§ 1. The ancients ingeniously appointed Saturn as guardian of money—sluggish, slow, morose,
scarcely opening the coffer once in the great year; but over collection, as over every gain, they appointed Mercury. For he, equally welcome to those above and those below, swifter than the rushing east wind when he puts on his winged sandals, runs over lands, seas, and the lower regions themselves, and sometimes even puts the heavens themselves up for auction; from everywhere he gathers what the never-sated greed of Saturn may store away. So it is: greedy courtiers repeatedly prescribe tributes at every movement and every opportunity, and run about with their Mercury’s wand. Let us therefore speak of this defense, not of the spoliation of the state.
§ 2. The power of imposing tributes is granted to the state, that is, to the authority which is supreme. At Rome the Senate exercised the right of striking coin, and therefore there was also the inscription S.C., that is, senatus consulto, “by decree of the Senate.” The matter was then entrusted to the monetary triumvirs, who marked the coin by their own authority and indicated it by these letters: III VIRI A.A.A.F.F.—triumviri auro, argento, aere flando feriundo, “the triumvirs for casting and striking gold, silver, and bronze.” To this faculty was formerly added this right of majesty: no one except the supreme magistrate could impose tributes or exactions. Law 3, Code, On the Establishment of New Taxes: It Is Not Permitted. This right was formerly by no means communicated to cities. Now almost all princes and free cities use it. But I must treat not the right, which is clear, but the manner.
§ 3. Customary and moderate customs duties, revenues of public land, and tributes are not to be remitted, although they annually yield ten times more than is expended upon roads, bridges, magistrates, and rewards for brave men. For the preparation for a single war will consume more than the peace of many years. Cicero complains to Atticus of the diminution of taxes: the port duties of Italy removed, the division of the Campanian land impending, and even the twentieth part to be taken away. Honorius and Arcadius, Theodosius and Valentinian, provided that taxes not be diminished. Nero attempted it with youthful impulse, but was restrained by prudent men, Tacitus, Annals 13; for they repeatedly said that the strength of the empire would be broken. But the freedmen easily shook that thought from him, since they inflamed him toward plunder.
§ 4. The cause of taxes ought to be just. Thus Novel 149:
If any of them—that is, of the magistrates—has conducted himself negligently in the exaction of public tributes, or has involved our taxpayers in losses or insulting injuries, he shall at once fall from his goods and be subjected to the supreme punishment. For, with God as our guide, this one concern is ours: that the provinces be governed by good laws, inhabited in safety, enjoy the justice of their governors, and that public tributes be paid without complaint. For otherwise it is impossible that the state be preserved if the sacred tributes are not paid. The military forces, receiving thence the salary assigned them, resist enemies and vindicate the taxpayers from the incursions and savagery of barbarians; finally, by keeping watch they defend fields and cities from the incursions of robbers and others who pursue a disorderly manner of life. From these tributes the remaining cohorts also receive what has been assigned to them; walls and cities are likewise restored; the heating of public baths proceeds thence; finally spectacles and all other things invented for the delight of individuals are cared for from the same source, so that what is contributed by them is expended and laid out partly upon them, partly on their behalf. But it falls to us to possess nothing except the care of these things, yet not without reward, since that great God and our Savior Jesus Christ, from the greatness of his clemency, rewards us with very many goods on this account.
And Novel 16, title On Provincial Governors, chapter 2:
The thought of securing these things by law came to us because the wealth and well-being of our subjects is of greater value to us than the revenues which are thereby brought into the empire. For together with the largesses of the governors we also reduce the fees paid into the imperial accounts, which produced a great heap of money, in order that this cause and the state may obtain a better outcome and return richer, freed from the payments devised by certain persons some time ago. For this one matter is the concern of our power: that the provinces be governed by good laws and inhabited safely, and also obtain the fruit of the justice of their governors, and that public tributes be paid without complaint. For otherwise it is not possible to preserve the state unless the payments are most dutifully brought into the public treasury; from them military forces are maintained so that enemies may be resisted and watches kept throughout fields and cities; likewise the other orders are furnished with the salaries assigned them, walls and cities are repaired, and finally all the other things arise which preserve the common utility of the subjects.
For since the prince presides over the body like its head, he ought to employ reason and love when receiving sustenance from the other members, and to remember that he is carried by the members and will fall when they languish.
Hadrian certainly remitted debts owed to the treasury. Spartianus.
Cato restrained embezzlement, as Plutarch relates in his life.
Tiberius answered that gold collected with the affliction of subjects and offered to him was adulterated and poisoned.
Masinissa made all Numidia exceedingly abundant from being uncultivated.
Philip, the father of Perseus, increased the revenues of the kingdom by agriculture and the digging of mines.
Through the harshness of contributions the English lost Aquitaine, and Alfonso’s heirs Naples.
Hybicas used to say to Antony: “If you want two collections, grant two harvests.” Plutarch, Antony.
For subjects are bound to contribute nothing other than what suffices for the honorable maintenance of the prince and the defense of the state. Magistrates receive tribute so that they may be guardians and defenders of justice. Nor is it the will of the people, nor can it prudently be, that they contribute so great resources for no or slight advantage of their own.
John de Salas, most learned in theology and law, rightly warns in On Laws, treatise 14, disputation 15, section 10, that it is most difficult to judge concerning the justice of a tribute:
It is exceedingly difficult to judge that a tribute imposed upon non-exempt subjects by a legitimate prince is unjust, because all private persons cannot judge the cause which moved the prince to impose the tribute. For it is often hidden and just. Often also it can seem to have ceased because it was temporary, or certainly because it is not put into execution as had been decreed or promised; and nevertheless the tribute is not immediately unjust, either because another cause has arisen or because the prince, beset by other actions or burdens, is compelled to cease from one work so that another more urgent one may be accomplished. Next, it is difficult to condemn a tribute from a defect of distribution alone: both because the manner of distributing can scarcely be established when a tribute is imposed simply upon some kind of thing and it is incidental whether it is sold or bought by these or those persons; and also because, if some greater burden from a tribute falls upon certain persons, it is customarily compensated through other means, such as by increasing the price of other things.
Hence mere uncertainty concerning the cause and the other conditions required for the justice of a tribute is not sufficient for the obligation of paying the tribute to cease, because knowledge of these matters does not
belong to every particular person; and the prince, who possesses universal prudence, can be moved by many just reasons which cannot readily become known to others. Hence I say that a merely negative doubt is not of itself sufficient to excuse one from payment of tribute. For it is often founded solely upon ignorance of the reasons or conditions of the tribute, which is not sufficient against the action performed; and because in doubt the presumption favors the prince, unless it is otherwise established that he is a tyrant. Otherwise ordinary people could never be bound, because of themselves they would always doubt unless they rested upon the good faith of their superiors.
Therefore Julian not unsuitably took care that tributes not be granted away through indulgences. For if people never contribute anything, war can scarcely be waged.
§ 5. When a new tribute is needed, let it rather be divided into small sums, for thus it is neither burdensome nor does it furnish astute ministers so great an occasion for theft. Cypselus had bound himself by an impious vow that he would sacrifice all the fortunes of the Corinthians; yet he did it by a mild command, for he sacrificed a tenth and thus only in the tenth year discharged his vow. Therefore the tribute paid to Antony by Asia was unjust also from the manner of demanding it, when he said: “Lest you be driven from your cities and fields”—Appian, Civil Wars 5—“money must be given for the use of the soldiers, and not the greatest sum, but one at the hearing of which you may willingly be at rest. In two years you gave our enemies, Cassius and Brutus, the tributes of ten years. Let these suffice for us also, except that they must be given in one year.” Gaius Sulla had furnished the example, for in the Mithridatic War he commanded that the taxes of five years be given immediately. Here the proportion of years is not observed, and the poor must necessarily be overturned from all their goods.
Golden is the judgment of Suárez, book 5, chapter 16, §1: “For if a tax is imposed upon immovable property, it ought not to exceed a moderate amount, with its fruits and the labors and expenses made upon it taken into account; for if the tribute becomes too burdensome in this respect, it will plainly be unjust. But if it is imposed upon movable things which are sold and bought or made by craft, care must be taken that such things are not of this sort, or that the tribute is small and not great, lest it redound to a greater burden upon the poor, craftsmen, or merchants than they can conveniently sustain while maintaining life and family.”
§ 6. A tax must be exacted in proportion to each person’s property and means. Otherwise the poor must necessarily be flayed, not shorn, something not even Tiberius—the cruelest of the avaricious, the most avaricious of the cruel—desired. For such men cut out the roots so that the plants do not grow again. Hence Servius established the census among the Romans, as is found in Livy, Florus, and others. The first class possessed one hundred thousand asses; the second, seventy thousand; the third, fifty thousand; the fourth, twenty-five thousand; the fifth, eleven thousand. A smaller valuation, or the sixth class, contained the remaining multitude. The equestrian valuation was different. The same method existed among the Athenians. Demosthenes, On the Public Services. Cato conducted the census avariciously, Livy 39, though he did certain things rightly, as when he assessed ornaments. For even now that man will act rightly who assesses ornaments and women’s clothing rather than the little fields and stones of countrymen; for those things too belong to their means.
Here account must also be taken of the things upon which the tax is imposed. For taxes imposed upon things conveyed for the sake of trade are unjustly extended to things intended for use, which is prohibited in the laws Universi and Omnium, Code, On Taxes. The Turk exacts an apparently small tribute when he plans war against Christians—one ducat from each person—but burdens his own people with another burden.
§ 7. The treasury is the collection of public goods; it is sometimes called the fisc. For the private patrimony of the prince is rarely called the treasury. The public treasury is not properly the prince’s patrimony, nor can he use it with full right except for public use. It is great praise for a prince to take from his private fisc and increase the public treasury. Thus Hadrian, according to Spartianus, forbade the goods of condemned persons to be brought into the private fisc, the whole sum being received into the public treasury. King Minyas, as Pliny, book 33, chapter 3, and Pausanias, Boeotia, book 9, attest, is said to have been the first to build a treasury—but among barbarians; treasuries had long before been constructed in Egypt. Thus our Suárez rightly judges in On Laws 5.13 that tributes must be paid even by commutative justice. Indeed, he rightly teaches in §9 of the same place: because the debt of maintaining the king and sustaining public burdens is natural, and tribute imposed by a just law is the means of justice.
Those who doubt whether a treasury is to be possessed and increased are not worthy of the name “political writers.” Yet questions have been published concerning this matter.
§ 8. When the immense and uncertain expenditures of war must be sustained, it is better to impose men, horses, and ships; for people tolerate all these things more easily than a contribution of money. They call this kind of tribute angaria, when the labor of persons, horses, and oxen is demanded. Yet care must be taken in this matter that public works not be exacted at the time of plowing, harvest, vintage, or fairs, something ministers frequently do in order to elicit money. Next, they must not be compelled to carry wine, grain, and other things to a distant place. Verres used this practice, and now the mercurial agents of princes are not ignorant of it. For example, one hundred wagonloads of wine are owed to the prince; they are valued at the highest price; the subjects wish to deliver wine, not money, but they are ordered to carry it a long distance at the busiest or a rainy season.
§ 9. Care must be taken that thefts by officials do not intervene; nowhere is wrongdoing more serious. Antony and Dolabella commanded Asia to pay two hundred thousand talents; avarice and the frauds of the tax-farmers added as much again. Today also, when people consent to a contribution, additions for the collectors are appended that are far too large. Our eyes teach how great an error is committed in these matters. For most officials who are put in charge of money, although at first they are thin and juiceless like the driest sponges, and, like the cows Pharaoh saw, misshapen and wasted by leanness, such that he had never seen their like in Egypt, nevertheless soon grow fat, although the prince is reduced to the last extremity.
Lipsius thinks that in the age of the princes there were no tax-farmers in the provinces of the Caesars, for they raged too violently. Julius removed both their injuries and the injurious men themselves, permitted the fruits to be collected from the farmers, and introduced tributes. There are many examples concerning Verres which today are repeated with greater ruin.
§ 10. An even greater error occurs when revenues are pledged or given to nobles. Henry III, king of Castile, corrected this practice. Because the same execution is necessary today, take the history as follows from Mariana, book 3, chapter 7.
Henry, the third king of Castile by that name, a man of lofty spirit, followed this course: when he was older and possessed of prudence, he freed the revenues seized by the nobles, in a memorable example. While still a minor he was staying at Burgos, a city in Old Castile, and was accustomed to amuse himself by hunting quail. It happened once that he returned to court very late in the day, exhausted by the delay and by his labor, and no food had been prepared. When the royal provisioner was summoned about the matter, he reported that not only the king’s money but also his credit had been exhausted. The king, concealing his present distress, ordered mutton to be bought after his cloak had been pledged, and a meal to be prepared entirely from it and the quail that had been caught.
During the meal he heard that the nobles were in a better condition: every day they attended the most sumptuous feasts among themselves; free from every other care, they vied in the luxury and splendor of their tables. That night there was to be a dinner at the house of Pedro Tenorio, archbishop of Toledo. The king came with his head wrapped. He saw everything overflowing with festivity and delights. When dinner was finished, each was to report for himself how much revenue he received annually from hereditary towns and how much from royal revenues.
On the following day the king, eager and resolved upon vengeance, pretended that he was confined by a grave illness and wished to give his final commands. At this announcement the nobles, hurried and afraid, came from different directions to the citadel. Their servants were excluded, as had been ordered; the nobles were admitted and remained in the dining hall until late in the day, wondering at the cause of the delay. At last the king entered among the nobles armed with iron and with drawn sword. When he had seated himself among them, all terrified by that sight, he asked the nobles with a stern expression, as though angry, how many kings each had seen in the province. Some answered two, others three or four, according to each man’s age. “Indeed,” he said, “what you say is true, although at my age I have nevertheless known twenty kings in Castile.” Wondering at the reason for the statement, with anxious minds awaiting the issue of the affair, they listened. “You,” he said, “all of you—you, I say—are kings. Having occupied the strongholds and resources of the kingdom, you have left me an empty title, squalor, and want. Does that seem an adequate cause for treating us as a mockery? But lest you do it any longer, I shall make a decree upon all your heads.” At the same time he ordered the things required for their punishment to be prepared and brought forward. In a loud voice he summoned the lictors and six hundred soldiers whom he had secretly held ready.
While the others were stunned with fear, the archbishop of Toledo, as he was a man of great spirit, fell upon his knees and, with tears streaming over his whole face, begged pardon; following his example, the others did the same. He granted pardon to those filled with fear of death and making supplication. Nevertheless, he decided not to release them from the citadel before one or two months had passed. During that interval they were compelled to deliver the strongholds and revenues to the king. Thus did he bear a spirit beyond his years, and manly care. It is no less shameful for public revenue to be appropriated for the pleasures of the prince than for the luxury of nobles. For it is public patrimony, not the prince’s.
§ 11. It is the counsel of many, including the most prudent, that revenues be established for the advantage of the country; this can be done with such moderation that, even if they are great, they nevertheless burden or trouble no one. Let no or very small customs duties be established upon common, necessary, and useful goods, but many and heavy ones upon useless, harmful, and costly things without which this life, whatever it is, is lived well—indeed, upon the craftsmen themselves. Bodin, book 6, On the State, chapter 2, says truly: “The tribute most pleasing to God, most honorable to the king, and most useful to subjects is that which is imposed upon those things that tend to corrupt morals.”
I remember seeing, in places where beer is used and wine is scarce, a third part of the wine paid to the state, because they deny that wine is necessary for their citizens. Therefore, it is in the interest of the polity to press with a heavy tribute those who sell sugar, unnecessary spices, and enticing preserves of Indian delicacies. It is likewise just to reduce by exactions confectioners, sellers of delicacies, and innkeepers dealing in foreign wine, since they are exceedingly harmful to morals. Indeed, a state will readily impose a tax, never unjust, upon purple, cotton cloth, silk trimmings, Attalic coverlets, and gilded vessels, since money is better expended in aiding the public welfare than in corrupting morals by luxury.
The Romans certainly imposed immense duties on Arabian wares, pearls, and precious pearls. This was accomplished by the Romans. Cicero, Against Verres, complains that the allies lost sixty thousand sesterces through Verres’s exports—according to Lipsius, 1,500 Philippei—and this from the twentieth part at the port of Syracuse alone. Behold a twentieth as a customs duty. In Justin an eighth is given, and those who exact it are called octavarii. In the speech For Quinctius and in Symmachus, a fortieth occurs. Lipsius rightly says that things imported more for delights and display than for use paid a heavier duty. Caesar established a duty upon foreign merchandise; I believe one existed before, but the customs duties were increased by Caesar. Alexander Severus had this intention when he established a tax upon makers of armlets, linen-workers, citron-wood workers, furriers, wagon-makers, bankers, goldsmiths, and other trades—rightly, if they were useless trades. Would that he had done the same to cithara-players and others who corrupt youth.
§ 12. They should also impose greater duties upon all foreign goods that are unnecessary, although not useless. In this way money will remain in the province—for example, duties on English cloth, Sarmatian skins, Gascon wines, and the like. For if we wish to hear and speak the truth, what do foreign regions bring to Germany without which it cannot live, except perhaps Dutch fish and cheeses? Why, therefore, do importers of foreign wares carry so many millions away from here? I seek a spirited prince who will abolish these things, or a frugal one who will grow rich from them.
Pliny, book 11, chapter 1, says that Arabia, India, and the Seres take one thousand million sesterces—two and one-half millions—from the empire; and in book 6, chapter 23, that those wares sell for a hundred times their cost. There are several causes, but the chief is the size of the customs duty. For if they sold for a hundredfold, were not two hundred and fifty millions produced from them? If they spent fifty millions upon the journey and gained one hundred from two and a half, what great thing is it if they contribute one hundred millions to the state? The luxury of those who buy them at a hundredfold for ostentation cannot complain of this, nor can the wicked toil of merchants who supply foreign nourishment to the vices of fools. Luxury has brought them to those prices.
§ 13. Since tributes are frequently increased through the harpies and swallows of the people, since they turn the labors and sweat of the people into their rewards and stir up hatreds and curses against the prince, care must be taken that the prince learn the complaints of his people, demand an account from the procurators, and cause it to be described item by item what has been spent by each. If anyone is found to have exacted more, let him be punished as a traitor to the prince.
I understand this not only of the amount of money and goods, but also of coin, which they demand disdainfully as unworn and exact to the standard, and not at its common price, so that poor people can scarcely find among the coins they possess any fit for those thieves. Yet all kingdoms cry out against them, and still they grow rich. Therefore my counsel is that everything be delivered to certain men of unimpaired fidelity chosen by the people, and that they, in the magistrate’s presence, deliver it to the king.
The whole kingdom of France approved this counsel, as Bodin reports. He says that he was present at the estates among the Tectosages when a petition was made to Henry II, king of the French, that he remove fraudulent men and money-scrapers. They promised that they would faithfully present all tributes on the appointed day and would even carry them to whatever part of the kingdom the king designated; this would benefit both king and people. The king approved the counsel, but, drawn away from his judgment by specious arguments, left the treasury
and his subjects to be harassed by coercive collectors. For they not only exacted more but also returned less, equally faithless to king and kingdom.
Richard, king of Britain, acted with much greater spirit, inflicting the supreme punishment upon those convicted of guilt. Antoninus Pius prescribed that moderation to his officials. He ordered his procurators to receive tributes moderately and commanded those who exceeded the limit to render an account of their deeds. He never rejoiced in gain by which a provincial had been oppressed, and willingly heard complaints against his own procurators.
Caligula, in keeping with his character, did the contrary. He administered new and unheard-of revenues, first through tax-farmers and then, because the profit was abundant, through centurions and tribunes of the Praetorian Guard, omitting no class of things or persons upon which he did not impose some tribute. A fixed and established charge was exacted upon foods sold throughout the whole city; a fortieth of the amount at issue was exacted for lawsuits and judgments wherever undertaken, with a penalty if anyone were convicted of having settled or relinquished the case; an eighth part of the daily earnings of porters; and from the takings of prostitutes, as much as each earned in one act of intercourse. It was added to the heading of the law that those who had practiced prostitution or procuring were liable to the public revenue, and that marriages were also liable.
A harsh and unjust exaction gave rise to the great war concerning which Tacitus writes in book 4 of the Annals. Drusus had ordered a moderate tribute from them, in view of their straitened circumstances: they were to supply ox hides for military uses. No one took care what strength or dimensions they possessed, until Olennius, formerly a chief centurion and appointed to govern the Frisians, selected the hides of aurochs as the pattern according to which they should be accepted. This was difficult for other nations and still harder to endure among the Germans, who had forests productive of immense beasts but small herds at home. At first they surrendered the oxen themselves, then their fields, and finally the bodies of their wives or children into servitude. Hence came anger and complaint. When no relief came, they sought a remedy in war: the soldiers present for the tribute were seized and fastened to the gallows. Olennius anticipated their hostility by flight and was received into the fortress called Flevum, where a by no means contemptible force of citizens and allies guarded the shores of the Ocean.
Claudius was in no less danger. Suetonius Tranquillus says of Claudius Caesar: “He ordered all orders to contribute a part of their assessed property, and in addition required tenants of private houses and apartment buildings to present a year’s rent to the treasury. With great disdain and severity he demanded unworn coin, refined silver, and purified gold, so that many openly refused the entire contribution and, by agreement, demanded that the rewards which the informers had received should rather be recalled from them.”
§ 14. I approve the wisdom of the ancient Romans in providing against the difficulties of the times. They had three treasuries. The first, which they also called sacred, was in the temple of Saturn, a most strongly fortified place; they praise Valerius Publicola as its founder. In the same place records, military standards, laws, and decrees of the Senate were preserved. They brought twentieths into this treasury, and it was reserved for the final emergencies of the state. It was opened in the Second Punic War, when Fabius was consul for the fifth time and Flaccus for the fourth; then again during the civil war. It was an enduring treasury appointed only for a Gallic war, Appian, book 2, Civil Wars.
The third was the richest, and into it were brought the tributes and revenues of citizens and allies, spoils, and the census of the people. Caesar plundered it, as Lucan relates:
Then from the lowest depth of the temple is dug out The census of the Roman people, untouched for many years, Which the Punic wars had given, which Perseus, Which the spoil of Philip had given to you; What Pyrrhus left to you, Rome, when he fled in terror; That for which Fabricius did not sell you to the king for gold; Whatever the customs of frugal ancestors preserved; The tribute which the rich peoples of Asia sent; And what Minoan Crete gave to victorious Metellus; What Cato carried over distant seas from Cyprus. Then the wealth of the East, and the last treasure of captured kings, The treasure displayed before Pompey’s triumphs, Is carried out; the temples are despoiled in mournful ruin.
But he did not spare even the more sacred treasury when he needed money and knew that the greatest dangers were imminent; for the Spanish and Pharsalian battle, the African war, and the final battles at Munda remained. States will have acted entirely rightly if, in a fortified place which not even the prince may enter without the consent of the nobles, they store away a treasure for the last emergencies.
It is therefore vainly disputed by newly fledged political writers whether it is expedient for a treasure to be preserved in a state. For just as in a household it is very advantageous, when money is at hand, to purchase everything at the proper time and not miss opportunities, so it is necessary in a state. For this reason we read of David’s treasuries not only in the citadel but in cities, villages, and towers; likewise those of Hezekiah and others. The Hebrews built for Pharaoh, who did not know Joseph, cities of tents, or treasuries; for in the same places in which the treasuries were situated were the military garrisons or tents.
The objection that public wealth can be seized by an enemy or sedition, and that the country can be oppressed by its own riches, is refuted. For no one therefore neglects money because his house is exposed to thieves. By that argument they would prove that neither towns, fortresses, nor ports ought to be fortified; indeed, that wealth ought not even to be possessed privately, lest an enemy or evil citizen have the means to harm his country. Vigilance is required; and when dangers threaten, the cities of the treasuries must be fortified, which ought to be strong and trustworthy.
I do not approve the counsel of the Athenians, who had a treasury at Delphi, protected by superstition alone, which an enemy, atheist, or witty man could easily borrow from Apollo. A Brennus, Dionysius, or certainly a Diagoras was needed. For the common treasury of Greece on Delos was meager; the individual cities provided for themselves.
Augustus very prudently established a separate military treasury. Suetonius, chapter 99: whatever soldiers there were anywhere, he bound them to a fixed schedule of pay and rewards, defining according to each man’s rank both his period of service and the benefits of discharge, lest through age or want after discharge they could be stirred to revolution. And so that funds for maintaining and rewarding them might always be available without difficulty, he established a military treasury together with new revenues.
This was prudent counsel, for the other expenditures upon magistrates, works, and ordinary gifts were regular and perpetual, whereas war demands great, sudden, and uncertain expenditures; and because the empire extended widely, war was being waged in different regions at the same time. This treasury at first consisted of the collection of twentieths paid from legacies and inheritances, unless the heirs were blood-relations or poor. This was a great tribute in so great an empire, but unjust, because the other revenues sufficed to support the army, but were consumed upon games, the fattening of the people, and the cruelty of the arena.
A twenty-fifth part of slaves sold was added, an altogether great sum amid so many myriads of saleable slaves, their frequent transfer, and their price—matters which Lipsius considers excellently in book 2, On the Greatness of Rome. To these was added a hundredth part of goods
sold. The separation of that treasury is to be approved, but the new exactions were not necessary. The kings of the Persians poured molten gold and silver into earthen vessels, Herodotus, book 3, and did not have different treasuries for war and peace. Yet lest accounts be confused and so that what is destined for extreme emergencies remain intact, it is expedient that those things which must be expended extraordinarily be separate.
§ 15. Lipsius teaches that Roman revenues consisted of tithes, pasture, and customs duties. First, they received a tenth part of grain—Appian, book 1, Civil Wars—and this is evident from the speeches against Verres. This was generally imposed upon conquered peoples and lands. From plantations and orchards they took a fifth. For pasture they agreed upon a fixed price, for the tax-farmer leased out the land and drew up the accounts; therefore the land was called scripturarius, and that revenue scriptura. A great profit was also made from goods imported or exported. These were just if imposed upon the lands of enemies conquered in a just war.
Among these, the Spaniards and Africans, and even the Gauls, were in the worst condition: both their lands and their persons were assessed more heavily. They called the latter a poll tax, and it is evident that it was severe. Lampridius says that those who under Heliogabalus had paid ten gold pieces paid a third of one gold piece under Alexander. From that census they knew the number of persons. Josephus says that there were 750 myriads of people in Egypt, and that this was clear from the tribute which individuals paid per head. Augustus arranged and increased all these; Vespasian increased the tributes of all the provinces and doubled them for some, as Suetonius says. These were for the most part exceedingly unjust, since not only were such amounts given, but they were exacted with the utmost harshness.
§ 16. A Christian prince, therefore, must act so as to abolish some tributes, moderate others, and reduce them to the ancient rule. Under Servius’s institution the tribute was slight; Tarquin increased it, but it was again reduced to its original form. Thereafter it was long observed that the rich contributed according to their census and the poor by their labor. Now tributes grow in Germany because, amid great mutual distrust, each fortifies himself. But if with united minds they spent against the Turk the money with which they frighten one another, they could all procure territories twice as extensive for themselves. Thus subjects are burdened and yet treasuries are not filled, although the sole end of tributes is that the poor not be burdened in time of war.
§ 17. But when tributes are exacted lawfully, it is unjust to refuse them. Accordingly, the penalty established by Servius was chains and death, as Livy says. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that it was provided by law that those who evaded their declaration or wished their goods to be valued at less should be flogged, their goods confiscated, and themselves sold. Zonaras says that those who did not report themselves or their goods for assessment were sold—the persons by the consuls and their goods by the censors. Herodotus testifies in book 3 that the Persians acted with the same precaution. For Darius apportioned the tributes and collected 14,560 Euboean talents annually, perhaps not a great sum for maintaining the army. But those who impose tribute upon nations conquered in a just war are readily excused. Thus Jotham commanded the Ammonites to pay one hundred talents of silver and ten thousand cors each of wheat and barley.
§ 18. There are three conditions of a tribute for it to be just: authority, cause, and proportion. If any one of these is absent, the tribute will not bind. Authority resides in the supreme prince; the cause is public necessity; proportion means that the tribute corresponds to people’s means. With these conditions posited, I judge with our John de Salas, treatise 14, disputation 15, section 10, that all are bound to pay tributes. Those whom he cites think thus: Gabriel, book 4, distinction 15, question 5, article 2; Antoninus, part 2, title 1, chapter 13; Sylvester, under the word gabella, question 8; Medina, On Restitution, question 13 and those following; Castro, book 1, On Penal Law, chapter 10, toward the end; Córdoba, Summa, question 95; Hostiensis, book 3 of the Summa, title 1, chapter 13, On Assessments, § For What Causes; Panormitanus with others upon the chapter We Renew, On Assessments; Covarruvias, rule Sin, part 2, §5, no. 5. There he therefore binds merchants who sell, buy, and transport goods to declare themselves and make their tender to tax-farmers and exactors.
The foundation is that tribute is not a penalty but a true debt founded upon a true title of justice. But whoever is bound to pay a debt without any compulsion or exaction is bound—even if it is concealed—to disclose it to the creditor or to pay it. Hence Matthew 17: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,” namely tributes, as all understand; and Romans 13: “To all their dues: tribute to whom tribute,” and so forth. Likewise, tributes are as it were a just stipend given to the king for his service and for the expenses necessary to defend and govern the state. But the hired laborer is worthy of his wages, nor is the mouth of the ox threshing grain to be muzzled. For the same reason tithes are owed even if not sought, because they are a just stipend and the owed maintenance of ministers; but the king is God’s minister for the state, Romans 13.
And manifest reason proves it. The prince has the right of commanding; therefore, when the command is legitimate, it must be obeyed. Many contend that payment is required only when it is rigorously exacted, because, since penalties are attached, the laws seem to be merely penal, and because otherwise a great snare would be cast upon consciences. These reasons, I say, accomplish nothing. For even if a penalty is established with the law, the law nevertheless binds conscience. It would indeed be absurd for a legitimate prince to bring just revenues for the necessities of the state to such a condition that he is not obeyed unless he exacts them rigorously, with armed hand and severe threats. This is to be unwilling for princes to be mild and gentle.
No honor sufficiently great can be shown to a good prince, and will you abandon him as he keeps watch for you, and not aid him unless compelled by evil? Next, if you lawfully owe it, rigorous exaction is therefore not to be awaited. For by resisting you cause him to exact it rigorously, and, as though you were a bad debtor, you do not permit the debt to be canceled unless force or law is employed. Finally, delay often carries danger; when aid does not come promptly, others who are ready are offended. Accordingly, authors who think otherwise err dangerously, and perhaps seditiously, if the question concerns right. But I believe rather that they think thus concerning tributes which are everywhere imposed without necessity; the counselors of princes, the swallows of the people, are accustomed to be accused of these, although the princes themselves are truly condemned.
§ 19. Exemption from just tributes must in no way be granted without a just cause. This can happen in two ways. First, the prince may remit the tribute to someone. When he does this without just cause, he sins partly by prodigality and partly by injustice, because he deprives the state of the protection owed to it. This latter kind of offense has its greatest place in revenue that must be expended not upon the prince but upon the state. But if a fixed sum has been commanded from the whole state or city, the prince cannot exempt some and incline the burden upon the rest. For even if individuals feel little loss, all are nevertheless injured; indeed, contrary to right a sum is imposed upon all, and from this arises mortal sin.
For if someone extorts one hundred gold pieces by fear from the inhabitants of a territory, although the multitude is such that individuals pay only one denarius, the injury is nevertheless grave, and he is bound to restore the one hundred gold pieces. Here, so far as the obligation is concerned, the reasoning is the same. For the prince exacts from the others what one man is bound to pay. It is certainly of great importance that exemptions of this kind not be granted. If a prince is pressed by the importunity of certain persons, let him either show them his own obligation or satisfy it from his private patrimony.
I give this warning because of certain men who always incite princes to collect tributes, yet when the matter comes to action most shamelessly demand immunity for their own estates. Although they redeem the infamy of this crime by another wickedness: in collecting tributes they contrive that something always remains over as an honorarium for the prince; it is then given to those very men, who boast that they have paid the revenues from their own possessions.
§ 20. Tributes which are given for the public cause not only require a cause; they also cease when the cause ceases, unless another cause has succeeded it. Those which are given to the prince for expenses and labors remain free. The continuation of a tribute when its cause has ceased is altogether damnable. Our Suárez defines the matter thus, book 5, On Laws, chapter 15, §§5–6:
Concerning this condition, it must be considered that, if we speak of tributes which are paid to the king himself for his expenses and because of his labors and vigils, the justice of such tributes does not depend upon their use. For whether the king later spends such revenues badly or well, he will not be unjust in receiving the tributes, because he is truly their owner and can freely dispose of them without injustice, provided that he fulfills his office by governing and defending the state as he is bound. Otherwise, if he fails in this, he will unjustly receive and retain these tributes, which are given on account of his office and are like wages for work, which one who does not labor receives unjustly.
But if we speak of tributes imposed for the common works of the state, it is clear that they must be expended upon such works; otherwise fraud and injustice are committed, which lies rather in the reception and retention of that tribute than in its imposition. For the imposition could have been just if a real cause was present, but afterward reception or retention becomes unjust from the lack of the required use. It is therefore necessary that the tribute be expended upon the work for which it was imposed; for the king does not properly become owner of that tribute, but its steward. Hence at most he will sometimes be able, when a true necessity arises, to transfer it to another work which also pertains to the common utility of the kingdom or people; for with respect to this he possesses supreme power and administration.
From this it is further inferred that tribute depends, so to speak, upon its cause both in coming to be and in being preserved. For if the cause is necessary for the justice of the title, the tribute cannot last longer than the cause, because when the cause—which is certainly necessary and adequate in its own kind—ceases, the effect ceases: chapter When It Ceases, On Appeals. The Gloss explains it in almost this way, citing various laws in the chapter After the Translation, On Renunciation, at the word ceasing; and the Doctors note it on law When the Father, § Sweetest, Digest, On Legacies, book 2. But in the present matter, the cause is necessary for the justice of the tribute, as has been said. Therefore, when it ceases, the justice ceases, and consequently the tribute ought to cease.
This is confirmed because, if tribute is exacted after the cause has ceased, more is now exacted than is necessary; therefore equity and justice are not observed in it. For, as we have said, the proportion between the amount of tribute and the demand of the cause is necessary for the justice of the tribute. Therefore, if the cause is perpetual, the tribute will be able to be perpetual; but if the cause is temporal, the tribute ought also to be temporal, so that when the cause ceases, it too ceases.
Nevertheless, the cause is just if, by consent, the contributions are useful for increasing the treasury, are brought into it, and are not expended upon other uses. Therefore it is expedient that they be brought in before the eyes of all. Thus Aristotle, Politics 5, chapter 8: “Therefore, lest the treasury be plundered, let public money be delivered in the presence of all the citizens; and let copies of the accounts, diligently compared with the exemplar, be distributed and deposited among the wards, centuries, and tribes. And so that magistracies may be administered without gain, honors ought by an enacted law to be decreed to those whose fidelity and diligence in office have been proven and observed. Now in democracies the wealthy must indeed be protected, not only by not dividing their farms and estates, but also by not dividing their fruits individually and transferring them to others—a thing which occurs in some forms of governing the state, yet is not noticed.”
§ 21. The last counsel is to warn all rulers to take the least possible amount in tributes. For through them they burden themselves with hatred, diminish commerce, destroy agriculture, and render the prices of things—especially estates—very low. And although the prince is armed with persuasion and violence, poverty is nevertheless unconquerable. Indeed, it cries freely with the Roman people: “May the devil take the new revenues, and their authors with them.”
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, when he saw ancient towns in ruins and their inhabitants few, restored everything by remitting revenues. What prince’s quaestor now does not favor the treasury more than justice? How many make the treasury a place of spoliation and a receptacle of bloody plunder? Danger is never greater than when the ignoble crowd riots because of tributes. When Hannibal threatened, the Romans withheld tributes and did not aid the state until the Senate set the example, although necessity stood before their eyes. How much more will they do so if they understand that the arrogance of courtiers is supported at their loss, as the city of Paris objected to Charles VI? The Lydians hanged Achaeus when he had exhausted everything by tributes.
For the benefit of those who suggest to princes new methods of exacting money—that is, of plundering—I shall append from Erasmus a tale, whether history or fable, that is certainly pitiable. In Paris, he says, in the grain market, there is shown a sewer in which a certain man ordered himself to be buried, because he repented too late of an evil counsel. He had seen the king sad and anxious; the cause of his grief was a straitness of money. In order to relieve the king, he advised that one or two small bronze coins be exacted even upon the small goods which countrymen brought into the city, and that this be done for only two years. When they saw that no small quantity of money was collected from this in a very populous city, more exactions were devised according to this example. When the man who had given the counsel saw that he did not possess the same authority in dissuading it that he had possessed in advising it, he fell into the greatest sorrows of mind, so much so that he despaired even of his salvation. In order both to exact punishment from himself for his ill-considered counsel and to warn others not to strike against the same stone, he provided in his will that he be buried in that sewer into which the filth of the whole market flows. The enforcement of the exaction remains there even to this very day.
But these things move little those whom avarice has blinded, who have reached such madness that sometimes they are administrators of the most filthy gains. The Chrysargyron, as Cedrenus says, was a payment of such a kind that every beggar or poor person, every prostitute even if retired, and every slave and freedman paid into the treasury for urine and dung—also the dung of beasts of burden and dogs—
whether they lived in the country or in towns. Men and women each paid a silver coin; a horse, mule, or ox the same amount; an ass and a dog, six folles.
Yet men sought the office of collecting this tribute no differently from a military command or civil magistracy, as Evagrius says. The jurists call the contractors for the same right foricarii. O how those whom wealth commands consider nothing shameful! Those who are blinded by avarice never lack their nightingale’s song; those greedy for gold never lack the pretext that security is sought for the kingdom. Princes who were rapacious and greedy of their own accord and had no need of teachers nevertheless always learned more from us against us. But after the prince has done everything, he will correct some things, not all; many, when open dangers of theft arise, will turn their minds to cunning and impostures.
The necessity of revenues is shown in law 1, § In the Cause 20, π., On Examinations: a city cannot be sustained without expense. See Bulenger, On the Revenues of the Roman People. A city without a treasury is fragile.
Egypt paid a fifth part, Genesis 47; Sicily a tenth, Cicero, Against Verres; the Indians a fourth, Strabo, book 11, to their kings. Babylon paid an artaba of silver each day, Herodotus, book 1; see also Herodotus, book 3. Lipsius thinks the Gauls gave Caesar four millions; others, one million. The latter is truer, for they also supplied grain, labor, soldiers, and other things. And at that time one million was worth more than ten are now.
Tacitus, book 13: the Senate prevented Nero when he wished to remit tribute, lest the empire be dissolved.
Nicephorus collected a tax from smoke, as Zonaras says, which he called καπνικόν.
A tax was given upon shade, with Pliny, book 12, as witness.
Michael the Paphlagonian scraped money together from the air; Cedrenus calls it ὑπὲρ ἀερικὸν, and Chrysostom says, ἀὴρ ὠναῖς ὑποβάλλεται. “Air is for sale.”
There was also another tax called ἀλληλέγγυον, the obligation of the rich on behalf of the poor. It was called chartiaticum when they paid two folles to officials for documents. The twentieth of Augustus is well known—altogether a tolerable tribute, and one which I would recommend. Those who were neither the nearest agnates nor poor gave a twentieth part of an inheritance or legacy. His invention too was the twenty-fifth part of slaves sold, altogether a great revenue at a time when they had armies of slaves and slave-dealers. All owed a fortieth to tax-farmers, Quintilian, Declamation 359. Caligula exacted a fortieth of lawsuits, Suetonius. A fiftieth of wild beasts was added.
Augustus instituted a hundredth part of goods sold; Tiberius converted it to a two-hundredth, but afterward restored the hundredth; Caligula remitted it for Italy. Appian, in the Syrian Wars, says that the Syrians and Cilicians paid a hundredth of assessed property.
The urine tax of Vespasian was exacted from fullers who used urine; jars stood in alleys. Macrobius, Saturnalia 3.17. Another was the foricarium.
I have spoken of the Chrysargyron; I have no intention of stirring further controversy about it.
A tenth was deducted from legacies made between spouses. Alexander Severus instituted a tax upon craftsmen, but for the most part upon those who were unnecessary. Lampridius.
Caligula also wished marriages to be taxable, although what he exacted is not stated individually; some understand it of those who were procurers of their wives at home. A brothel tax existed in the time of Claudius.
In the Triumvirate an eighth part was exacted from freedmen in Italy, Dio, book 10; from freeborn men, a fourth of annual income. Isaac Comnenus imposed a tribute upon villages; Pertinax received revenue from lakes and rivers. There was also a ground rent, when houses had been built upon public soil. More severe was the tax of thirds, when a third part was paid from fields. A tribute for the dead was as profitable as it was wicked. Cicero, book 2 To Quintus His Brother, admits that the tribute of the aediles was unjust and heavy. The siliquaticum was imposed upon all merchandise. The sextarius paid in Apulia and Calabria seems to belong here. The tribute for the furnishing of recruits was great. Tenants also brought twelve drachmas into the treasury.
Add to these all revenues, tithes, pasture-dues, poll taxes, the income of the meat market, and saltworks, and an immense quantity of money will result. There are so many other names which I have omitted that in a short time the state drew everything to itself.