§ 1. Concerning the security of Ambassadors, our Carolus Scribanius has written better than all others. Their security is sacred by the public law of nations. Everywhere among nations, even among Barbarians, they are inviolable. At Rome, if anyone had struck them, he was judged guilty of treason and was surrendered for punishment to those who had sent them, so that they might punish him according to their judgment. If he was spared through the humanity of those injured, they nevertheless did not receive him into citizenship. Varro, On the Latin Language; Cujacius, book 11 of Observations, chapter 5. Necessity is the procurer of so great a privilege, lest the society of the human race perish. Security itself includes the power to come, remain, and depart—indeed, also to conduct business. They therefore act wickedly who restrict the liberty of Ambassadors by fear or corrupt them with gifts. The ministers of Arcadius Caesar were injurious in all these ways toward the Ambassadors of the Roman Pontiff; Zeno and others sinned in the same manner, something abominable among Christians. The harshness of the Swiss War was remarkable, when beggars and girls were employed as Ambassadors because men were insufficiently safe.
§ 2. When enemy Ambassadors and those of others are warned not to come, or that they will be held as enemies and spies, or are ordered to depart by a prescribed time, the law of nations is not violated if the reason for so harsh a decree is just or appears prudent. If those barbarous decrees are made from arrogance, hatred of peace or enemies, or an immense hope of victory, this is contrary to the law of nations: to cut off every hope of peace or pardon and to refuse even to enter into conference. For even a state which has injured another so greatly that it is attacked in a just war possesses the right to send Ambassadors, to entreat, to make a compact, and to intercede for its innocent people, who constitute the greatest part. It is not bound to surrender its people to servitude or slaughter; humanity and the law of nations command that satisfaction be accepted without destruction. Coriolanus acted contrary to the law of nations when he declared that, if they sent Ambassadors, he would hold them as enemies. The King of Syria during the siege of Samaria and others acted with the same injustice and cruelty. The Athenians can be excused when they rejected the Ambassadors of Kings. Basilides, Duke of Muscovy, killed some Ambassadors after driving a great nail through their heads, and sent others home cut limb from limb and salted. Formerly the people of Fidenae furnished examples of equal barbarity and paid for them with their own destruction.
But if Ambassadors possess no evil in their intention or mandates and come altogether innocently for the sake of sincere peace, yet the condition of affairs and men is nevertheless such that, if they wish, they could contrive sedition and treachery, they are rightly forbidden to come; and if they do not obey, they can be killed, for they cast themselves headlong by their own rashness. The state ought not to trust them but to act so that it is safe through its own counsel and caution, not through the innocence of enemies. The Senate does not dispute whether the enemy wishes or does not wish to cause harm, but resolves to provide matters in such a way that, even when he most wishes it, he cannot cause harm. Accordingly, Ambassadors who come in opposition to that security of the state violate the law of nations.
§ 3. Those who deny that Ambassadors are secure unless they first send a Herald and obtain permission to come understand the law of nations insufficiently. A Herald or Trumpeter is safe by the law of nations, under no other right than an Ambassador. The right of each is equal; indeed, the sanctity of the Ambassador is greater. Otherwise the Herald too would require a forerunner. Those who procure security for an Ambassador from a pledge sought and given through a Herald abolish the entire law of nations. For in that manner any man whatever is secure, since a pledge cannot be violated without crime. An Ambassador is inviolable by his own sanctity and the consent of the entire world. He is venerable amid the weapons of enemies, not by the promise of one Prince or King, and he does not bargain for protection; rather, he carries with himself rights and laws whose violator is not to be tolerated even by any barbarism.
They allege the custom of Ambassadors, who are accustomed to send ahead men to announce their arrival and ask that they be permitted to approach with favorable leave. Yet that very practice asserts the right of Ambassadors. For if the Ambassador’s messenger or forerunner is safe by the law of nations because he is the Ambassador’s servant or courier, how much more is the Ambassador himself? The reason for giving notice of the arrival is both that it may be established that he is an Ambassador and that civility and courtesy may be observed, lest a new guest arrive unexpectedly before the Prince and so that provision may be made concerning lodging and other matters.
§ 4. Moreover, the things which are said concerning the security of Ambassadors pertain only to those to whom they are sent, not to others. For if we detect enemy Ambassadors proceeding either to other enemies or even to our friends, it will be lawful to intercept, detain, or kill them. For they are enemies. Thus the Romans detained Ambassadors of the Samnites who were journeying to the Etruscans; the same Romans intercepted those of the Carthaginians, the Athenians those of the Persians, and Charles V those of Francis I who were proceeding to the Turk. This is the perpetual practice of nations: that they intercept not only enemy Ambassadors but even their letters.
§ 5. Through an offense an Ambassador loses his right and immunity. Yet not every sin of this kind is such that he forfeits his right. For the private disgraces of an Ambassador—drunkenness, fornication, blasphemy—merely render the Ambassador infamous and are turned into a reproach against the Prince by whom he is sent; by those to whom he is sent, they are customarily dissembled. But concerning crimes which bring injury upon others—such as adulteries, murders, and thefts, whether committed by the Ambassador himself or by his household—although all concede that they ought not to be unpunished, they nevertheless dispute concerning the punishment. Many judge that the cause must be referred to the Prince by whom he was sent. For another Prince is not Judge of an Ambassador, since the Ambassador is free from his scepter; moreover, it is burdensome to undergo judgment among foreigners, rivals, and enemies.
To me, certainly, the law of nations does not appear to permit an Ambassador license for crimes or to take defense away from those who have suffered injury. Is the Prince of the injured party not the Judge of the Ambassador? But the Ambassador’s Prince is not the Prince of the injured party. There is nevertheless a reason why my Prince should punish the Ambassador; there is no reason why he should dispatch me to accuse him before a foreign Prince. The Ambassador is judged in the place of his offense. I ought not, through no fault of my own, to be compelled to foreign tribunals. It belongs to natural law that a brigand, thief, or incendiary be punished by that Prince whose subjects he has harmed. Brigandage, theft, and adultery have punishments established by the law of nations, for no nation is so barbarous that it has not imposed vengeance for those crimes by law. The Ambassador therefore deserves punishment by the law of nations. But the man whose house he has plundered or whose wife he has violated can be compelled by no right to accuse the malefactor at Byzantium or elsewhere. Neither the length of the journey, the measure of the expenses, nor the system of the courts permits it. By law and desert, therefore, the Ambassador is judged in the place where he is known to have sinned. But if he has contrived sedition, tumult, or treachery, he himself has already violated the law of nations first and is punished by right. For it would be foolish to send him back to his own Prince, from whom he possessed not only license for the crimes but even mandates, and who will instead give him rewards. The law of nations protects only an innocent embassy.
§ 6. Although these things can be done by strict law, I would nevertheless counsel moderation and a certain surrender of his own right to the injured Prince. If an Ambassador kills a private person and confesses it, let the Prince conclude the affair by a settlement, admonish the Ambassador’s Prince, seek his judgment, or refer the cause to neighboring Princes or Academies. If the matter is obscure and requires examination, let him ask the sending Prince for Commissioners to take part in the inquiry, or let him delegate the cognizance to others. In this manner the Prince will obtain praise for justice and moderation even among enemies, and therefore love, reverence, and authority. No occasion will be furnished for violating the law of nations; then an opportunity for complaints will be cut off. For never, or rarely, will the Ambassador of a foreign Prince recognize equity in his judgment; and, to clear himself, he will endeavor to render the Judges suspect.
But if he is said to have conspired against the Prince or state or to have attempted something else, because the matter is secret I should generally prefer him to be dismissed rather than entrust the affair to an inquiry. If the matter is notorious, it pertains to the security of nations that the violator of that law not be without punishment.
§ 7. If an enemy has killed our Ambassador, crime must not be weighed out for crime. I am not ignorant that many Jurisconsults, in the law If It Has Been Agreed, π., For Partnership, judge this lawful and employ the saying: “Let fidelity be broken toward the same man who breaks fidelity.” For the law, they say, is not violated but returned. More prudent men, however, rightly pronounce this too unjust. For an Ambassador is secure, sacred, and inviolable absolutely by the law of nations and in his own person, and does not lose his right through another man’s crime. Nor ought another Prince to be an imitator of a foreign crime; rather, he ought to protect and favor the innocent man. For who would undertake an embassy if he saw that his own safety depended upon another? What if the Prince is offended with his own Ambassador or despises his life? Toward a Prince who breaks fidelity, promised fidelity is rightly broken; but it ought not to be broken toward an Ambassador, to whom it is owed by the law of nations.
Indeed, that principle has no place even with captives. For if Hannibal slaughters four thousand captives contrary to the pledge given, the Senate at Rome will not therefore kill the Carthaginians to whom a pledge has been given. For the pledge was given to the captives themselves so that they would not fight to the point of extermination and, through despair of their own life, draw others into destruction. Indeed, not even hostages can be killed unless, willing and knowing, they themselves stipulated that law for themselves.
§ 8. If an enemy detains our Ambassador, most writers concede that his Ambassador can also be detained so that ours may be freed. Yet not even this must be conceded without
caution. For the law of nations always protects an innocent Ambassador, whatever his state, against his will, may sin. He does not cease to be sacrosanct, because of the necessary society of the human race, against which it is not lawful to offend by another man’s example. Scipio assuredly presented himself as such toward the Carthaginians. For when they had killed the Romans, he did not touch even those who feigned an embassy, being the more worthy of victory, the more he loved law and equity. On the other hand, detestable was the fraud of the Italian cities which contemplated revolt. For, after feigning a disagreement among certain cities, they asked for Ambassadors from Rome to settle the affairs. Men of the highest rank were sent; they detained them until they recovered their own hostages. But a little afterward they paid great penalties for the twofold deceit.
What, therefore, must be done to an Ambassador? First, he must be afflicted by no insult or punishment, neither beating nor prison. Next, he may be detained honorably for a time—for he does not cease to be an Ambassador—if perhaps our Ambassador too will be released. But if the enemy possesses such harshness that he is not moved by danger to his own Ambassador, the latter must not long be detained to the peril of his health and household affairs. He ought not to refuse a brief and honorable detention whose end is the liberation of our Ambassador; by the law of nations he ought to be exempt from a long captivity.
Certainly, if an Ambassador has been sent from friend to friend and, during the embassy, a savage war has broken forth with plunderings, fires, killings even of chief men, and the overthrow of cities; if every bond of friendship has been broken and even a just cause has been given for repaying destruction, nevertheless the Ambassador pays no penalties, but departs unharmed amid the weapons and fires of enemies, and even honored. Thus it was done by Charles V and Francis I: each dismissed the other’s Ambassador and offered gifts while all things blazed with war. Although the Frenchman did not accept Caesar’s gifts, Caesar’s Ambassador received and returned them. Accordingly, I would counsel a Prince to overcome an enemy by virtue, whose victory is the noblest, and to send the enemy’s Ambassador away honored and presented with gifts.
§ 9. A more difficult question is whether the security of rebel Ambassadors is valid by the law of nations. Most deny it. The civil laws also appear to oppose it. For do seditious men merit the law of nations by rebellion and perjury? I do not dispute the right; rather, I give this counsel: if they send Ambassadors, let them be heard and dismissed unharmed through the Prince’s kindness. For in sedition, although no right is acquired by the wicked, it is nevertheless better for tranquility to be restored by words than by the sword, lest despair—equally dangerous to each party—destroy the one. Next, if the rebels repent of their deeds and send suppliant Ambassadors, even if the Ambassadors themselves are guilty, I judge them to be immune by the law of nations. For although the offenses of the suppliants can be so great and so savage that pardon ought not to be given, their embassy must be heard and sent back without harm. Thus it has been established and practiced by the law of nations. For just as it is humane to pardon sins, whose atrocity must nevertheless sometimes be punished without pardon, so it belongs to Princes to hear suppliants even when pardon must be denied, lest they appear to be punished by cruelty, not justice. This always has place in a multitude, in which there are always many who are either innocent or at least pardonably guilty.
In these circumstances they nevertheless customarily employ others as intercessors; sometimes they send either women or an innocent person. The Romans too did this when Coriolanus had forbidden Ambassadors to come.
When Ambassadors are discharging their duty, they cannot be summoned into court at home. Law 2, § Ambassadors, law 7. The Memmian Law extended this privilege to all who were absent on account of the state, for their names were not to be received.
But if anything was done against them, when they return they are restored to their former condition. They are nevertheless compelled to appear in a lawsuit begun before the embassy and to continue it, lest justice be delayed to the great detriment of others. Indeed, an absent man can be summoned into court if he has given a new cause for a lawsuit—for example, if he has ordered a neighbor’s field to be occupied or through his people has given cause for complaint. Otherwise embassies, which often continue for many years, would be dangerous to citizens and neighbors; for injuries would have to be endured and tolerated without remedy until the Ambassador’s return. This is without doubt burdensome and harmful to the state.