affair had been frustrated, he praised the citizens and returned to each what he had contributed. By doing this he reconciled their goodwill to himself. Afterward, in the same hope that they would receive it back, they contributed again. Dionysius, however, retained what he then received for building the triremes.
Thus they build up trust in small things so that they may deceive in great ones.
§ 31. When he did not abound in silver, he struck a coin from tin and, summoning an assembly, commended that coin in an abundant speech. The Syracusans, although unwilling, approved it by their decree, and each preferred to regard himself as possessing silver, not tin.
Since neither he himself nor others afterward accepted the tin coins, private persons necessarily suffered this loss contrary to right. For it was just as if he had exchanged χρύσεα χαλκείων ἑκατόμβια ἑπταβοείων: gold for bronze, things worth a hundred oxen for things worth seven.
§ 32. This also belonged to a crafty defrauder mocking his citizens. Again, when in want of money, he asked the citizens to contribute to him. When they denied that they possessed any, he brought out his own utensils and offered them for sale, as though he were doing this through want. When the Syracusans bought these things, what each had bought was recorded. But when the price had been paid, he ordered each man to carry back to him the utensil which he had bought.
§ 33. This too was tyrannical. Because of frequent tributes the Syracusans had ceased to raise livestock. Then Dionysius affirmed that enough had been contributed to him for that use, and that those who thereafter acquired livestock would be exempt. But when many had acquired many animals in hope of immunity, he seized the opportunity, ordered an assessment of what each possessed, and imposed a tribute or payment. Then the Syracusans, resentful that they had been deceived, began to slaughter and sell their livestock. When Dionysius had by edict fixed the number of animals to be slaughtered each day, they claimed when slaughtering them that they were sacrificing. Then Dionysius prohibited the killing of a female animal.
§ 34. This, however, was cruel, although it found imitators. Again, when in want of money, he ordered a declaration to be registered with him of the property of every household whose children were bereft of parents. Once this had been done, he himself used the money until each came under his own guardianship.
§ 35. There is also what he did at Rhegium. After occupying Rhegium, he summoned an assembly and said that he could lawfully plunder their city, but that he wished to release them if only he recovered the expenses made upon that war and three minae for each person. Then the Rhegians brought into view whatever they had concealed. Even the needy borrowed money from wealthier persons and foreigners, and thus they paid that sum. But after Dionysius had received it, he nevertheless both sold them all under the auctioneer’s spear and took away all the household furnishing which they had brought out from concealment.
Here he was a thief and breaker of treaties. But nothing is sacred to avarice.
§ 36. He had borrowed money from the citizens which he was to repay. When they demanded it back, he ordered each to bring him as much silver as he possessed, under penalty of death if they did not do so. When the silver had been brought, he struck coin in such a way that one denarius was valued at two, and with it paid both what he owed and what they had brought to him.
§ 37. When he had sailed with one hundred ships into Tyrrhenia, he took from the shrine of Leucothea a very great quantity of gold and silver and no small quantity of other ornaments.
But because it did not escape him that the sailors also possessed much, he ordered a proclamation to be made that half of what each had taken should be brought to him, and that the man who had taken it could retain the other half. He proposed the penalty of death for anyone who did not bring it. The sailors, judging that if they brought half they would safely retain the rest, brought it. But when Dionysius had received these things, he ordered them again to bring half of what remained.
Thus did that tyrant use not only power but falsehood and frauds to milk men of money.
§ 38. The Mendaeans used the proceeds rendered by the harbor and other taxes for the administration of the city. But they did not exact what was received from land and buildings, and recorded only the names of the occupiers. Whenever the city needed money, these men paid what was owed. They therefore made profit from the past time, having used that money without interest.
That method was most just, for those who occupied the buildings could use the money and thus become rich. If money was not needed for a period of twenty years, they paid nothing; and even then they paid not as much as they owed, but as much as the city needed. Nor did the state suffer loss from this, for they leased those properties at a price higher by as much as they saw that they could profit from the proceeds not paid. Nevertheless, lest they become bankrupt, everything was recorded each year.
§ 39. When the same people needed money in a war against the Olynthians and abounded in a great number of slaves, they decreed that each should retain only two, a male and a female, and sell all the rest, so that private persons might possess money which they could lend to the city.
Without doubt a great sum of money was collected from the numerous and costly slaves. Yet the cause of the edict was that, while the Mendaeans were occupied with war, the multitude of slaves should not be dangerous and occupy the city after expelling their masters, as they had done elsewhere and attempted elsewhere; and then that resources might remain for sustaining the burdens of war.
§ 40. Callistratus, when the customs duty in Macedonia generally sold for 280 sesterces, brought it about that twice as much was received. For when he observed that the wealthier men always bought it because sureties were required, and that sureties worth a talent had to be appointed for those 280, he proclaimed through a herald that whoever wished was given power to buy it and to appoint sureties for a third part and for whatever sum anyone could show that he possessed.
I judge that a prince should frequently employ this method, so that properties are leased in various ways; for in truth men are often persuaded that a thing is of less advantage although it can bring an immense sum.
§ 41. Timotheus of Athens, waging war against the Olynthians, when in want of money, struck a bronze coin and distributed it to the soldiers. When they bore this with resentment, he showed that all things offered for sale by merchants and in the marketplace would be sold to them for the same coin. He showed the merchants, however, that with the bronze coins they received they must in turn buy things offered for sale in that region and booty that had been taken. If any bronze remained, they were to bring it to him and receive silver for it.
We have seen the same practices of creating money above. Here only the difficulty arising from it is removed. From this it is clear that the method has no force unless the money is accepted and there is hope that it can be redeemed.
§ 42. But when he was waging war at Corcyra, suffering from want, while the soldiers demanded pay, refused his command, and threatened that they would pass over to the enemy, he summoned their assembly and said that storms had prevented silver from being carried to him. For he abounded in such plenty that he wished to give them as a gift three months’ pay now, before its time. The soldiers, judging that he would by no means have undertaken so great a loss unless he truly expected the money to reach him, thus acquiesced concerning their pay until Timotheus completed the things which he wished to accomplish.
Aristotle does not explain whether he gave it afterward. Certainly the soldiers believed him, and it was dangerous not to give. A man who refuses just things to one bearing arms gives him everything.
§ 43. His method during the siege of Samos was excellent. When he was besieging Samos, he sold the crops and whatever was in the fields to the Samians themselves, whence an abundance of money was available for paying the soldiers’ wages. But afterward, when many persons came and money for necessities began to circulate in the camp, by edict he forbade the sale of grain or flour in a measure smaller than six modii, and of all liquids in a measure smaller than ten congii. The centurions, therefore, and those who led companies, buying all things in quantity, distributed them to their soldiers. Those arriving brought their own sustenance with them, and when departing sold whatever remained, so that the soldiers now abounded in a plentiful supply of food.
The first point worthy of praise is that, since he could not conquer them by famine, he voluntarily sold them crops which they bought dearly from fear of scarcity, since the field lay uncultivated because of the war. This is an example for illustrious commanders: things captured from enemies which cannot be of use to themselves can be sold back even to the enemies so that pay may be obtained for the soldier. Then, since those who came to the camp wished to procure provisions for only one or two days and could not buy small amounts, they brought them with them, and somewhat more than they needed; when departing they gave the remainder away or sold it cheaply in the camp. Yet merchants and retailers were not thereby turned away from the camp, since they sold many things together without κολλυβισμῷ, minute division.
§ 44. The Persian Didales could furnish daily sustenance to the soldiers whom he had from the enemy’s land, but he did not possess money to pay them. When the day of payment arrived, he devised the following. Summoning an assembly of the soldiers, he said that he was not destitute of money, but possessed money in a certain place, which he also indicated. Breaking camp, he proceeded there. Then, when he approached that region, he advanced into the place itself and took from the shrines there whatever silver vessels he found. Soon he loaded the mules and made the journey as though they carried nothing but silver, while those vessels that projected could be seen. Observing this, the soldiers, judging that whatever the mules carried was all silver, were of good courage, as though about to receive their pay. But he said that they had to reach Amisus and that the silver had to be coined there. The road to Amisus was several days long and difficult because of the cold. During that entire time, therefore, he made use of the army while furnishing nothing except sustenance. Likewise he kept with him in the camp all craftsmen, innkeepers, and exchangers, nor was anyone else permitted to practice any of these occupations.
A stratagem not unworthy of a great commander, provided that he afterward discharged the debt in good faith from the royal treasury.
§ 45. Chabrias of Athens taught Taos, king of the Egyptians, various methods of raising money. Aristotle recounts them thus. When King Taos of the Egyptians was leading out an army and lacked money, Chabrias advised him to show the priests of both sexes that, because of the expenses of the war, it was necessary for him to reduce their number. Upon hearing this, both those priests and each person wishing the administration of the rites to remain his own gave money individually to the king. When he had received it, Chabrias advised the king to order in addition that the priests should thereafter spend only a tenth part of the expenses which they had hitherto made upon the rites and themselves, and lend him the remainder until the war against the king of the Persians was ended. He also advised him to impose a fixed sum upon each settlement as tribute, and likewise upon individual persons. As to grain brought to market, two asses beyond the price were to be exacted from both buyer and seller for each artaba; and upon ships, workshops, and every other business in which profit was made, a tenth part of that profit. When the king was now about to lead the forces outside the land, he advised him to command that each person bring to him whatever uncoined silver or gold he possessed. When it had been brought, he likewise advised the king to use it and to commend those who had lent it to the naval commanders, who would discharge the debts from the tributes.
§ 46. Iphicrates of Athens gave Cotys better advice: that he should command all subject to his dominion that each should recognize a portion of his own land exempted for the king, sufficient for eighteen modii. When this had been done, a great abundance of grain was collected. When it was exported to those places where markets were held, an abundant sum of money was obtained.
Thus he bore the expenses of war from agriculture. If he had listened to Iphicrates beforehand in peace, he would have prepared heaps of grain and money for the uses of war.
§ 47. The deed of Cotys the Thracian was full of treachery. He sought a loan from the Perinthians to enlist soldiers. The Perinthians were unwilling to give it. He therefore asked them at least to send to him some of their citizens to serve as garrisons in specified places, so that he might use elsewhere the soldiers who were then guarding them. The Perinthians quickly did this, judging that those places would thereby be in their own power. But Cotys detained as captives those who had been sent to him, ordered the money sought as a loan to be sent to him, and thus ordered them to receive their citizens back.
§ 48. Mentor, after capturing Hermias and also occupying the places which he had held, did not remove the administrators appointed by Hermias. Accordingly, when all were now secure and again possessed whatever they had long concealed or deposited with foreigners, he captured them also and took away everything which they possessed.
§ 49. Memnon of Rhodes, after gaining possession of Lampsacus, in want of money prescribed a great sum which the wealthiest were to pay, and showed that they themselves would recover it from the tribute of the other citizens. But when the others also had contributed, he ordered that this sum likewise be lent to him for a time, and fixed the time at which the money would be restored. Needing money again, he ordered them to contribute and to recover from the revenues what they had given. They, hoping that they would recover it quickly, contributed. The time was now at hand for the revenues to be received, but Memnon showed that he still needed money then and that he would afterward return what had been received with interest. From those whom he had in the army he also deducted grain and pay for six days in each year, assuring them that on those days they would undertake neither watches nor marches and would spend nothing, because those duties had of course been removed from them.
§ 50. At an earlier time also, when he measured grain to the soldiers on the second day after the new moon, in the first month he passed over three days, in the next five, and proceeded in this manner until he reached thirty. Those who in our time made a military month of five or seven weeks have imitated this.
§ 51. Charidemus of Oreus, holding certain places in Aeolis, when Artabazus was bringing an army against him, lacked money to be paid to the soldiers. At first they contributed something. Soon they said that they possessed nothing more. But Charidemus ordered the inhabitants of the place which he judged richest to send elsewhere any coins or costly vessels they possessed, saying that he would add escorts. It was manifest that he was doing this very thing.
Accordingly, when they trusted him, once they had been led not far outside the city he searched them for anything they possessed, took as many things as he needed, and led them back to the same place. He also proclaimed through a herald that no one in that city subject to his dominion should possess weapons in his house; whoever possessed them was to pay a stated sum of silver. But immediately he himself neglected the matter and showed no concern for it. The men, judging that the proclamation had been made rashly, retained in its place what each had possessed before. But Charidemus, suddenly searching their houses, exacted the established fine from those with whom he found any weapon.
The first had been plunder, the second fraud. For a law ought not to be enacted so that a fine may be imposed upon transgressors. Our princes could collect plentiful money daily in this way, for their laws are generally neglected. Accordingly, if those who violate sumptuary laws concerning meals or clothing were secretly noted, and penalties were exacted when they thought everything safe, the treasury would be increased with great advantage. But it does not belong to a good prince to place laws like snares and traps for his subjects.
§ 52. A certain Philoxenus, a Macedonian satrap in Caria, when in want of money, showed that he was going to celebrate the Dionysia. He enrolled the wealthiest inhabitants of Caria to furnish the choruses, prescribing the things to be prepared by them. Seeing that they were burdened, he suborned certain men to ask what they would give to obtain exemption from the office. They promised that they would give even more than they appeared likely to spend, so that they would not be interrupted and drawn away from their business. When he had received what they gave, he enrolled others until he received from these also what he wished; thus he received something from each.
This mockery was indeed shameful, but nevertheless profitable and customary in another sphere, when those who desire in every way to avoid military service are summoned to it and therefore buy exemption at any price.
§ 53. Euaeses also added avarice and mockery to cruelty. This Syrian satrap in Egypt, when he perceived that the governors of the provinces wished to revolt from him, summoned them to the palace and hanged them all. He ordered their households and relatives to be told that they were being kept in custody. Each therefore labored for his own man and wished to redeem the captive with money. After bargaining over each and receiving the amount agreed upon, he returned each man dead.
§ 54. Cleomenes, the Alexandrian satrap in Egypt, when there was a great famine in other places but a moderate one in Egypt, prohibited permission to export grain. The governors of the provinces said that they could not pay tribute unless it were lawful to export grain. Then he permitted exportation but imposed a great tax upon the grain. It therefore happened that, although not much grain was exported, a great tax was received and the governors were deprived of the pretext which they had put forward.
When famine pressed Egypt, he rightly prohibited the exportation of grain; but when tribute was refused, he found a method by which there would be no pretext for refusing, and nevertheless little grain would be exported.
§ 55. What he determined concerning crocodiles was ridiculous. When at one time he was passing by ship through the province in which the crocodile was regarded as a god, one of his boys was seized by a crocodile. Then, summoning the priests, he showed that, since he had first been injured, he wished to avenge himself upon the crocodiles responsible for it, and gave orders that they be captured. But the priests, lest their god be despised, gathered as much gold as they could and gave it to him.
§ 56. But what he next did was malicious. King Alexander had given him commands to found a city at Pharos and to transfer there the market for merchandise from Canopus. He himself then approached Canopus by ship and showed the priests and wealthy men in that place that he had come for the purpose of transferring them elsewhere. The priests and citizens gave him money which they had contributed so that he would leave the market among them. After receiving it, he departed at that time. Later, when everything had been prepared for building, he again approached Canopus by ship and demanded a vast quantity of money from them, for the difference between having the market there and elsewhere was now so great. When they affirmed that they could by no means pay so much, he transferred them.
§ 57. He nevertheless ingeniously circumvented an unfaithful trader. After sending a certain man away to make a purchase, when he perceived that the man had found cheap goods and wished to enter as expenditure a greater price, he told the man’s associates that he had heard that their friend had bought merchandise at an excessively high price and that he would therefore not approve it. At the same time, with feigned anger, he attacked the man’s idleness. Upon hearing this, they said that he ought not to trust those who said something against an absent man until he returned and rendered his account in his presence. When he returned, they related to him what they had learned from Cleomenes. Wishing to demonstrate everything both to his own associates and to Cleomenes, he reported the price which he had expended in trading.
§ 58. The following was similar. When grain sold in that region for ten denarii, he summoned those who made profit by selling grain and asked how much they wished to receive from him. When they said that they would give it to him for less than to other merchants, he ordered grain to be delivered to him at the same price as to others; but he himself fixed the price of grain at thirty-two denarii and sold it for that amount.
§ 59. Summoning the priests, he said that very unequal expenses were made upon sacrifices in that region, and that therefore the number both of shrines and priests ought to be diminished. The priests gave him both their private and public sacred monies, judging that he would truly do what he said, since each wished his own shrine to be safe and himself to remain a priest.
§ 60. Antimenes of Rhodes, after Alexander had entrusted to him the oversight of the roads around Babylon, obtained an abundance of money in the following manner. There was an ancient law in the region of Babylonia that a tenth part of the things imported had to be paid. No one had used it for a long time. But he observed the time when the arrival of all the satraps was expected, and likewise of soldiers and not a few ambassadors, as well as craftsmen summoned and bringing others, and men traveling in a private capacity, at which time many gifts also were customarily brought. He then exacted the tenth according to the law which existed.
§ 61. Again suffering from want, he ordered that the names of the slaves in the camps be registered by those who wished, and that they be valued at whatever amount seemed proper; they were to pay him eight denarii for each for one year. If anyone’s slave fled, he promised that the slave’s price would be restored. When the names of many slaves had therefore been registered, no small amount of silver was raised. But if any slave fled, he ordered the satrap into whose territory it had come either to arrange its return to the camp or to pay its price to the owner.
§ 62. Ophellas of Corinth, after a procurator of the province of Athridis had been appointed, when the governors of that place’s districts approached him and promised that they would pay much more tribute and asked that he remove the appointed procurator, asked whether they could fulfill their promise. When they affirmed that they could, he did not remove the procurator from his place, but ordered the tributes which they had submitted according to their own valuation to be exacted. Thus he seemed neither to detract honor from the man appointed by him nor to impose greater tribute upon the governors than they themselves had established, while manifold money came to him.
§ 63. Pythocles of Athens gave the Athenians counsel that the state should receive Tyrian lead from private persons at the price for which it sold, namely two denarii, and that the city should then sell it at the established price of six denarii.
That fraud belongs to forbidden monopoly; for the state ought not to trade in such a way that private persons are compelled to buy.
§ 64. Chabrias, having compelled a number of men sufficient for 120 ships to assemble, although he needed no more than sixty, ordered the remainder to pay two months’ wages to those who were in the sixty ships or themselves to sail. Desiring to remain with their own affairs, they gave what he had commanded. Antimenes ordered the supplies customarily stored for the royal roads to be furnished by the satraps according to the law of that region. Whenever either the army or another multitude suffered want in the king’s absence, he sold some of the supplies that had been stored for a little less than half price.
§ 65. Cleomenes defrauded the soldiers of one month. When the new moon approached and pay was to be given to the soldiers, he deliberately arrived by ship. Then, when the month departed, he sailed away after paying the wages. Afterward, in the following month, he deferred payment until the next new moon. Because the soldiers had received their pay a little before, they remained quiet. Thus, by passing over one month in a year, he withheld one month’s pay from the soldiers.
§ 66. Stabellius, when he owed the soldiers pay, summoned the commanders and said that he had absolutely no need of them personally; and that whenever he needed soldiers, if he gave each of them silver, they could thus be sent away to hire foreign soldiers. He said that he would more willingly give them the wages which he was compelled to pay to the soldiers. He therefore ordered each to dismiss his men, so that they would depart from that region company by company. The commanders, judging that they would make some profit from the affair, dismissed the soldiers as Stabellius had commanded. After a short interval, when they had assembled, he said that neither a flute-player without a musical company nor a commander without soldiers was of any use, and ordered them to leave that region.
§ 67. Dionysius, going around the shrines, whenever he saw a little golden or silver table set out “of Good Fortune,” ordered wine to be poured into it and commanded that it be carried away. As for statues of such a kind that they held out a bowl in an extended hand, he ordered it to be removed, saying that he accepted it. He also stripped golden cloaks and crowns from the statues, saying that he wished to give them things both lighter and more fragrant; and thus he wrapped them in a linen cloak and crowns of violets.