§ 1. In matters so uncertain and fluid, counsel and reason must be employed. For although states never perish except when their counsels are corrupt, even good counsels can nevertheless be ineffectual and lack success. But, as I have said, no state has perished except through corrupted counsels; for I have not yet found an example to the contrary. Hence it belongs to the prince and senate always to think about stabilizing, strengthening, and increasing power, and to contrive that there be no day upon which something is not added to the strength of the state. For although most things depend upon occasions, the weak are nevertheless struck most severely; the less powerful you are, the more is exacted from you. The blow which casts down the languid rouses the strong, and that which extorts prayers from the sluggish awakens the strength of the angry. Nothing among mortal things is so fluid as power, but it must be held in many ways lest it flow from one’s hands. Health too is a fluid thing, which cannot subsist without the proper tempering and integrity of so many limbs and humors, and, besides these, the wholesomeness of air and food; yet it is not therefore neglected, but is preserved with great care and expense.
§ 2. A just method of acquiring power must be entered upon. For those who inflict injury upon inferiors and then, increased by their strength, subjugate others to their dominion, act altogether unjustly. And they build power upon a fragile foundation—that is, upon injustice. For unbridled power commits many evils, and therefore easily collapses.
§ 3. The reason why power must be acquired is evident: because without it we cannot protect our fatherland. For since the number of the covetous and wicked is very great, the state cannot break injustice without power. Subjects, therefore, will be prey, exposed to the insolence, rapacity, violence, and cruelty of all; nor will the princes themselves be safe, but they will be objects of contempt and will reign on sufferance. For the right of rule without power is like a body without a soul: it is a statue, not a living thing. Therefore, since government has been instituted to defend all and each from injury and, if they have been harmed, to avenge and restore them to their former condition, and to preserve the society of citizens, a nerveless and powerless prince can by no means attain this end. Those men, therefore, do not act prudently who so establish a state that it cannot be safe from neighboring princes, pirates, and robbers except by the power of another. Justice surely requires a strong patron and an unconquered champion.
Let that king according to the heart of God, King and Prophet David, be for us an example of acquiring power. His power in a kingdom not very great seems to me almost greater than the forces of all kings. For in addition to the people he maintained a great number of soldiers. Thus it is described in 1 Chronicles, chapter 27: “Now the sons of Israel according to their number, the princes of families, tribunes and centurions, and officers who ministered to the king according to their companies, entering and departing month by month throughout the year, were each set over twenty-four thousand. Over the first company in the first month was Jesboam, the son of Zabdiel, and under him were twenty-four thousand. Of the sons of Perez, he was chief of all the captains in the army in the first month. The second month had the company of Dudia the Ahohite, and after him another named Macelloth, who governed a part of the army of twenty-four thousand. The captain also of the third company in the third month was Benaiah, the son of Jehoiada the priest, and in his division were twenty-four thousand. This is that Benaiah who was the mightiest among the thirty and over the thirty; and over his own company was Amizabad his son. The fourth, in the fourth month, was Asahel the brother of Joab, and Zebadiah his son after him; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The fifth, in the fifth month, was the captain Shamhuth the Izrahite; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The sixth, in the sixth month, was Ira the son of Ikkesh the Tekoite; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The seventh, in the seventh month, was Helez the Pelonite, of the sons of Ephraim; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The eighth, in the eighth month, was Sibbecai the Hushathite, of the stock of Zerah; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The ninth, in the ninth month, was Abiezer the Anathothite, of the sons of Jemini; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The tenth, in the tenth month, was Maharai, also a Netophathite, of the stock of Zerah; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The eleventh, in the eleventh month, was Benaiah the Pirathonite, of the sons of Ephraim; and in his company were twenty-four thousand. The twelfth, in the twelfth month, was Heldai the Netophathite, of the stock of Othniel; and in his company were twenty-four thousand.”
Behold, a guard for the royal court—twenty-four thousand, in addition to the ordinary attendants, ministers, and throng. To what end was this multitude? First, to uphold royal dignity; for who would rebel when he saw so many garrisons in the cities and an army in the palace? Second, that he might be feared by his neighbors, for they were very brave men; for whatever brave and industrious man he saw, he associated that man with himself. Third, by this means he made the royal city illustrious. Fourth, he conciliated for himself the love of the tribes. Fifth, he fostered the study of arms, for in that splendor of the kingdom, in the sight of the brave, they exercised themselves in that battle line of the praetorian soldiery. And zeal for military affairs was kindled in a wonderful manner when the tribes contended concerning the adornment of arms and skill. Sixth, by this occasion also, in the royal city, where there was an abundance of priests and learned men, they were most easily instructed in religion. Nor did David sin against the divine precept; for he had gathered resources and a bodyguard for the protection of his subjects and the restraint of peoples whom he had subjugated by war, without injury to the Israelites.
But why do I speak of David? Behold Jehoshaphat, king of two tribes, Judah and Benjamin. His power is described in this manner in 2 Chronicles 17:14: “There were also warriors and strong men in Jerusalem, whose number by the houses and families of each was this. In Judah, the captains of the army: Adnah the captain, and with him three hundred thousand very strong men. After him Jehohanan the captain, and with him two hundred and eighty thousand. After him also Amasiah the son of Zichri, consecrated to the Lord, and with him two hundred thousand brave men. He was followed by Eliada, strong for battles, and with him two hundred thousand bearing bow and shield. After him also Jehozabad, and with him one hundred and eighty thousand soldiers equipped for war. All these were at the king’s hand, besides others whom he had placed in walled cities throughout all Judah.”
Who would not marvel at 1,160,000 men in that kingdom? Nor was that soldiery in garrisons, but at the king’s hand; for by turns it attended the court and was sent upon sudden business. The text expressly excepts the garrison soldiers—those in the cities and throughout all Judah.
In the same chapter, verse 2, there are other garrison soldiers in the captured cities: “And he stationed numbers of soldiers in all the cities of Judah which were fortified with walls.”
When I consider these things, they would seem to me almost incredible if Scripture did not say them; and then what is said about Roman greatness seems small. For the king maintained these soldiers without tyranny and did not exhaust his subjects with tribute, but filled them with an abundance of all things. “Moreover, he built in Judah houses after the fashion of towers and walled cities.” God bestowed so great a power upon a single kingdom which afterward was an appendage of a single province of Syria—how small a part of the Roman Empire? But he who is truly powerful displayed such great power in so small a kingdom. For so far was he from emptying the treasury with so great an army, contracting debt, attacking towns, and selling rights and immunity that he accumulated treasures besides. For verse 13 says: “And he prepared many works in the cities of Judah.” The Hebrew has, “and he had much work”; καὶ τὰ ἔργα πολλὰ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ. It calls the buildings בירניות, for they are palaces, temples, edifices. Thus in Ezra 8:2, ἐν τῇ βάρει τῶν Μήδων, and Daniel 8:2, “I was in Susa, in the palace,” ἐν βάρει. בירה also frequently signifies a city, 1 Chronicles 29. “For the palace is not for man.” Therefore it is just as though he said that he built palatial buildings, lofty and towered. They think that בירניות is said from אבר, because they are strong. Then “walled cities,” ὀχυρὰς; the Hebrew has מסכנות, “of treasures,” because treasures were stored in fortified places. Then those soldiers were not barbarians or unwarlike, but גבורי חיל, “of robust strength,” verses 14 and 16; and in verse 17, two hundred thousand armed with bow and shield. Verse 18 has חלוצי צבא, “girded or equipped for war,” words by which brave, trained, and well-armed soldiers are designated.
What, therefore, if he had been obliged to fight against Alexander the Great or the most powerful Romans? Surely he would have been equal or superior; for he was more powerful than all of them in this respect: although fortified by so great a soldiery, he was nevertheless rich. Verse 5: “And riches and glory were made infinite for him.” Indeed, he gave his sons many gifts of silver, gold, and precious things, with fortified cities—מצורות, ערי מבצר—“with cities of fortifications.” He was therefore continually able, in addition to the garrisons of the cities, to maintain 1,160,000 brave men; and he did this in time of peace, while he gathered resources. What, then, in time of war? Yet, when he heard that neighboring nations were rising up, he was afraid, proclaimed a fast, and conquered by prayer. 2 Chronicles, chapter 20. This is what I warn: so powerful a king set, not his treasury as his power, but his face to seek God, who fought for him and left to him only the labor of gathering the spoils for three days. He feared that, if the Lord were not with him, all that force would collapse upon itself, just as happened in the enemy camps. Thus Scripture, 2 Chronicles, chapter 20, verse 22.
§ 4. Concerning power, this must especially be warned: that its timely use not be delayed until it is diminished; that if an enemy attacks, he be repelled with the whole effort; if wicked citizens rebel, they be restrained at the very onset, while their counsels still waver in uncertainty. The Romans formerly erred gravely in estimating their strength during the Second Punic War, but at last, with great spirit, they corrected the error for which they paid with much blood. Florus weighs the matter well in book 2, chapter 6:
Meanwhile the Roman began to breathe again and, as it were, to rise from the dead. There were no arms: they were stripped from the temples. Youth was lacking: slaves were freed into the military oath. The treasury was in need: the Senate willingly brought its wealth into the common stock, and, beyond what was in their amulets, belts, and rings, they left themselves nothing of gold. The equestrian order followed the example, and the tribes imitated the knights; finally, the tablets and the hands of the scribes scarcely sufficed, when, in the consulship of Laevinus and Marcellus, private wealth was conveyed into the public treasury.
And in electing magistrates, what wisdom of the centuries there was, when the younger sought counsel from the older concerning the creation of consuls! For against an enemy so often victorious and so crafty it was necessary to fight not only with courage but also with his own counsels. Fabius was the first hope of a returning and, so to speak, reviving empire: he devised a new victory over Hannibal—not to fight. Hence came that new surname, salutary to the state, “the Delayer”; hence that saying from the people, that he should be called the shield of the empire. Thus throughout all Samnium, through the Falernian and Gauran passes, he so wore down Hannibal that the man who could not be broken by courage was diminished by delay. Thereafter, under the leadership of Claudius Marcellus, Rome even dared to engage him: it came to close quarters, drove him from its Campania, and struck him away from the siege of the city of Nola. Then, under the leadership of Sempronius Gracchus, it dared to follow him through Lucania and press upon the rear of the retreating man, although at that time—O shame!—it fought with a servile hand.
O dreadful confidence amid so many adversities! O singular spirit and courage of the Roman people! When its affairs were so constrained and afflicted that it was doubtful about its own Italy, nevertheless it dared to look in different directions; and while enemies flew at its throat through Campania and Apulia, and were already making Africa out of the middle of Italy, at the same time it both sustained this enemy and sent arms in diverse directions through the world—to Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. Sicily was entrusted to Marcellus and did not resist for long. For the whole island was conquered in one city. That great head, Syracuse, undefeated before that time, although defended by the genius of Archimedes, at length yielded. Its triple wall, its equal number of citadels, its marble harbor, and the celebrated fountain of Arethusa—what did they avail except this much, that the beauty of the conquered city was spared?
Gracchus seized Sardinia. The fierceness of its people and the savagery of its “insane” mountains—for so they are called—availed it nothing. Violence was inflicted upon the cities and upon Cagliari, the city of cities, so that a stubborn people, holding death cheap, might at least be subdued by longing for its native soil. Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, sent into Spain, had taken almost all of it from the Carthaginians; but, crushed by the ambushes of Punic fraud, they lost it again. They indeed had cut down Punic resources in great battles, but Punic ambushes overwhelmed the one with the sword while he was laying out his camp, and the other, after he had escaped into a tower, by surrounding him with firebrands. Therefore Scipio, sent with an army to avenge his father and uncle—he for whom the fates had decreed so great a surname from Africa—recovered all that warlike Spain, renowned for men and arms, that nursery of the enemy army, that instructor of Hannibal, from the Pyrenees to the Pillars of Hercules and the Ocean—an incredible thing to say. You would not know whether he did it more quickly or more easily. Four years attest how quickly; even one city proves how easily: for on the same day on which it was besieged it was captured, and the fact that Spanish Carthage was conquered so easily was an omen of the African victory.
Yet it is certain that the singular chastity of the commander contributed especially to subduing the province; for he restored to the barbarians captive boys and girls of surpassing beauty, and did not even permit them to be brought into his sight, lest he should seem to have touched the integrity of their virginity even with his eyes.
Amid these operations in diverse lands stood the Roman people; yet for this reason it could not dislodge Hannibal, who clung to the entrails of Italy. Most cities had defected to the enemy, and that very fierce commander used Italian strength too against the Romans. Yet by now we had struck him out of most towns and regions. Tarentum had now returned to us; Capua too—the seat, home, and second fatherland of Hannibal—was held. Its loss caused the Carthaginian commander such grief that thence he turned all his strength against Rome. O people worthy of command over the world, worthy of the favor and admiration of all men and gods! Driven to the extremity of fear, it did not desist from its undertaking; anxious about its own city, it nevertheless did not abandon Capua, but, leaving part of the army under the consul Appius and sending part with Flaccus to the city, it fought at once absent and present.
Why, then, do we marvel? When Hannibal moved his camp from the third milestone, the gods themselves—for a second time, the gods, I say, nor shall it shame me to confess it—gave testimony. For at each of his movements so great a force of rain was poured down, so great a violence of winds arose, that the enemy seemed to be driven off by divine agency, not from heaven but from the very walls of the city and from the Capitol. And so he fled, yielded, and withdrew into the farthest gulf of Italy, leaving the city all but assaulted. A small matter to tell, but sufficiently effective to prove the greatness of spirit of the Roman people: during those very days in which it was besieged, the field which Hannibal occupied with his camp was offered for sale at Rome and, placed under the spear, found a buyer. Hannibal wished in turn to imitate their confidence; he offered the bankers’ shops of the city for sale, but no buyer was found, so that you may know that even the omens were sufficient.
Nothing had been accomplished by such courage and such favor even of the gods. For Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, was coming from Spain with a new army, new strength, and a new weight of war. It was undoubtedly all over if that man had joined himself to his brother; but Claudius Nero, together with Livius Salinator, conquered this man too as he was pitching camp. Nero had driven Hannibal into the farthest corners of Italy. Livius had turned the standards toward an entirely opposite region and the very jaws of nascent Italy. With so great—that is, with the entire length of Italy—an expanse of soil lying between, it is difficult to say by what plan and speed the consuls joined their camps and, after bringing their standards together, crushed an unsuspecting enemy. Certainly, when Hannibal learned the matter and saw his brother’s severed head thrown before his camp, he said, “I recognize the misfortune of Carthage.” This was that man’s first confession, not without a certain foreboding of impending fate. But nothing was more wonderful than that, while Hannibal still clung to Italy, Scipio was sent into Africa.
These things Florus says, fully and truly, in praise of his Romans. But if at the beginning they had expended even half the care and expense, it would have been easy for them to rout Hannibal—indeed, to occupy Africa. Saguntum was captured; armies were lost at the Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae; cities of Italy were alienated, captured, and turned against the Romans; fields were devastated and villas burned. Only then did they fight in earnest and send armies into Africa. Ought this not to have been done at the beginning? Upon hearing that Saguntum was being besieged, they ought to have prepared a strong army for Spain, a stronger one to meet Hannibal, and the strongest to attack Africa. This was easy while their affairs were intact; after they had been cut down it was arduous, but nevertheless it was done.
Greater was the error of the Constantinopolitan emperors throughout the time when Turkish power was growing. They never resisted it in earnest, though the error could still have been corrected around the time of the siege of Byzantium. For if Palaeologus had been willing to spend even the tenth part of his gold, he could have made from the Christian kingdoms an army equal to the Turkish one. But they brooded over buried gold, of which they were afterward not only stripped, but many were also cut to pieces by tortures so that they might reveal it. Nor was the error of the Christian kings smaller. There were six thousand Greek soldiers and three thousand Venetians and Genoese; in the harbor were seven Genoese ships, three Cretan, and some from Chios. The Venetian fleet looked on, as did all the Christian princes, who afterward paid great penalties for their negligence by the loss of so many kingdoms. But then, if each king had sent three ships, each prince one ship, and each city two soldiers as aid, we would still hold Greece, Macedonia, the islands, and Hungary. Yet we continue in the same error: we do not give a part of our resources in time to ward off the enemy, soon to give all. How slowly, how meagerly, and not without harsh conditions were subsidies decreed for the Hungarian war some years ago? I do not speak of those who secretly conspired with the Turk. And yet no one now doubts that, if Pannonia is occupied and the Hajduks and other Hungarians are let loose into Germany, we shall fight for all our fortunes and our liberty.
For if the power now necessary for the frontier princes is not assembled, after their provinces have been occupied they will oppress us by means of the resources seized and the nations conquered. Nor will those nations be gentler toward us, but will exact penalties for the aid denied them; and those who were first the shield of the German Empire will begin to be thorns in our sides. Let these observations suffice in general concerning the necessity of power and its just and timely use.